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DSSH

Juraj Bednár
The problem


●   SSH clients allow for a simple kind of “VPN access”

    ●   access control

    ●   channel protection through cryptography

●   Not well suited for “traversing through VPNs”

    ●   I have to login to our company's server

    ●   Then I can login to a customer's firewall (or use a VPN)

    ●   From there I can login to the server
The problem


●   What if I need to restart application on ten servers?

●   In addition, there's PermitRootLogin no

●   Passwords are (of course) different on each server

●   I have to decrypt the passwords (I can't remember passwords for

hundreds of servers), do an ssh, login through key, type “su -”, cut &

paste the password

    ●   Takes me tens of minutes
The solution: DSSH


●   Enter DSSH

●   Secure storage of key material through dssh-agent (much more

secure than ssh-agent)

●   Scriptable

●   In the end

    ●   Populate agent with material (one script involving gpg)

    ●   for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10;do dssh root@server${i} svcadm refresh

        applicationname; done
DSSH: Authentication



●   It is not always possible to use public key cryptography for

authentication

    ●   PermitRootLogin no

    ●   Some devices (network infrastructure) have no support for keys

    ●   Administrator does not need to know the passwords, he needs

        them properly used at the right time

    ●   Randomly generated passwords (different for each server)
DSSH: Authentication



●   DSSH<->Agent mutual authentication using X.509 certificates

●   Agent never reveals private key

●   DSSH client on your (trusted) machine does the key validation (even

if it's forwarded) and then decides if it will communicate with the server

(unlike ssh-agent from OpenSSH)
DSSH: scriptability


●   Scriptability through the use of BeanShell

●   Authentication, target server and how to connect there fully scriptable

    ●   Can have “internal hostnames”, that are resolved by script

    ●   Different paths for different servers

    ●   Some servers need to use “su” or “ena” for leveraging privileges

●   Logging and auditing support (root is root, but who used that

privilege?)
DSSH: portability and security


●   Uses Java (no buffer overflows, no integer overflows, ...)

●   Uses JCA (well-audited cryptography standards implementation)

●   Is open-source

●   Uses proven Java SSH library (used by Google or JetBrains)

●   Passwords don't matter at all -> can be changed by script

●   Needs only terminal emulator (xterm, linux console, mac os x

terminal) => works almost everywhere (haven't tried on Windows'

xterm or putty)
DSSH: Why Open-Source?


●   People know what we use to access their servers

●   Better quality of libraries and code (if we write code just for us, the

“let's document it later” approach will prevail)

●   We use a lot of open-source in DSSH, let's give something back

    ●   DSSH uses code from OpenSSH, Trilead-SSH, BeanShell, Java,

        GNU GetOpt, OpenCSV – we build on open technologies
History and future


●   Started as a tiny project, now supports most of the standard ssh

features (port forwarding, scp, ...)

●   Switched from Groovy to Beanshell, cut startup time to a third (the

rest is Java), project size and memory footprint from 2.2MB to 500KB

●   Future: Auditing “transit server” that records session for auditability

purposes

●   Users never ever store key material (other than their X.509 certificate)

on their computers, even in encrypted form
Thank you



                     Questions?



            http://opensource.digmia.com/

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DSSH: Innovation in SSH

  • 2. The problem ● SSH clients allow for a simple kind of “VPN access” ● access control ● channel protection through cryptography ● Not well suited for “traversing through VPNs” ● I have to login to our company's server ● Then I can login to a customer's firewall (or use a VPN) ● From there I can login to the server
  • 3. The problem ● What if I need to restart application on ten servers? ● In addition, there's PermitRootLogin no ● Passwords are (of course) different on each server ● I have to decrypt the passwords (I can't remember passwords for hundreds of servers), do an ssh, login through key, type “su -”, cut & paste the password ● Takes me tens of minutes
  • 4. The solution: DSSH ● Enter DSSH ● Secure storage of key material through dssh-agent (much more secure than ssh-agent) ● Scriptable ● In the end ● Populate agent with material (one script involving gpg) ● for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10;do dssh root@server${i} svcadm refresh applicationname; done
  • 5. DSSH: Authentication ● It is not always possible to use public key cryptography for authentication ● PermitRootLogin no ● Some devices (network infrastructure) have no support for keys ● Administrator does not need to know the passwords, he needs them properly used at the right time ● Randomly generated passwords (different for each server)
  • 6. DSSH: Authentication ● DSSH<->Agent mutual authentication using X.509 certificates ● Agent never reveals private key ● DSSH client on your (trusted) machine does the key validation (even if it's forwarded) and then decides if it will communicate with the server (unlike ssh-agent from OpenSSH)
  • 7. DSSH: scriptability ● Scriptability through the use of BeanShell ● Authentication, target server and how to connect there fully scriptable ● Can have “internal hostnames”, that are resolved by script ● Different paths for different servers ● Some servers need to use “su” or “ena” for leveraging privileges ● Logging and auditing support (root is root, but who used that privilege?)
  • 8. DSSH: portability and security ● Uses Java (no buffer overflows, no integer overflows, ...) ● Uses JCA (well-audited cryptography standards implementation) ● Is open-source ● Uses proven Java SSH library (used by Google or JetBrains) ● Passwords don't matter at all -> can be changed by script ● Needs only terminal emulator (xterm, linux console, mac os x terminal) => works almost everywhere (haven't tried on Windows' xterm or putty)
  • 9. DSSH: Why Open-Source? ● People know what we use to access their servers ● Better quality of libraries and code (if we write code just for us, the “let's document it later” approach will prevail) ● We use a lot of open-source in DSSH, let's give something back ● DSSH uses code from OpenSSH, Trilead-SSH, BeanShell, Java, GNU GetOpt, OpenCSV – we build on open technologies
  • 10. History and future ● Started as a tiny project, now supports most of the standard ssh features (port forwarding, scp, ...) ● Switched from Groovy to Beanshell, cut startup time to a third (the rest is Java), project size and memory footprint from 2.2MB to 500KB ● Future: Auditing “transit server” that records session for auditability purposes ● Users never ever store key material (other than their X.509 certificate) on their computers, even in encrypted form
  • 11. Thank you Questions? http://opensource.digmia.com/