Futbol Club Barcelona Molt més que un club

PROJECT FOR: BUSINESS ECONOMICS II

Futbol Club Barcelona
Molt més que un club

Eduard Llaguno
Roger Cuscó
Altair Ciurans

Business Economics II
Professor: David Rodríguez

03/15/2010

1. Why FC Barcelona? …………………………………………….…………………………………………. 3

2. Introduction to FC Barcelona ………………………………………….………..…………………… 4

3. Futbol Club Barcelona Strategy …………………………………………………………………….. 5

3.1 FC Barcelona economic strategy………………………………………………..………….. 5
3.2 Football strategy …………………………………………………………………….…………….. 7
3.3 International focus ………………………………………..…………….……………………….. 9
3.4 Sport deparments ………………………………………..…………………………………..….. 11

3.4.1 “Futbol Base” ………………………………………..……………………………….. 11
3.4.2 Basketball ………………………………………..………………………………….….. 12

3.5 “More than a club” ………………………………………..…………………………………….. 13

4. Profitability ………………………………………..…………….…………………...………………….. 14

5. Conclusion………………………………………..………………………….…..……………………….. 18

6. Bibliography ………………………………………..……………………………..…………………….. 19

Annex 1: Interview………………………………………..…………………………………….…..……….. 20
Annex 2: Survey results………………………………………..…………………………………….…….. 25
Annex 3: Economic results ………………………………………..……………………………………... 33

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1. Why FC Barcelona?
FC Barcelona is much more than a football club, it is an institution, with a combination of
values and ideas to which many people feel identified with. Millions of people all over the
globe know or admire FC Barcelona. One of the things that most astonished us about FC
Barcelona was that it was attaining incredible economics results while the rest of the economy
still is under a severe recession. Even more, the club itself as well as its revenues have
exponentially grown over the past 6 years. At that time FC Barcelona had losses of 140 M€ and
was at the very edge of bankruptcy.

Another aspect which we found interesting was its other sport departments and the terrible
economic results they were having, despite those losses FC Barcelona departments win most
of the competitions they participate in. Then the dilemma appears: Why should FC Barcelona
hold to departments that are clear economical drawback? Is there any strategic reason on
doing that?

In order to solve all those questions we have proceeded to analyse FC Barcelona’s strategy,
how it creates value, what the economic results have been as well as the opinion of the club
members. FC Barcelona is a very special case, bearing in mind that its club members are also
the owners of the club it is extremely important to know what their anxieties and opinions are.
We also interviewed Joan Oliver who is FC Barcelona’s current executive director, from who
we got extremely relevant information for our project as well as a new approach to the
concept of “more than a club” that FC Barcelona is trying to implement worldwide.

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2. INTRODUCTION TO FC BARCELONA
On November 29, 1899, Hans Gamper founded Futbol Club Barcelona, along with eleven other
enthusiasts of 'foot-ball', a game that was still largely unknown in this part of the world.

He could never have imagined the magnitude of what that initiative would eventually develop
into. Over more than one hundred years of history, FC Barcelona has grown spectacularly in
every area and has progressed into something much greater than a mere sports club, turning
Barça’s ‘more than a club’ slogan into a reality.

Barça has become, for millions of people all around the world, a symbol of their identity, and
not just in a sporting sense, but also in terms of society, politics and culture. Throughout the
most difficult of times, Barça was the standard that represented Catalonia and the Catalan
people's desire for freedom, a symbolism that has continued to be closely linked to the
idiosyncrasy of the Club and its members to this day. Within the context of Spain, Barça is seen
as an open and democratic club. And all around the world, Barça is identified with caring
causes, and most especially children through its sponsorship agreement with Unicef.

For a whole century, FC Barcelona has passed through moments of glory and pain, periods of
brilliance and other less successful ones, epic victories and humbling defeats. But all these
different moments have helped define the personality of a Club that, due to its peculiar
nature, is considered unique in the world.

With over one hundred years of history, there have naturally been many different periods,
both in a social and a sporting sense. In the early years (1899-1922) , from the foundation of
the club to the construction of Les Corts stadium, Barça was a club that had to distinguish itself
from all the other football teams in Barcelona, to the point that it would come to be identified
with the city as a whole. Barça soon became the leading club in Catalonia, and also associated
itself with the increasingly growing sense of Catalan national identity.

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3. Futbol Club Barcelona Strategy
3.1 FC BARCELONA ECONOMIC STRATEGY

FC Barcelona economic strategy, like all of the other professional clubs, has substantially
changed during the past years. An increasing professionalization within the sector and the
expansion of its commercial activities has turned football clubs into highly competitive
organizations. The sell of TV rights has allowed very high volume of revenues compared to the
ticket ones, a more traditional sort of revenue. At the same time the start of the exploitation
of the TV rights has allowed marketing campaigns to be much more aggressive, with all sorts of
commercial activities such as sponsors, adverts, etc. The distribution of revenues among
commercial activities (a), ticket sells (b) and that of TV rights (c) is widely different depending
on the club or league on which teams play. For instance, in the Fußball-Bundesliga the main
source of revenues are comercial activities. Italian clubs work on a TV rights base of revenues
whilst English ones have a more gentle and even distribution among the three.

FC Barcelona strategic model is much more alike the English system, but in general Spanish
clubs do not share any specific or unique distribution of revenues. Real Madrid CF tends to
finance itself most on a commercial basis. In the following table you can identify the odds and
twists of every model we have said.

Table X: Distribution of different European clubs revenues.

Team Commercial (%) Tickets (%) TV right (%)

F.C.Barcelona 34 30 36

Chelsea 28 38 34

Bayern Munich 54 25 21

Real Madrid 43 26 31

AC Milan 23 13 64

* Revenue percentages of 2007, elaborated from Deloitte, «Football Money League: changing the guard», 2006.

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FC Barcelona as a brand name has spent the last 7 years trying to intensify its process of
internationalization with tours in the USA and Asia. From these tours FC Barcelona is able to
get highly advantageous contracts for marketing, TV rights and sponsors of all kinds. These
markets are very attractive as they do not have a city related club, therefore they are more
likely to be seduced by other clubs such as FC Barcelona. Hence a competition among clubs is
created in order to gain those new markets with high potential of revenues. In 2003 Joan
Laporta’s board of directors established a set of directives in order to associate the club with
international companies. They consisted on the division of the sponsors in three categories:
principal, official and supplier.

Another important fact to bear in mind is the collaboration with charities like UNICEF for which
FC Barcelona is allowed to wear its name on the shirts. These measures suppose a loss in strict
economic terms, however, they significantly improve the club’s image and in the long term the
benefits of having a social caring brand name make revenues rise much higher than they would
otherwise have been. All this commercial activities come from a single strategic model, Joan
Oliver: “FC Barcelona, nowadays, has stopped being local but global”. In order to give more
value to the brand name its General Manager has set up an innovative strategy based on
qualitative differentiation. Other than Catalan national feelings and the cooperation with
UNICEF’s project FC Barcelona also has many other sport departments the intention of which is
to outstand in every single tournament so that the image of a champion team is even more
consolidated. These departments are economically damaging to the club but add a value to FC
Barcelona that other clubs cannot afford to have.

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3.2 FOOTBALL STRATEGY UNDER JOAN LAPORTA’S PRESIDENCY 2003-2010

Late football strategy has been based on three main pillars: buying players’ policy, style of
game, and the competition’s successes.

Nowadays 40% of the players that have come out of FCB’s school and that play in the Spanish
league currently participate in FCB’s first team (11 out of 28). This is a highly remarkable fact
that shows the very intention of getting a high degree of vertical integration in the production
of football players within the club. Last year’s FIFA ranking was as follows: 1st Lionel Messi, 2nd
Cristiano Ronaldo, 3rd Xavier Hernandez, 4th Kaka, 5th Andrés Iniesta. As you can see 3 out of
the 5 best players in the world currently play in FCB and have been trained in its school. These
3 players are valued in 380 million Euros (in case someone wants to buy them before their
contract with the club ends), this value has been created in the club itself, hence it has carried
no extra cost to the club’s financial burden.

FCB’s first team has a very particular style of playing football, it is based on a high possession
of the ball and in its fast display. The very objective of this tactic is to destabilize the opponent
and make it very hard to their strikers to have as many opportunities as they would enjoy
playing against a more conservative team. The display of the team in the field is very advanced
with respect to others hence it is of vital importance that FCB guarantees that such a key area
like the mid-field is held with players of great quality and a very fine knowledge of the tactics
being used. Xavier Hernandez and Andrés Iniesta have been brought up in FCB’s style and
perfectly suit the profile that the team needs at that key position. The fact that they must be
able to turn around an opponent’s offensive strike, very dangerous to FCB if it is of a fast
counter-attack nature, into an own offensive strike makes all the difference in becoming the
best club in the world or just a mere noble try that could have but unfortunately did not
succeed.The high possession of the ball provides the strikers with many chances to score,
which is even further enhanced by having players of the quality of Lionel Messi, Pedro, Bojan,
Henry or Ronaldinho (in previous seasons). Ball’s possession is usually above 55% and most of
the game is played in the opponent’s part of the field (in the Spanish league).

As we have been discussing the mid-field position is key to the tactics, so we find that the
defenders have a bit more of a role in supporting the mid-fielders than in actually defending
there positions with strict rigidity. FCB’s goalkeeper is not quite active in a normal match
although it proves itself vital when the action of the rest of the team has failed. Eventually we
could argue that such a risky strategy makes Barça get many opponent’s goals , but data like
the “Copa del Rei” (equivalent to the FA Cup) with 9 goals for and 3 goals against seem to
agree that previous assessment was on the right direction. However, having lost the chance to
win this year’s Cup against Seville a ratio of 3:1 goals is still highly encouraging although may
not be always determinant.

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Liverpool, the English football club, has shown interest in FCB’s strategy and has already
started to introduce some of its tactics to their own football school. This highly innovative style
that has taken the world’s breath in terms of football has got to a point that now some football
experts (coaches and managers) agree to say that in about 10 years time most of the world
teams will play in the same fashion that FCB does now.

Cal dir també que altres equips com el Liverpool s’han interessat pel joc del Barça i han
començat a moure fils perquè el seu filial comenci a fer el mateix joc que el primer equip del
Barça. El joc innovador del FCB ha meravellat mig món fins al punt que hi ha gent que
sentencia que el joc actual del Barça serà el joc predominant als camps de futbol mundials
d’aquí a 10 anys.

FCB’s first team has during the last 7 years attained: 3 Spanish leagues, 2 Champion’s, 1
World’s club league, 1 Copa del Rei, 1 Super cup of Spain and 1 Super cup of Europe. This
means 9 bright successes in just 7 years, a result that seems to encourage a continuation and
further expansion of today’s football strategy.

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3.3 INTERNATIONAL FOCUS

FC Barcelona’s international area is a strategic key issue for the club and a source of revenues
in continuous expansion. The great level of football that the first team showed last season has
attracted even more worldwide companies and institutions that want to attach Barcelona’s
triumphal image to their respective entities.

The USA is consolidating as a priority region for FC Barcelona’s strategy. Needless to say the
USA is the market where sponsoring is more common and socially accepted, the idea of the
club managers is to attract those potential sponsors to the club in a short period of time. Last
season a collaboration contract was signed between the MLS, American league of professional
football, and FC Barcelona in order to let the image of the club spread all over the USA and
also to promote this sport in the country. Other regions like UAE (United Arab Emirates),
Japan, South Korea and all those countries with a high potential of growth such as China, India
are strategic key points for the success of FC Barcelona’s international expansion.

- “Patrocinis internacionals/regionals”:
Interest from international sponsors to link their image to that of FC Barcelona is
growing faster every year. A very good example is that last season FC Barcelona and
the mobile services company Etisalat closed a deal consisting on a 4 years contract and
3 M€ per year in order to sponsor FC Barcelona. Other than that Etisalat will also be
contributing to FC Barcelona’s foundation with an annual donation of 250.000€.
Turkish airlines also signed a contract valued in 2 annual million €. These two contracts
will substitute those of Telefonica and Vueling both Spanish companies that offered
less than half the money for the sponsorship. Other important contracts were also
closed in Mexico, China and Japan.

- “Stage de pretemporada i gira”:
Tours and pre-season matches are two important sources of revenues to the club, also
they provide the club with an excellent opportunity to promote itself and its values. St.
Andrews (Scotland) stage in July has been done twice. In August the club went to the
USA where 2 matches were played. Other institutional and commercial acts also took
place as well as charities in order to project the social caring image of the club and
make it truly become “more than a club”.

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- Media:
Media strategy is based on 3 main pillars:
- International FC Barcelona TV: Current agreements with TV companies assure the
covering of the games to 150 countries.
- Internet: Make the club accessible to any fan in the world.
- New Media: New deals with respect to the distribution of mobile contents and
broadband, like for instance the one signed with the Arab company Etisalat.

- Licensing & FCB International school:

During this season a great expansion has occurred thanks to the opening of new
business areas. Mainly to the Asian, American and UAE markets. On the other hand FC
Barcelona’s football school has also expanded internationally by the means of campus
and football schools for children. Season 2008-2009 9 summer campus took place
internationally: Miami, Philadelphia, Castel di Sangro (Italy), Arhus, Helsingborg, Umea,
Istanbul, Kobe and Yokohama. More than 1.000 children participated in those summer
football campus and now FC Barcelona has 11 football schools all over the globe (
Mexico, Egypt, Kuwait, Dubai, Hong Kong) with 2.000 students.

As a result of this internationalization FC Barcelona has become a worldwide brand name with
more than 200 M followers. The opening of the Chinese and American markets remains both
as a challenge and a priority to FC Barcelona. On the one hand China is the most populated
country in the world where many fans can be capitalised, and on the other hand the USA is a
part from a big market the place where global brand names are created and sponsored. To
succeed in those markets is then the key to the success of the international project of FC
Barcelona.

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3.4 SPORT DEPARTMENTS

3.4.1 “Futbol Base”

In the past years FCB has been developing a new innovative strategy consisting on fast moves
and strongly offensive strategies. It has spread this tactic to its training school and has profited
from it by taking a great deal of top players from its school, these players virtually have 0 cost
and are all specialised on the same game tactics. Vertical integration on the production of
players eliminates any power suppliers could have used against the club and helps
consolidating the good economic results that FCB has been enjoying thanks to the raise in
revenues. However vertical integration is not been carried forward at the expense of the
players’ quality, on the contrary, the club makes sure that its players are fully specialised in its
tactics and strategies so that at the end of the day vertical integration represents a bigger
bonus to achieve. An example of the great performance of FCB’s training school is that players
such as Messi, Bojan, Pedro, Iniesta, Xavi, Puyol have been brought up there.

All FCB players feel happy in the club and have explicitly said that their wish is to continue in
the team and fight for as many titles as they can. This is an attitude that is enforced by two
main characteristics: The first one is that FCB is a successful team where players feel they have
a chance to outstand, and the second one is that they feel entitled to the club because of the
investment in terms of time and money as well as opportunities FCB’s training school provided
them with. The second characteristic is not common among other clubs and provides FCB with
a competitive advantage both in terms of costs (it is easier to maintain happy players within
the club) and motivation (it is easier to motivate them if they feel it is their club other than just
their job). In economic terms we could say that the value of FCB’s players coming from its
school (breaking contract values) raises up to 1.280 M€, but as we just pointed out in previous
paragraphs the feelings they have got with respect to the club are not by any means assessable
in terms of money and contribute greatly to the performance standards as well as to the club’s
world image.

In the balance sheets FCB formally incurs a loss of 20 M€ for its training school, however it is
probably crystal clear that this actual loss is just an investment that it is over satisfied by the
amounts of money saved in acquiring players in the market. Another disadvantage in the
balance sheets is that players coming from within the club count as an asset of value 0, while
outsiders do count as valuable assets. For instance Lionel Messi has an accounting value of 0
Euros whilst Maxwell of some millions, this does not seem to make sense as everyone knows
that the best player in the world is much more valuable than any ordinary player. In terms of
accountancy FCB is in a greater disadvantage compared to other clubs that base their strategy
on buying and not creating players because its own resources artificially look smaller in the
balance sheets.

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3.4.2 Basketball

The basketball department is the second one in terms of social and sportive projection of the
club. It was created in 1926 and it is the oldest deparment other than football. Handball
(1942), hockey (1942) and indoor’s football (1978) are the most recent ones and have less
success among the club members.

Basketball and all other departments have a very high level of achievements successes,
however they are a drawback for the club’s revenues. Just as it happened with football
basketball’s main revenue source have become commercial activities and publicity. Currently it
does not seem feasible to have a high level basketball department without a sponsor that
takes the image of the club and gives the name to it (AXA). Other examples of this sort are DKV
Joventut, Baskonia- Caja Laboral.

Saski Baskonia (Caja Laboral Baskonia) & DKV Joventut

Vitoria’s basketball club, Saski Baskonia, was founded in 1959, but it is more widely known as
“Tau”. This nickname comes from an old sponsor called “Ceràmiques Taulell” but it is currently
sponsored by Caja Laboral. We know have a glimpse on how Spanish basketball teams get
financed. DKV Joventut, founded in 1930, gets revenues from many sources: merchandising,
principal sponsor, 6 oficial sponsors, 2 oficial suppliers and 55 other companies. Both clubs
offer the option of sponsoring the club and publicly show the amount of money they get
through sponsoring. It is now crystal clear that the only option basketball teams are left in
order to finance themselves is by becoming an “advert-club”, selling their identity to
companies that seek publicity.

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3.5 MORE THAN A CLUB

The slogan “more than a club” is open-ended in meaning. It is perhaps this flexibility that
makes it so appropriate for defining the complexities of FC Barcelona’s identity, a club that
competes in a sporting sense on the field of play, but that also beats, every day, to the rhythm
of its people’s concerns. FC Barcelona is “more than a club” in Catalonia because it is the
institution that most represents the country and is one of its greatest ambassadors. Also, for
different reasons, FC Barcelona is “more than a club” for many people living elsewhere in
Spain, who see Barça as a staunch defender of democratic rights and freedom.

Today, football has become a global phenomenon, and support for Barcelona has spread
spectacularly around the world. The number of club members from outside of Catalonia and
Spain is increasing daily, and the club wants to reciprocally respond to that passion for Barça.
This has developed into a need and an obligation. And the best way for the club to do that has
been to take a step further and become “more than a club around the world” as well. This
Barça that is so concerned for its people needs to be globalized. This caring and humanitarian
Barça needs to be globalized. It is a strategic decision that is in keeping with the club’s history
and the way that football is continuing to develop on a worldwide basis. That is why the club
has decided to contribute 0.7 per cent of its ordinary income to the FC Barcelona Foundation
in order to set up international cooperation programs for development, supports the UN
Millennium Development Goals and has made a commitment to UNICEF’s humanitarian aid
programs through the donation of one and a half million Euros for the next five years and
currently wears the UNICEF logo on its shirts. An agreement that has made FC Barcelona
unique.

The following graph comes from a survey made to 50 FC Barcelona club members. We can see
a somewhat different pattern compared to the world image FC Barcelona gives. While 40% of
the national club members attach the biggest responsibility to the fact that FC Barcelona
represents Catalunya no one does just to the fact that they give money for charities,
nevertheless 37% of them think that “more than a club” means something much wider and
believe that it is all the answers that represent the spirit FC Barcelona has adopted nationally
and internationally. We can know start to understand what this feeling towards the club
means in terms of emotional attachments, long term supporters and potential customers. Just
to put an example, when FC Barcelona start wearing UNICEF’s logo on its shirt Nike nearly
doubled the price of the contract with the club, hence the differentiation of product by
offering something more than football proves to be on the right track.

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To you what does it mean that
FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?
13% Catalunya's
40% representant
The union of many
37% people through sport
10% A charity foundation

All the above

Should FC Barcelona have other sport departments? This is a very sensitive question that
departs from the constant contradiction between maximization of profits within a business
and the social or emotional considerations it has. However, it is not just an issue of social
consequences. FC Barcelona is not a normal company with a single owner, its owners are the
club members that decide on the policies and board of directors that will manage the club.
Then we should agree that is it their right to do what they like with the money their club earns,
even if that implies reducing its profits dramatically. But to what extent is the latter true?
Although in the short term FC Barcelona has a loss of 40M€ due to its secondary sport
departments it gains an indirect way of publicity. Investing that amount of money for sport
tells everyone that what they care about is sports and not money hence people associate FC
Barcelona with something more than a company and feel inclined support the club. We could
argue that it is the most aggressive marketing campaign in order to become not just a good
brand name in terms of sport but the leading one worldwide. In the following graph we can
see how an astonishing 92% of the surveyed club members want to have other sport
departments despite the losses it might carry.

Other sport departments
8%
They are justified if there are no
total losses bearing in mind that
Barça's objective is not to make
40% 52% money
Barça represents Catalunya and
therefore they must exist

They are not justified and I
would rather they closed them

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4. Profitability
Profitability and revenue analysis

As you can see in the following graph, FCB has an important role in the world stage of football.
In 2008-2009 revenues rose to 384 million Euros, thus proclaiming himself as the 2nd world’s
largest club in terms of revenues.

Seasons
2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008

1 Reial Madrid Reial Madrid Reial Madrid Reial Madrid

2 Manchester United Manchester United Manchester United Manchester United
World
football 3 Barcelona Barcelona Barcelona Barcelona

ranking 4 Chelsea Bayern München Bayern München Bayern München

in terms of 5 Arsenal Chelsea Chelsea Chelsea

revenues 6 Liverpool Arsenal Arsenal Arsenal

7 A.C Milan Liverpool Liverpool Liverpool

8 Bayern München A.C. Milan A.C Milan A.C Milan

9 Internazionale Roma Roma Roma

10 Roma Internazionale Internazionale Internazionale

Something that intrigued us the most about this project was the low turnover FCB gets in
terms of profits. In the following graph we see that FCB gets a net pre tax profit of just 22
million Euros compared to that of Manchester United which gets 5 times a bigger profit
although its revenues are of a smaller amount. Although FCB’s first football team provides the
club with a profit of 67 M€, other activities like charity and other departments of the club such
as basketball, hockey and handball incur a net loss of nearly 60 M€ making the net profits fall
dramatically to a mere 6 M€.
Profits M€
200
150
100
50
0
2003- 2004- 2005- 2006- 2007- 2008-
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Manchester United 41,64 68,81 74,18 88,96 94,59 107,41
Reial Madrid 58,8 49 47,9 44 52 54
FCB 1,5 17,6 16,8 18,3 16,1 22,4 15

Manchester United’s turnover before taxes is about 30%, FCB’s is about 20% and Reial
Madrid’s is about 30%. We can see that turnovers for the football industry are high and we will
now proceed to analyse why this so happens by using Porter’s five forces scheme:

1. High entry barriers:
In order to create a football club a big initial investment is required, needless to say, there
are very strong emotional attachments to the people’s old football teams. Therefore entry
barriers are high for new brand football clubs.

2. Low exit barriers:
They are more of an emotional nature than an economical one because breaking contracts
with players and club members can easily be solved whilst the emotional gap that you
leave to the club members and the terrible social publicity deriving from a foreclosure is
far more damaging.

3. Low power vis-à-vis suppliers:
As years go past the cost of buying new good quality players is rising at an unstoppable
level, thus showing the declining power of negotiation held by the football clubs. A way to
foresee and avoid this problem is by vertically integrating the productions of players and
hence reducing costs. An example of this strategy is FCB where about 50% of the players in
the first team were trained within the club.

4. High power vis-à-vis customers:
Football is a sport followed by hundreds of millions of people but that concentrates most
of its fans within a rather small range of clubs (about 20 important clubs), therefore there
is a high concentration of suppliers against the customers’ interests. This situation is highly
advantageous to the important and champion teams who are able to constantly get
contracts that provide huge amounts of money pouring into the clubs.

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5. Rivalry:
European markets have already been distributed among the predominant clubs, this fact
carries high emotional attachments to a certain team and hence makes it very hard for
European clubs to get more fans coming from other European teams. However, China and
USA have proved to be markets of a very high potential of growth with no good teams
coming from there, an scenario that encourages up to the ultimate European club to get a
slice of those markets. Competition amongst clubs is then assured in order to conquer new
markets although they can always rely on their part of the European market if they ever
need a place where to retreat while the performance of their team improves.

6. Substitutes: other sports could substitute football but this trend does not seem to be
followed, actually the last Super Bowl’s final was undermined by the football World Cup
which by first time in history got more TV share the Super Bowl one.

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5. Conclusion
FC Barcelona is the strongest brand name in Catalunya, statistics estimate that it has about 200
million followers in the world and enjoys economic results, though not those of a big company,
that are within the best of the sector. Since 2003 Laporta’s management has been based on an
ambitious strategy of both internationalizing and self-identification with the country. We
found this approach very interesting and was the reason that pushed us to start this project.

The momentum FC Barcelona as a brand name has been used to expand the club values by the
means of a differentiation process that has risen the interest of many sponsors and people all
over the world. This fact has made the revenues of the club rise sky high in comparison on how
they were some years before when the club did not have an international focus. Although the
rise in revenues FC Barcelona identified the cost of players as a threat to its project and started
a vertical integration in the production of high quality players that already now the tactics of
the team.

FC Barcelona is one of the last football clubs that is still owned by its members, this makes that
the policies followed can at some stages differ from those of the privately owned clubs.
Although we could see this fact as a drawback and a loss of incentives, this difference provides
the club with feelings and emotions that are shared amongst all the members and fans which
enhance and promote at a higher degree the brand name FC Barcelona. These reasons
economically support the current management of the club and if we add the role it has as a
national team in Catalunya FC Barcelona does really and truly become MÉS QUE UN CLUB.

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6. Bibliography
- Delloite agency

- fcbarcelona.cat

- Entrevista Joan Oliver

- IESE: www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/OP-06-12.pdf

- REAL MADRID CF - FC BARCELONA: ANALISIS DE LAS ESTRATEGIAS
ECONOMICA I DEPORTIVA DEL PERIODO 2000-2006

- penya.com

- baskonia.com

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ANNEX 1

Interview
Entrevista a Joan Oliver, director general corporatiu del F.C.Barcelona

(Transcripció)

10-03-2010, Oficines del F.C.Barcelona

Per què va decidir entrar a l’executiva del F.C.Barcelona?

Bé, jo sóc un ‘tio’ raro. Primer vaig estudiar història i econòmiques, i m’he passat la vida fent
feines rares. Vaig començar escrivint; em vaig dedicar al món de les finances, de les inversions;
després vaig crear una empresa d’informació electrònica, els anys vuitanta, i em vaig arruïnar –
cosa que és molt sana–; després vaig treballar pel grup financial times; més tard vaig treballar
a TV3; he anat fem mil coses a la vida. Llavors arriba un moment que les empreses que només
són empreses no em diverteixen; no sé si és molt pretensiós, però és veritat. I m’agraden els
món on, a banda de l’aspecte de la gestió, hi ha certs graus de passió, altres components més
divertits que no són el mer business. Els business amb passió també són més complicats de
gestionar, perquè no els pots mesurar, només, amb ratis financers. Però trobo que són molt
més atractius.

I quins elements té el Barça que el fan esdevenir un “business amb passió”?

El Barça té dos elements essencials. Un és la passió que genera la cosa “futbolera” i esportiva,
que fa que sigui divertit de gestionar; i l’altre és el seu significat especial a Catalunya pel que
representa pels catalans. Per tant, la meva impressió és que el Barça és la marca més potent
que té Catalunya, amb molta diferència –tot i que com a empresa no sigui la més important de
Catalunya, ni de molt– però sí que és la marca més potent que té, la que té més projecció
mundial. I per tant, gestionar el Barça té la gràcia d’estar gestionant dirigint una empresa com
tantes n’hi ha a Catalunya però amb el valor afegit de la passió que desperta el futbol.

20

Per tant, la seva feina com a director general corporatiu del Barça, en què difereix d’una
empresa qualsevol?

No difereix de res, però has de saber administrar la passió del culer i la imatge global dels
catalans. És a dir, el Barça en els fons és una pime, una empresa mitjaneta, perquè facturen
400 milions d’euros l’any, que no és gaire, però amb una marca que és de les més grosses del
món. Per tant, la gestió del Barça, en gran mesura, és més la gestió de la marca que la pura
gestió de -----.

Entenc, doncs, que la marca Barça es podria explotar més econòmicament, si l’objectiu
d’aquest fos maximitzar beneficis. Vull dir, se sap que les seccions com el bàsquet, l’Handbol
o l’Hoquei són deficitàries però no s’eliminen. Per què?

Què és una marca? Bé, jo no ho sé definir, però una marca ve a ser una cosa que aconsegueix
transmetre unes determinades percepcions, és a dir, amb el Barça, tu has d’explicar una sèrie
de coses. Fixeu-vos que fa un anys, el Barça era un club molt local. Va començar sent un club
de les corts, després va ser un club de Barcelona, i després un club de Catalunya, un club
català. Però avui en dia el Barça ha deixat de ser local i és global. Llavors el Barça té un
problema, com tothom, que és omplir de contingut, donar valor a la seva marca, la a seva
imatge. Hi ha coses que formes part d’aquesta imatge, d’aquest valor de marca que el Barça
té. Com a mínim n’hi ha tres d’importants. N’hi ha una, que és allò que és “Més que un club”,
que històricament s’ha explicat amb la cosa catalana i no sé què i que ara la millor manera
d’explicar-ho és amb UNICEF. Aquests senyors són més que un club, ¿per què? Doncs perquè
porten UNICEF a la samarreta i enlloc de cobrar diners, com fan la resta de clubs del món,
paguen a UNICEF per portar UNICEF a la samarreta. Això suposa deixar d’ingressar diners, però
suposa també reforçar la marca. Jo crec que, en el cas de les seccions, pots fer un raonament
relativament similar. És veritat que les seccions tenen un cost per a tu, però et donen unes
característiques de club únic al món. És un club multiesportiu, que és número u en futbol, però
que aposta també per altres esports. Per tant, si tu fas l’anàlisi, estrictament, des del terreny
econòmic, això no surt a compte. Ara, si tu dius: ¿quina és la contribució de les seccions a la
marca, o a l’ADN, del Barça, te n’adones que és una contribució important.

És una inversió a llarg termini?

Sí, però ja no pensis en els diners que aconsegueixes, et dóna una manera de ser, un perfil
diferent dels altres club i jo crec que aquesta és una raó bastant essencial per explicar el tema
de les seccions. A més de l’exemple d’UNICEF, encara n’hi ha un altre, la tercera pota
d’aquesta identitat o manera de ser, i és el fet que és un club que no té amo,
extraordinàriament democràtic que, en el límit, podríem dir que és propietat dels 170.000
socis. Llavors, això també té conseqüències econòmiques. Vosaltres us heu fixat amb això
d’UNICEF o això de les seccions i heu dit: al Barça són Burros perquè perden vint milions i
escaig d’euros l’any per no posar el nom d’una marca comercial a la samarreta, però també
podríeu haver dit: al Barça són burros, perquè perden molts milions l’any perquè tenen un

21

preu de les entrades i dels socis i abonaments molt baix. ¿Per què passa això? Perquè el Barça
és propietat d’aquesta gent. De tota la vida, quan tu tens una determinada identitat, del que
has de ser capaç és de treure rendiment d’aquesta identitat encara que a curt termini et costi
diners. És a dir: si el Barça demà decidís posar una publicitat a les samarretes que no fos
UNICEF, carregar-se les seccions, i apujar el preu dels abonaments segurament ingressaria 50 o
60 milions d’euros més l’any. Ara bé: deixaríem de ser el que som. ¿Això sortiria a compte a
llarg termini? La meva impressió és que no. La meva impressió és que si som el primer club del
món quant a seguidors, fans, etcètera, tot això és precisament perquè tenim una identitat
molt diferenciada, molt específica.

En canvi, això, el soci no sembla que ho sàpiga. En les enquestes que hem fet pel treball,
molts es queixaven de què els havien apujat el preu de les entrades, i la imatge que tenen és
que els estan exprimint; tot i que els altre clubs són molt més cars.

Penseu que vivim uns temps econòmicament difícils i la gent es toca la butxaca. Això és com
quan la gent agafa un preu en euros i ho compara amb quan valia en pessetes. I no se n’adona
que entre el moment en què ell pagava amb pessetes i ara han passat sis o set anys i hi ha
hagut un procés d’inflació. És a dir, la percepció del consumidor moltes vegades no és correcta.
Agafeu els preus dels abonaments d’altres clubs, per no parlar de la Premier League, i
compareu. Som els més barats.

*sobre l’estratègia del Barça en l’era Laporta+ Bàsicament és pensar que si tu fas les coses bé, si
tu jugues a mantenir la teva identitat –us he parlat d’identitat en el terreny exterior però
evidentment hi ha una identitat també pel que fa a l’estil de joc– si tu jugues a això, això
mateix et permet fer créixer els teus ingressos. Des del 2003 fins ara els ingressos del Barça
s’han multiplicat per 2.7, és a dir, han passat, en números tontos, de 150 milions a 400. ¿Com
has fet això? Ho has potenciant, justament, potencial la teva imatge i convertint-te en una
marca global. Per tant, l’estratègia és aquesta. No és intentar estalviar, retallant la despesa,
sinó ser el número u del món, que ho som. El que farà que hagi de gastar més però, per
suposat, que ingressi més.

Els ingressos que genera el marketing són més nacionals o més internacionals?

Cada cop més internacionals. Et dono un parell d’exemples perquè ho entenguis. Nosaltres
tenim un sponsor des de fa molts anys, que és Telefónica. Telefónica ens paga
aproximadament 1,5 milions d’euros l’any per ser sponsor de telecomunicacions a tot el món.
L’any passat varem tancar un acord amb una companyia de telefonia mòbil d’Abu Dhabi, pel
qual aquesta gent és sponsor per una determinada zona: l’orient mitjà, un tros d’àfrica oriental
i un tros de l’Àsia occidental, i ens paguen tres milions d’euros l’any. Un altre exemple. Fa poc
hem firmat amb Turkish airlines un acord pel qual ens paguen una mica més de dos milions

22

d’euros l’any per ser l’aerolínia del Barça. I fins fa un any nosaltres teníem un patrocinador
aerolínia que era Vueling que ens pagava mig milió d’euros l’any. És a dir: és evident que quan
tu fas el salt de ser una marca local a una marca global, se t’obren unes oportunitats de negoci
molt més importants, i cada vegada aquestes oportunitats de negoci les vas capitalitzant més.
El problema que tens és que el tema dels sponsors requereix un temps de maduració. Els
contractes són a tres, quatre, cinc anys, i per tant tot això d’ampliar sponsors a companyies
internacionals i de substitució d’sponsors és un procés progressiu. Nosaltres, fa dos anys que
tenim gent del club que viu i treballa sempre a Nova York, per entendre’ns. I tot això et
demostra aquest canvi d’orientació, aquest canvi de mentalitat.

Les gires que es fan a EUA han obert mercat, imaginem.

Han obert mercat extraordinàriament a Amèrica, sí.

I això que allà no es segueix gaire el futbol. Però deu passar que Amèrica, o l’Àsia, estan
encara per conquerir; vull dir, aquí tothom és d’un equip, i no els mous, però allà encara no.

Sí. És evident que els dos mercats estratègics, per a nosaltres i per a qualsevol, són els EUA i la
Xina. Això no cal ser massa llest per saber-ho. Però hi ha una diferència que és que l’Àsia, i
específicament la Xina, és important pel potencial de consum que té. Però, en canvi, Els EUA,
no només és important pel potencial de consum, sinó per la capacitat de fabricar cultura a
nivell mundial. Penseu en qualsevol gran marca, en qualsevol terreny. Totes elles passen per
EUA. Allí es fabriquen les marques del món.

Nosaltres tenim un pressupost d’uns 400 milions i, segons les estadístiques, 200 milions de
seguidors fanàtics arreu del món. Si som capaços, només, de treure’ls un euro a cadascun
d’aquests seguidors a l’any, només un euro l’any, haurem augmentat el pressupost un 50%.

Potser això ho aconsegueixes amb el PPV dels drets televisius.

Bé, això ho pots aconseguir via televisió, i tens camins indirectes, però també tens les
samarretes, el marxandatge, que es comprin despertadors, o sabatilles, o calçotets del Barça;
vull dir: tens molts camins. El nostre gran repte de creixement és que el volum de seguidors
que tenim a tot el món ens generi més ingressos.

Què més?

23

Sobre el futbol base, nosaltres l’hem pres com una inversió tot i que genera pèrdues...

Sí, és una inversió. Aquí tens un problema molt curiós i és que, formalment, el que tu gastes en
futbol base no és una inversió sinó una despesa. I això és una bestiesa. Té una contrapartida
que és molt bèstia que és que, si tu tens molts jugadors del plantes, com és el cas del Barça i és
evident que és el model que funciona, tens un club amb menys patrimoni que si compres. El
Messi, a la nostra comptabilitat, val 0. Perquè l’hem fabricat, no l’hem comprat; en canvi, el
Maxwell, té un valer en llibre superior al Leo Messi. És una animalada.

Els jugadors són actius?

Són actius és clar. Són actius que tu amortitzes. Tu valores el preu de compra, el traspàs que
pagues, i ho amortitzes amb els anys de contracta que tens. Cada any amortitzes la part que
correspon.
Tu et mires el balanç del Manchester City, que és l’equip que compra més del món, i la seva
plantilla val molt més que la del Barça, perquè ho ha comprat tot. En canvi, nosaltres, com que
les peces importants de la plantilla no les hem comprat sinó que vénen de la casa, figura que
val menys.

En cas que es volgués vendre un jugador quedaria reflectit, però?

Sí, però això té la contrapartida que si tu t’imagines un balanç, tens uns recursos propis molt
petits. Això fa que tu, comptablement, siguis un club poc capitalitzat. Quan és mentida. En
realitat el que passa és que tu tens un actiu del que, seguit les regles comptables que
evidentment no estan fetes pensant en un club de futbol sinó amb empreses que fan botons,
com si diguéssim, no en pots reflectir el valor real.

24

ANNEX 2

Surveys

GENERAL RESULTS:

1- Age range:
Age range
Absolute Relative Abs. Cum. Rel. Cum.
frequency frequency frequency frequency
10-30 11 22,92% 11 22,93% 23%
30-50 18 37,50% 29 60,42% 10.-30.
40%
+ than 50 19 39,58% 48 100% 30.-50.
Older than 50
37%

2- Opinion on economic management:

Opinion on economic
Very good 33 68,75% 33 68,75% 4% management
Fine 13 27,08% 46 95,83%
Bad 2 4,17% 48 100% 27%
Very good
69%
Fine
Bad
3- Other sport departments:

They are justified if there are
no total losses bearing in
25 52,08%
mind that Barça's objective is 25 52,08%
not to make money
Barça represents Catalunya 91,67%
and therefore they must 19 39,58% 44 Other sport departments
exist
8%
would rather they closed 4 8,33% 48 100%
them
52%
40%

25

4- Do you follow other sport departments?

Yes, basketball 28 58,33% 28 58,33%
Yes, hockey 0 0% 28 58,33%
Yes, handball 0 0% 28 58,33%
Yes, indoor’s football 1 2,08% 29 60,42%
Do you follow other
Yes, all of them 11 22,92% 40 83,33%
None 8 16,67% 48 100% sport departments?

None 16,67%
Yes, all of them 22,92%
Yes, indoor's football 2,08%
Yes, handball 0,00%
Yes, hockey 0,00%
Yes, basketball 58,33%

5- To you what does it mean that FC Barcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya’s
19 39,58% 19 39,58%
representant
The union of many
5 10,42% 24 50%
people through sport
A charity foundation 0 0% 24 50%
All the above 18 37,50% 42 87,50%
None 6 12,50% 48 100% To you what does it mean
that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?
Catalunya's
13% representant
40%
The union of many
37% people through sport

All the above

AGE: 10-30 YEARS OLD


Very good 11 100% 11 100%
Fine 0 0% 11 100%
Bad 0 0% 11 100% Opinion on economic
management:
0%

Very good
Fine
100%
Bad

26


5 45,45% 45,45%
mind that Barça's objective is 5
not to make money
Barça represents Catalunya 90,91%
and therefore they must 5 45,45% 10
exist Other sport
They are not justified and I departments
would rather they closed 1 9,09% 11 100% 9%
them
46%

45%


Yes, basketball 5 45,45% 5 45,45%
Yes, hockey 0 0% 5 45,45%
Yes, handball 0 0% 5 45,45%
Yes, indoor’s football 1 9,09% 6 54,55%
Do you follow other
Yes, all of them 3 27,27% 9 81,82%
None 2 18,18% 11 100% sport departments?

None 18,18%
Yes, handball 0,00%
Yes, hockey 0,00%

9- To you what does it mean that FC Barcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya’s
3 27,27% 3 27,27%
representant
The union of many 4
1 9,09% 36,36%
A charity foundation 0 0% 4 36,36% To you what does it mean that
All the above 5 45,45% 9 81,82% FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?
None 2 18,18% 11 100% Catalunya's
representant
18% 27% The union of many
people through
9% sport
A charity foundation
46%

All the above
0% 27

AGE: 30-50 YEARS OLD


Very good 13 72,22% 13 72,22% Opinion on
Fine 4 22,22% 17 94,44% economic management
6%
Bad 1 5,26% 18 100%
22%
Very good
72% Fine
Bad


8 44,44% 44,44%
not to make money
Barça represents Catalunya 17
and therefore they must 9 50% 94,44%
exist
them 6%
44%

50%


Yes, basketball 11 61,11% 11 61,11%
Yes, hockey 0 0% 11 61,11%
Yes, handball 0 0% 11 61,11%
Yes, indoor’s football 0 0% 11 61,11%
Do you follow other
Yes, all of them 5 27,78% 16 88,89%
None 2 11,11% 18 100%
sport departments?

None 11,11%
Yes, handball 0,00%
Yes, hockey 0,00%

28

13- To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya’s
3 16,67% 3 16,67%
representant
The union of many
4 22,22% 7 38,89%
A charity foundation 0 0% 7 38,89%
All the above 9 50% 16 88,89%
None 2 11,11% 18 100%
To you what does it mean that
FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?
Catalunya's
representant
The union of many
11% 17% people through sport
50%
All the above

0% None

AGE: + THAN 50 YEARS OLD

Opinion on economic
Absolute Relative Abs. Cum. Rel. Cum. management
frequency frequency frequency frequency 5%
Very good 9 47,37% 9 47,37% Very good
Fine 9 47,37% 18 94,74% 48%
Bad 1 5,26% 19 100% 47% Fine
Bad


They are justified if there are 63,16%%
12 63,16%%
not to make money Other sport departments
Barça represents Catalunya
and therefore they must 5 26,32% 17 89,47%
exist 11%
26%
them 63%

29


Yes, basketball 12 63,16% 12 63,16%
Yes, hockey 0 0% 12 63,16%
Yes, handball 0 0% 12 63,16%
Yes, indoor’s football 0 0% 12 63,16% Do you follow other
Yes, all of them 3 15,79% 15 78,95% sport departments?
None 4 21,05% 19 100%

None 21,05%
Yes, handball 0,00%
Yes, hockey 0,00%

17- To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

Catalunya’s 13
13 68,42% 68,42%
representant
The union of many To you what does it
0 0% 13 68,42%
people through sport mean that FCBarcelona
A charity foundation 0 0% 13 68,42% is "more than a club"?
All the above 4 21,05% 17 89,47% Catalunya's
None 2 10,53% 19 100% representant
11%
21% The union of
many people
68% through sport
0% A charity
0% foundation

COMPARISON:

- Opinion on economic management:

Opinion on economic management
100%
100%
72%
80%

60% 48% 47% 10.-30

40% 30-50
22%
+ de 50
20% 6%
0% 0% 5%
0%
Very good Fine Bad

30

- Other sport departments:

63%
70% 50%
60% 46%44% 45%
50%
40% 26%
30% 9% 6%11%
20%
10% 10.-30
0%
30-50
They are justifiedBarça represents They are not
if there are no Catalunya and justified and I + de 50
total losses therefore they would rather
bearing in mind must exist they closed them
that Barça's
objective is not
to make money

- Do you follow other sport departments?

Do you follow other sport departments?

70,00% 61,11% 63,16%
60,00%
45,45%
50,00%
40,00%
27,27% 27,78%
30,00% 21,05%
18,18% 10.-30
20,00% 9,09% 15,79%
11,11% 30-50
10,00% 0% 0% 0%
0,00% + de 50

31

- To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is "more than a club"?

To you what does it mean that FCBarcelona is
80,00% 68,42% "more than a club"?

60,00% 50%
45,45%
40,00% 27,27%
22,22% 21,05% 18,18%
16,67% 11,11%
20,00% 9,09%
0% 0% 10,53%
10.-30
0,00%
30-50
+ de 50

32

ANNEX 3

Economic results
Sport Deparments results: (in Milions of €)

2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09

Primer
6,297 0,835 -135,975 33,229 37,886 53,759 46,106 44,089 66,777
equip
Futbol
0 3,523 0 -6,103 -6,923 -9,729 -12,337 -13,188 -19,287
base

Bàsquet 0 0 0 -8,79 -8,479 -13,428 -16,549 -14,797 -20,757

Handbol 0 0 0 -3,902 -3,175 -3,804 -4,64 -4,902 -5,52

Hoquei 0 0 0 -1,419 -1,701 -1,77 -2,607 -1,945 -2,218

Altres
0 0 0 -1,579 -2,487 -2,957 -3,79 -5,174 -6,372
seccions
Altrres
activitats 0 2,865 -28,046 -9,942 21,595 10,91 0,638 5,986 -5,972
del club

TOTAL 6,297 7,225 -164,021 1,494 36,715 32,981 6,821 10,069 6,652

Xifres en Milions
Resultats Finals del FCB
d'euros. 36,715 32,981
50
25 6,297 7,225 1,494 6,821 10,069 6,652
0
2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09

-25
-50
-75
-100
-125
-164,021
-150
-175

33

Xifres en Milions Resultats finals: Primer equip
d'euros.
100 66,777
53,759 46,106
33,229 37,886 44,089
50
6,297 0,835
0

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

2005/06

2006/07

2007/08

2008/09
-50

-100
-135,975

-150

Xifres en Milions Resultats finals: Seccions
d'euros.
10

5

0 Futbol base
4 5 6 7 8 9 Bàsquet
-5
Handbol
-10
Hoquei
-15 Altres seccions

-20

-25

Xifres en Milions Resultats finals: Bàsquet
d'euros.
25

15

5

-5

-15 -8,79 -8,479
-13,428 -14,797
-16,549
-25
-20,757

34

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