1. EFFECTS ON POLICY
AND SCHOOL BOARDS

2. Privatising education, privatising
education policy, privatising
educational research: network
governance and the „competition
state‟
Stephen Ball

3. Overview
 Paper addresses aspects of the privatisation
of public sector education
 Examines the forms of privatisation taking
place of, in, and through education policy
both nationally and internationally
 Gives context to rhetoric such as
“partnership” with respect to corporate
logistics of expansion, diversification,
integration and profit, and relates these
commercial developments to changes in the
state itself

4. Three Layers of Policy and
Privatisation
 Organisational recalibration
 Colonisation of the infrastructures of
policy
 Global reach of education business

5. ORGANISATIONAL
RECALIBRATION, ‘SELLING’
IMPROVEMENT AND
MEDIATING POLICY

6. Retailing of Policy Solutions and
Improvement to Schools
 Policy is sold as a retail commodity
through:
◦ Continuing professional development
◦ Consultancy
◦ Training
◦ Support and programme services

7. Examples in the UK
 New Labor education policies offered
business opportunities – “selling school
improvement”
 Government policy of zero tolerance for
underperformance so “failing schools” must be
remediated
 “Turnaround services” marketed to school to meet
targets
 Provided at a price to make policy manageable to
schools and teachers
 Companies sell practical approaches to new policy
ideas (i.e. personalised learning)

8. Examples in the United States
 Policies such as No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) pressures public sector to use
private services
 Four main functions to educational
privatisation:
◦ Test development and preparation
◦ Data analysis and management
◦ Remedial services
◦ Content area specific programming

9. The „Sales Pitch‟
 Offer „ready made‟ solutions
 Selling the „necessities of change‟
 Use words such as „coaching‟, „collaborative‟,
„transformative‟, “innovative”
 Provide “consultants” or “advisors”
 “Savior Discourse”: Companies present
themselves as working for the public good
and saving the public sector from itself
(making education better)
 Private providers present a sense of urgency
to change and to change quickly
(scaremongering)
 Presented as a necessity to accommodate to
the requirements of policy

10. The Result
 Districts feel pressure to use these services to meet
targets
 Outside vendors become able to exert political influence
over local accountability reforms
 These products change relationships within the
workplace and make them more like those in other
public and private sector organisations (more like „the
firm‟)
 Politics and business become embedded in the
institutional culture
 Failure becomes a business opportunity

11. THE COLONISATION OF
INFRASTRUCTURE OF
POLICY

12. A Hidden Layer of
Privatisation
 Representatives of the private sector
work within the government to create
policy texts and ideas as part of the
„policy creation community‟
 These policy products („statework‟) are
then exported to private providers and
agencies who disseminate new policy
discourses in report writing, evaluation,
advice, consultancy and
recommendations

13. „Statework‟
Advisors
Evaluators
Philanthropy
Service
Delivery
ResearchersBrokers
“Partners”
Committees
Auditors

14. Scope (UK)
 Office of Government Commerce (2005): consultant
spending rose 42% in the past year to a total of 1.76
billion
 Some private consultancies now focus entirely on public
sector contracts due to the huge fees
 Department of Education and Skills (DfES) increased
spending on private consultants from £5 million to £22
million in three years without considering using its own
staff
 DfES was told by a committee to reduce spending on
consultants but so far has not

15. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC)
 Largest firm of accountants and
management consultants in the UK with
over 16 000 partners and staff in 37
offices worldwide
 Embedded and intertwined in the
education state with multiple roles,
relationships and responsibilities
 Act as suppliers of services,
commissioners, brokers

16. PWC‟s “Grid of Power/Influence”
 Involvement in 44 different aspects of
work in relation to education policy
 Specific examples include:
◦ DfES teachers workload study
◦ School workforce remodelling toolkit
◦ Building better performance
◦ Part of Education Funding Strategy Group

17. PWC Involvement and Roles

18. The Result
 Private sector is part of, and doing the work of, the state
 Profit and Product - many of the reports and
recommendations create new opportunities for more
business
 Relationships become „totally inscribed in general and
essential transformations‟
 Stream of solutions, best practice, evidence, etc., are
developed which tend to privilege further privatisation
and business models.
 Continuing to expand and provide opportunities for
influence and profit for educational businesses
 Foucault (1979), “apparently innocent, but profoundly
suspicious”

19. THE GLOBAL REACH OF
EDUCATION BUSINESS

20. Globalisation
 Education businesses seek to expand
into new market opportunities
internationally especially when local
market growth is modest
 Increasing international opportunities
for educational businesses (especially
US and UK)

21. UK International Activity
 New York School District applies English
Inspection Model
◦ Cambridge Education provides services to lead
school review programme
◦ Worth over $6 million per year
◦ Learned about CE from Michael Barber
(consultant)
 Cambridge Education also working with:
National Government of Thailand, Provincial
governments in China, Education Ministry in Hong
Kong, California, New Orleans, Papua New
Guinea, Eritrea, Bangladesh, Cambodia

22. US International Activity
 Salisbury School in north London
hired Edison Schools to increase
GCSEs grades and scores in national
tests for 14 yr olds
◦ Edison Schools is the largest private
operator of state schools in the US
◦ 3 year contract worth over £1 million
◦ Took over management of the school
◦ Called it a „radical step‟ to outsource the
management of a community school to a
private business

23. The Result
 “Policy Entrepreneurship”
 Policy Transfer: Western ideas of
organisation, education, leadership
become embedded in local policy
systems
 Regulatory Re-territoralisation:
◦ increases political power and control as well
as creates infrastructure that is friendly to
future business opportunities.
 “Re-colonialisation” – private sector is
built into the system from the start in
many developing countries.

24. DISCUSSION POINTS

25. Selling Improvement
 Do you have any personal
experiences with private sector
involvement? (i.e. What products or
services have been marketed to you?)
 What benefits or problems could you
foresee with private involvement in
your district or school?

26. Colonisation of Infrastructure of
Policy
 How do you determine if an
organisation’s purpose is to benefit
education as opposed to being profit
oriented?
 To what extent should private sector be
part of making policy decisions at a state
level?
 Can a private enterprise be trusted to
advocate for policies that are in the best
interests of students?

27. Globalisation
 Is it ethical for private sector to be
involved in policy decisions that
impact the creation of educational
systems in developing countries?

28. Three Decades of Choice in
Edmonton Schools
Alison Taylor
Jessie Mackay

29. Overview
 Article considers the role of a school
board in structuring provision and its
relationship with „consumer groups‟
 Examines two overall questions:
◦ How does a school board that is well known
for its alternative programs and high levels of
student mobility manage choice processes?
◦ How does it engage with different
„consumers‟ in establishing alternative
programs?

30. In Support of Choice:
 Introduction of market mechanisms will make
schools more responsive to parental demand
and will raise standards.
 Prevents system from being dominated by
unions, professional organizations and other
interests
 Challenges bureaucracy and makes the
system responsive to parents
 “Markets” transfer power from producers (the
system) to consumers (the parents)

31. Does this increase
responsiveness?
 Government and school systems generally
control the entry of new providers (choice
schools), resources, curriculum,
transportation, policies regarding access
 Schools often end up choosing the students
(permanent „seller‟s market‟).
 Social class advantages are reproduced. Not
all schools and parents have equal access to
choice. The elite segments of population get
more choice, while the bottom segment of the
market doesn‟t have the same opportunity.

32.  Racialized choices may be encouraged.
School differences may have more to do
with attempts to change the
socioeconomic and ethnic student mix
than with innovation
 In the UK, schools who are „losing
market share‟ are encouraged to provide
choice programs, but lack the resources.
They must increase diversity without
adding costs

33. Context: Edmonton Public Board
 Opened school boundaries in 1973
which allowed student mobility
 Outlined provisions for alternative
options in 1974 with a belief that
providing choice meets the needs of a
pluralistic society
 School Act was changed in 1988 to
allow alternative programs that
emphasized a particular language,
culture, religion or subject matter

34. Timeline of Alternative
Programs
 1980: 11 alternative programs
 1980-1995: four more programs
added
 1995 – 2005: twenty-two more
programs added (150% increase!)

35. Requesting an Alternative
Program
 According to the district:
◦ Presented by parents, staff or community
◦ District ensures that the program complies with
criteria
◦ Department makes a recommendation
 According to some within the district:
◦ “We don‟t have a clear definition in policy”
regarding establishment.
◦ Seems to be a policy to have no policy
 District staff initiated over 1/3 of schools:
Perhaps alternatives create demand rather than
vice versa
 Tensions are often created regarding staffing
etc.

36. Three Programs as Case
Study
 Awasis
◦ Created to meet the needs of Edmonton‟s
Aboriginal children and families
 Victoria School
◦ K to 12 arts focus
◦ Was formerly Victoria Composite High School
prior to declining enrolment
 Logos Christian Program
◦ Alternative program with a Chrisitan
emphasis

37. Awasis
 Idea born from a school trustee who
approached their domestic employee
(who was First Nations) about the idea
 Wrote the proposal along with a
university professor so it would sound
well educated
 At various stages, trustees questioned
whether it would be against policy,
segregate native students, wondered if
the students were „at a comparable level‟
to the system

38. Awasis
 Only once (1999) wanted to influence
staffing when there was a tension
between the Cree people and the
Awasis administrators
 Support was not always strong.
District questioned spending large
amounts of money on a small
population
 This type of school does not attract
greater numbers, as does an arts-
based school

39.  Inclusion/exclusion was an issue –
Awasis students were seen as outside of
the local community because they were
bussed. Local councilors felt that there
was more vandalism, assault, robbery for
this reason
 The expanded junior high site was
closed due to finances, poor
achievement and community relations.
 Executive director of Edmonton Metis
and Family Services questioned whether
the expanded program was set up for
failure from the start

40. Victoria
 Principal with ties to the arts community
developed the vision
 No evidence of parent representatives in
the proposal
 Proposal included a summary of
enrolments by program and suggested
that they should move away from a
trades focus in order to attract „more
capable‟ students in the area
 Became part of a plan to revitalize the
area

41.  Board report noted that reduction in
vocational students would have a
positive impact and assist in the task
of improving school effectiveness
 Transformation was essentially
uncontested/ little debate

42. Logos
 Trustee approached a former principal to
work on a proposal for Christian program
 Wrote proposal with two university
professors, one experienced in Christian
alternative programs
 A lawyer and a parent joined with them to
form the board of the Logos alternative
program
 Used a fiscal argument to show the board
was losing money to home, private, separate
schools
 Used a legal discourse based upon minority
rights, suggestion that Christians were

43.  Pointed to other religious schools
(Talmud Torah)
 Wanted significant input into selecting
the principal and staff
 Admittance requires signing a contract
– does this eliminate „problem
children‟?
 Non-Christian parents worried about it
affecting the „regular‟ program

44. Synthesis
 Discourses about policy evolve over time
 Awasis and Logos show the shift from
creating schools that meet the needs of
marginalized youth towards those that appeal
to consumer preferences and attract high
performers
 Most advocates are not „ordinary parents‟ but
have personal knowledge or access within
the system
 District control over the establishment of
alternative programs can mitigate the risk of
shifting demographics. (i.e. EPSB
superintendant commented that many
schools were placed downtown where the
population has diminished)

45.  The district established a programs
department to deal with the demands
of parent groups
 The level of support from the district
was much different in the case of
Awasis as compared to Victoria and
Logos

46. Advantages of Public Markets
 Responsive to diversity
 Gain market share through
appearance of innovation and
responsiveness
 Encourage parent involvement
 Shift responsibility and accountability
for student outcomes to the family
 Increase the district‟s ability to
respond to demographic changes

47. Tensions
 What degree and kind of diversity is desirable
in a public system?
 On one hand, districts promote themselves
as innovative and responsive, but on the
other, they attempt to allocate resources
across schools efficiently
 Some bureaucratic rules must exist to ensure
equal access to opportunity and quality
standards; this constrains the market
 Schools may seek programs that attract the
top students
 Schools are supposed to differentiate for
individual students, so how does that fit in?

48. DISCUSSION POINTS

49. Choice and Public Schooling
 Within a public school board, how
much choice is appropriate?
 Why do most people choose a regular
program instead of a school of
choice?
 Do these alternative programs conflict
with the idea of personalised learning
and differention?

50. Purpose and Equity
 What is the real purpose of alternative
programs? Do they meet a need or
create a need?
 Do alternative programs provide choice
or are they intended to increase
enrollment and create a particular
demographic ‘mix’?
 As they are now, is the process for
creating and enrolling in an alternative
fair and equitable? Why or why not?
What might improve this?

51. Standards, Accountability,
and School Reform
Linda Darling-Hammond

52. Overview
 Authors examine the outcomes of
various approaches to the standards-
based reform movement as well as
the unintended consequences of high-
stakes testing
 Examines the issue of accountability
in terms of improving teaching and
learning

53. Alternate Views on High-Stakes
Testing
Let‟s Do It!! Maybe Not…
 High stakes testing
should be used to make
decisions that have
consequences for
teachers and students
(i.e. merit pay,
recognition, extra funds)
 Promotes accountability
 Will mobilize resources
for student learning
 High stakes tests simply
certify student failure more
visibly
 High stakes tests are often
imposed without
addressing inequalities in
access to qualified
teachers
 Narrows curriculum
 Pushes low achievers into
special Ed (for funding
reason)
 Selective admission

54. Types of Accountability
Political Legal
Bureaucratic Professional
Market

55. Accountability Attempts
 Ending social promotion through testing
(Retention):
◦ More misbehaviour
◦ More dropouts
◦ Misreporting of test scores (higher and lower)
◦ Retained students did not do better the next year
◦ Lower self-concept
◦ Does not address issues of teaching and
learning (i.e. Repeating the same steps again still
won‟t improve learning)
 Substantial research says this does not work

56. Inequalities
 Two thirds of minority students attend
predominately minority schools
 Urban districts tend to get less
resources
 Teachers with high income tend to be
in low-minority, high achieving areas

57. Institutional Responses to
Testing
 Most schools rely on year-to year
comparisons rather than longitudinal
studies of the same population
 Attempts to skew data (i.e. exclude
certain individuals, etc.)
 Student selection – get rid of low
achievers, attract high achievers
 Capable staff don‟t want to take risks

58. More Effective Strategies
 Enhance preparation and PD for
teachers
 Redesign school structures for
intensive learning (i.e. team teaching,
smaller numbers of students)
 School-wide and classroom
performance assessments
 Targeted supports and services when
needed

59. Connecticut - Improvement
By:
 Standards-based PD, and high standards
(performance assessments) for teachers
 Assessment of students‟ higher-order thinking
and performance skills
 Student assessments can NOT be used to
determine promotion/graduation
 Pressure for schools to improve but not
rewards/punishments for results
 Investments: improved teacher salaries and
equalized funding so all districts could attract
quality staff
 Scholarships and forgivable loans for teacher
candidates
 High standards for teaching licenses; required
Master‟s degree for continuing license

60. New York School District #2
 Focus on ongoing, intensive PD
 Focus intensely on a few curricular
strands that are expected to have a long-
term impact
 Teams of principals and teachers work
together on district wide curriculum and
staff development issues – Shared
Expertise
 Accountability in terms of meeting
objectives for instructional improvement
 Management defined as helping
teachers to do their work

61. Professional Accountability
(NY)
 High stakes in terms of hiring and
retaining teachers/principals, NOT
punishing students who don‟t succeed
 Uncomfortable for some, but created a
positive professional culture

62. New Haven, CA
 Tightened teacher evaluation
 Held administrators accountable for
assessing teachers AND providing supports
for teachers to meet expectations
 Redesigned hiring process (not so last-
minute)
 Focus on retention: LOTS of support for new
teachers, mentors, support teams, PD
opportunities, 90 minutes/ week to plan
collaboratively
 Decided to create highly qualified teachers
instead of spending on an array of special
programs

63. New Haven Standards &
As‟mts
 Clearly articulated performance
standards with clear descriptions of
seven different performance levels
 Criterion-based parent reporting
system, including Special Ed and ELL
 Three strands of assessments
 Database system to pull together info
about students to use in program
planning

64. Accountability & Success
 Accountability is about IMPROVING student
learning (not just measuring)
◦ Ensure teachers have knowledge and skill
◦ Provide structures that support high quality
teaching and learning
◦ Create processes for assessment that are
formative
 Accountability only occurs when a useful set
of processes exists for interpreting and acting
on the information in educationally productive
ways
 Policy decisions should rest on whether or
not they improve teaching and learning

65. DISCUSSION POINTS

66. Do you agree or disagree with the idea
that accountability should be based
upon the teacher/school’s ability to meet
instructional goals (assuming the
instructional goals are appropriate and
effective)?