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Treating Security Vulnerabilities As Software Defects

SANS What Works In AppSec 2010

Friday February 5th, 2010
Agenda
•   Something Most Security Vendors Won’t Tell You
•   The Wrong Way to Do It
•   A More Excellent Way
•   Strategies
•   Demo
•   Questions?




                                                     1
Something Most Security Vendors Won’t Tell You




                                                 2
Something Most Security Vendors Won’t Tell You

Finding Vulnerabilities is Easy

Fixing Vulnerabilities is Valuable




                                                 3
The Wrong Way to Do It




                         4
The Wrong Way to Do It
Dan: What is your application security strategy
A: We bought Scanner XYZ
Dan: Cool! Have you started using it?
A: Yes. The analyst who wanted us to buy it ran a bunch of scans when we got
    the license key.
Dan: All right! Did you find anything?
A: Oh yeah! We found all sorts of scary stuff.
Dan: Well what did you do about it?
A: We sent the PDF report to the development team and told them to fix the
    problems.
Dan: Were they successful?
A: I don’t know. I guess I should check in on that…


                                                                               5
Why Is This Bad?
•   PDFs are blobs
•   Email is infinitely ignorable
•   Lumps all vulnerabilities together
•   No guidance for developers
•   Just plain rude




                                         6
A More Excellent Way




                       7
A More Excellent Way
• Treat (Application) Security Vulnerabilities as Software Defects

• Why?
   – Developers have to fix the issues eventually
   – Developers understand defects
   – Even most “loosely-structured” development teams have defect tracking systems




                                                                                     8
What Makes a Good Security Defect?




                                     9
What Makes a Good Security Defect?
•   Why do I care?
•   Scope
•   Where is it?
•   How do I fix it?




                                     10
Why Do I Care?




                 11
Why Do I Care?
• Do not rely solely on the defect to communicate this
    – Simply pumping defects into the defect tracking system is unlikely to be effective
• Provide context
• Provide steps to reproduce
    – Automated if possible
• Transparency!




                                                                                           12
Scope




        13
Scope
• Defects that take 5 minutes to fix take far longer to administer
    – Especially with mature (elaborate) QA processes
• Maximum time: 16 hours
    –   http://www.joelonsoftware.com/items/2007/10/26.html

• Target: 1-16 hours
    – Long enough to be an actual task, short enough to be predictable
    – Defects for technical vulnerabilities should be shorter
    – Defects for logical vulnerabilities can be longer




                                                                         14
Where Is It?




               15
Where Is It?
• Providing location information removes a “barrier” to fixing
• Better location information leads to quicker fix times
• Dynamic analysis: attack surface location
    – Vulnerability type, URL, possibly parameter
    – (For web applications)
• Static analysis: code location
    – Filename
    – Line (and hopefully column)
    – Include actual code if possible in case underlying codebase has changed




                                                                                16
How Do I Fix It?




                   17
How Do I Fix It?
• Prescriptive guidance is required here
   – Removes a reason not to fix
   – Leads to consistency
• Does your organization have an ESAPI? Does it address this issue?




                                                                      18
Why Is This Approach Better?
•   Defects are structured data
•   Defects are durable
•   Vulnerabilities have been portioned out into tractable chunks of “work”
•   We have provided prescriptive guidance
•   Communicates with developers via systems they already use




                                                                              19
Strategies




             20
Strategies
• Group by location
• Group by type
• Group by severity




                      21
Grouping By Location
• By file/URL or by directory
• Pros:
    – Helpful if there is one “owner” for that area of the code
    – Can help to minimize requirements for QA regression testing
• Cons:
    – Different vulnerability types require different fixes
    – Can be hard to keep things straight




                                                                    22
Grouping By Type
• By vulnerability type (XSS, SQL injection, authorization issue, etc)
• Pros:
    – Similar vulnerabilities often have very similar fixes
    – Economies of assembly lines – get Henry Ford on vulnerabilities
    – Approach with a “punchlist” mentality
• Cons:
    – There can be LOTS of vulnerabilities of a given type if bad coding idioms are in use




                                                                                             23
Grouping By Severity
• High, medium, low
• Pros:
   – Can help you game certain metric programs
• Cons:
   – Least tied to how developers work
   – Different types of vulnerabilities
   – Cutting across functional areas




                                                 24
Strategies (continued)
• Combine more than one
   – Group by type or severity and then by location




                                                      25
What About BIG Issues?
• Serious issues can map to multiple defects
• REALLY serious issues can map to enterprise change management
  initiatives




                                                                  26
What About Non-Software Vulnerabilities?
• Transition to change management systems rather than defect tracking
  systems




                                                                        27
Demo




       28
Contact
Dan Cornell
dan@denimgroup.com
(210) 572-4400
@danielcornell

Web: www.denimgroup.com
Blog: blog.denimgroup.com
Vuln Mgr: vulnerabilitymanager.denimgroup.com
                                                29

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Treating Security Vulnerabilities As Software Defects

  • 1. Treating Security Vulnerabilities As Software Defects SANS What Works In AppSec 2010 Friday February 5th, 2010
  • 2. Agenda • Something Most Security Vendors Won’t Tell You • The Wrong Way to Do It • A More Excellent Way • Strategies • Demo • Questions? 1
  • 3. Something Most Security Vendors Won’t Tell You 2
  • 4. Something Most Security Vendors Won’t Tell You Finding Vulnerabilities is Easy Fixing Vulnerabilities is Valuable 3
  • 5. The Wrong Way to Do It 4
  • 6. The Wrong Way to Do It Dan: What is your application security strategy A: We bought Scanner XYZ Dan: Cool! Have you started using it? A: Yes. The analyst who wanted us to buy it ran a bunch of scans when we got the license key. Dan: All right! Did you find anything? A: Oh yeah! We found all sorts of scary stuff. Dan: Well what did you do about it? A: We sent the PDF report to the development team and told them to fix the problems. Dan: Were they successful? A: I don’t know. I guess I should check in on that… 5
  • 7. Why Is This Bad? • PDFs are blobs • Email is infinitely ignorable • Lumps all vulnerabilities together • No guidance for developers • Just plain rude 6
  • 9. A More Excellent Way • Treat (Application) Security Vulnerabilities as Software Defects • Why? – Developers have to fix the issues eventually – Developers understand defects – Even most “loosely-structured” development teams have defect tracking systems 8
  • 10. What Makes a Good Security Defect? 9
  • 11. What Makes a Good Security Defect? • Why do I care? • Scope • Where is it? • How do I fix it? 10
  • 12. Why Do I Care? 11
  • 13. Why Do I Care? • Do not rely solely on the defect to communicate this – Simply pumping defects into the defect tracking system is unlikely to be effective • Provide context • Provide steps to reproduce – Automated if possible • Transparency! 12
  • 14. Scope 13
  • 15. Scope • Defects that take 5 minutes to fix take far longer to administer – Especially with mature (elaborate) QA processes • Maximum time: 16 hours – http://www.joelonsoftware.com/items/2007/10/26.html • Target: 1-16 hours – Long enough to be an actual task, short enough to be predictable – Defects for technical vulnerabilities should be shorter – Defects for logical vulnerabilities can be longer 14
  • 17. Where Is It? • Providing location information removes a “barrier” to fixing • Better location information leads to quicker fix times • Dynamic analysis: attack surface location – Vulnerability type, URL, possibly parameter – (For web applications) • Static analysis: code location – Filename – Line (and hopefully column) – Include actual code if possible in case underlying codebase has changed 16
  • 18. How Do I Fix It? 17
  • 19. How Do I Fix It? • Prescriptive guidance is required here – Removes a reason not to fix – Leads to consistency • Does your organization have an ESAPI? Does it address this issue? 18
  • 20. Why Is This Approach Better? • Defects are structured data • Defects are durable • Vulnerabilities have been portioned out into tractable chunks of “work” • We have provided prescriptive guidance • Communicates with developers via systems they already use 19
  • 22. Strategies • Group by location • Group by type • Group by severity 21
  • 23. Grouping By Location • By file/URL or by directory • Pros: – Helpful if there is one “owner” for that area of the code – Can help to minimize requirements for QA regression testing • Cons: – Different vulnerability types require different fixes – Can be hard to keep things straight 22
  • 24. Grouping By Type • By vulnerability type (XSS, SQL injection, authorization issue, etc) • Pros: – Similar vulnerabilities often have very similar fixes – Economies of assembly lines – get Henry Ford on vulnerabilities – Approach with a “punchlist” mentality • Cons: – There can be LOTS of vulnerabilities of a given type if bad coding idioms are in use 23
  • 25. Grouping By Severity • High, medium, low • Pros: – Can help you game certain metric programs • Cons: – Least tied to how developers work – Different types of vulnerabilities – Cutting across functional areas 24
  • 26. Strategies (continued) • Combine more than one – Group by type or severity and then by location 25
  • 27. What About BIG Issues? • Serious issues can map to multiple defects • REALLY serious issues can map to enterprise change management initiatives 26
  • 28. What About Non-Software Vulnerabilities? • Transition to change management systems rather than defect tracking systems 27
  • 29. Demo 28
  • 30. Contact Dan Cornell dan@denimgroup.com (210) 572-4400 @danielcornell Web: www.denimgroup.com Blog: blog.denimgroup.com Vuln Mgr: vulnerabilitymanager.denimgroup.com 29