1. 1
Sharing Water: Water Allocation, Water Quality and Conflict Management
Jacob W. Kijne, Water Management Consultant, Washington DC
Text of a lecture presented at the Robert B. Daugherty Water for Food Institute, Nebraska
University, Lincoln, September 20, 2012
In early August 2012, BBC World News and other news agencies reported that half of the
counties in the USA (in 35 states) had been declared disaster areas because of drought. USDA
had said that yields, especially corn (maize) and soya were badly affected. Since then there
have been headlines in the news papers about the higher food prices to come. Droughts here
and in many other countries, as well as floods in Burma and Niger, are the background for this
discussion about water sharing and water conflicts. A motto for this discussion might be:
“There is a sufficiency in the world for man’s need but not for man’s greed” (as said by
Mahatma Gandhi1).
Introduction
Some twenty years ago, Ismail Serageldin, then Vice-President of the World Bank, and
Chairman of the CGIAR, said that ‘the wars of the next generation will be about water’. At about
the same time, the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a similar
statement. Perhaps it is no coincidence that both gentlemen are from Egypt, a country that
depends entirely on Nile river water, a source that could easily be cut off by upstream countries
such as Ethiopia, with its population of more than 80 million people and still growing, or Sudan.
This essay starts with a discussion of the water war argument, followed by some data on
different types of water conflicts, and their number reported in the past. Then there follows a
brief review of incentives to cooperate rather than to enter into a dispute. The process of water
conflict management and its key issues are discussed before concluding with an analysis of
whether the history of conflicts can be seen as a predictor of what the future will bring.
But first a word about terminology: the terms transboundary and international waters need
clarification. Generally, the term ‘international waters’ refers to those waters that cross
boundaries of two or more countries, while ‘transboundary water’ is a more inclusive term that
refers to waters crossing any jurisdictional or sectoral boundaries, including those within
countries. The terms conflict and dispute also have distinct meanings in the literature. A
‘conflict’ involves two or more parties with one of them disagreeing on a change in water use
by one of the other parties, with the disagreement leading to violence of some kind. A ‘dispute’
1 Quoted on 2012page 259 of Gustaf Olsson’s newbook ‘Water and Energy: threats and opportunities’.IWA
Publishing.

2. 2
is a conflict that results in non-violent tensions among parties, including political, legal, or
economic actions.
The water war argument
The competition for water is becoming stronger every year because of increased food and
biofuel needs for a growing world population, aggravated by changing eating patterns, greater
demands for water from urban centers for drinking water and sanitation and also from
industrial and economic development, and finally as a result of changing rainfall and runoff
patterns due to climate change. The causes of conflicts include both hydrological factors and
the social and economic needs of riparian states, but also the need for changes in water use,
e.g. arising from economic development. The critical issues in conflict management to be
discussed later are of course linked to the causes of conflict.
Some scientific papers point to water not only as a cause of historic armed conflict but also as
the resource that will bring soldiers to the battlefield in this 21st century. Invariably, water wars
are mentioned in the context of the arid and hostile Middle East where the situation is rapidly
getting worse with a diminished flow in the River Jordan and a much lower water level in the
Dead Sea. The basic arguments for ‘water wars’ therefore are:
(1) water scarcity in arid and semi-arid regions that leads to immense political pressures;
(2) water ignoring political boundaries; and
(3) the fact that international water law is poorly developed and hard to enforce, complicating
water conflict management.
On the legal aspects, the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses Commission, which took 27 years to develop, reflects the difficulty of matching
legal and hydrological realities. The Convention, based on the Helsinki Rules (1966), provides
important principles for cooperation, such as ‘equitable use’ and the ‘obligation not to cause
appreciable harm’2. The Convention, however, provides little practical guidelines for water
allocation, the most common cause of conflict. International laws are concerned with the rights
and responsibilities of nations; as a result that some non-national political entities, such as the
Palestinians along the Jordan River and the Kurds along the Euphrates, cannot claimwater
rights in international courts.
Data on transboundary river basins, conflicts and agreements
2 The Helsinki Rules havebeen used explicitly only onceto help define water use, when the Mekong Committee
formulated their Declaration of Principles in 1975.

3. 3
Globally, nearly half of the total land area is found in international basins; for Africa, the
percentage is as high as 62%. There are about 270 international river basins and more than half
of the world’s population lives in transboundary basins (Gleick, 2012).
Water conflicts have been reported since people first started to leave written records. The Atlas
of Water (Black and King, 2012) counts a total of 816 conflicts between 1948 and 2008, half of
which were about the allocation of water. Other sources present slightly different data (Gleick,
2012; Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Additional causes of conflict cited by these authors include
water resources being used as weapons or targets during military action. In terrorism the
action is caused by non-state actors; such actors may use water resources as targets or tools of
violence and coercion. In development disputes the harm can be done by state or non-state
actors.
Data show an increase in water disputes over time. This increase may partly be explained by
better reporting and the globalization of news. Since the end of WWII, all regional wars and
conflicts, such as those in the Balkans and Central Africa, have resulted in water-related harm.
The effects in these two areas reflects one of the most important changes in the nature of
conflicts over the last several decades – the growing severity and intensity of local and sub-
national conflicts, and the relative decrease of conflicts at the international level (Gleick, ibid). A
growing number of these disputes over water allocations across local boundaries, ethnic
boundaries, or between economic groups have escalated into conflicts.
An early example of a terrorist-cum-development-related conflict happened from 1907 till 1913
in the Owen’s Valley of California. The Los Angeles aqueduct/pipeline suffered repeated
bombings in efforts by the affected people in the Valley to prevent diversions of water from the
Owen Valley to Los Angeles.
Another well-known development conflict resulted from the 1947 partition of India and
Pakistan over the waters of the Indus River. This was not resolved until 1960 with the Indus
Water Agreement, reached through World Bank intervention, involving the construction of a
number of large link canals to bring water from the Indian side of the new border to Pakistan.
An example of a conflict in which water was used as a political tool occurred in 1998 in Angola.
Fierce fighting broke out at the Gove dam on the Kunune River as UNITA and Angola
government forces battled for control of the installation.
A recent example of a development conflict occurred in 2006 in Ethiopia. At least 12 people
died and more than one hundred were wounded in clashes over competition for water and
pasture in the Somali border area.

4. 4
The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is an example of a political conflict. In the
West Bank, it is mainly caused by competition for water supplies, with Israel getting more than
three quarters of the supply, including water for the controversial settlements in the West
Bank.
At the same time as this increasing number of disputes and conflicts, there are many examples
of peaceful resolutions. The Atlas of Water (2012) reports a total of 1743 cooperative events
between 1948 and 2008. Delli Priscoli and Wolf (2009) report the number of international
water treaties from 1888 till 2000 as 62. Most of the treaties specify boundaries and indicate
some limits on the use of surface water. Only nine of the 62 treaties deal specifically with
groundwater regulations, including allocation, quality and protection of the land. About 25
include some conditions on groundwater management, but not on water allocation, while an
equal number mention water quality only indirectly.
Although the exact number of disputes and treaties may not be known, it is evident from the
data that there are more cooperative events than conflicts. It should also be realized that
treaties seldom clearly define water allocations and limits on water quality. Moreover
enforcement mechanisms on water quality are often absent, especially in international basin
agreements. Thus, although helpful, the mere presence of a treaty does not automatically
translate into behavior altering cooperation (Warner and Zawahri, 2012)
Incentives to cooperate
Cooperation among riparian countries is becoming imperative as pressure on the water
resource increases. In March 2012 in Marseilles, at the initiative of the International Network
of Basin Organizations, some 69 basin organizations in Africa, America, Asia, and Europe signed
‘The World Pact for Better Basin Management’. They expressed their intention – among other
things – to improve water governance in their basins, organize dialogues with stakeholders,
facilitate agreements on a ‘shared vision of the future of the basin’, develop action and
investment plans that meet the economic, social and environmental priorities of the basins, and
organize in each basin a harmonized data base as part of an integrated information system.
Although important, these agreements do not include a methodology for dealing with disputes
or conflicts. A case in point is the Mekong River basin. There is a long history of international
cooperation under the Mekong River Committee and the Mekong River Commission,
established in 1957. This Commission is made up of representatives of Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam. In December 2011, the Commission urged for a second time that
approval be withheld for the construction of a potentially devastating dam at Xayaburi in
northern Laos until more is known about its effect on the Lower Mekong (Economist, May 5th
2012). Apart from high up in the gorges of south-western China, the Mekong remains

5. 5
undammed. But now a Thai construction company has been contracted to build the dam, and
apparently 5000 workers have been hired. Two countries, Laos and Thailand, are expected to
share the power to be generated at the dam. The news that the dam will be built has triggered
an angry response from the other riparian neighbors. The December agreement, calling for
further environmental studies, included Laos. Opponents of the dam argue that the Xayabury
dam will adversely affect the livelihood of 65 million people in South-East Asia who depend on
fishery for their sustenance. In fact, the Mekong Agreement of 1995 requires the four nations
to consult and respect their neighbors’ concerns but leaves the final decision to each sovereign
state.
Interesting in this context is a 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice in a decision on
a dispute about water pollution from paper mills between Argentina and Uruguay which states
that Environmental Impact Assessment is an essential requirement of customary international
law and diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm and its notification are required
not just between states that have concluded international agreements (McIntyre, 2011). The
international Court of Justice has also stipulated that the principle of equitable utilization
should be seen as a process rather than a normative determinative rule.
Equity versus efficiency
Under ideal circumstances striving for equity and preventing harm would be strong incentives
for collaboration between neighboring countries. However, rarely are the potential partners in
collaboration equal partners in power. A review of the treaties from the past half century
reveals an overall lack of robustness (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.). Nevertheless, on the positive
side, in some of the more recent treaties, there has been a broadening in the definition and
measurement of basin benefits, with the intention to equitably allocate the benefits derived
from the use of water, not the amount of water itself. One example is the 1961 Columbia River
Treaty, in which the US paid Canada for the benefits of flood control and Canada was granted
rights to divert water between the Colombia and Kootenai Rivers for hydropower generation.
Some scientists support the introduction of ‘efficiency’ rather than ‘equity’ into water conflict
management, where ‘efficiency’ is defined as the allocation of water to its highest use. ‘Highest
use’ may be illustrated by the following example. There is much variation in current water
demands for producing 1 kg of corn: in the USA it is 0.57 m3, in India 3.05 m3, and in Nigeria
5.34 m3. This is an example of inefficient water use in India and Nigeria. Water sharing should
take into consideration the possibility of increasing the overall efficiency of water utilization by
reallocating the water according to these values. But different water users, for example
domestic water users versus users of golf courses, along a watercourse may value water
differently.

6. 6
The logical extension of this efficiency concept is the so-called ‘virtual’ water, i.e. the water
required to produce specific goods and services. Some argue that the virtual water trade will
become increasingly important as nations or regions experience water scarcity and then desire
to mitigate the economic and political impacts of the internal water shortage by importing
food. This can only work if nations in water-scarce regions have the hard currency to buy the
food they need on the world market and are willing to forgo food self-sufficiency in their staple
food crops. To complicate this issue: water-poor countries often export fruits and other high
value crops to water-rich countries as these crops cannot be grown in the importing country for
climatic reasons or can be produced much more cheaply in the exporting country. Trade should
be beneficial to both the exporter and importer. The assumption that nations are willing to
depend for their staple crops on import from elsewhere is doubtful, especially when world
market prices of agricultural products are volatile as a result of drought in the main production
areas.
Possible procedures for successful water conflict management
Procedures for collaboration and dispute management range from initiatives taken by the
conflicting parties themselves towards increased participation and interventions by third
parties. The most far-reaching type of outside intervention is third-party decision making.
Unassisted conflict management procedures include conciliation, information exchange,
collaborative problem solving and negotiations. Assistance by others could consist of help in
relationship building, such as counseling, team building, and procedural assistance (i.e.
coaching, facilitation and mediation), as well as more substantive assistance through technical
advisory boards, dispute panels, fact finding, and advisory mediation. Third- party intervention
could be nonbinding or binding arbitration and mediation, and judging. A critical tipping point is
reached when the power to resolve the dispute moves from the parties in dispute into the
hands of an outside party. With third party decision-making, the primary communication
pattern is between parties and the arbiter or the panel charged with the decision making (Delli
Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.).
The extensive literature on dispute management shows a trend toward procedures of assisted
dispute resolution but without the third-party making the decision. In the USA, the growing
experience of litigation or threat of litigation when a third party made the decision, acts as an
incentive to move away from third-party involvement. Reviews of international mediations
describe similar experiences. Procedures with minimal assistance allow the parties in dispute
more control over the outcome. Some reviewers suggest that disputes with a third-party
decision have limited capacity to deal with the multiple parties and issues that characterize
water disputes. Yet expert panels or commissions have been common in the water resources
field. For example, there are technical committees on the Nile, the Euphrates, the Indus and

7. 7
other rivers. Technical committees have also been central to the work of a variety of river basin
commissions in the USA and Canada.
Stages in water conflict management
Many disputes, such as upstream-downstream conflicts, start as zero-sum confrontations
where one party’s loss is another’s gain. As the adversarial stage plays out, negotiations can
shift from rights (what a party feels it is entitled to) to needs (what is actually needed to fulfill
its goals). At the same time, the attention shifts from past to future. The next stage – if all goes
well – is usually a move towards more cooperative solutions which entail the desire to increase
the benefits of the resource throughout the basin. This is often called ‘expanding the pie’,
meaning no longer conceiving the situation as a zero-sum argument. The most successful cases
of building regional approaches to water have gone beyond seeing water as the end to
recognizing it as a means to achieve other goals such as socio-economic development or
reducing the risks of floods or drought. The last stage is agreeing on the sustainable
implementation of an action plan in which the benefits are distributed fairly equitably among
the parties. Needless to say, this is a very brief summary of what is usually a complicated and
time-consuming process which is often characterized by one step forward and two steps back
(Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.).
The interesting studies by Professor Lynn of the Department of Agricultural Economics at
University of Nebraska, Lincoln, (UNL) should be mentioned in this context. He and his co-
workers (Sheeder and Lynn, 2011) studied farmers’ motivation to engage in conservation tillage
in the upstream area of the Blue River/Turtle Creek watershed on the border between
Nebraska and Kansas. Runoff from irrigated fields of upstream farmers contributes to the
pollution of the lake which is the source of drinking water for the downstream people.
Traditionally, upstream farmers have not been concerned about downstream water users’ lack
of access to clean water. To reduce water pollution from agricultural runoff, conservation
measures are stimulated by payments. Three groups of people were identified in the study
area: upstream farmers, downstream water users and people who were both upstream farmers
and downstream water users. The researchers analyzed the sense of empathy (thinking yourself
in the shoes of others) of those in each group. The key finding from their research is that
increasing conservation payments is not likely to be cost-effective on their own for addressing
pollution problems. Individuals may ultimately make choices based on empathy/sympathy. A
strong feeling of empathy leads to a sense of a shared interest in enhanced water quality and
diminishes the more primal tendency to maximize profits. They conclude that water policy and
educational programs need to pay attention on how to induce, and otherwise ’nudge’,
empathy. A key question in conflict management is indeed how to stimulate this feeling of
empathy for the other party in the conflict.

8. 8
Critical issues in conflict management
Power often plays an important role in water disputes. Unequal power relationships, without a
robust third-party involvement, can create strong disincentives for cooperation. A strong
regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states, as was
the case with the Central Asian Economic Community in disputes around the Aral Sea. This was
also the role of the World Bank (especially of its president Eugene Black) with the World Bank’s
positive, active and continuous involvement in the India-Pakistan water treaty after partition in
1947. Note that the World Bank was also the donor facilitating the solution in this conflict. It
has been recognized that in particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override the
water issues, a sub-optimal solution may be the best that can be achieved. Sometimes
separating resource issues from political interest may not be productive. Involvement of a non-
riparian, regional power may then be important. A case in point was the role of Egypt in
conflicts about the water of the Jordan River. Elsewhere, solving political and resource use
disputes was accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks (also in the Middle East). A
special type of unequal power occurs in disputes between Mexico and USA in the use of water
from a shared aquifer when federal and state governments hold different opinions and thus
impede cooperation (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).
Upstream-downstream power. Equitable agreements are hard to reach when one riparian
country holds most geographic and military power. Examples include disputes between Turkey
and Iraq and Syria over the water allocation from Tigris and Euphrates, and also with respect to
the Salween River, with China as the upstream power, and Burma and Thailand downstream.
The water disputes between Turkey and Iraq and Syria have been studied in detail (Warner,
2012, and Warner and Zawahri, 2012). Turkey is clearly the dominant power (hegemony) in this
situation, while Syria and Iraq complained but had little choice but to accept the fact that
Turkey was building dams and the remaining flow in the two rivers would be much reduced.
Turkey needed the water for the development of the South East, the Greater Anatolia Project
(GAP), including hydropower and irrigation of 2 million ha. Gradually, Turkey started to frame
the right to water as a security issue. Presenting policy issues as a security issue
(‘securitization’) has been done by many countries and is often a potent way of rallying a
political constituency behind a policy. Securitization involves presenting a threat as a life and
death concern legitimizing extraordinary measures, such as top-down decision-making and
classifying information. [On May 9, 2012, Mario Otero, Under-secretary for Civilian Security,
Democracy and Human Rights, in the State Department (USA) commented that “if left
unaddressed, water challenges worldwide will pose a threat to US security interests”.3]
3 American Society of Agronomy CSA News September 2012, page 20.

9. 9
The political situation in the area changed with the US occupation of Iraq, Syria’s support for
Kurdish fighters, privatization of Turkey’s water sector and the outcome of the World
Commission on Dams (FAO and World Bank, 2000). Turkey at the time wanted to construct the
Ilisu dam close to the border with Syria. The downstream water users objected as they feared
for their own water supplies; the river shows large variability in its flow. The need to find
international funding for the construction of the Ilisu dam alerted national and international
NGO’s to the destruction of heritage sites below the reservoir, the environmental impact of the
dam and the inevitable resettlement issues. As a result of international pressure, the donor
countries and banks withdrew their support which led to long delays. Yet, in 2005 Turkey
revised the project. More protests followed but the construction has now started with
completion expected in 2015.
This brief discussion of power and power distribution shows the complexity of the various roles
played by domestic and international political players, and the limited validity of the
secularization attempted by Turkey.
Data. Data collection and sharing is essential before an agreement can be reached or
construction takes place. But parties in developing countries often disagree about the validity
of the collected data, especially on the ecological impacts and development projections.
Requesting increasingly detailed data clarifications is often used as a delaying tactic. Agreement
on the minimum data necessary for a solution can be a first step in establishing trust, and if that
is not possible delegating data gathering to a third party may speed up negotiations.
Benefits. All the water resources in the relevant domain of the parties in conflict need to be
included in the water management programs and strategy. Ignoring the link between quantity
and quality, and between surface water and groundwater ignores the hydrologic reality. What
is needed is Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM; see Lenton and Muller, 2009),
which is difficult to realize. In all disputes, but especially between nations with unequal power
all economic benefits from a possible agreement between parties should be considered.
Forecasting the future from past trends
Several important trends of the recent past could raise the likelihood of water disputes in the
future. These are population growth and the associated increased demand for food, biofuel and
meat, urbanization, economic development, the associated energy and industrial water
demands, and climate change. These challenges are closely interlinked. For example, Vaux
(2004) argued with great clarity that water scarcity will constrain the extent to which we are
able to provide adequate water and sanitation services to most of the world’s population. The
notion that water for domestic purposes is of such high value and clear priority that it takes
precedence over other uses, cannot be maintained. There are no well-functioning markets

10. 10
which respond to relative values to ensure that water is allocated to uses with the highest
values. Communities in both dry and humid areas struggle to obtain the water supplies needed
to support existing and anticipated population and economic growth. The need to maintain
sustainable ground water resources, the maintenance and improvement of water quality and
the need to feed a more populous world will compete in part with the need for water that
should be allocated to sanitation and drinking water supplies for poor people. Alleviating
ground water overdraft by importing additional surface water supplies is becoming less viable
as surface water becomes fully appropriated (Vaux, ibid.). Increasing energy supplies in
countries with frequent power cuts require large amounts of water; energy from biomass and
oil need most4. A case in point is South Africa, one of several countries that are both water- and
energy-scarce, and where much needed water is diverted to coal-fired power plants with SO2
scrubbers.
To make matters worse, there are concerns about the implications for transboundary waters
arising from the rapid increase in acquisition and leasing of large areas of agricultural land by
others countries and investors. Since 2000, more than 1000 of such deals have been made,
involving a land area of about half the size of Europe, 40 percent of which is in Africa (230 Mha,
according to a recent report from Kings College, London). In Mali 100,000 ha of land previously
cultivated by small family farmers was last year allocated to investors for large-scale farming.
The process has largely bypassed the official procedures established by the Office du Niger at
regional scale. Negotiations are done behind closed doors and water is often presumed to be
included without it explicitly being mentioned in the land lease agreements. Large scale
farming for the production of sugarcane or palm oil (perennial crops), and double cropping
require more water than was used by the family farmers in the past. Local farmers often have
no legal ownership of their land or the water they use. In dry seasons of deficit years the water
supply in the Niger River is not adequate to meet this increased demand. The Niger Basin
Authority has put restrictions on the flow of water that Niger is allowed to divert upstream of
the Markala dam, in order to maintain a significant downstream flow for fishing and ecological
reasons. A recent special issue of Water Alternatives (Mehta et al., 2012) reports several similar
cases. Unfortunately, as the SIWI report (Jägerkog et al, 2012) points out, the Principles for
Responsible Agricultural Investments agreed by FAO, International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), the UN conference on Trade and Development, and the World Bank do
not explicitly mention water. Is the acquisition of land in a developing country land grabbing or
a normal business transaction? It should be recognized that large-scale investment is often
desperately needed in rural areas to deliver social and environmental benefits, and help reduce
rural poverty. The SIWI report concludes that there is a clear trend for deals to occur in places
with weak governance and legislation.
4 See also Olsson (2012).

11. 11
As mentioned climate change complicates the already existing competition for scarce water.
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007)
notes that climate change will lead to “changes in all components of the freshwater system”
and includes impacts on water availability, timing, quality and demand. Most transboundary
water agreements, however, are based on the assumption that future water supply and quality
will not change (Gleick, 2012). As the Egyptian hydrologist Fekri Hassan has observed “In the
long run, the only constant is change.”5 Currently, global circulation models are not of much
help to water managers as they are not reliable predictors of rainfall and runoff at the scale
required for catchment water management. There are 23 of such models which generate
hundreds of scenarios (Delli Priscoli, 2012). Policy changes will also be needed. As Delli Priscoli
(ibid) writes, “anticipatory policies and actions can improve the capacity of a watershed to
adapt to transboundary impacts of changes in water use, land use and climate on water
resources and services. But these policies are still in their infancy”.
Closing comments
Full-scale water wars are unlikely but the frequency of water conflicts is likely to increase
because of strong competition for the scarce resource. Conflicts can be anticipated as the most
common causes are known. Such anticipation should include data collection and measures to
encourage cooperation between the opposing parties. Parties should not be allowed to get
stuck in rigid positions or in securitization. Broad sets of benefits should be identified.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for water disputes. Much depends on the local situation but
international institutions might play a role as third party mediators. Coping with water scarcity
requires both mitigation and adaptation. There are various ways to augment the supply of
water by constructing more storage in reservoirs, reuse of drainage water and treated waste
water, and desalinating sea water; all of which are controversial, expensive and require energy.
Equally important, there are various ways to reduce the demand for water, including reducing
water consumption in high-income countries, reducing the amount of animal products we
consume, and reducing the amount of non-revenue water (losses). There is a role for
governments and water companies in achieving these demand reductions.
Demographics are important: the growing population of the Sahel can expect their water
supplies to diminish, while the decreasing population of Southern Europe will have relatively
more water. Similar dichotomies exist elsewhere. In future, they might cause a flow of
ecological refugees.
5 Quoted in Delli Priscoli (2012).

12. 12
Overall, then, with respect to water conflicts there is room for optimism as well as pessimism,
since water sharing has the potential for win-win solutions.
References
Black, M. and King, J. (2012) The Atlas of Water: Mapping the World’s most critical resource. 2nd
edition. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles
Delli Priscoli, J. (2012) Reflections on the nexus of politics, ethics, religion and contemporary
water resource decisions. Water Policy 14:21-40
Delli Priscoli, J and Wolf, A.T. (2009) Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge and New York
Gleick, P.H (2012) The World’s Water, vol. 7. Island Press, Washington DC
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) The Fourth IPCC Assessment Report.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York
Jägerskog, A, Cascao, A, Harsmac, M, and Kim, K (2012) Land acquisitions: how will they impact
transboundary water? Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI)
www.siwi.org/publcations
Mehta, L, Veldwisch S.J. and Franco, J. (2012) Introduction to the Special Issue: Water
Grabbing? Focus on the (Re)appropriation of Finite Water Resources. Water Alternatives
5(2):193-207
McIntyre, O. (2011) The World Court’s ongoing contribution to International Water Law: the
Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay. Water Alternatives 4(2):124-144
Olsson, G. (2012) Water and Energy: threats and opportunities. IWA Publishing, London, New
York
Sheeder, R.J. and Lynne, G.D. (2011) Empathy-conditioned conservation: “Walking in the shoes
of others”. Land Economics 87(3): 433-452
Vaux jr, H. (2004) Perspective Paper 9.2 pp 535-540 In: Global Crises, Global Solutions (B.
Lomborg, ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York

13. 13
Warner, J. (2012) The struggle over Turkey’s Ilisu dam: domestic and international security
linkages. Int. Environ. Agreements 12:231-250
Warner, J. and N. Zawahri (2012) Hegemony and asymmetry: multiple-chessboard games on
transboundary rivers. Int. Environ. Agreements 12: 215-229
World Commission on Dams Report (2000). UNDP, New York and World Bank, Washington DC