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2011 Wintel Targeted Attacks and a Post-
Windows Environment APT Toolset
Extending the APT infiltration into new technologies
SAS 2012




Kurt Baumgartner, Senior Security Researcher
Global Research and Analysis Team
kurt.baumgartner@kaspersky.com
The Infiltration
2011 and Prior


  Targeted attacks and subsets

  “The APT” v “APT” v “APTs”? „It‟s a “who”, not a “how”‟

  General targeted attack activity, the APT and targets

  2011 attack details and IoC

  Post windows world?

  Attacks 2012 and beyond
The APT Infiltration
2011 and Prior



   Timelines!

   Corporate organizations are now defending themselves against nation
   states?

   Note – chart leaves out NGO‟s like Tibet‟s Government in Exile, the Falun
   Gong, various political and non-profit orgs, etc




     "State of the Hack: It‟s the End of the Year as We Know It 2011", Mandiant,
     http://www.mandiant.com/presentations/state_of_the_hack_its_the_end_of_the_year_as_we_know_it_-_2011/
The Infiltration
2011 – Persistent? Relentless
The Infiltration
2011 Offensive Security R&D Investment


  Indications of Attack Investment

  Flash – simple fuzzing, one bit adjustment (fairly low)
  Mitsubishi Heavy Industries – low
  RSA – medium (0day along with Poison Ivy?)
  Lockheed Martin – medium (another 0day + RAT?)
  Google – fairly low (IEPeers 0day)
  Tibetans, Uyghurs – low
  Undisclosed law firms – low
  Beltway think tanks – low
  Massive Fortune 50 Energy Firms – low
  Various overseas political groups – low
  Human rights groups – low

  Setting up, rotating, maintaining thousands of C2 – fair effort
  Email automation – low
  Translators/social engineers and schemers – fair effort
Targeted Attacks and Infiltration
Email as a Vector of Attack – Schemes, Automation


• Phishing with better bait – themes of relevant geographical, timely
  conference discussions, familiar interests, urgenct geopolitical
  interests, shared financial interests

• Automated schemes and changing work hours to fit targets
Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything”
Exploitation – Examining the attackers’ work



 2011 Exploitation – Adobe Flash, Adobe Reader, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft
 Office documents and Windows system components
 Let‟s discuss one of their favorites from this past year (CVE-2011-0611)


 Malicious pdf
 ???
 PdfStreamDumper
 http://sandsprite.com/blogs/index.php?uid=7&pid=57
 Flash Player Debugger (Flash Player Projector content debugger)
 http://www.adobe.com/support/flashplayer/downloads.html
 Fdb.exe Flex SDK
 http://opensource.adobe.com/wiki/display/flexsdk/Downloads
 SWFTools with SWFDump, although a Flash Decompiler might help
 Olly and patience – there is no crash
 Xvi32 or another hexeditor, .AS structures will be obfuscated and mangled
 Note – Adobe code can be a lot like Microsoft code - unexpected structures
 result in unexpected runtime behaviors
Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything”
Exploitation – Examining the attackers’ work



 Laying out the 2 Actionscripts with static and dynamic analysis

 replaceString on obfuscated code strings
 call hexToBin on the concatenated strings
 8.swf/Mainline.as calls loadBytes on the *de-obfuscated* “ddd.swf” and loads it
 to run, it is this badly mangled file that triggers the exploit for CVE-2011-0611

 ddd.swf attacks authplay.dll with its own actionscript custom function called on
 a confused object type
 Object type confusion is the name of the game, failure in authplay flow
 verification

 Heap spray and a chunked multi-stage shellcode deobfuscation stub, kernel32
 decomposed api call hash resolution and use (_lcreat, _lwrite, _lread, _lseek)
 provides ROP with over 50 links, drops dll from pdf content to %temp%,
 LoadLibrary(AdobeARM.dll) writes out rudll.dll, registers it as 6to4 Servicedll,
 loads into svchost.exe

       http://www.fortiguard.com/sites/default/files/CanSecWest2011_Flash_ActionScript.pdf
Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything”
Post Exploitation - Data Collection, Lateral Movement, Exfiltration


 365day and folks that don‟t update  “anyone who has an interest in security
 has already updated” Really?

 Effective but stale exploitation vs
 0day and “original research” or the “author”

 RATs, backdoors, spyware
         Data thievery
         Communications - encrypted?
         Comments Crew – Shady?

 Low investment - Pass-the-Hash utils, WCE
 New Active Directory vulnerability

 Archivers (rar), 7z, available source

 POSTs, FTP, outbound obfuscated communications
Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything”
Post Exploitation – Why “these” tools?



 2011 Backdoors – Poison Ivy, Agent, Agent, Agent2…

 Why Poison Ivy? Where is it from?
 ChaseNET хакер “forums” founded by previous Evil Eye Software Th3ChaS3r
 Members included ksv, shapeless, Heike, Digerati (busted in Operation Bot
 Roast II because of mistaken C2 config file update)…

 ShapeLeSS joined ChaseNET as 18 year old Swedish kid in late October
 2005, coded Poison Ivy
 Codius assumes the project years later, continues to distribute it for free
 SDK allows for new plugins and development, max size 7kb

 Connections? No. Continued development today? No.
 Stable, available, and FREE builder? Yes. Free SDK? Yes. Free crypters? Yes.
 Quantifiable tool? Reliable? Yes. Low investment? Yes.
Targeted Attacks – Identifying Details
Indicators of Compromise




 Indicators of Compromise – indicators? artifacts?

 OpenIOC open source project

 IoC Editor

 IoC Finder

 Isn‟t that what AV provides?
 Only it is based on XML format without
 the performance considerations?




                                                     http://openioc.org/
Targeted Attacks – Identifying Details
OpenIOC?



 IoC examples
                               ~
                            Stuxnet
A Post Windows Environment Toolset
Tablets are everywhere
Targeted Attacks in a Post-Windows World
Abused Platforms



 Android and iOS dominate the market
 Smartphones and tablets
 Blackberry(?)
 Windows Phone(?)

 Starting with the .mil space…
 2011 – DISA STIG Android v2.2 Dell Mobile
 Good Technology “Secure Browser” includes encryption capabilities with a
 fallback to Safari
 Webkit Dell Native Browser

 Attacks start with .gov/.mil? Sign of the times…
Targeted Attacks in a Post-Windows World
Originating research



 Offensive security and “original research”?
 Increased investment…


 HTML5 features and native support in browsers
 Increased attack surface
 Cache poisoning, clickjacking, data leakage

 Attacking remote client-side BoF?
 http://www.slideshare.net/seguridadapple/attacking-the-webkit-heap-or-how-to-
 write-safari-exploits
 Flash for mobile replaced with HTML5 and AIR
Thank You




Kurt Baumgartner, Senior Security Researcher
Global Research and Analysis Team
kurt.baumgartner@kaspersky.com

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2011 Wintel Targeted Attacks and a Post-Windows Environment APT Toolset

  • 1. 2011 Wintel Targeted Attacks and a Post- Windows Environment APT Toolset Extending the APT infiltration into new technologies SAS 2012 Kurt Baumgartner, Senior Security Researcher Global Research and Analysis Team kurt.baumgartner@kaspersky.com
  • 2. The Infiltration 2011 and Prior Targeted attacks and subsets “The APT” v “APT” v “APTs”? „It‟s a “who”, not a “how”‟ General targeted attack activity, the APT and targets 2011 attack details and IoC Post windows world? Attacks 2012 and beyond
  • 3. The APT Infiltration 2011 and Prior Timelines! Corporate organizations are now defending themselves against nation states? Note – chart leaves out NGO‟s like Tibet‟s Government in Exile, the Falun Gong, various political and non-profit orgs, etc "State of the Hack: It‟s the End of the Year as We Know It 2011", Mandiant, http://www.mandiant.com/presentations/state_of_the_hack_its_the_end_of_the_year_as_we_know_it_-_2011/
  • 4. The Infiltration 2011 – Persistent? Relentless
  • 5. The Infiltration 2011 Offensive Security R&D Investment Indications of Attack Investment Flash – simple fuzzing, one bit adjustment (fairly low) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries – low RSA – medium (0day along with Poison Ivy?) Lockheed Martin – medium (another 0day + RAT?) Google – fairly low (IEPeers 0day) Tibetans, Uyghurs – low Undisclosed law firms – low Beltway think tanks – low Massive Fortune 50 Energy Firms – low Various overseas political groups – low Human rights groups – low Setting up, rotating, maintaining thousands of C2 – fair effort Email automation – low Translators/social engineers and schemers – fair effort
  • 6. Targeted Attacks and Infiltration Email as a Vector of Attack – Schemes, Automation • Phishing with better bait – themes of relevant geographical, timely conference discussions, familiar interests, urgenct geopolitical interests, shared financial interests • Automated schemes and changing work hours to fit targets
  • 7. Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything” Exploitation – Examining the attackers’ work 2011 Exploitation – Adobe Flash, Adobe Reader, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Office documents and Windows system components Let‟s discuss one of their favorites from this past year (CVE-2011-0611) Malicious pdf ??? PdfStreamDumper http://sandsprite.com/blogs/index.php?uid=7&pid=57 Flash Player Debugger (Flash Player Projector content debugger) http://www.adobe.com/support/flashplayer/downloads.html Fdb.exe Flex SDK http://opensource.adobe.com/wiki/display/flexsdk/Downloads SWFTools with SWFDump, although a Flash Decompiler might help Olly and patience – there is no crash Xvi32 or another hexeditor, .AS structures will be obfuscated and mangled Note – Adobe code can be a lot like Microsoft code - unexpected structures result in unexpected runtime behaviors
  • 8. Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything” Exploitation – Examining the attackers’ work Laying out the 2 Actionscripts with static and dynamic analysis replaceString on obfuscated code strings call hexToBin on the concatenated strings 8.swf/Mainline.as calls loadBytes on the *de-obfuscated* “ddd.swf” and loads it to run, it is this badly mangled file that triggers the exploit for CVE-2011-0611 ddd.swf attacks authplay.dll with its own actionscript custom function called on a confused object type Object type confusion is the name of the game, failure in authplay flow verification Heap spray and a chunked multi-stage shellcode deobfuscation stub, kernel32 decomposed api call hash resolution and use (_lcreat, _lwrite, _lread, _lseek) provides ROP with over 50 links, drops dll from pdf content to %temp%, LoadLibrary(AdobeARM.dll) writes out rudll.dll, registers it as 6to4 Servicedll, loads into svchost.exe http://www.fortiguard.com/sites/default/files/CanSecWest2011_Flash_ActionScript.pdf
  • 9. Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything” Post Exploitation - Data Collection, Lateral Movement, Exfiltration 365day and folks that don‟t update  “anyone who has an interest in security has already updated” Really? Effective but stale exploitation vs 0day and “original research” or the “author” RATs, backdoors, spyware Data thievery Communications - encrypted? Comments Crew – Shady? Low investment - Pass-the-Hash utils, WCE New Active Directory vulnerability Archivers (rar), 7z, available source POSTs, FTP, outbound obfuscated communications
  • 10. Targeted Attacks - “Steal Everything” Post Exploitation – Why “these” tools? 2011 Backdoors – Poison Ivy, Agent, Agent, Agent2… Why Poison Ivy? Where is it from? ChaseNET хакер “forums” founded by previous Evil Eye Software Th3ChaS3r Members included ksv, shapeless, Heike, Digerati (busted in Operation Bot Roast II because of mistaken C2 config file update)… ShapeLeSS joined ChaseNET as 18 year old Swedish kid in late October 2005, coded Poison Ivy Codius assumes the project years later, continues to distribute it for free SDK allows for new plugins and development, max size 7kb Connections? No. Continued development today? No. Stable, available, and FREE builder? Yes. Free SDK? Yes. Free crypters? Yes. Quantifiable tool? Reliable? Yes. Low investment? Yes.
  • 11. Targeted Attacks – Identifying Details Indicators of Compromise Indicators of Compromise – indicators? artifacts? OpenIOC open source project IoC Editor IoC Finder Isn‟t that what AV provides? Only it is based on XML format without the performance considerations? http://openioc.org/
  • 12. Targeted Attacks – Identifying Details OpenIOC? IoC examples ~ Stuxnet
  • 13. A Post Windows Environment Toolset Tablets are everywhere
  • 14. Targeted Attacks in a Post-Windows World Abused Platforms Android and iOS dominate the market Smartphones and tablets Blackberry(?) Windows Phone(?) Starting with the .mil space… 2011 – DISA STIG Android v2.2 Dell Mobile Good Technology “Secure Browser” includes encryption capabilities with a fallback to Safari Webkit Dell Native Browser Attacks start with .gov/.mil? Sign of the times…
  • 15. Targeted Attacks in a Post-Windows World Originating research Offensive security and “original research”? Increased investment… HTML5 features and native support in browsers Increased attack surface Cache poisoning, clickjacking, data leakage Attacking remote client-side BoF? http://www.slideshare.net/seguridadapple/attacking-the-webkit-heap-or-how-to- write-safari-exploits Flash for mobile replaced with HTML5 and AIR
  • 16. Thank You Kurt Baumgartner, Senior Security Researcher Global Research and Analysis Team kurt.baumgartner@kaspersky.com

Notas del editor

  1. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  2. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  3. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  4. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  5. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  6. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  7. Slide #8Duration: 10 secThis was general information. Now,few practical examples. The first is Zbot outbreak: root cause, risk to the business, suggestions.
  8. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.
  9. Slide #6Duration: 1.5 minOn this slide you can see common IT security policy mistakes. The biggest mistake is to ignore network shares access rights. There might be an open share on internal file server or on end-user work desktop. (Question to the audience): Does anybody of you ever shared file directory from you work computer (desktop or laptop)? I.e. to transfer files to your co-worker computer.(Next question): Did you open it for unlimited users or just for dedicated person? Did you disable it later or just forgot?Sooner or later this can be a great source of malware redistribution in your organization. Looks now that the slide, this mistake is responsible for about 35% of incidents!There was an interesting case in one of the School Districts in the USA. The customer has several thousand end-users connected to the CSD network. Most of them are school student computers, beginning from 3rd grade. The network included few file share servers with unlimited access to everyone. So, everyone got infected after malware infected this network resource. The students could not do their class work, tests and lab work at school for at least few weeks.Now about missing security patches. Modern malware takes advantage of existing vulnerabilities. The network with even a single patch can be faced a serious risk. This is a common issue that we see mostly in Small organization, where number of end-users is less than 500. They either do not have enough expertise or ignoring patching completely.Partially protected environment means that Antimalware solution is installed on part of the network, leaving other resource unprotected.We have got some incidents related to firmware vulnerabilities. There was a software vulnerability in some DSL Router device. The impact of it was huge – possible lawsuit.And the last mistake is to believe that tools and software downloaded from the Web are always good software.