2010 update of annual nuclear industry briefing - includes league tables and recent insights

1. 2010 Nuclear Power Briefing
Edward Kee
Vice President
New York
23 March 2010

2. Disclaimer
The slides that follow do not provide a complete
record of this presentation and discussion.
The views expressed in this presentation and
discussion are mine and may not be the same
as those held by my clients or my colleagues.
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 2

3. Nuclear energy is valuable
Low carbon energy
Low cost energy
High availability and reliability
Profitable for unregulated owners
Low rates for regulated utility and public power
ratepayers
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 3
Existing nuclear power plants are valuable resources
Nuclear energy is low-carbon and low-cost
Existing US nuclear power plants are operating well, with very high availability to produce:
•significant profits for unregulated utility or merchant generation company owners
•low rates for customers of regulated and public power utility owners

4. Low nuclear production costs
9
8
7
cents / kWh
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Source: NEI
Coal Gas Nuclear
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 4
Nuclear power low and stable production costs are a key advantage
Marginal costs of nuclear energy are even lower, perhaps equal to zero. Short-run marginal
costs are the costs that change due to a small change in output for a short time period – for
nuclear power plants, this is at or close to zero
If carbon costs (or other emissions costs) were included in fossil power plant costs, nuclear
energy would be even more competitive
Of course, production costs for gas generation are down this year. If there is a real shale-
based gas bubble, there is a possibility of a return to the low and stable gas prices prior to
2000.

5. Long nuclear plant operating life
Wind
CT
CCGT
Nuclear
0 20 40 60 80
Typical operating life
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 5
Long nuclear power plant operating life is a positive attribute.
Nuclear units operate for a long time after capital recovery is complete
While cash flows more than about 25 years into the future add little to NPV using any
reasonable discount rates, a 25-year old nuclear plant is a valuable and profitable asset
(whether for shareholders of a non-regulated company or ratepayers of a regulated utility)
A key challenge is getting investors/shareholders/ratepayers comfortable with investing
today’s dollars in new nuclear projects with upside that is 25 years or more into the future
High capital costs over a long life suggested a role for government and/or regulation

6. How to get more nuclear energy?
Increase output of existing plants
– Improve performance
– Nuclear power plant roll-up
License renewal / life extension
Uprate
and . . .
Build new nuclear power plants
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 6
The first way to get more nuclear energy is to work existing nuclear plants harder and longer
Companies that developed a superior organizational approach to running nuclear power
plants (e.g., Constellation, Dominion, Entergy, Exelon) were able to make money by
transferring this institutional knowledge to other plants they acquired
This nuclear “fixer-upper” strategy has gone well, but there are few fixer-uppers left in the
US. Is it time for industry leaders to consider an international fixer-upper strategy?
License renewal - Most US nuclear units have already gotten NRC approval for a 20-year
license renewal, most other units have applications in the review process. 80 year (or
longer) life is not out of the question for existing nuclear plants
Uprate - Many US units have already received approval for uprates and have implemented
them, with some units including extensive secondary plant re-works to accommodate higher
electrical output. Other units have or will apply for uprates
Building new nuclear power plants is the biggest way to get more nuclear energy, but is the
most difficult

7. NEW nuclear plant economics
New nuclear plants have high value . . .
– Low energy cost
– Long operating life
But face some hurdles
– Long lead time
– High overnight capital cost
– High degree of regulatory oversight
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 7
Developing a new nuclear power plant built is not easy; nuclear power projects (especially
the first few new nuclear power projects) may not fit well into commercial project
development/project finance framework
New nuclear power projects are:
(a) very capital intensive; and
(b) invested capital is at risk for a long time before revenue is received (lead time) and even
longer before payback
Nuclear projects face a level of regulatory oversight that is much higher than other
commercial power plant technologies; this is a key driver of the long development period
(e.g., time to get a COL), raises cost and increases risk for developers
Many of the risks for a nuclear power plant are during the long development and
construction phase - when significant capital has been spent but before there is any revenue
or profits.

8. Long lead time
PV
CT
Wind
CCGT
Nuclear
0 4 8 12
Years prior to Operation
Development Construction
Source: EIA 2009 Annual Energy Outlook input assumptions for construction (lead time); development period is estimate
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 8
Long lead time brings additional costs and risks
IDC: Interest during construction (IDC) is much higher for nuclear, a combination of high
capital cost and longer development/construction period. A solution for investor-owned
utilities is to get approval to put IDC into rates as it is incurred (i.e., get a return on CWIP),
rather than capitalizing the IDC and putting it into rate base at commercial operation
Decision under uncertainty: Key decision factors (e.g., need for new capacity, the market
price outlook) may change during the 11 year lead time for a nuclear power plant. Shorter
lead time for other technologies lowers this risk; an investor/utility relying on a CT or CCGT
may be able to wait longer to commit (i.e., closer to need for more capacity), so that
decisions can be made with additional (and better) information.
Disruptions: Once a commitment to construction is made, the longer construction period
for a nuclear plant may mean longer exposure to risk from disruptions
Nuclear power lead time could be shorter if a developer had an approved (and banked)
ESP, then used an approved certified design in a COL application
Nuclear construction might be shorter (4 years or less) if modular construction works well
and the industry gets down the learning curve with a mature supply chain

9. High overnight capital cost
6,000
5,000
4,000
$ / kWe
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
NUCLEAR
Wind
IGCC
IGCC w/CCS
PV
Hydro
Wind Offshore
Biomass
Fuel Cells
Conv. Coal
CCGT w/ CCS
CT
CCGT
Geothermal
Solar Thermal
Source: EIA 2009 Annual Energy Outlook; 2008 overnight cost including contingency in 2007 $/kW; nuclear increased from $3,318 to $4,000
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 9
Nuclear is one of the most capital intensive energy technologies, per unit of capacity output
Even with this high capital cost, nuclear energy life-cycle costs in $/kWh are low due to high
capacity factor, low marginal cost, and long operating life
Importantly, nuclear overnight capital cost is significantly higher than CT, CCGT and
conventional coal options
$4,000/kWe used in this chart is only an estimate of overnight costs; until there is more
experience with completed and operational nuclear plants, nuclear capital costs will be less
certain than the capital costs of other generation technologies with significant completed
project experience

10. Reactor Design Evolution
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 10
Areva explained the UAE loss as the result of a “cheap Generation II” reactor design sold by
the Koreans, yet the Korean APR1400 (based on System 80+) is similar to the EPR, with
active reactor safety
There is no real definition of Generation III/III+; here are some attributes:
•Large size
•Aircraft crash resistance
•Passive safety - no active controls or operator intervention to avoid accidents
•Low accident probability (e.g., less than 1 core damage event in 20 million years for EPR,
compared to 1 event in 100,000 years for Gen II
•Modular construction and design for fewer components, less materials, less welding
•Improved fuel design for longer refueling cycle and higher fuel burnup
•Standardized design to expedite licensing, reduce capital cost and construction time
•Higher availability and operating life of 60 years or more
•Better load-following capability
Source: DOE (http://nuclear.energy.gov/genIV/neGenIV1.html

11. Vendor share - Gen III inside USA
AP1000 4 6 3
EPR 1 1 2
ABWR 2
APWR 2
ESBWR 2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
First Wave COL - active NRC review Proposed
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 11
Source: EDK global nuclear database, Mar 2010
First Wave – those units that are likely to start construction as soon as NRC approves their
COL application (i.e., DOE Loan Guarantee finalists)
COL-Active NRC Review – these units are officially still on the NRC active list and are
proceeding. However, some of them are likely to slow down (i.e., put NRC review on hold)
and none is expected to be in the First Wave
Proposed – these units are those that have either (1) asked the NRC to suspend COL
application review, or (2) have not yet filed a COL Application.

12. League table - Gen III inside USA
Design First Wave Active COL review Proposed
AP1000 4 - Vogtle (2), 6 - Lee/Duke (2), Levy 3 - Turkey Point/FPL (2),
Summer (2) County (2), Harris (2) Bellefonte (1)
EPR 1 - Calvert Cliffs 1 - Bell Bend 2 - Callaway, Nine Mile
Point
ABWR 2 - STP
APWR 2 - Comanche Peak
ESBWR 2 - Dominion, DTE
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 12
The first wave is now looking like no more than 4 projects, with the DOE loan guarantees
being the deciding factor.
Vogtle is on its way, having locked in a commitment for $8.3 billion of the $18.5 billion
available
Now the battle is for second place, as the remaining $10.2 billion may not be enough for two
more large projects.
NRG/NINA’s STP project and the UniStar Calvert Cliffs project are contending for the next
tranche of loan guarantees – with SCE&G’s Summer project moving slower.
TVA is completing the Gen II Watts Bar 2 unit and is considering whether to complete the
old Gen II Bellefonte unit or to proceed with a new Gen III unit at the site.

13. US Nuclear Power
First wave & Second wave clearer
Obama support for nuclear power
– State of the Union speech
– First DOE Loan guarantee speech
NRG & CPS settle STP dispute
Vermont Yankee & Enexus
Yucca Mountain dead – what next?
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 13
4 projects contending to be in the first wave, and two of them may not make it, due to limited
loan guarantee funds
Obama’s recent public support for nuclear power (e.g., Jan 2010 State of the Union Address
and the Feb 2010 announcement of the Vogtle loan guarantee)
Large increase in news/pundit coverage and may have pushed public opinion toward
support of nuclear power
Settlement announced in dispute between NRG and CPS Energy over the South Texas
Project (STP). NRG/NINA now has a large share (93.375%) of the project
Vermont senate votes to not approve Vermont Yankee license renewal; coupled with NY
push back, may mean end of Enexus spin-off
MEAG debt offering is oversubscribed – refutes the common view that new nuclear is not
financeable; may mean that MEAG uses little of their Loan Guarantee
Yucca Mountain now seems really dead, since the DOE withdrew the license application
from the NRC. Blue ribbon panel will try to find another way, but on-site storage will be okay
for many decades.

14. Vendor share - Outside USA
CPR1000 4 14 24 32
AP1000 3 13 54
VVER 2 8 21 32
ABWR 4 3 9 &
APR-1400 2 10
OPR1000 6 4
EPR 3 6 2
APWR 3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
In operation Under construction Planned Proposed
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 14
Source: EDK global nuclear database, Mar 2010
In operation = connected to grid and producing power
Under construction = at first nuclear concrete pour
Planned = units that typically have vendor, site, and other details firmed up; range from pre-
construction to only a little more advanced than proposed unit
Proposed = units that have been mentioned, but not yet planned; ranges from detailed
project plans to press release/news story
Big story here is that KNHP was NOT in the export market until the end of 2009

15. League table – Outside USA
Design Op. Construction Planned Proposed
CPR1000 4 - China 14 - China 24 - China 32 - China
AP1000 3 - China 13 - China 54 - China (48), India (6)
VVER 2 - China 8 - Russia (3), India 21 - India (8), 32 - Russia (28),
(2), Bulgaria (2), Russia (7), China China (2), Iran (2)
Iran (1) (4), Belarus (2)
ABWR 4 - Japan 3 - Japan (1), 9 - Japan
Taiwan (2)
APR1400 2 - Korea 10 - Korea (6),
UAE (4)
OPR1000 6 - Korea 4 - Korea
EPR 3 - Finland, 6 - India (4), 2 - India
France, China China, France
APWR 3 - Japan
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 15
This table (and the chart on the prior slide) Includes two designs that are usually considered
as Gen II – the Chinese CPR1000 and the Korean OPR1000.
Both these designs have features (e.g., digital I&C, 60-year life) that are similar to Gen III,
but they are being built now and are much cheaper
• CPR1000 is mostly Chinese clone of Daya Bay/Ling Ao; design is licensed from Areva
• OPR1000 is based on Westinghouse/Combustion Engineering design
There are differing views on which Russian VVER units are Gen III and which are Gen II –
this table and the chart on the prior slide includes only recent units that are thought to be
Gen III (e.g., the recently completed Rostov/Volgodonsk Unit 2 is Gen II, Units 3 and 4 are
Gen III)

16. International Nuclear Power
UAE reactor vendor selection changes the game
French nuclear industry discord & review
Other
– Lithuania, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Poland
– Bulgaria
– Czech Republic
– Turkey, Armenia
– Jordan, Egypt,
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 16
Dec 2009 UAE selection of a South Korean consortium for 4 nuclear plants changed the
reactor vendor situation in a big way – Koreans move up the league tables
French nuclear industry review – Roussely, former EdF head, appointed to complete review
in April 2010 – some predict that this will mean big changes for Areva
Baltic region – Lithuania’s Ignalina 2 is shut down and a search for investors for a
replacement is on; meanwhile the Russians start a new nuclear plant next door in
Kaliningrad and plan a new nuclear plant in Belarus (at Lithuanian border), and Poland
announces plans for nuclear power
Bulgaria – RWE walks away from Belene deal, Bulgaria is looking for new strategic investor,
Rosatom has offered to fund the deal (as well as build the plant) and may prevail
Czech – Temelin tender includes Russian designs, moves ahead
Turkey – cancels 2009 nuclear deal with Rosatom, may re-open tender; Armenia may get
new Russian nuclear plant(s)
Jordan and Egypt – both have retained consulting/engineering firms to move toward tenders;
much recent interest in Korean reactors after UAE selection
South Africa – news stories suggest a new nuclear tender process in late 2010
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia – all talking about nuclear

17. Cost estimates escalating
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 17
Source: Mark Cooper; “The Economics of Nuclear Reactors,” June 2009, page 3
Large increase in cost estimates (pink dots); Cooper suggests that this is a repeat of the
situation in the last wave (blue dots)
While Cooper puts actual costs (blue dots) and cost estimates (pink dots) on same chart,
cost estimates are different from actual completed plant costs; not much information on real
plant costs for new units (i.e., few are completed and the Russian, Chinese and Korean unit
completed costs are not easy to know)
An increase in cost estimates is not the same thing as an increase in actual costs
Actual costs in the earlier wave went up for some specific reasons (TMI, IDC, design
changes during construction, etc.)
Why are cost estimates going up today?

18. Nuclear plant costs
Concept phase Mature phase
Concept to first-of-a-kind FOAK unit learning used in
(FOAK) unit building multiple units
FOAK
Unit Cost
Concept
Years
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 18
Cost estimates are increasing because of the transition from concepts to FOAK real units.
Concept phase - Cost estimates increase as concepts become real offers to build the first-
of-a-kind (FOAK) units - “Paper reactors are always cheaper than real reactors”
FOAK costs are high due to sparse supply chain, semi-custom fabrication of components,
little competition; A lot of risk for buyers (T&M contract) and sellers (firm, fixed price
contracts) leads to high contingencies and high transaction costs
FOAK plants built - The first units built will be among the most expensive. A lot of learning
at all levels – will lead lower risk and lower costs as real units are completed; Areva in
Finland = FOAK EPR; Sanmen in China (and Vogtle in US) = FOAK AP1000
Mature phase - More units are built, costs decline; vendors, constructors and suppliers
move down the learning curve; mature and competitive supply chain is established; long
production lines; competition among vendors and suppliers; risk and transaction costs are
lower
The nuclear power industry, if it reaches the mature phase, should have costs that are much
lower than the FOAK costs now seen. Experience from Korea, Russia, China and Japan
demonstrate this.

19. First Wave = more hurdles
First Wave projects
– Face higher risks and higher costs
– Blaze the path for Second Wave projects
New nuclear unit hurdles and issues
– NRC regulatory process
– State regulation / electricity markets
– Infrastructure and supply chain
– Schedule & capital cost risk
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 19
First Wave units will face higher costs and risks
Later projects will benefit from First Wave experience and have lower risks and costs
First Wave of new nuclear in the US will be only the 2 or so projects that get DOE loan
guarantees
The reasons that a First Wave nuclear plant project is difficult include:
NRC regulatory process
State regulation / electricity markets
Infrastructure and supply chain
Schedule & capital cost risk
The timing and number of nuclear projects in the Second Wave is highly uncertain

20. EPAct of 2005
Focused on First Wave (e.g., FOAK)
– DOE Loan Guarantees are key benefit
First Wave will test and refine
– COL & ITAAC process
– Gen III detailed design & EPC contracts
– Financing, infrastructure and supply chain
Build industry experience and confidence
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 20
EPAct of 2005 provides incentives for a limited number of First Wave projects
DOE Loan Guarantees are a key incentive, even though some see the program as moving
slowly and the important subsidy cost issue remains open
When First Wave projects are completed and placed in commercial operation, industry
confidence and experience will be higher and industry infrastructure/ supply chain will have
been established
Second Wave projects (benefiting from First Wave efforts) may not need these incentives
EPAct of 2005 benefits were defined before recent nuclear capital cost estimates
With higher nuclear capital costs and no carbon benefits, there are two large issues:
1. Will the EPAct incentives be enough for a First Wave (original concept was no more than
6 units, now it looks like fewer)
2. Will the Second Wave need incentives to be developed?

21. DOE Loan Guarantees
First Conditional Commitment issued
Subsidy fee amount still uncertain
Funding when COL is approved
MEAG in bond market already
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 21
Conditional Commitments issued
• There are a lot of conditions (for DOE and applicant)
• Some of the $18.5 billion is committed and no longer available to remaining applicants
• Applicant with strong credit sees Loan Guarantee as option for lower-cost funding (MEAG
seems to have found funding already)
• Loan Guarantee seems to be requirement for merchant nuclear projects
Subsidy fee amount still uncertain – OMB is key player
• Subsidy fee depends on project (credit quality, corporate guarantees, project risk)
• If fee is high, applicants may not take Loan Guarantee
• Applicant with strong credit, can afford to get commitment and wait
• Merchant generators needs certainty on subsidy fee NOW to proceed
• Conditional commitment for Vogtle without subsidy fee decided took pressure off OMB
Loan Guarantee Closing in about 2012
• Conditions include receipt of NRC COL approval (2012?)

22. New nuclear ownership
Commercial power projects
Public participation
– State cost-of-service regulation
– DOE Loan guarantees
Government projects
– Fast and clear commitment
– Government finance
– Fewer parties - lower transaction costs
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 22
Commercial projects (e.g., US)
Merchant nuclear plants will have a hard time, especially those in the first wave
Public participation
State regulators can make resource planning decisions today that benefit future ratepayers
The low-cost, long-term, high-leverage debt from the DOE Loan Guarantee program will
help, but is now only available (so far) to a few First Wave projects
Government Projects (e.g., China, UAE)
Fast and clear commitment – governments can decide quickly and make strong
commitments, unlike commercial nuclear projects that need agreement from multiple
stakeholders (investors, lenders, shareholders, regulators, etc.)
Government cost of capital - lower IDC, lower cost of capital
Lower transaction costs – A government that is builder, owner, regulator and operator can
internalize the multiple transactions (each with risk sharing, contingencies, and profits) that
are in a commercial project, to get lower transaction costs and faster schedules

23. Role of government
Gov’t / public role in existing nuclear power plants
Most new nuclear power plants gov’t-owned
US - EPAct of 2005 reflects limited gov’t role
UK - similar to US merchant projects
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 23
All operating nuclear plants built with government or public support
• In most countries, investment by governments or government-owned utilities
• In US, a mix of regulated IOUs and public power (municipals, coops, TVA)
New nuclear power plants are mostly being built by governments; some countries are using
domestic nuclear plant build to establish national nuclear industrial capability and vendors -
France, Russia, Japan, and ROK – China is close behind
Electricity industry restructuring usually means lower incentives for baseload projects – this
is true in some US regions, and in all of UK
US EPAct of 2005 intended to re-start US nuclear industry & facilitate FOAK investment by
• Demonstrating that the new NRC licensing process works
• Getting a few standard designs certified and licensed
• Getting some site ESP permits approved
• Getting a few FOAK units built
• Kick-starting the nuclear industry supply chain
UK new nuclear is in hard spot; Public government position = “no support” yet EdF and other
developers may not build nuclear without support; Ofgem consultation paper in Feb 2010;
includes re-nationalizing industry (seen as cover for government assistance to nuclear)

24. Country perspective
China
60
New Nuclear planned (GWe)
40
Japan
20 Russia
USA ROK India
UK
France UAE
0
Role of Government
Size of bubble is operational nuclear plants (GWe); red countries have national vendor
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 24
Premise: Countries with a large role for government in electricity sector and nuclear power
(e.g., China, France, Russia, India, UAE, etc.) will:
• Build large fleets of nuclear power plants inside their countries
• Establish a large, experienced and credible nuclear industrial base
• Create a National nuclear power plant vendor to compete in the global market
Japan – the relatively loose coalition between utilities, industrial companies and government
may not be as effective as the tight link in Russia, China, France, and even South Korea.
Market timing - reactor vendors peaked early, with ABWR units completed in the 1990s
Vendors invested in the US reactor market; Toshiba = Westinghouse; GE-Hitachi JV.
Toshiba/Westinghouse big winner in China and US; GE/Hitachi has not made a single sale
yet; MHI has a single sale in Texas, but seems well back in the pack
France – Areva’s strategy a decade ago to sell a firm fixed price unit in Finland was good;
execution has been poor

25. SMA reactors - potential benefits
Lower total plant cost – easier to fund
Shorter construction time – factory build
Smaller size with dispersed locations
– Lower transmission build
– Lowers single shaft risk
Longer fuel cycle – with exotic reactor designs
Safer – lower accident and proliferation risk
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 25
SMA is Small, Modular, Alternate
SMA reactors come in different sizes, reactor types (LWR, IFR, liquid metal), fuel types, and
power production approaches
Lower total plant cost – avoids the issue of having a single new plant be a significant portion
of balance sheet value
Shorter construction time – factory build and truck/rail transport lowers time on construction
in field, also may allow higher quality and lower cost for inspections
Smaller size with dispersed locations
• Lower transmission build – especially if sited near existing (soon-to-be-extinct) coal plants
• Lower single shaft risk
• Lower planning and decision risk with multiple small commitments
Longer fuel cycle – exotic reactor designs, such as IFR (Integral Fast Reactor), have 1:1
breeder ratio that replenishes fuel as it runs
Safer – lower accident risk and lower proliferation risk
Today, entrepreneurs trying to raise capital for these SMA reactors.

26. SMA reactors - key questions
Can these designs get an NRC license?
When will a commercial product be available?
What is delivered cost ($/kWe; $/MWh)?
Will the benefits be enough to overcome the loss
of scale economies?
Will any operational issues arise?
Will there really be a market?
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 26
Some SMA designs concepts may not fit with NRC safety approach without major changes
SMA commercial product may not be available for 10 years (or more) from now
The delivered cost ($/kWe; $/MWh) might be much higher than large light water reactors
SMA benefits may not be enough to overcome the loss of scale economies?
SMA operational issues are unknown - Large LWRs have a half-century of experience
(hundreds of operating units, millions of operating hours, thousands of refueling outages)
built into large Gen III designs
SMA business models may be based on large production runs – need to sell a lot of units
PBMR is a cautionary tale: seen as “promising” for over 50 years, multiple prototypes built,
still not a commercial product. Key industry lessons from PBMR:
• Promising technology concepts do not always work in reality
• A lot of detailed engineering & development needed to get to real power plant
• SMA reactors may not easily reach commercial product stage, even if they work
• Adding technology risk and licensing risk to a difficult nuclear project will be hard for market
to buy
• Marketing/sales/promotion is not enough to get real nuclear power plants built

27. Front end - Uranium
$140
$120
$100
$/lb of U3O8
$80
$60
$40
$20
$0
Jan-06
Jul-06
Jan-07
Mar-07
Jul-07
Sep-07
Jan-08
Jul-08
Jul-09
Mar-06
May-06
Sep-06
Nov-06
May-07
Nov-07
Mar-08
May-08
Sep-08
Nov-08
Jan-09
Mar-09
May-09
Sep-09
Nov-09
Jan-10
Mar-10
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 27
This is the nominal “spot price” for uranium yellowcake (U3O8)
Fundamental supply and demand have not changed much over this period, despite the price
spike. Increased world production is being matched by major purchases by India and China.
Areva has recently announced lower production levels in response to soft uranium prices.
The supply-demand fundamentals may change in 2013 (i.e., the end of the US-Russian
HEU deal) and change again in later years as new nuclear power plants commence
operation (e.g., Finland, China, etc).

28. Back end - Spent Fuel
Yucca Mountain option seems gone
– Over $30 billion paid into fund
– About $10 billion spent on facilities
Spent fuel stored at reactor site
Potential for future use of “spent” fuel
Multiple approaches to High Level Waste
23 March 2010 NERA Nuclear Briefing 28

29. Contact Us
Edward Kee
Vice President
Washington, DC
+1 (202) 370-7713
edward.kee@nera.com © Copyright 2010
National Economic Research Associates, Inc.
All rights reserved.