Danielle Resnick POLICY SEMINAR What Drives Policy Change? Insights from the Kaleidoscope Model of Food Security Policy Organized by IFPRI, Michigan State University and University of Pretoria, Consortium partners- Food Security Policy Innovation Lab

1. The Kaleidoscope Model of Food
Security Reform:
Introduction and Applications to Input Subsidy Policies
Danielle Resnick

2. Motivations and Aims
Since MDGs and Paris Declaration, growing concern with a
“results based agenda” and achieving policy impact
o Motivated greater attention to techniques to evaluate the impact of
policy interventions already chosen (e.g., 3ie)
How can we better understand where policy decisions emerge in
the first place and the possibilities for reform?
o Requires a holistic understanding of the underlying policy process
o Requires integrating insights from separate food security spheres
(agriculture vs. nutrition and public health)
Inductively derived the Kaleidoscope Model by uncovering a set
of variables, across broad range of scholarship that were
consistently important in driving change

3. Kaleidoscope Model of Policy Change
Source: Resnick, Haggblade, Babu,
Hendriks, and Mather (2017).

4. Initial Application to Two Domains
Characteristics of policy
domain
Input subsidies Micronutrients
Evidence base Abundant but contested
(social science)
Abundant and
uncontested
(medical science)
Time frame to impact Short-term Long-term
Visibility of response High Low
Beneficiaries Targeted Dispersed
First movers Domestic governments International donors
Interministerial
coordination
Low High
Opportunities for rent
seeking
High Low

5. Suite of Tools
Policy chronologies – process tracing by indicating whether
certain events precipitated subsequent policy changes
Policy domain mapping – roles of key actors (e.g., formulation,
administration, oversight, or knowledge)
Stakeholder inventories – identifies perceived winners and losers
and their preferences
Circle of influence graphics – aligns stakeholders in a two-
dimensional space to map their preferences vis-à-vis a policy with
their power
Hypothesis testing tables – codes significance of variables

6. Application to Input Subsidy Programs
• Fertilizer Subsidy Program (2008–
present)
o Targeted voucher (2008–2009)
o Waybill system (2010 onwards)
• Fertilizer Support Program (2002–2008)
• Farmer Input Support Program (2009 to
present)
o Integration of e-voucher (2015 to
present)
• Geographical targeted
fertilizer subsidies
(2003–07)
• Pilot targeted voucher
(2007–2008)
• National Agricultural
Input Voucher Scheme
(2008–2014)

7. What Pushed ISPs onto Agenda?
(1) Recognized, relevant problem
• Low use and affordability of
inorganic fertilizer for food staple
crops since market liberalization
(2) Focusing events
• S. African droughts of 2000–2002
• Global food and fuel price crisis of
2007/08
(3) Powerful advocates
• Presidents Mwanawasa, Kufuor,
and Kikwete
• Fertilizer companies (Ghana and
Tanzania)

8. What Explains ISP Design?
(4) Knowledge and research
• Less significant in initial design
than in subsequent refinements
• Regional diffusion was prominent
(5) Norms, biases, ideology, and beliefs
• Where government supply chains
had been dismantled during SAPs,
private-sector design was more
feasible (Ghana/Tanzania vs. Zambia)
• Initial sunset clauses reflected donor
biases on subsidies
(6) Cost-benefit calculations
• Low initial economic costs
o Borne largely by the donors
• Low political costs
o Perceived as rural vote buying

9. Why Were Proposed Design Modalities Adopted?
(7) Powerful opponents vs. proponents
• Initially few opponents
• More pronounced over time but
for different reasons
(8) Government veto players
• Strong presidents often
announced programs as a fait
accompli to their parliaments
(e.g., Ghana, Zambia)
(9) Propitious timing
• Proved important but in no
obvious direction (e.g., ISPs
adopted both in advance of and in
the aftermath of elections)

10. Does Planned Implementation Actually Occur?
(10) Requisite budget
• Release of promised donor
resources proved critical
(11) Institutional capacity
• Delays in transfers from
finance to ag ministries
• Hugely complex programs at
subnational level
(12) Implementation veto players
• Fertilizer importers could
significantly delay or halt the
programs if not paid
(13) Commitment of policy
champions
• Much higher in Tanzania and
Zambia than Ghana

11. What Motivates Refinements or Reform?
(14) Changing information and beliefs
• Preponderance of research, media
reports, and parliamentary
inquiries in these programs over
time
(15) Changing material conditions
• Creates government receptivity to
new information (e.g., macro
crisis, end of budget, or project
support)
(16) Institutional shifts
• New presidents, parties, and
ministries of agriculture (e.g.,
Ghana, Zambia)

12. Conclusions and Recommendations
With respect to ISPs
• Improve interministerial cooperation and align budget calendars with
agricultural planting seasons
• Multiple program objectives result in complex program designs that may be
inappropriate given weak institutional capacity
• ISPs can be a perceived opportunity for vote buying or elite patronage; efforts
at reform cannot be achieved through technical arguments alone
• Degree of fungibility of donor funding affects donor influence in the design
(most in Tanzania, least in Zambia)
The Kaleidoscope Model provides an operational framework with testable
hypotheses that are applicable across different countries and policy domains
• The 16 hypotheses are not always applicable but do offer a maximum set of
conditions to consider retrospectively and prospectively
• Moves away from silver bullet hypothesizing that implicitly underlies some
development interventions

13. We wish to acknowledge the co-authors of the six initial
field studies:
Suresh Babu, Nicolette Hall, Jody Harris, Nicole Mason, Elizabeth
Mkandawire, David Mather, Stephen Morgan, Flora Nankhuni, David
Ndyetabula, Dorothy Nthani, Nic JJ Olivier, Nico JJ Olivier, Phillip
Randall and Hettie C Schönfeldt.

14. For More Information, Please Visit
http://foodsecuritypolicy.msu.edu/

15. www.feedthefuture.gov