3. Forest law enforcement
2007 Chatham House compara8ve study of enforcement
‐ fisheries, wildlife, forests, ozone ‐
• Forest law enforcement emerged as weakest
• In 7 REDD countries: “the general picture that emerges
is one of widespread corrup>on undermining a?empts
to strengthen forest law enforcement”
• “…found a few examples of successes, oSen associated
with Independent Forest Monitoring (IFM) conducted by
NGOs or following publicity surrounding inves8ga8ons by
NGOs.”
5. Es8mated propor8on of illegal and legal 8mber
produc8on in 15 REDD candidate countries in 2007
Ghana Vietnam
Cameroon Laos Guyana
DRC Malaysia Colombia
Papua New Guinea
Tanzania Indonesia Indonesia PNG &
Gabon SI Peru
Rep. of Congo
Bolivia
Illegal Legal
Paraguay
Source: based on estimates from http://www.globaltimber.org.uk/IllegalTimberPercentages.doc except Colombia (World Bank estimate).
6. Governance in 37 REDD Countries
in FCPF
• World Bank survey of governance in 212
countries – 2 indicators
– control of corrup8on
– voice and accountability
• 80% of 37 FCPF countries rank in boaom half
• Nearly 30% are in the lowest quarter
9. Ra8ngs
• 2 types
– Country ra8ngs
– Business climate ra8ngs
• 7 levels
– A1, A2, A3, A4, B, C, D
10. REDD countries ‐ Best and Worst
• A4
– the ins8tu8onal framework has shortcomings
– acceptable but occasionally unstable [business]
environments
• D
– a high‐risk poli8cal and economic situa8on
– the business environment is very difficult
– the ins8tu8onal framework has very serious
weaknesses
11. REDD country ra8ngs
Business climate Country ra>ng
• DRC D D
• Bolivia C D
• Ecuador C C
• Indonesia C B
• Panama A4 A4
• PNG D B
• Paraguay C C
• Tanzania D B
• Vietnam C B
• Zambia C C
• Brazil A4 A4
• Cambodia D D
• CAR D D
• Cameroon C C
• Congo ‐ Brazzaville D C
• Guyana D D
• Kenya C C
• Mexico A4 A4
14. Interpol
• "Alarm bells are ringing. [REDD] is simply too big
to monitor. The poten8al for criminality is vast
and has not been taken into account by the
people who set it up"
• "Organised crime syndicates are eyeing the
nascent forest carbon market. I will report to the
bank that Redd schemes are open to wide abuse”
Peter Younger, Interpol, Oct 09
15. Interpol
• "Fraud could include claiming credits for
forests that do not exist or were not protected
or by land grabs. It starts with bribery or
in8mida8on of officials, then there's threats
and violence against those people. There's
forged documents too. Carbon trading
transcends borders.“
Peter Younger, Interpol, Oct 2009
18. Engage Enforcement Agencies
• Interna8onal
– Interpol – “I do not see any input from any law
enforcement agency in planning REDD”
• Regional
– Regional enforcement en88es, e.g. Lusaka Agreement
Task Force
• Na8onal
– not just forest law enforcement officers – police and
Interpol NCBs, prosecutors, judiciary
19. Develop Coopera8ve Law Enforcement
• Interna>onal level, e.g. MOU between Interpol and
UNFCCC Secretariat
• Regional level – use exis8ng mechanisms, e.g. LATF,
and develop new ones modeled on exis8ng networks
• Na>onal level – between na8onal agencies – police,
forest authori8es, climate focal points, Interpol NCBs,
prosecutors, judiciary
• Na>onal to Interna>onal level – use exis8ng
mechanisms, e.g. Interpol and their networks
22. Effec8ve MRV (not MRv)
• Broad – address safeguards as well as carbon
– governance
– social issues and impacts
– biodiversity and environmental integrity
• Inclusive – all stakeholders
• Transparent
• Robust ins8tu8ons
• Integrated – all the parts fit and work together
• Feedback loop – to inform REDD implementa8on
• Incorporate independent monitoring – IM‐REDD
23.
24. Planned work
Chatham House and Global Witness
• Build on 25 years combined experience in:
– Analysing environmental crime and convening
enforcement community (Chatham House)
– Inves8ga8ng forest crime (Global Witness)
– Establishing independent monitoring systems (Global
Witness)
– Building coopera8ve law enforcement
• Iden>fy the possibili>es for fraud to emerge in carbon
trading