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Incident Response
Operation
Before/After Hacked
Sumedt Jitpukdebodin
Senior Security Researcher @ I-SECURE Co. Ltd.
LPIC-1, NCLA, C|EHv6, eCPPT, eWPT, CompTIA Security+, IWSS, CPTE
# whoami
• Name: Sumedt Jitpukdebodin
• Jobs: Security Consultant, Senior Security Researcher @ I-
SECURE
• Website: www.r00tsec.com, www.techsuii.com
• Admin: @2600thailand, @OWASPThailand
• Book: Network Security Book
• Hobby: Writing, Hacking, Researching, Gaming, etc.
• My article: please search google with my name.
Hacker
SOC(Security Operation Center)
Attacker And Defender
Catch me if you can
# id
• Hack is easy, defend is so f*cking hard.
• Surfaces
• 0day
• Social Engineering
• Etc.
Incident Response
# man ir
Definition
• Event - Activity that we monitor (Log)
• Incident - the damage event.
• Incident Response(IR) - Actions taken
subsequent to an incident to understand the
incident and take remedial action
Top Priority for IR.
• Identify the problems
• Fix the problems.
• Recovery system back to normal.
Step of IR.
Source:: http://www.emrisk.com/sites/default/files/images/newsletters/Incident%20Response%20Cycle.png
Step of IR.
• Preparation
• Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc.
• Detection(Identification) & Analysis
• From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned
• Containment
• Eradication
• Remediation
• Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned)
• What are they doing
• Where are they doing
• What backdoor have they left
• Develop Attack Signatures.
Step of IR.
• Preparation
• Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc.
• Detection(Identification) & Analysis
• From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned
• Containment
• Eradication
• Remediation
• Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned)
• What are they doing
• Where are they doing
• What backdoor have they left
• Develop Attack Signatures.
Step of IR.
• Preparation
• Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc.
• Detection(Identification) & Analysis
• From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned
• Containment
• Eradication
• Remediation
• Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned)
• What are they doing
• Where are they doing
• What backdoor have they left
• Develop Attack Signatures.
Step of IR.
• Preparation
• Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc.
• Detection(Identification) & Analysis
• From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned
• Containment
• Eradication
• Remediation
• Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned)
• What are they doing
• Where are they doing
• What backdoor have they left
• Develop Attack Signatures.
Step of IR.
• Preparation
• Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc.
• Detection(Identification) & Analysis
• From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned
• Containment
• Eradication
• Remediation
• Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned)
• What are they doing
• Where are they doing
• What backdoor have they left
• Develop Attack Signatures.
Step of IR.
• Preparation
• Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc.
• Detection(Identification) & Analysis
• From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned
• Containment
• Eradication
• Remediation
• Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned)
• What are they doing
• Where are they doing
• What backdoor have they left
• Develop Attack Signatures.
What to look for
• Look for abnormalities
• Performance issues, off peak activity
• Redirect some client.
• Example Indicators
• new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual
system usage patterns
• Example Sources
• Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic
• Potential Issue
• File/ Folder Encryption
• BIOS Password Protection
• Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
What to look for
• Look for abnormalities
• Performance issues, off peak activity
• Redirect some client.
• Example Indicators
• new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual
system usage patterns
• Example Sources
• Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic
• Potential Issue
• File/ Folder Encryption
• BIOS Password Protection
• Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
What to look for
• Look for abnormalities
• Performance issues, off peak activity
• Redirect some client.
• Example Indicators
• new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual
system usage patterns
• Example Sources
• Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic
• Potential Issue
• File/ Folder Encryption
• BIOS Password Protection
• Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
What to look for
• Look for abnormalities
• Performance issues, off peak activity
• Redirect some client.
• Example Indicators
• new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual
system usage patterns
• Example Sources
• Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic
• Potential Issue
• File/ Folder Encryption
• BIOS Password Protection
• Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
Before Breach
Source:: http://jokideo.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Funny-cat-Come-on-birdy.jpg
Centralized Log Diagram
Source:: http://www.sysadmin.in.th/course/LogFiles/Centralized_Logs_Server_by_SysAdmin.jpg
# whereis logs
• Device Log
• Server Log
• Application Log
# ls /var/log/
• web_server/{access.log,error.log}
• audit/audit.log
• syslog
• openvpn.log
# cat /var/log/apache2/access.log
# cat /var/log/syslog
Devices
• Firewall
• IDS/IPS
• Next Generation Firewall
• Mail Gateway
• Etc.
Centralized Log
• Syslog-ng(rsyslog)
• Splunk
• Graylog2
• logstrash
• Scribe
Example of Splunk
SIEM(“Security Information
and Event Management")
• Arcsight
• Log Correlation Engine By Tenable
• Splunk
• OSSIM **
• Alienvault **
• LOGalyze **
• Etc.
Log Correlation Engine By Tenable
Source:: http://www.tenable.com/blog/log-correlation-engine-36-now-with-its-own-gui
Arcsight
Source:: http://blog.rootshell.be/2013/06/26/out-of-the-box-siem-never/
Arcsight Dashboard
Source:: http://www.observeit.com/images/content/features_siem14.jpg
False Positive
SQL Injection Case
• Alert: SQL Injection
• Attacker: China
• Log From: Web Application Firewall
SQL Injection Case
After Breach
Source:: http://www.dumpaday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/funny-
cat-bath.jpg
Forensic
Forensic
• Containment
• Ensure that the system(s) and network are protected from further risk.
• Isolate the compromised system(s)
• Eradication
• How they got in
• Where they went
• What they did
• The removal of malware
• Patching Vulnerability
• Identifying vulnerability
• Improve network and system countermeasures
Forensic
• Containment
• Ensure that the system(s) and network are protected from further risk.
• Isolate the compromised system(s)
• Eradication
• How they got in
• Where they went
• What they did
• The removal of malware
• Patching Vulnerability
• Identifying vulnerability
• Improve network and system countermeasures
Recovery(Restore/Rebuild)
• Restore status of service to normal
• System owners decide based on advice from
incident handling team - Business Decision.
• Monitor the service after recovery
• Performance
• Anomalies
Lesson Learned
• Detail of incident report
• Communicate to others on the team
• Apply fixes in environment
• Conduct a performance analysis of the overall incident and improve operations
• “Not!!!!” Blaming people
• Review/Rewrite Policy
• Determines cost of incident
• Apply lesson learned to the entire entity
• Budget for, install, and maintain protection software
Incident response before:after breach

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Incident response before:after breach

  • 1. Incident Response Operation Before/After Hacked Sumedt Jitpukdebodin Senior Security Researcher @ I-SECURE Co. Ltd. LPIC-1, NCLA, C|EHv6, eCPPT, eWPT, CompTIA Security+, IWSS, CPTE
  • 2. # whoami • Name: Sumedt Jitpukdebodin • Jobs: Security Consultant, Senior Security Researcher @ I- SECURE • Website: www.r00tsec.com, www.techsuii.com • Admin: @2600thailand, @OWASPThailand • Book: Network Security Book • Hobby: Writing, Hacking, Researching, Gaming, etc. • My article: please search google with my name.
  • 6. # id • Hack is easy, defend is so f*cking hard. • Surfaces • 0day • Social Engineering • Etc.
  • 9. Definition • Event - Activity that we monitor (Log) • Incident - the damage event. • Incident Response(IR) - Actions taken subsequent to an incident to understand the incident and take remedial action
  • 10. Top Priority for IR. • Identify the problems • Fix the problems. • Recovery system back to normal.
  • 11. Step of IR. Source:: http://www.emrisk.com/sites/default/files/images/newsletters/Incident%20Response%20Cycle.png
  • 12. Step of IR. • Preparation • Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc. • Detection(Identification) & Analysis • From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned • Containment • Eradication • Remediation • Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned) • What are they doing • Where are they doing • What backdoor have they left • Develop Attack Signatures.
  • 13. Step of IR. • Preparation • Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc. • Detection(Identification) & Analysis • From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned • Containment • Eradication • Remediation • Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned) • What are they doing • Where are they doing • What backdoor have they left • Develop Attack Signatures.
  • 14. Step of IR. • Preparation • Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc. • Detection(Identification) & Analysis • From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned • Containment • Eradication • Remediation • Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned) • What are they doing • Where are they doing • What backdoor have they left • Develop Attack Signatures.
  • 15. Step of IR. • Preparation • Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc. • Detection(Identification) & Analysis • From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned • Containment • Eradication • Remediation • Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned) • What are they doing • Where are they doing • What backdoor have they left • Develop Attack Signatures.
  • 16. Step of IR. • Preparation • Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc. • Detection(Identification) & Analysis • From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned • Containment • Eradication • Remediation • Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned) • What are they doing • Where are they doing • What backdoor have they left • Develop Attack Signatures.
  • 17. Step of IR. • Preparation • Skill, Procedure , Log, Tools, Forms, Policies, Checklists, etc. • Detection(Identification) & Analysis • From Best Practise, Researching and Lesson Learned • Containment • Eradication • Remediation • Post-Incident Activities(Lesson Learned) • What are they doing • Where are they doing • What backdoor have they left • Develop Attack Signatures.
  • 18. What to look for • Look for abnormalities • Performance issues, off peak activity • Redirect some client. • Example Indicators • new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual system usage patterns • Example Sources • Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic • Potential Issue • File/ Folder Encryption • BIOS Password Protection • Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
  • 19. What to look for • Look for abnormalities • Performance issues, off peak activity • Redirect some client. • Example Indicators • new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual system usage patterns • Example Sources • Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic • Potential Issue • File/ Folder Encryption • BIOS Password Protection • Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
  • 20. What to look for • Look for abnormalities • Performance issues, off peak activity • Redirect some client. • Example Indicators • new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual system usage patterns • Example Sources • Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic • Potential Issue • File/ Folder Encryption • BIOS Password Protection • Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
  • 21. What to look for • Look for abnormalities • Performance issues, off peak activity • Redirect some client. • Example Indicators • new accounts, new directories, new file in website, file system changes, crashes, unusual system usage patterns • Example Sources • Access Log, IDS, IPS, Firewall, System Log, Suspicious Traffic • Potential Issue • File/ Folder Encryption • BIOS Password Protection • Whole Disk Encryption/ Risk
  • 23. Centralized Log Diagram Source:: http://www.sysadmin.in.th/course/LogFiles/Centralized_Logs_Server_by_SysAdmin.jpg
  • 24. # whereis logs • Device Log • Server Log • Application Log
  • 25. # ls /var/log/ • web_server/{access.log,error.log} • audit/audit.log • syslog • openvpn.log
  • 28. Devices • Firewall • IDS/IPS • Next Generation Firewall • Mail Gateway • Etc.
  • 29. Centralized Log • Syslog-ng(rsyslog) • Splunk • Graylog2 • logstrash • Scribe
  • 31. SIEM(“Security Information and Event Management") • Arcsight • Log Correlation Engine By Tenable • Splunk • OSSIM ** • Alienvault ** • LOGalyze ** • Etc.
  • 32. Log Correlation Engine By Tenable Source:: http://www.tenable.com/blog/log-correlation-engine-36-now-with-its-own-gui
  • 36. SQL Injection Case • Alert: SQL Injection • Attacker: China • Log From: Web Application Firewall
  • 40. Forensic • Containment • Ensure that the system(s) and network are protected from further risk. • Isolate the compromised system(s) • Eradication • How they got in • Where they went • What they did • The removal of malware • Patching Vulnerability • Identifying vulnerability • Improve network and system countermeasures
  • 41. Forensic • Containment • Ensure that the system(s) and network are protected from further risk. • Isolate the compromised system(s) • Eradication • How they got in • Where they went • What they did • The removal of malware • Patching Vulnerability • Identifying vulnerability • Improve network and system countermeasures
  • 42. Recovery(Restore/Rebuild) • Restore status of service to normal • System owners decide based on advice from incident handling team - Business Decision. • Monitor the service after recovery • Performance • Anomalies
  • 43. Lesson Learned • Detail of incident report • Communicate to others on the team • Apply fixes in environment • Conduct a performance analysis of the overall incident and improve operations • “Not!!!!” Blaming people • Review/Rewrite Policy • Determines cost of incident • Apply lesson learned to the entire entity • Budget for, install, and maintain protection software