Security within Scaled Agile

Scaled Agile Framework
Overview for Security and Privacy Specialists / Ops from DevOps Teams
Mark Underwood @knowlengr | Views my own | ShareAlike | v1.1
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Disclaimers
Not an in-depth briefing
SAFe treats security as one among many quality attributes
Also consider hybrid models and/or Site [Service] Reliability Engineering
Credit: Some content adapted from Scaled Agile materials
♫ = Personal “Professional” Opinion
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SAFe: Built from Borrowed Concepts
 Lean
 Agile
 DevOps
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 Composable Services ♫
 MBSE ♫
 OOP ♫
 Quality (ISO 9001, PDCA) ♫

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Lean-Agile Principles5

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Core Values
in SAFe
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1. Alignment
2. Fully integrated quality
3. Transparency
4. Program Execution

Agile Manifesto
 Individuals and interactions
over processes and tools
 Working software over
comprehensive
documentation
 Customer collaboration over
contract negotiation
 Responding to change over
following a plan
8 Mark Underwood @knowlengr | Views my own | ShareAlike | v1.1

More of the Agile Manifesto
 1. Satisfy customer through early and continuous delivery
 2. Welcome changing requirements, even late in development.
 3. Deliver working software frequently
 4. People and developers must work together daily throughout a project
 5. Build projects around motivated people; support them; trust them
 6. Face to face conversation
 7. Working software is the primary measure of progress
 8. Agile processes promote sustainable development
 9. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design enhances agility
 10. Simplicity – maximizing the amount of work not done – is essential
 11. Best architectures, requirements, designs emerge from self-organizing teams
 12. Teams regularly reflect on how to become more effective, then tune & readjust
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SAFe Lean-Agile Principles10

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Deming Cycle
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Program Increment Planning
 “No event is more powerful than PI
planning. It’s the magic in SAFe.”
 “Teams create and take responsibility for
plans.”
 “Stakeholders appear face to face.”
 “Requirements and design emerge.”
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 Requirements engineering depends on
story fidelity
 Story fidelity is more art than design
pattern
 Security is a bit player
 Privacy, compliance? Sometimes a starring
role

Architectural Runway14

Delay-centric Optimization15
“Visualize and limit
WIP, reduce batch
sizes and manage
queue lengths.”
Ops issues such as
latency, scalability,
robustness

“Continuous
Exploration”
 Less well integrated in SAFe
 R&D
 Professional associations,
SDO’s, consortia

Cadence and Synchronization
for Security & Privacy
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Most Powerful Principle18
“Iterate toward the sustainably
shortest lead time with best
quality and value to people and
society.”

Security First? ♫
Not even close.
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Symptom, not
Diagnosis ♫
 “Security is an afterthought.”
 “Security is tacked on.”
 “Security needs to be designed
in at the beginning.”*
 *My choice for the most
pernicious

Applications Rule! ♫
 Unless you’re building a security tool, security is not even a stakeholder
 Applications are (almost) never about security
 Discussing security is a distraction from good story-craft
 By “security” customers mean:
 Privacy
 Functional features (e.g., “controls”) in a domain
 Expression of distrust in a process / developer team / internal competitors
 Indirectly express lack of awareness about security/privacy standards
 Dependencies
 Operations work as Apps, but it’s not a 1:1 mapping
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“Secure Code” Reality Check ♫22
15-20% defects remain after
static/dynamic scans
Bug-free software production is beyond
the current state of the art
Goal subtracts from more important
objectives (sustainability, manageability,
risk, usability, maintainability, customer
needs)

Enablers
. . . To the rescue
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SAFe Support for Security/Privacy
 Frequent iteration
 Automated test
 Shorter sprints
 Left-shifted test development
 Immersion with quality dimensions in value streams
 Nurture domain-rich security through “knowledge worker” focus
 Depicts security teams/artifacts as enablers, not blockers
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Security as Quality ♫
So far, an insight external to SAFe
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Meanwhile, at the Retrospective . . . ♫
 Enablers have different life cycles in different enterprises / projects
 Retrospectives often hint at enabler gaps
 Cut and paste
 Role of R&D
 Domain specific languages
 Repository deployment, discovery, development
 Maturing the CI/CD for security/privacy
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Test Engineering
Security as test and vice versa
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Frequent System Demos
 For security, as with quality, manageability, monitoring:
 Test must be fully integrated
 Left-shifted
 Tagging and annotation are valuable stubs when used with an orchestrator
 Increase reliance on IDE support
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Deconstructing
“Configuration
Error”
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 Developer or Insfrastructure engineering problem?
 Common Operations Responsibility

Security is a Specialization ♫
 Haphazard coverage in college level software engineering
 Reflecting indifference?
 Reflecting moving target, weak domain integration
 Consider how a rheumatologist engages a neurologist
 Some (few?) software engineers will become security specialists
 (nor should they have to)
 Each operation (e.g., Akamai or Palo Alto firewall specialist) role is specialized
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Legacy
“Over-the-
wall” Test
Engineering
♫
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 Some hardening may require aggressive red teaming
 New paradigm
 Not part of, but supported by SAFe
 Mix of legacy and software-defined data centers

Teaching Toys ♫
 “Zero Trust”
 Do what the unicorns do
 Many organizations (must) manage code written before Google was founded
 Security and capacity / performance management are unrelated
 Terraform
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Security as Code ♫
Yes, partly, but also knowledge engineering for domain-aware safety
frameworks.
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Decision
Support ♫
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 Derive from a full Integration with quality
 What telemetry to support decision-making?
 Security incidents, use cases may require human
intervention
 Need for models & simulation
 Earlier, often, incrementally available
 Risk may need HCI engagement
 Support for operations support tooling / dashboard-
style management

Security Big
Data ♫
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 Old: Applications telemetry as “signature,” “snapshot”
 Now: Application telemetry will exceed the scale of most
applications
 No telemetry, no analytics
 Security Analytics -> Complex Event Processing -> Data
science
 Dashboards for big data are still emerging from the data
science community

HCI in Security and Privacy♫
Human - Computer Interaction
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Repo’s,
Discovery &
Design
Patterns ♫
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 What are these patterns?
 SAFe offers some ideas, solutions, enablers
 CNCF community is part of this ecosystem, but how?
 What is an Ops Repo? Is it teachable?

Stories and
Domain
Knowledge ♫
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 Stories = Natural Language = Complex
 Security stories (e.g., OWASP -> an application domain)
 Domain expertise supersedes security expertise
 Are operations stories similar or different?
 Is Ops a stakeholder?

Technical Debt and Backlog
 Sometimes security dumping grounds
 Ops technical debt is . . . What?
 Failure to measure
 Telemetry gap
 Failure to design manageability
 Exogenous events
 New/updated integration points
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The Enterprise
Lens in SAFe
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 Small teams (e.g., CNCF teams)
 API-First
 Legacy software (owner, developer,
infrastructure)
 Product/Release Centered (vs. SRE)
 What is a “Product Owner” ?
 Simplistic views of
 Knowledge Management (vs.
CKO)
 Data / Application Management
(CDO)

Systemic Security Risks:
Termites in the House of Security ♫
 RBAC instead of ABAC
 The Admin Syndrome
 Short-sighted understanding of test engineering
 Weak adoption of ModSim
 Weak automation
 Excessive dependence on static / dynamic testing
 Risk registers are oil to security water
 Supply chain (especially OSS)
 “Machine Learning (‘AI’) will fix it”
 Frameworks (e.g., 800-53, etc., are too manual)
 DevSecOps based on weak software engineering (bash, CLI, no OOP)
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Contact
@knowlengr dark@computer.org
www. scaledagile.com
Presented to CNCF Sig Security 2020-04-01
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Security within Scaled Agile

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