Hacking A Bluetooth-Enabled Medical Device Is Too Easy
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Presentation by Mike Kijewski, CEO, medcrypt at the Smart Health Conference 2018, held at Bally's Las Vegas on the 26-27th of April, 2018.
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Hacking A Bluetooth-Enabled Medical Device Is Too Easy
- 1. HACKING A BLUETOOTH-ENABLED MEDICAL DEVICE IS TOO EASY Mike Kijewski mike@medcrypt.co
- 2. PREDICTION: >50% OF MEDICAL DEVICES WILL BE INTERNET-ENABLED BY 2030
- 3. HEALTHCARE IS MOVING TO THE HOME
- 4. WE ONLY GET PAID IF DEVICES ARE WORKING
- 5. THERES AN INTERNET GATEWAY IN YOUR POCKET
- 7. WE HACKED A DEVICE
- 8. WE’RE NOT A HEDGE FUND
- 9. Basestation Cloud AppMeasurement Device COMMON AMBULATORY DEVICE ARCHITECTURE # Mobile App BTLE WiFi
- 10. Basestation Cloud AppMeasurement Device # Mobile App BTLE WiFi Measurement device packages data, broadcasts over BTLE V4.0 COMMON AMBULATORY DEVICE ARCHITECTURE
- 11. Basestation Cloud AppMeasurement Device # Mobile App BTLE WiFi COMMON AMBULATORY DEVICE ARCHITECTURE Basestation sees advertised data, interprets measurement, sends to cloud app.
- 12. Basestation Cloud AppMeasurement Device # Mobile App BTLE WiFi COMMON AMBULATORY DEVICE ARCHITECTURE Measurement is shown to user via mobile app.
- 13. Basestation Cloud AppMeasurement Device # Mobile App BTLE WiFi Various BTLE vulnerabilities Lack of encryption / TLS / data signing COMMON AMBULATORY DEVICE ARCHITECTURE #
- 14. Basestation Cloud AppMeasurement Device # Mobile App BTLE WiFi BTLE Raspberry Pi Raspberry Pi Measurement Device Basestation ANONYMIZED EXAMPLE HACK
- 15. ANONYMIZED EXAMPLE HACK BTLE Raspberry Pi Raspberry Pi Measurement Device Basestation Raspberry Pi Hacker
- 16. DEMO
- 18. TECHNICAL REASONS FOR VULNERABILITY •Bluetooth advertising, not pairing •Data being sent in plain text •Bluetooth V4.0 is inherently insecure (key exchange vulnerability) •No signing of data
- 19. TECHNICAL FIXES •Use BTLE V4.2 Bonding •Assign unique public/private keys to monitors, basestations •Encrypt data on monitor before transmit •Cryptographically sign data on monitor before transmit •Check data signature at basestation before reporting to cloud app
- 20. ORGANIZATIONAL REASONS FOR VULNERABILITY • Research project becomes prototype, becomes MVP, becomes V1 • Infinite number of feature requests, finite number of engineers • Need to launch by CES / RSNA / HIMSS / etc. • “Why would anyone actually want to hack this?”
- 22. “Not a big deal because it would require physical proximity.”
- 24. Security is not a distraction from your business; it’s imperative for the success of your business. Takeaway #1
- 25. If your device connects to a network, you’re an internet company. Takeaway #2
- 26. Things Internet Companies Do • Deliver product continuously • Only build what isn’t available as Open Source • Scour internet for known vulnerabilities • Pay hackers via “bug bounties”
- 27. Takeaway #3:
- 29. HOW WE’RE ADDRESSING THIS •Security software gets “baked in” your device’s software •Secure communications, instructions between devices •Monitor device behavior for suspicious behavior •Features designed specifically to meet FDA guidelines
- 30. Final Thought: “Has this ever actually happened?”