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© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Lessons Learned from Building and Running MHN,
the World's Largest Crowdsourced Honeynet
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
whoami
• Jason Trost
• Director of ThreatStream Labs
• Previously at Sandia, DoD, Booz Allen, Endgame Inc.
• Big advocate of open source and open source
contributor
– Binary Pig – large-scale static analysis using Hadoop
– Apache Accumulo – Pig integration, pyaccumulo, Analytics
– Apache Storm
– Elasticsearch plugins
– Honeynet Project
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
ThreatStream
• Cyber Security company founded in 2013 and venture
backed by Google Ventures, Paladin Capital Group,
Institutional Venture Partners, and General Catalyst
Partners.
• SaaS based enterprise security software that provides
actionable threat intelligence to large enterprises and
government agencies.
• Our customers hail from the financial services, retail, energy,
and technology sectors.
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Agenda
• Intro to Honeypots
• Modern Honey Network (MHN)
• MHN Community
• Crowdsourcing Security Data through MHN
• Lessons Learned Building MHN
• Announcement
• Demos
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Honeypots
• Software systems designed to mimic
vulnerable servers and desktops
• Used as bait to deceive, slow down, or detect
hackers, malware, or misbehaving users
• Designed to capture data for research,
forensics, and threat intelligence
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Why Honeypots?
• Cheapest way to generate threat intelligence feeds around
malicious IP addresses at scale
• Internal deployment
– Behind the firewall
– Low noise IDS sensors
• Local External deployment
– Who is attacking me?
– Outside the firewall and on your IP space
• Global External deployment
– Rented Servers, Cloud Servers, etc
– Who is attacking everyone?
– Global Trends
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Why Honeypots?
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
What is Modern Honey Network
• Open source platform for managing honeypots,
collecting and analyzing their data
• Makes it very easy to deploy new honeypots and
get data flowing
• Leverages some existing open source tools
– hpfeeds
– nmemosyne
– honeymap
– MongoDB
– Dionaea, Conpot, Snort, Kippo, p0f
– Glastopf, Amun, Wordpot, Shockpot
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
MHN Server Architecture
Mnemosyne
Webapp REST APIhoneymap
MHN Server
wordpot
shockpot p0f
snort
conpot dionaea
Sensors
hpfeeds
suricata
KippoAmun
Glastopf
hpfeeds-logger
Integrations
Users 3rd party apps
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
MHN Community
• MHN is also a community of MHN Servers that
contribute honeypot events
• MHN Servers and their honeypots are operated
by different individuals and organizations
• Sharing data back to the community is optional
• Anyone that does share can get access to
aggregated data on attackers
• Currently working on a way to share more
granular event data
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
MHN Community
MHN Servers
Honeypots/Sensors
MHN Project
Stats on Attackers
Events
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Data Sharing
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
MHN Community Stats
269,746,704 Events
1.2M Events/day
2,959 Honeypots
~300 MHN Servers
42 Countries
6 Continents
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
MHN Community: Events per Sensor
Sensors Events Submitted
2,191 100+
1,660 1,000+
963 10,000+
381 100,000+
62 1,000,000+
2 10,000,000+
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
MHN Community: Project
• github.com/threatstream/mhn
– 12 contributors
– 76 Forks
– 459 Stars
• modern-honey-network Google Group:
– 64 Members
– 135 Topics
– 461 Messages
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Sensors Added Daily
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Cumulative Sensor Growth
Unique Sensors Deployed: 2,959
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Events
269,746,704 Events Total, ~1.2M Events/Day
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Events
230,589,522 non-rfc1918 Events Total
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Events by Honeypot
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Events By Honeypot
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Events By Attacker Country
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Events By Attacker Country
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Crowdsourcing Security Data
• Diverse perspectives (cloud providers vs.
residential ISPs vs. commercial broadband)
– Different Attackers
– Different Locations/Timezones
• Diverse data collection
• Distribute the costs in terms of $$$, management
time, and energy
• Provide useful data to the community, esp. for
research
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Lessons Learned Building a Community
• We've found that lots of people like honeypots,
especially if you give them a cool real-time
visualization of their data and make it easy to
setup
• Lots of organizations will share their data with
you if it is part of a community
• And lots of companies will deploy honeypots as
additional network sensors, especially if you
make it easy to deploy/manage/integrate with
their existing security tools.
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Lessons Learned Building a Community (cont.)
• There will be many n00bs, help them and be
patient
• Be willing to provide help beyond the scope of
just your project (within reason)
– network/firewall troubleshooting
– misconfigured systems
– etc.
• Courtesy can be lost in translation (literally)
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Lessons Learned Building a Community (cont.)
• Create a FAQ ASAP and populate it, this saves
so much time, esp. if a teacher happens to
make your project part of their college class
assignment. 
• Make it clear that users must provide logs if
they want assistance
• Be appreciative of those who report bugs
• Encourage participation and asked questions
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Announcement: MHN Splunk App
• Open source (LGPL) release of
MHN App for Splunk
• New integration option during
the MHN installation
• Enables more advanced
analysis, exploration,
dashboards, and alerting in
Splunk
• Provides pivots to VirusTotal,
TotalHash, and Dshield
• Uses Splunk’s Common
Information Model (CIM)
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Demos
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Open Source @ ThreatStream
• github.com/threatstream/mhn
• github.com/threatstream/mhn-splunk
• github.com/threatstream/hpfeeds-logger
• github.com/threatstream/shockpot
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Thanks
• The Honeynet Project
• Andrew Morris
• David Cowen
• Andrew Hay
• Matt Bromiley
• Miguel Ercolino
• github.com/ch40s
• github.com/zeroq
• github.com/tweemeterjop
• github.com/sidra-asa
• Keith Faber
• Mike Sconzo
• Roxy Dehart
• Lenny Zeltser
• Andrew Hay
• Eric Brinkster
• github.com/karlnewell
• github.com/exabrial
• github.com/hink
• github.com/aabed
© 2015 ThreatStream Inc.
Questions
? ?

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Lessons Learned from Building and Running MHN, the World's Largest Crowdsourced Honeynet

  • 1. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Lessons Learned from Building and Running MHN, the World's Largest Crowdsourced Honeynet
  • 2. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. whoami • Jason Trost • Director of ThreatStream Labs • Previously at Sandia, DoD, Booz Allen, Endgame Inc. • Big advocate of open source and open source contributor – Binary Pig – large-scale static analysis using Hadoop – Apache Accumulo – Pig integration, pyaccumulo, Analytics – Apache Storm – Elasticsearch plugins – Honeynet Project
  • 3. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. ThreatStream • Cyber Security company founded in 2013 and venture backed by Google Ventures, Paladin Capital Group, Institutional Venture Partners, and General Catalyst Partners. • SaaS based enterprise security software that provides actionable threat intelligence to large enterprises and government agencies. • Our customers hail from the financial services, retail, energy, and technology sectors.
  • 4. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Agenda • Intro to Honeypots • Modern Honey Network (MHN) • MHN Community • Crowdsourcing Security Data through MHN • Lessons Learned Building MHN • Announcement • Demos
  • 5. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Honeypots • Software systems designed to mimic vulnerable servers and desktops • Used as bait to deceive, slow down, or detect hackers, malware, or misbehaving users • Designed to capture data for research, forensics, and threat intelligence
  • 6. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Why Honeypots? • Cheapest way to generate threat intelligence feeds around malicious IP addresses at scale • Internal deployment – Behind the firewall – Low noise IDS sensors • Local External deployment – Who is attacking me? – Outside the firewall and on your IP space • Global External deployment – Rented Servers, Cloud Servers, etc – Who is attacking everyone? – Global Trends
  • 7. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Why Honeypots?
  • 8. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. What is Modern Honey Network • Open source platform for managing honeypots, collecting and analyzing their data • Makes it very easy to deploy new honeypots and get data flowing • Leverages some existing open source tools – hpfeeds – nmemosyne – honeymap – MongoDB – Dionaea, Conpot, Snort, Kippo, p0f – Glastopf, Amun, Wordpot, Shockpot
  • 9. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. MHN Server Architecture Mnemosyne Webapp REST APIhoneymap MHN Server wordpot shockpot p0f snort conpot dionaea Sensors hpfeeds suricata KippoAmun Glastopf hpfeeds-logger Integrations Users 3rd party apps
  • 10. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. MHN Community • MHN is also a community of MHN Servers that contribute honeypot events • MHN Servers and their honeypots are operated by different individuals and organizations • Sharing data back to the community is optional • Anyone that does share can get access to aggregated data on attackers • Currently working on a way to share more granular event data
  • 11. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. MHN Community MHN Servers Honeypots/Sensors MHN Project Stats on Attackers Events
  • 12. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Data Sharing
  • 13. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. MHN Community Stats 269,746,704 Events 1.2M Events/day 2,959 Honeypots ~300 MHN Servers 42 Countries 6 Continents
  • 14. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. MHN Community: Events per Sensor Sensors Events Submitted 2,191 100+ 1,660 1,000+ 963 10,000+ 381 100,000+ 62 1,000,000+ 2 10,000,000+
  • 15. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. MHN Community: Project • github.com/threatstream/mhn – 12 contributors – 76 Forks – 459 Stars • modern-honey-network Google Group: – 64 Members – 135 Topics – 461 Messages
  • 16. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Sensors Added Daily
  • 17. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Cumulative Sensor Growth Unique Sensors Deployed: 2,959
  • 18. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Events 269,746,704 Events Total, ~1.2M Events/Day
  • 19. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Events 230,589,522 non-rfc1918 Events Total
  • 20. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Events by Honeypot
  • 21. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Events By Honeypot
  • 22. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Events By Attacker Country
  • 23. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Events By Attacker Country
  • 24. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Crowdsourcing Security Data • Diverse perspectives (cloud providers vs. residential ISPs vs. commercial broadband) – Different Attackers – Different Locations/Timezones • Diverse data collection • Distribute the costs in terms of $$$, management time, and energy • Provide useful data to the community, esp. for research
  • 25. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Lessons Learned Building a Community • We've found that lots of people like honeypots, especially if you give them a cool real-time visualization of their data and make it easy to setup • Lots of organizations will share their data with you if it is part of a community • And lots of companies will deploy honeypots as additional network sensors, especially if you make it easy to deploy/manage/integrate with their existing security tools.
  • 26. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Lessons Learned Building a Community (cont.) • There will be many n00bs, help them and be patient • Be willing to provide help beyond the scope of just your project (within reason) – network/firewall troubleshooting – misconfigured systems – etc. • Courtesy can be lost in translation (literally)
  • 27. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Lessons Learned Building a Community (cont.) • Create a FAQ ASAP and populate it, this saves so much time, esp. if a teacher happens to make your project part of their college class assignment.  • Make it clear that users must provide logs if they want assistance • Be appreciative of those who report bugs • Encourage participation and asked questions
  • 28. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Announcement: MHN Splunk App • Open source (LGPL) release of MHN App for Splunk • New integration option during the MHN installation • Enables more advanced analysis, exploration, dashboards, and alerting in Splunk • Provides pivots to VirusTotal, TotalHash, and Dshield • Uses Splunk’s Common Information Model (CIM)
  • 29. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Demos
  • 30. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Open Source @ ThreatStream • github.com/threatstream/mhn • github.com/threatstream/mhn-splunk • github.com/threatstream/hpfeeds-logger • github.com/threatstream/shockpot
  • 31. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Thanks • The Honeynet Project • Andrew Morris • David Cowen • Andrew Hay • Matt Bromiley • Miguel Ercolino • github.com/ch40s • github.com/zeroq • github.com/tweemeterjop • github.com/sidra-asa • Keith Faber • Mike Sconzo • Roxy Dehart • Lenny Zeltser • Andrew Hay • Eric Brinkster • github.com/karlnewell • github.com/exabrial • github.com/hink • github.com/aabed
  • 32. © 2015 ThreatStream Inc. Questions ? ?

Notas del editor

  1. more than 10 years experience in security, primarily on building distributed systems, big data analytics, and most recently data science
  2. In this talk, when I say honeypot, I am referring to low interaction honeypots.
  3. Local vs. Global Deployment: is this IP scanning/attacking everyone or just my network?
  4. Anyone go to Derby Con? did you see Katherine Trame and David Sharpe’s talk? They are from GE-CIRT team. This is a slide they presented that showed the types of attacks that their team responded to over the past 3 years. Internet facing assets represented the vast majority of incidents they responded to. IMO, this makes a strong case for honeypots.
  5. automates the install process for each honeypot: install dependencies, install honeypot, run under supervisord, get data flow going to MHN server using HPFeeds. Makes them manageable. GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL)
  6. Start with sensors hpfeeds -> honeymap hpfeeds to mnemosyne hpfeeds to hpfeeds-logger for integrations web app for uses to manage, deploy and explore the data REST APIs for building apps and automation around MHN
  7. MHN is also a community of MHN Servers that contribute honeypot events. Anyone can install MHN and then start deploying honeypots. If they opt to share their data, it is contributed to the community and they can get access to the data.
  8. Sharing data back to the community is optional Anyone that does share can get access to aggregated data on attackers Currently working on a way to share more granular event data
  9. 428 MHN Servers – 413 /24’sand 286 /16’s  this should put a bound on DHCP related changes 428 MHN Servers, 42 countries, 6 continents (did IP geo on the MHN server IPs) 2,959 Sensors, 35 countries, 5 continents (self reported IP GEO from maxmind)
  10. Anyone want to speculate why there was a surge in sensors add here. Here’s a hint: this was Sept 30 and Oct 1.  ShellShock
  11. As you can see, Shell Shock is what caused the MHN project to really take off.
  12. forgive the drop off in late november, we had a collection outage the huge spike is from dionaea sensors, and this is actually not from the surge in sensors added. This was 2 weeks later. We investigated, and if you look at the attack Ips…
  13. 39M events from one sensor. Thanks! 269,746,704 – 39,157,182 = 230,589,522
  14. vast majority of the events that come in are from Dionaea, then Kippo and Amun
  15. notice the rfc1918 spike is gone
  16. The countries of origin for the events is primarily USA, China, France, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. This is not attribution, this is just stats on the aggregated data we collected.
  17. * crowdsourcing was coined in 2005. * wikipedia: Crowdsourcing is the process of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people, and especially from an online community, rather than from traditional employees or suppliers. * ThreatStream is a big believer in Crowdsourcing, especially for security data. Our optic platform leverages this concept to enable companies to share diverse threat intelligence with each other. Our MHN project leverages it to collect and share global hoeypot data.
  18. Many many people I’ve spoken to have set this up primarily for the ThreatMap it provides them
  19. we were all beginners once There will be many n00bs, help them and be patient Be willing to provide help beyond the scope of just your project (within reason) network troubleshooting misconfigured systems etc Courtesy can be lost in translation (literally) – lots of international users and it seems like they use Google translate to create their help emails.
  20. It was submitted to Splunkbase and is waiting for approval
  21. ThreatStream is big on open source contributions. If you go to our Github page, you will see 24 publicly shared open source projects (10 are original projects, 14 are forks we’ve made and contributed our changes back). Expect more to come. Here are the main projects that we authored related to MHN. MHN – the main mhn project mhn-splunk – the MHN Splunk App hpfeeds-logger – the generic hpfeeds logger to enable integrations with Splunk and ArcSight shockpot
  22. Thanks to these contributors, supporters, and vocal users. We appreciate your help and support. I would highly recommend making a donation to the Honeynet Project. MHN relies on many of their packages and they do awesome work.