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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
RECON FOR THE DEFENDER:
YOU KNOW NOTHING (ABOUT
YOUR ASSETS)
GRC-W12
CTO, Co-founder
Kenna Security
@ebellis
Jonathan Cran
Head of Research
Kenna Security
@jcran
Ed Bellis
#RSAC
Recovering penetration tester. Formerly…
Bugcrowd, Rapid7, Metasploit. Also,
creator of Intrigue discovery framework.
Founded Kenna security in 2010 to help
organizations get a true picture of risk.
Formerly… CISO, Orbitz, Bank of America.
About Your Presenters
Jonathan Cran, Head of ResearchEd Bellis, CTO & Founder
#RSAC
Agenda
Part I: The Case for Recon: Challenges of real-world asset and
vulnerability discovery
Part 2: Adversarial Perspective: What techniques can we utilize from
attackers
Part 3: Integrating Recon Techniques: Affecting your Risk
Management program
#RSAC
The Need for Visibility
#RSAC
The Need For Speed
#RSAC
SHODAN?!
#RSAC
2018 - Top Detections - “Scannables”
Apache Struts 2.3.x - CVE-2017-5638, CVE-2017-9791, CVE-2017-9805
Joomla! 3.7.1 - CVE-2017-8917
Jenkins 2.56 - CVE-2017-1000353
MASTER IPCAMERA - CVE-2018-5723 (hardcoded password)
Microsoft SMBv1 - CVE-2017-0143/4/5
Oracle WebLogic 10.3.6, 12.1.x, 12.2.x - CVE-2017-10271
PHP 5.4.2 - CVE-2002-1149, CVE-2012-1823
#RSAC
IPv4 is ... too small
1998 - Bell Labs - Internet Mapping Project
2009 - SHODAN
2011 - Fyodor - Nmap: Scanning the Internet
2011 - Carna botnet “Internet Census of 2012”
2012 - HD Moore - Critical.IO
2012 - University of Michigan (zmap) / CENSYS
2014 - Rob Graham - Masscanning the Internet
Now - … everybody
#RSAC
CIS #1: Inventory & Control of HW Assets
Hardware Asset Inventory
Active Discovery
Passive Asset Discovery
Use DHCP Logging
Address Unauthorized Assets
Deploy Network Access Control
Utilize Client Certificates
#RSAC
CIS #2: Inventory & Control of SW Assets
Software Asset Inventory
Maintain Inventory of Authorized Software
Ensure Software is Supported
Integrate SW & HW Asset Inventories
Address Unapproved Software
Utilize Application, Library, Script Whitelisting
Segregate High Risk Applications
#RSAC
ITSM & CMDB - Asset Discovery & Mgmt
Extensive discovery
capabilities…
internal view… generally
require creds
rarely integrated with
vulnerability or threat
data
#RSAC
• Provide limited discovery capabilities
—In practice, network ranges are used
• Scan windows are still a challenge, and may not provide
enough information quickly enough
• Depth and completeness favored over quick scans
Vulnerability Scanners & Asset Discovery
#RSAC
More Layers… More Complexity
...Yep, we’re making it worse.
#RSAC
HAM: Hardware Asset Management
SAM: Software Asset Management
ITAM: IT Asset Management
ITSM: IT Service Management
Now, Devops.
IT Asset Management… Security is secondary
#RSAC
Visibility … Fragmented
#RSAC
Visibility is a Major Challenge
Mid Tier - 11 different discovery and inventory tools
Enterprise - 15 different discovery and inventory tools
Average respondent spent about 15 hours a week
More successful respondents spent more (not less) time doing this!
BEST CASE… 60-70% percent of assets covered
#RSAC
Recon as a Process
Asset Discovery - PROCESS utilizing a technique to find new assets
Asset Inventory - COLLECTION of things and their specific attributes
Asset Management - a end to end management PROCESS for assets
(Defender) Recon - PROCESS for preliminary surveying or research of
devices, software, or specific vulnerabilities
#RSAC
So you’re saying…
Many RCE vulnerabilities are being scanned
Internet scanning is trivial
Unknown assets are a big problem for larger organizations
Vulnerability scanning helps, but leaves unknown assets
Asset management is foundational but often incomplete
… Recon techniques can help.
#RSAC
Taking on an Adversarial Perspective
#RSAC
What’s different now
Ipv4 Internet Scanning
Databases full of security data
Application everything
Enter… Bug Bounty Recon
#RSAC
Striking Gold!
#RSAC
Bug Bounties… Finding Targets
WHOIS Data
DNS - Active & Passive
Scanning
Certificates
Application Responses
#RSAC
Bug Bounties & Recon
• Subdomain Bruteforcing & Permutations
• Zone Transfers & NSEC walks
• Querying Historical APIs - WHOIS, DNS
• Scanning Nmap & Masscan (or SHODAN / CENSYS)
• Fingerprinting Services, Applications
#RSAC
The Need for Speed
#RSAC
search_bing
search_censys
search_corpwatch
search_crt
search_github
search_opencorporates
search_shodan
search_sublister
search_whoisology
aws_ec2_gather_instances
aws_s3_brute
dns_brute_sub
dns_nsecwalk_survey
dns_permute
dns_transfer_zone
email_harvest
masscan_scan
nmap_scan
Intrigue - Sources (partial list)
uri_brute
uri_extract_metadata
uri_gather_ssl_certificate
uri_screenshot
uri_spider
web_account_check
web_stack_fingerprint
whois
whois_org_search
#RSAC
Iteration Model
DnsRecord IpAddress
Uri SSLCertificate
uri_spider
uri_gather_ssl_certificate
enrich_ip_address
enrich_dns_record
DnsRecord
#RSAC
Graph-Based Gathering
#RSAC
Challenges of Recon at Scale
#RSAC
“Electricity - Powering Stuff Since 1879”
“WordPress 2.7.1; Wordpress API”
`Apache/1.3.31 (Unix) mod_jk/1.2.5
PHP/5.2.17 FrontPage/5.0.2.2634
mod_fastcgi/2.4.2 mod_throttle/3.1.2
mod_ssl/2.8.18 OpenSSL/0.9.7d`
Cisco Stealthwatch 1.0.1
”That would be telling.”
Interesting Finds
#RSAC
It’s not just external
No one discovery tactic to rule them all
• Local - Plug into the Network -
• Cloud - APIs Provided
• External - Iterative OSINT
• Bringing it all together requires an integration-first approach
• Each asset with a small set of required data and a dynamic locator
#RSAC
Integrating into your Vulnerability
and Risk Management Program
#RSAC
Operationalizing
41
• Measuring Success - How quickly can you determine if you’re subject
to a particular vulnerability or technique
• An automated external recon capability can provide a safety net, and…
You can enlist hackers as part of that safety net via Bug Bounty or
Vulnerability Disclosure program
• Recon findings should be integrated into risk scoring. If an attacker can
find it quickly, the threat is increased
#RSAC
Takeaways
Defender reconnaissance can augment and enhance vulnerability management
program - both by finding assets and identifying likely targets
New data sources are available and operationalizable for defenders, and can assist in
both asset and vulnerability management
Organization risk management should factor in assets and vulnerabilities discoverable
via recon techniques – automatically higher priority
Do you know what software (and versions!) are exposed and scannable?
#RSAC
Next Week Discuss unknown assets in with your asset
and vulnerability management teams.
Three Months Perform an external discovery for
unknown assets using one of the tools we’ve discussed
today.
Six Months Integrate recon into your asset and
vulnerability management processes. Create escalation
processes for new assets with vulnerabilities. Consider a
Bug Bounty or Disclosure program to provide a safety
net.
Putting it into action
#RSAC
Thank you!
Thank you for your time!

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RSA 2018: Recon For the Defender - You know nothing (about your assets)

  • 1. SESSION ID: #RSAC RECON FOR THE DEFENDER: YOU KNOW NOTHING (ABOUT YOUR ASSETS) GRC-W12 CTO, Co-founder Kenna Security @ebellis Jonathan Cran Head of Research Kenna Security @jcran Ed Bellis
  • 2. #RSAC Recovering penetration tester. Formerly… Bugcrowd, Rapid7, Metasploit. Also, creator of Intrigue discovery framework. Founded Kenna security in 2010 to help organizations get a true picture of risk. Formerly… CISO, Orbitz, Bank of America. About Your Presenters Jonathan Cran, Head of ResearchEd Bellis, CTO & Founder
  • 3. #RSAC Agenda Part I: The Case for Recon: Challenges of real-world asset and vulnerability discovery Part 2: Adversarial Perspective: What techniques can we utilize from attackers Part 3: Integrating Recon Techniques: Affecting your Risk Management program
  • 4. #RSAC The Need for Visibility
  • 7. #RSAC 2018 - Top Detections - “Scannables” Apache Struts 2.3.x - CVE-2017-5638, CVE-2017-9791, CVE-2017-9805 Joomla! 3.7.1 - CVE-2017-8917 Jenkins 2.56 - CVE-2017-1000353 MASTER IPCAMERA - CVE-2018-5723 (hardcoded password) Microsoft SMBv1 - CVE-2017-0143/4/5 Oracle WebLogic 10.3.6, 12.1.x, 12.2.x - CVE-2017-10271 PHP 5.4.2 - CVE-2002-1149, CVE-2012-1823
  • 8. #RSAC IPv4 is ... too small 1998 - Bell Labs - Internet Mapping Project 2009 - SHODAN 2011 - Fyodor - Nmap: Scanning the Internet 2011 - Carna botnet “Internet Census of 2012” 2012 - HD Moore - Critical.IO 2012 - University of Michigan (zmap) / CENSYS 2014 - Rob Graham - Masscanning the Internet Now - … everybody
  • 9.
  • 10. #RSAC CIS #1: Inventory & Control of HW Assets Hardware Asset Inventory Active Discovery Passive Asset Discovery Use DHCP Logging Address Unauthorized Assets Deploy Network Access Control Utilize Client Certificates
  • 11. #RSAC CIS #2: Inventory & Control of SW Assets Software Asset Inventory Maintain Inventory of Authorized Software Ensure Software is Supported Integrate SW & HW Asset Inventories Address Unapproved Software Utilize Application, Library, Script Whitelisting Segregate High Risk Applications
  • 12.
  • 13. #RSAC ITSM & CMDB - Asset Discovery & Mgmt Extensive discovery capabilities… internal view… generally require creds rarely integrated with vulnerability or threat data
  • 14. #RSAC • Provide limited discovery capabilities —In practice, network ranges are used • Scan windows are still a challenge, and may not provide enough information quickly enough • Depth and completeness favored over quick scans Vulnerability Scanners & Asset Discovery
  • 15. #RSAC More Layers… More Complexity ...Yep, we’re making it worse.
  • 16. #RSAC HAM: Hardware Asset Management SAM: Software Asset Management ITAM: IT Asset Management ITSM: IT Service Management Now, Devops. IT Asset Management… Security is secondary
  • 18. #RSAC Visibility is a Major Challenge Mid Tier - 11 different discovery and inventory tools Enterprise - 15 different discovery and inventory tools Average respondent spent about 15 hours a week More successful respondents spent more (not less) time doing this! BEST CASE… 60-70% percent of assets covered
  • 19. #RSAC Recon as a Process Asset Discovery - PROCESS utilizing a technique to find new assets Asset Inventory - COLLECTION of things and their specific attributes Asset Management - a end to end management PROCESS for assets (Defender) Recon - PROCESS for preliminary surveying or research of devices, software, or specific vulnerabilities
  • 20. #RSAC So you’re saying… Many RCE vulnerabilities are being scanned Internet scanning is trivial Unknown assets are a big problem for larger organizations Vulnerability scanning helps, but leaves unknown assets Asset management is foundational but often incomplete … Recon techniques can help.
  • 21. #RSAC Taking on an Adversarial Perspective
  • 22. #RSAC What’s different now Ipv4 Internet Scanning Databases full of security data Application everything Enter… Bug Bounty Recon
  • 24.
  • 25. #RSAC Bug Bounties… Finding Targets WHOIS Data DNS - Active & Passive Scanning Certificates Application Responses
  • 26. #RSAC Bug Bounties & Recon • Subdomain Bruteforcing & Permutations • Zone Transfers & NSEC walks • Querying Historical APIs - WHOIS, DNS • Scanning Nmap & Masscan (or SHODAN / CENSYS) • Fingerprinting Services, Applications
  • 29. #RSAC Iteration Model DnsRecord IpAddress Uri SSLCertificate uri_spider uri_gather_ssl_certificate enrich_ip_address enrich_dns_record DnsRecord
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37.
  • 38. #RSAC “Electricity - Powering Stuff Since 1879” “WordPress 2.7.1; Wordpress API” `Apache/1.3.31 (Unix) mod_jk/1.2.5 PHP/5.2.17 FrontPage/5.0.2.2634 mod_fastcgi/2.4.2 mod_throttle/3.1.2 mod_ssl/2.8.18 OpenSSL/0.9.7d` Cisco Stealthwatch 1.0.1 ”That would be telling.” Interesting Finds
  • 39. #RSAC It’s not just external No one discovery tactic to rule them all • Local - Plug into the Network - • Cloud - APIs Provided • External - Iterative OSINT • Bringing it all together requires an integration-first approach • Each asset with a small set of required data and a dynamic locator
  • 40. #RSAC Integrating into your Vulnerability and Risk Management Program
  • 41. #RSAC Operationalizing 41 • Measuring Success - How quickly can you determine if you’re subject to a particular vulnerability or technique • An automated external recon capability can provide a safety net, and… You can enlist hackers as part of that safety net via Bug Bounty or Vulnerability Disclosure program • Recon findings should be integrated into risk scoring. If an attacker can find it quickly, the threat is increased
  • 42. #RSAC Takeaways Defender reconnaissance can augment and enhance vulnerability management program - both by finding assets and identifying likely targets New data sources are available and operationalizable for defenders, and can assist in both asset and vulnerability management Organization risk management should factor in assets and vulnerabilities discoverable via recon techniques – automatically higher priority Do you know what software (and versions!) are exposed and scannable?
  • 43. #RSAC Next Week Discuss unknown assets in with your asset and vulnerability management teams. Three Months Perform an external discovery for unknown assets using one of the tools we’ve discussed today. Six Months Integrate recon into your asset and vulnerability management processes. Create escalation processes for new assets with vulnerabilities. Consider a Bug Bounty or Disclosure program to provide a safety net. Putting it into action
  • 45. Thank you for your time!