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Internet Explorer Exploit Protection
                                 ENTERPRISE BRIEFING REPORT




TESTED PRODUCTS:
AVG Internet Security Network Edition v8.0
Kaspersky Total Space Security v6.0
McAfee Total Protection for Endpoint
Sophos Endpoint Security and Control v8.0
Symantec Endpoint Protection 11.0.2 MR2
Trend Micro Officescan 8.0 SP1 R3



                                              DECEMBER 20, 2008
Published by NSS Labs.

© 2008 NSS Labs



CONTACT:
5115 Avenida Encinas
Suite H
Carlsbad, CA 92008

Tel:      +1.847.553.4300
E-mail:   info@nsslabs.com
Internet: http://www.nsslabs.com




All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored on a retrieval system, or transmitted without the
express written consent of the authors.

Please note that access to or use of this Report is conditioned on the following:

1. The information in this Report is subject to change by NSS Labs without notice.

2. The information in this Report is believed by NSS Labs to be accurate and reliable, but is not guaranteed. All use of and reliance on
this Report are at your sole risk. NSS Labs is not liable or responsible for any damages, losses or expenses arising from any error or
omission in this Report.

3. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED ARE GIVEN BY THE NSS LABS. ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE DISCLAIMED AND
EXCLUDED BY NSS LABS. IN NO EVENT SHALL NSS LABS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR INDIRECT
DAMAGES, OR FOR ANY LOSS OF PROFIT, REVENUE, DATA, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, OR OTHER ASSETS, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY THEREOF.

4. This Report does not constitute an endorsement, recommendation or guarantee of any of the products (hardware or software) tested
or the hardware and software used in testing the products. The testing does not guarantee that there are no errors or defects in the
products, or that the products will meet your expectations, requirements, needs or specifications, or that they will operate without
interruption.

5. This Report does not imply any endorsement, sponsorship, affiliation or verification by or with any companies mentioned in this
report. For PCI-related reports, this does not constitute an endorsement by the PCI Security Standards Council.

6. All trademarks, service marks, and trade names used in this Report are the trademarks, service marks, and trade names of their
respective owners, and no endorsement of, sponsorship of, affiliation with, or involvement in, any of the testing, this Report or NSS Labs
is implied, nor should it be inferred.




© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.
CONTENTS
1  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
  1.1     Affected systems................................................................................................... 1 
  1.2     Microsoft Response .............................................................................................. 1 
  1.3     Test Relevance ..................................................................................................... 1 
2  Results ............................................................................................................ 2 
  2.1     Security Effectiveness ............................................................................................ 2 
  2.2     Memory Utilization Post-Exploit .............................................................................. 3 
  2.3     Partial Exploit Code ............................................................................................... 4 
3  NSS Labs Recommendations ........................................................................... 4 
4  The Products Under Test .................................................................................. 5 
  4.1     Products tested .................................................................................................... 5 
  4.2     Settings Used ....................................................................................................... 5 
5  Endpoint Protection Test Environment ............................................................... 6 
  5.1     Client Host Description .......................................................................................... 6 
  5.2     Network Description .............................................................................................. 7 




© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.
1 INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 2008 Microsoft published Microsoft Security Advisory (961051), detailing a vulnerability in
Internet Explorer that could allow arbitrary Remote Code Execution. This vulnerability in IE5, IE6, IE7 and IE8
Beta allows an attacker to take complete control of an affected system.

Active exploits have been seen in the wild. There are two known variants: an Active X variant, and a
Javascript variant. Users with vulnerable versions of Internet Explorer are at high risk of being exploited if
they visit a website hosting the exploit code. Sources indicated over 10,000 web sites are hosting these
exploits, and potentially even more variants of malware.

Based on the potential impact as well as concerns from a number of enterprises, NSS Labs conducted a
series of tests of popular endpoint protection products to evaluate their ability to protect clients from exploits
targeting the IE vulnerability.

 1.1     AFFECTED SYSTEMS
Windows Internet Explorer 7 on supported editions of Windows XP Service Pack 2, Windows XP Service
Pack 3, Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1, Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2, Windows Vista,
Windows Vista Service Pack 1, and Windows Server 2008. Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 Service Pack 4,
Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1, Microsoft Internet Explorer 6, and Windows Internet Explorer 8
Beta 2 on all supported versions of Microsoft Windows are potentially vulnerable.

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-078.mspx

 1.2 MICROSOFT RESPONSE
Microsoft has reacted extremely quickly and by providing a patch within 7 days of the vulnerability being
disclosed. At the time of testing, Dec 18, 2008, Microsoft had just released a patch. For those unable to
update immediately, Microsoft offers some mitigating steps at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961051.mspx

 1.3 TEST RELEVANCE
Internet Explorer is the most popular web browser on the planet, owning the lion’s share of the market. This
increases the importance of this vulnerability and the potential reach of exploits.

Most Enterprises have change control procedures governing patching of systems. As a result, the adoption
rate of this patch will likely occur over an extended period of time. Therefore, Endpoint Protection products
will be relied upon heavily during the period of exposure to this vulnerability.




Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                        p. 1
2 RESULTS
During the week of December 15, NSS Labs performed a focused test of popular Endpoint Protection
products to evaluate the protection offered against this exploit. This section provides a quick overview of the
test results collected during live testing conducted through Thursday, December 18th 2008.

    2.1 SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS
All of the products tested were classified as Enterprise class Endpoint Protection by the vendor, meaning
they had both Client Host Intrusion Prevention (HIPS) and anti-malware components. In addition, they also
all included a reputation-based component – meaning they block and warn users about malicious web-sites
in order to prevent them from downloading malware. Each vendors system works differently, but they
generally rely on collective intelligence and back-end analysis of specific URLs and files to supplement the
local signatures and heuristics.

This was first and foremost a test of intrusion prevention, and not anti-malware, capabilities. Our goal was to
clearly identify the protective layers within the products to combat the exploits against IE. In this scenario
there are two distinct attacks against the IE vulnerability. Exploits could deliver any number of different
malicious payloads to be executed. Preventing either the URL from being accessed or the exploit from
executing would be the ideal solution. To do this properly, an in-line intrusion prevention system must be
able to prevent the requested web page from reaching the web browser before it can be analyzed and
declared safe. For a more complete discussion of exploits and drive-by downloads, refer to the article on
NSS Labs’ website: http://nsslabs.com/white-papers/exploits-vs-drive-by-downloads.html



    Test                         AVG         Kaspersky        McAfee        Sophos        Symantec         Trend

    1. Block URL Access         Missed       Blocked &        Missed      Warned but       Missed         Missed
                                              Warned                      did not block
                                                                             properly

    2. Block Exploit            Missed         Blocked        Missed      Blocked but      Missed         Missed
                                               Exploit                      called it
                                                                            malware
                                                                           (mislabel)

    3. Malware Detection        Missed           N/A          Missed          N/A         Quarantined   Quarantined
                                                                                           Malware      the first but
                                                                                                         Unable to
                                                                                                        Quarantine
                                                                                                        the second 

 


Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                                  p. 2
Our investigation showed that most products are looking for so-called “Drive-by downloads” and focusing on
detecting the malware downloaded in step 3, thereby missing the opportunity to prevent the initial exploit
from occurring. Preventing the exploit would eliminate the necessity to research and detect multiple variants
of malware.

Kaspersky Antivirus (part of Total Space Security) was the only product we tested, which effectively blocked
the exploit using its reputation-based system, The product apparently has a blocking function that delays
display of a website until after the URL has been verified. Total Space Security was also the only product to
block the javascript exploit and classify it correctly.

Sophos Endpoint Security and Control correctly identified the website as malicious, however it did not
prevent the javascript exploit from running. This was a puzzle until we realized that their Reputation-based
product is not does not block access to the URL while it is looking up the reputation. Thus, Sophos
reputation solution is akin to Intrusion Detection, and not Intrusion Prevention. The approach is not effective
where the browser itself is being exploited since the Reputation system is in a race with the web browser,
and the browser is nearly always going to win.

Both Symantec and Trend were able to identify the malware that was included in the payload of the exploit,
but failed to prevent the exploit itself from running. Symantec was able to accurately identify and quarantine
the malware. Trend was able to accurately identify the malware, but unable to quarantine one of the two
pieces of malware inserted into our test system by the exploit.

 2.2 MEMORY UTILIZATION POST-EXPLOIT
Average normal memory utilization of Internet
Explorer ranges between 21 and 40MB
depending on a range of factors (e.g. operating
system, plugins and number of open windows).
Successfully exploited browsers consume more
than 230MB, as shown in the example here.

Note, that different systems and endpoint
protection products react differently to the
exploit. In some cases the browser closed or
crashed, while in others it continued to operate.




Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                     p. 3
2.3 PARTIAL EXPLOIT CODE
In this case, an attack against the data binding engine which delivered a keylogger.




3 NSS LABS RECOMMENDATIONS

Due to the lack of protection provided by Endpoint Protection products, NSS recommends that all
companies patch immediately. Also, a Network IPS product with current signatures for the vulnerability will
provide an additional layer of protection.

Most companies have already scheduled maintenance for updates and patches over the next week due to
the upcoming holidays and end of year cycles. Even those companies that have not had time to run the
patch through a full testing regime, should consider patching due to the severity of the vulnerability. It is NSS
Labs opinion that the risk of being exploited outweighs the risk of patching without full testing.

NSS Labs plans to test network IPS products as well as retest endpoint products for IE exploit protection in
the near future. For further information please check our website (www.nsslabs.com) or contact us to
schedule a briefing at +1 760-412-4627.




Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                       p. 4
4 THE PRODUCTS UNDER TEST

The Endpoint Protection products were downloaded from the vendors’ sites. All products were updated
immediately prior to testing in order to provide the latest protection.

 4.1 PRODUCTS TESTED
 Product & Version                                              Engine & Signatures
 AVG Internet Security Network Edition v8.0                     v. 8.0.200
                                                                Virus DB: 270.9.19/1855
 Kaspersky Total Space Security v6.0                            12/18/2008 12:21:56am
 McAfee Total Protection for Endpoint
    • Host Intrusion Prevention 7.0                             HIPS: 2373
    • VirusScan Enterprise 8.5i                                 Scan Engine Ver. 5300.2777
    • SiteAdvisor Enterprise 1.5                                DAT: 5469.0000
                                                                BOAP DAT: 354
 Sophos Endpoint Security and Control v8.0
    • Anti-virus 7.6                                            SAV v.7.6.3
    • Client Firewall v1.53                                     Threat Detection data: 4.37E
 Symantec Endpoint Protection 11.0.2 MR2                        AVAS: Dec 17, 2008 r50
                                                                Proactive: Dec 17, 2008 r19
                                                                Network: Dec 12, 2008 r1
 Trend Micro Officescan 8.0 SP1 R3                              VSE: 8.910.1002
                                                                VP: 5.717.00



 4.2 SETTINGS USED
Where possible, we tested with the most aggressive settings.

While vendors may have advanced in-the-cloud technologies, they are often deployed in their home-user
products before rolling them into corporate offerings. Also, some (like Trend) offer a separate application as
an add-on.

Note: This testing represents a point in time, and it is quite feasible (and desirable) for vendors to add
protection depending on their implementations - some quicker than others.




Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                       p. 5
5 ENDPOINT PROTECTION TEST ENVIRONMENT

ABOUT THIS TEST
The NSS Labs test reports are designed to address the challenges faced by IT professionals in selecting
security products. This NSS Labs report provides readers with empirically validated evidence about a
product’s features and capabilities. NSS Labs tests host anti-malware and endpoint protection products
against a comprehensive methodology including:

         Security Effectiveness (Anti-malware and Intrusion Prevention)
         Management and Usability
         Performance
The scope of this test was limited to on-access protection of the browser application while surfing to live
sites on the internet which had been infected. Client machines accessed live exploits hosted on malicious
web sites on the internet and were tested simultaneously. Availability of the malicious sites was validated
before, during and after the test to ensure validity of the sample set.

 5.1     CLIENT HOST DESCRIPTION
The Systems Under Test were installed on the following Operating System and service pack.

    •    Windows XP, SP3

    •    Internet Explorer 7 (without the Security Update released by Microsoft on 12/17)

HARDWARE:
         DELL SC440
         Two 3.0 GHz processors
         2 GB RAM




Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                 p. 6
5.2 NETWORK DESCRIPTION
The endpoint protection product was tested in a live environment, connected directly to the internet.




The host system has one network interface card (NIC) and is connected to the network via a 1Ge switch
port. The NSS Labs test network is a multi-Gigabit infrastructure based around Cisco Catalyst 6500-series
switches (with both fiber and copper Gigabit interfaces).




Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection
© 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.                                                                                  p. 7

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IE Exploit Protection

  • 1. Internet Explorer Exploit Protection ENTERPRISE BRIEFING REPORT TESTED PRODUCTS: AVG Internet Security Network Edition v8.0 Kaspersky Total Space Security v6.0 McAfee Total Protection for Endpoint Sophos Endpoint Security and Control v8.0 Symantec Endpoint Protection 11.0.2 MR2 Trend Micro Officescan 8.0 SP1 R3 DECEMBER 20, 2008
  • 2. Published by NSS Labs. © 2008 NSS Labs CONTACT: 5115 Avenida Encinas Suite H Carlsbad, CA 92008 Tel: +1.847.553.4300 E-mail: info@nsslabs.com Internet: http://www.nsslabs.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, photocopied, stored on a retrieval system, or transmitted without the express written consent of the authors. Please note that access to or use of this Report is conditioned on the following: 1. The information in this Report is subject to change by NSS Labs without notice. 2. The information in this Report is believed by NSS Labs to be accurate and reliable, but is not guaranteed. All use of and reliance on this Report are at your sole risk. NSS Labs is not liable or responsible for any damages, losses or expenses arising from any error or omission in this Report. 3. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED ARE GIVEN BY THE NSS LABS. ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED BY NSS LABS. IN NO EVENT SHALL NSS LABS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR INDIRECT DAMAGES, OR FOR ANY LOSS OF PROFIT, REVENUE, DATA, COMPUTER PROGRAMS, OR OTHER ASSETS, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY THEREOF. 4. This Report does not constitute an endorsement, recommendation or guarantee of any of the products (hardware or software) tested or the hardware and software used in testing the products. The testing does not guarantee that there are no errors or defects in the products, or that the products will meet your expectations, requirements, needs or specifications, or that they will operate without interruption. 5. This Report does not imply any endorsement, sponsorship, affiliation or verification by or with any companies mentioned in this report. For PCI-related reports, this does not constitute an endorsement by the PCI Security Standards Council. 6. All trademarks, service marks, and trade names used in this Report are the trademarks, service marks, and trade names of their respective owners, and no endorsement of, sponsorship of, affiliation with, or involvement in, any of the testing, this Report or NSS Labs is implied, nor should it be inferred. © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.
  • 3. CONTENTS 1  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1  1.1  Affected systems................................................................................................... 1  1.2  Microsoft Response .............................................................................................. 1  1.3  Test Relevance ..................................................................................................... 1  2  Results ............................................................................................................ 2  2.1  Security Effectiveness ............................................................................................ 2  2.2  Memory Utilization Post-Exploit .............................................................................. 3  2.3  Partial Exploit Code ............................................................................................... 4  3  NSS Labs Recommendations ........................................................................... 4  4  The Products Under Test .................................................................................. 5  4.1  Products tested .................................................................................................... 5  4.2  Settings Used ....................................................................................................... 5  5  Endpoint Protection Test Environment ............................................................... 6  5.1  Client Host Description .......................................................................................... 6  5.2  Network Description .............................................................................................. 7  © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc.
  • 4. 1 INTRODUCTION On December 10, 2008 Microsoft published Microsoft Security Advisory (961051), detailing a vulnerability in Internet Explorer that could allow arbitrary Remote Code Execution. This vulnerability in IE5, IE6, IE7 and IE8 Beta allows an attacker to take complete control of an affected system. Active exploits have been seen in the wild. There are two known variants: an Active X variant, and a Javascript variant. Users with vulnerable versions of Internet Explorer are at high risk of being exploited if they visit a website hosting the exploit code. Sources indicated over 10,000 web sites are hosting these exploits, and potentially even more variants of malware. Based on the potential impact as well as concerns from a number of enterprises, NSS Labs conducted a series of tests of popular endpoint protection products to evaluate their ability to protect clients from exploits targeting the IE vulnerability. 1.1 AFFECTED SYSTEMS Windows Internet Explorer 7 on supported editions of Windows XP Service Pack 2, Windows XP Service Pack 3, Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1, Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2, Windows Vista, Windows Vista Service Pack 1, and Windows Server 2008. Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 Service Pack 4, Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1, Microsoft Internet Explorer 6, and Windows Internet Explorer 8 Beta 2 on all supported versions of Microsoft Windows are potentially vulnerable. http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-078.mspx 1.2 MICROSOFT RESPONSE Microsoft has reacted extremely quickly and by providing a patch within 7 days of the vulnerability being disclosed. At the time of testing, Dec 18, 2008, Microsoft had just released a patch. For those unable to update immediately, Microsoft offers some mitigating steps at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/961051.mspx 1.3 TEST RELEVANCE Internet Explorer is the most popular web browser on the planet, owning the lion’s share of the market. This increases the importance of this vulnerability and the potential reach of exploits. Most Enterprises have change control procedures governing patching of systems. As a result, the adoption rate of this patch will likely occur over an extended period of time. Therefore, Endpoint Protection products will be relied upon heavily during the period of exposure to this vulnerability. Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 1
  • 5. 2 RESULTS During the week of December 15, NSS Labs performed a focused test of popular Endpoint Protection products to evaluate the protection offered against this exploit. This section provides a quick overview of the test results collected during live testing conducted through Thursday, December 18th 2008. 2.1 SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS All of the products tested were classified as Enterprise class Endpoint Protection by the vendor, meaning they had both Client Host Intrusion Prevention (HIPS) and anti-malware components. In addition, they also all included a reputation-based component – meaning they block and warn users about malicious web-sites in order to prevent them from downloading malware. Each vendors system works differently, but they generally rely on collective intelligence and back-end analysis of specific URLs and files to supplement the local signatures and heuristics. This was first and foremost a test of intrusion prevention, and not anti-malware, capabilities. Our goal was to clearly identify the protective layers within the products to combat the exploits against IE. In this scenario there are two distinct attacks against the IE vulnerability. Exploits could deliver any number of different malicious payloads to be executed. Preventing either the URL from being accessed or the exploit from executing would be the ideal solution. To do this properly, an in-line intrusion prevention system must be able to prevent the requested web page from reaching the web browser before it can be analyzed and declared safe. For a more complete discussion of exploits and drive-by downloads, refer to the article on NSS Labs’ website: http://nsslabs.com/white-papers/exploits-vs-drive-by-downloads.html Test  AVG Kaspersky McAfee Sophos Symantec  Trend 1. Block URL Access  Missed Blocked & Missed Warned but Missed  Missed Warned did not block properly 2. Block Exploit  Missed Blocked Missed Blocked but Missed  Missed Exploit called it malware (mislabel) 3. Malware Detection  Missed N/A Missed N/A Quarantined Quarantined Malware  the first but Unable to Quarantine the second    Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 2
  • 6. Our investigation showed that most products are looking for so-called “Drive-by downloads” and focusing on detecting the malware downloaded in step 3, thereby missing the opportunity to prevent the initial exploit from occurring. Preventing the exploit would eliminate the necessity to research and detect multiple variants of malware. Kaspersky Antivirus (part of Total Space Security) was the only product we tested, which effectively blocked the exploit using its reputation-based system, The product apparently has a blocking function that delays display of a website until after the URL has been verified. Total Space Security was also the only product to block the javascript exploit and classify it correctly. Sophos Endpoint Security and Control correctly identified the website as malicious, however it did not prevent the javascript exploit from running. This was a puzzle until we realized that their Reputation-based product is not does not block access to the URL while it is looking up the reputation. Thus, Sophos reputation solution is akin to Intrusion Detection, and not Intrusion Prevention. The approach is not effective where the browser itself is being exploited since the Reputation system is in a race with the web browser, and the browser is nearly always going to win. Both Symantec and Trend were able to identify the malware that was included in the payload of the exploit, but failed to prevent the exploit itself from running. Symantec was able to accurately identify and quarantine the malware. Trend was able to accurately identify the malware, but unable to quarantine one of the two pieces of malware inserted into our test system by the exploit. 2.2 MEMORY UTILIZATION POST-EXPLOIT Average normal memory utilization of Internet Explorer ranges between 21 and 40MB depending on a range of factors (e.g. operating system, plugins and number of open windows). Successfully exploited browsers consume more than 230MB, as shown in the example here. Note, that different systems and endpoint protection products react differently to the exploit. In some cases the browser closed or crashed, while in others it continued to operate. Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 3
  • 7. 2.3 PARTIAL EXPLOIT CODE In this case, an attack against the data binding engine which delivered a keylogger. 3 NSS LABS RECOMMENDATIONS Due to the lack of protection provided by Endpoint Protection products, NSS recommends that all companies patch immediately. Also, a Network IPS product with current signatures for the vulnerability will provide an additional layer of protection. Most companies have already scheduled maintenance for updates and patches over the next week due to the upcoming holidays and end of year cycles. Even those companies that have not had time to run the patch through a full testing regime, should consider patching due to the severity of the vulnerability. It is NSS Labs opinion that the risk of being exploited outweighs the risk of patching without full testing. NSS Labs plans to test network IPS products as well as retest endpoint products for IE exploit protection in the near future. For further information please check our website (www.nsslabs.com) or contact us to schedule a briefing at +1 760-412-4627. Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 4
  • 8. 4 THE PRODUCTS UNDER TEST The Endpoint Protection products were downloaded from the vendors’ sites. All products were updated immediately prior to testing in order to provide the latest protection. 4.1 PRODUCTS TESTED Product & Version Engine & Signatures AVG Internet Security Network Edition v8.0 v. 8.0.200 Virus DB: 270.9.19/1855 Kaspersky Total Space Security v6.0 12/18/2008 12:21:56am McAfee Total Protection for Endpoint • Host Intrusion Prevention 7.0 HIPS: 2373 • VirusScan Enterprise 8.5i Scan Engine Ver. 5300.2777 • SiteAdvisor Enterprise 1.5 DAT: 5469.0000 BOAP DAT: 354 Sophos Endpoint Security and Control v8.0 • Anti-virus 7.6 SAV v.7.6.3 • Client Firewall v1.53 Threat Detection data: 4.37E Symantec Endpoint Protection 11.0.2 MR2 AVAS: Dec 17, 2008 r50 Proactive: Dec 17, 2008 r19 Network: Dec 12, 2008 r1 Trend Micro Officescan 8.0 SP1 R3 VSE: 8.910.1002 VP: 5.717.00 4.2 SETTINGS USED Where possible, we tested with the most aggressive settings. While vendors may have advanced in-the-cloud technologies, they are often deployed in their home-user products before rolling them into corporate offerings. Also, some (like Trend) offer a separate application as an add-on. Note: This testing represents a point in time, and it is quite feasible (and desirable) for vendors to add protection depending on their implementations - some quicker than others. Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 5
  • 9. 5 ENDPOINT PROTECTION TEST ENVIRONMENT ABOUT THIS TEST The NSS Labs test reports are designed to address the challenges faced by IT professionals in selecting security products. This NSS Labs report provides readers with empirically validated evidence about a product’s features and capabilities. NSS Labs tests host anti-malware and endpoint protection products against a comprehensive methodology including: Security Effectiveness (Anti-malware and Intrusion Prevention) Management and Usability Performance The scope of this test was limited to on-access protection of the browser application while surfing to live sites on the internet which had been infected. Client machines accessed live exploits hosted on malicious web sites on the internet and were tested simultaneously. Availability of the malicious sites was validated before, during and after the test to ensure validity of the sample set. 5.1 CLIENT HOST DESCRIPTION The Systems Under Test were installed on the following Operating System and service pack. • Windows XP, SP3 • Internet Explorer 7 (without the Security Update released by Microsoft on 12/17) HARDWARE: DELL SC440 Two 3.0 GHz processors 2 GB RAM Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 6
  • 10. 5.2 NETWORK DESCRIPTION The endpoint protection product was tested in a live environment, connected directly to the internet. The host system has one network interface card (NIC) and is connected to the network via a 1Ge switch port. The NSS Labs test network is a multi-Gigabit infrastructure based around Cisco Catalyst 6500-series switches (with both fiber and copper Gigabit interfaces). Enterprise Briefing Report - Internet Explorer Vulnerability Protection © 2008. NSS Labs, Inc. p. 7