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Leonardo Nve Egea 
      lnve@s21sec.com 
1. because I’m sure that some people will 
   publish more attacks. 

.2 cause previously presentations about 
  satellite. 
  Warezzman – (in 2004 at Undercon VIII first 
  Spanish hacker CON) 


  Jim Geovedi & Raditya Iryandi 
  (HITBSecConf2006) 

  Adam Laurie (Blackhat 2009 at DC) 


  Myself at S21Sec Blog (February 2009) 
  Orbit based satellites  
    Low Earth orbiting (LEO) 
    Geostationary orbit (GEO) 
    Other: Molniya, Alta (HEO), etc. 
  Function based satellites 
    Communications 
    Earth observation 
    Other: Scientifics, ISS, etc. 
  Satellite LEO 
     Meteorological 
     HAM (Amateur Radio Operator) 

  Satellite GEO 
     UFO (UHF Follow ON) Military 
     Inmarsat 
     Meteorological (Meteosat) 
     SCPC / Telephony link FDMA 
  Standard of European Telecommunications 
 Standards Institute (ETSI). 

  Defines audio  and video transmission, and 
 data connections. 

  DVB‐S & DVB‐S2 is the specification for 
 Satellite communications. 
  Transponder:  Like channels (in Satellite 
  comms)  
    Frecuency (C band or Ku). Ex: 12.092Ghz 
    Polarization. (horizontal/vertical) 
    Symbol Rate. Ex: 27500Kbps 
    FEC.  
  Every satellite has many transponders 
  onboard which are operating on different 
  frequencies 
  Header                          Body 
0x47     Flags    PID    Flags     Adaptation Field    Data 


Program ID (PID): It permits different programs at same 
  transponder with different components [Example BBC1 
  PIDs: 600 (video), 601 (English audio), 603 (subtitles), 4167 
  (teletext)] 

Special PIDs: NIT (Network Information Table), SDT (Service 
Description Table), PMT (Program Map Tables), PAT (Program 
Association Table). 
  Temporal video links. 


  Live emissions, sports, news. 


  Temporal. 

  FTA – In open video. 
Hispasat Pre news feed (live news)
ATLAS Agency to TV
feeds
Captured NATO feeds
  Find feeds: 
    Lists of channels in www 
    Blind Scan 
    Visual representations of the signal  
  Dr HANS 
    http://drhans.jinak.cz/news/index.php 


  Zackyfiles 
    http://www.zackyfiles.com (in spanish) 


  Satplaza 
    http://www.satplaza.com 
  Two scenarios 


    Satmodem 


    Satellite Interactive Terminal (SIT) or Astromodem  
INTERNET 
CLIENT 


                      ISP 
DOWNLINK 




              INTERNET 
    CLIENT 


                          ISP 
DOWNLINK 




              RTB/GRPS 
              UPLINK 
                 INTERNET 
    CLIENT 

              UPLINK 
                             ISP 
DOWNLINK 




              RTB/GRPS 
              UPLINK 
                 INTERNET 
    CLIENT 

              UPLINK 
                             ISP 
DOWNLINK 
                             ISP’s UPLINK 



              RTB/GRPS 
              UPLINK 
                 INTERNET 
    CLIENT 

              UPLINK 
                                      ISP 
DOWNLINK 
                          ISP DOWNLINK & UPLINK 




              INTERNET 


    CLIENT                              ISP 
Anyone with coverage can SNIFF 
the DVB Data, and normally it is 
unencrypted. 
  What do you need: 
    Skystar 2 DVB Card 
    linuxtv‐dvb‐apps  
    Wireshark 
    The antenna 
    Data to orientate it (Internet) 
I bought it for 50€!!! from an 
PayTV ex‐”hacker” :P  
(Including a set‐top box that I will 
not use) 
Linux has the modules for this card by 
default, we only need the tools to manage it: 

linuxtv‐dvb‐apps 

My version is 1.1.1 and I use Fedora(Not too 
cool to use Debian :P ). 
Once the antenna and the card is installed 
and linuxtv‐dvb‐apps compiled  and installed, 
the process is: 
 1‐ Tune the DVB Card 
 2‐ Find a PID with data 
 3‐ Create an Ethernet interface associated to that 
 PID 
We can repeat 2 to 3 any times we want. 
Tune DVB Card 
The tool we must use is szap and we need the 
transponder’s parameters in a configuration file. 
For example, for “Sirius‐4 Nordic Beam": 
# echo “sirius4N:12322:v:0:27500:0:0:0" >> channels.conf 


We run szap with the channel configuration file 
and the transponder we want use (the 
configuration file can have more than one). 
# szap –c channels.conf sirius4N 
Tune DVB Card 
We run szap with the channel configuration 
file and the transponder we want use (the 
configuration file can have more than one). 
# szap –c channels.conf sirius4N 

We must maintain it running. 
The transponder parameters can be found 
around Internet. 

http://www.fastsatfinder.com/transponders.html 
  Find a PID 


#dvbsnoop ‐s pidscan 

Search for data section on results. 
  Create an interface associated to a PID 


#dvbnet ‐a <adapter number> ‐p <PID> 

  Activate it 
#ifconfig dvb0_<iface number> up 
Back to de pidscan results 
Create another interface 
Wireshark is our friend 




16358 packets in 10 seconds 
  We can have more than one PID assigned to an 
interface, this will be very useful. 
  Malicious users can: 
    catch passwords. 
    Catch cookies and get into authenticated HTTP 
  sessions. 
    Read emails 
    Catch sensible files 
    Do traffic analysis 
   etc …. 
Remainder:  
   In satellite communications we have two 
scenarios: 
 A‐ Satmodem, Only Downlink via Satellite 
 B‐ Astromodem, Both uplink and downlink via 
 Satellite. 
In Satmodem scenario we can only sniff the 
downloaded data. We can only sniff one 
direction in a connection. 
In Astromodem scenario, if we find the PID 
used to send the uploaded packets to the 
main ISP to be routed to Internet, we can 
sniff all the traffic, uploaded and downloaded 
data. 
For this chapter, we will suppose all the time 
that we are in a Satmodem scenario so we 
can´t sniff uploaded data of the client with 
the Sat link. 
  DNS Spoofing 


  TCP hijacking 


 Attacking GRE 
  Data we need to realize this attack 
   DNS Request ID 
   Source Port 
  Source IP 
  Destination IP 
  Name/IP asking for 
  It´s trivial see that if we sniff a DNS request 
we have all that information and we can 
spoof the answer. 
(and Dan Kaminsky can rule the world) 

  Many many tools around that do this job,  
the only thing also we need is to be faster 
than the real dns server. 
  Why is this attack important? 
  Think in phising     
   We this attack, uplink sniff can be possible 
   ▪  Rogue WPAD service 
   ▪  sslstrip can be use to avoid ssl connections. 
Seq=S1   ACK=A1   Datalen=L1 


            Seq=A1   ACK=S1+L1   Datalen=L2 

        Seq=S1+L1   ACK=A1+L2   Datalen=L3 


If we sniff 1 we can predict Seq and Ack of 2 and 
   we can send the payload we want 3 will we 
   not accepted by B. 
  Initially we can only have a false connection 
with A. 
  In certain circumstances, we can make this 
attack to B, when L2 is predictable (whitepaper soon). 
 Some tools to doing this: 
    Hunt 
    Shijack 
    Scapy 
  Generic Routing Encapsulation  


  Point to point tunneling protocol 


 13% of Satellite’s data traffic in our 
transponder is GRE 
This chapter is based in Phenoelit’s discussion 
paper written by FX applied to satellite 
scenario. 

Original paper:  
http://www.phenoelit‐us.org/irpas/gre.html 
HQ 




               INTERNET 


                                  Remote Office 
Remote Office        Remote Office 
Find a target: 

#tshark –ni dvb0_0 –R gre –w capture.cap 
GRE Packet 
IP dest 1                   IP source 1 
                      GRE header 
Payload IP dest             Payload IP source 
                   Payload IP Header 

                     Payload Data 
  IP destination and source 1 must be Internet 
reachable  IPs 

 The payload´s IPs used to be internal. 
1.1.1.2                        1.1.1.1 
                   INTERNET 


      10.0.0.54                10.0.0.5 
1.1.1.2                        1.1.1.1 
                   INTERNET 

                     (*) 

      10.0.0.54                10.0.0.5 
(*) GRE Packet 
1.1.1.1                          1.1.1.2 
                GRE header (32 bits without flags) 
10.0.0.5                         10.0.0.54 
                       Payload IP Header 

                          Payload Data 
(1) 
1.1.1.2                   1.1.1.1 




      10.0.0.54           10.0.0.5 
(1) GRE Packet 
1.1.1.1                          1.1.1.2 
                GRE header (32 bits without flags) 
10.0.0.5                         10.0.0.54 
                       Payload IP Header 

                          Payload Data 
(1) 
1.1.1.2                   1.1.1.1 
                                      (2) 




      10.0.0.54           10.0.0.5 
(2) IP Packet 
10.0.0.5             10.0.0.54 


                 IP header 


                   Data 
(1) 
1.1.1.2                   1.1.1.1 
                                      (2,3) 




      10.0.0.54           10.0.0.5 
(3) IP Packet 
10.0.0.54             10.0.0.5 


                 IP header 2 


                   Data 2 
(4) 




                   (1) 
1.1.1.2                          1.1.1.1 
                                             (2,3) 




      10.0.0.54                  10.0.0.5 
(4) GRE Packet 
1.1.1.2                          1.1.1.1 
                GRE header (32 bits without flags) 
10.0.0.54                        10.0.0.5 
                      Payload IP Header 2 

                         Payload Data 2 
At Phenoelit´s attack payload’s IP source is our public IP. This 
attack lacks  if that IP isn´t reachable from the internal LAN 
and you can be logged.  

I use internal IP because we can sniff the responses. 


To better improve the attack, find a internal IP not used.  
How 
To 
Scan 
NSA 
And 
Cannot 
Be 
Traced 
We can spoof (putting a satellite’s routable 
source IP) a SYN packet with any destination 
IP and TCP port, and we can sniff the 
responses. 

We can analyze the responses. 
OR… We can configure our linux like a 
satellite connected host. 


VERY EASY!!! 
  What we need: 
    An internet connection (Let’s use it as uplink) with 
    any technology which let you spoofing. 

    A receiver, a card…. 
  Let’s rock! 
    Find a satellite IP not used, I ping IPs next to 
    another sniffable satellite IP to find a non 
    responding IP.  We must sniff our ping with the 
    DVB Card (you must save the packets). 

    This will be our IP! 
  Configure Linux to use it. 




               We need our router ‘s MAC 
Configure our dvb interface to receive this IP 
(I suppose that you have configure the PID…) 

 The IP is the one we have selected and in the 
 ICMP scan, we must get the destination MAC 
 sniffed. 
Here we get  the MAC 
address  we must configure 
in our DVB interface 
I use netmask /32 to avoid routing problems 
Now we can configure our Internet interface 
with the same IP and configure a default 
route with a false router setting this one with 
a static MAC (our real router’s MAC). 
IT WORKS! 
This is all !!!   

Some things you must remember: 

The DNS server must allow request from any 
IP or you must use the satellite ISP DNS 
server. 

If you have any firewall (iptables) disable it. 
Some things you must remember: 

The DNS server must allow request from any 
IP or you must use the satellite ISP DNS 
server. 

If you have any firewall (iptables) disable it. 

All the things you make can be sniffed by 
others users. 
Now attacking GRE is very easy, you only 
need to configure your Linux with IP of one of 
the routers (the one with the satellite 
connection) and configure the tunneling. 

http://www.google.es/search?
rlz=1C1GPEA_en___ES312&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF‐8&q=configuring
+GRE+linux  
What happened with the scenario where the client use an 
astromodem? 

We can capture the downlink and the uplink so all these 
attacks are easier to do. 

We can capture all queries for the DNS Spoofing attack. 

We can capture  all traffic in a TCP connection, we can hijack 
easily in any direction. 
  I’m studying the different methods to trace 
  illegal users. (I only have a few ideas). 

  In the future I would like to study the 
  possibilities of sending DVB data to Satelite 
  via Astromodem. 
  Satellite communications are insecure. 


  It can be sniffed. 


  A lot of attacks can be made, I just talked 
  about only few level 4 and level 3 attacks. 
  With these technology in our sky, an 
  anonymous connection is possible. 

  Many kinds of Denial of Service are possible. 
Leonardo Nve Egea - Playing in a Satellite Environment 1.2

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