Under Secretary of the Navy's presentation at the MCPON's 2012 Leadership Mess Symposium.

1. Department of the Navy
The Emerging Strategic Environment
and the U.S. Navy:
Where do we Stand?
Hon. Robert O. Work
MCPON Leadership Mess Symposium
26 Sep 2012

2. Sometimes, it’s good to take a break…
Declining OCO
Sequestration
Declining topline
DoN
6-month CR

3. Part I: Understanding where we are
I take …a ‘GPS approach’ to strategy…. The first
thing you have to understand about the historical
moment is where we are.”
Ralph Peters, 2007
3

4. Prior National Security Policy Eras
• Continental Era (July 4, 1776-December 29, 1890; 1374 months)
– Primary national security challenge: deter, defeat, or frustrate any
intervention of foreign powers in either the newly formed United States
or, later, the entire western hemisphere; screen our steady expansion to
the limits of our continental borders; secure the continent from internal
threats; and preserve the Union
– No entangling alliances; expeditionary posture…out-of-hemisphere
engagement through naval forces only
– Dominant service: Army (if not always in budget, in stature)
– 181 months at war (48 months with each other); ratio of number of
months at war to number of months at peace: 1:6.59
4

5. Prior National Security Policy Eras (II)
• Oceanic Era (December 30, 1890-March 12, 1947; 674 months)
– Primary national security challenge: Solidify position as a hemispheric
hegemon and secure the maritime approaches to the hemisphere; use a
secure hemispheric base to project joint power beyond the North
American continent for the first time
– We fought with allies and foreign partners overseas, but on our own
terms; we continued to avoid foreign alliances
– Expeditionary posture, but with first external bases—all on US
sovereign/ controlled territory
– Dominant service: Navy (in terms of world naval rankings)
– 108 months at war; war-to-peace ratio: 1:5.24
5

6. Prior National Security Policy Eras (III)
• Transoceanic (Eurasian) Era, aka, the Cold War (March 13, 1947-May
12, 1989; 506 months)
– Primary national security challenge: Lead a global coalition to
contain/deter a hostile ideological continental peer located across the
oceans
– Many entangling alliances; garrison posture, with large numbers of
external US bases on foreign soil around forward defensive perimeter
– Nuclear Warfighting Phase (1947-1960): Dominant service: Air Force (in
strategy, budget)
– Flexible Response Phase (1961-1988): no dominant service; PPBS and the
“1/3-1/3-1/3” rule
o 1/3 rule later solidified with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols
– 138 months at war; war-to-peace ratio: 1:2.67
6

7. With the end of the Cold War, we entered a
fourth national security policy era
• Global Era (May 13, 1989-present; 271 months…and counting)
– With the Cold War won, we began to slowly return to our more traditional
expeditionary global posture, with most US combat power resident in the
continental US or on US-controlled external bases
– Even as we reduced or disassembled our overseas garrisons, however,
leaders from both parties were determined to remain engaged forward in
order to maintain global stability and peace, prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and enlarge the community of democratic
nations
– In support of these key national security aims, the 1993 BUR called for a
force structure capable of fighting and winning two regional wars in
overlapping timeframes
o Perhaps more importantly, however, the BUR established the principle that the
U.S. military would be an important national instrument for actively “shaping”
the international environment in peacetime
7

8. Global Era (con’t)
• Global Era (May 13, 1989-present; 280 months…and counting)
– The BUR strategy, updated in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010, ultimately led to
notions of preventive war, armed nation building, and rebuilding failed
states as an sanctuary denial strategy
– It also led to an unprecedented level of military activity that has continued
to this day
– On Aug 31, 2012, we will have seen 138 months at war; war-to-peace ratio:
1:1.03 (and assuming we cease combat ops in Afghanistan in Dec, 2014:
1:0.85)
o Most active period of military activity in our country’s history
o Next most active period: between the start of the Transoceanic Era (March 12,
1947) and end of the Vietnam War (January 27, 1973), a 310-month long period
which saw 137 months at war, for a war-to-peace ratio of 1:1.25
8

9. Given the amount of military activity, the
Global Era has seen unprecedented defense
spending levels
(Dollars in Billions)
Iraq/Afghan
800
701.6
700 Korea 688.0
633.4
622.9 Reagan Buildup
600 Vietnam
551.8
533.6 530.9
500
400 371.5 369.7
300
200 187.9
100
0
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 11 12 14 16 17
Fiscal Year
Total Defense BA in Constant FY 2011 Dollars
Projections (red bars) assume OMB guidance plus OCO placeholder of $70B in FY14, trending to $20B in FY17
2

10. With this as backdrop, last year the
President announced a 10-year plan to
renew our economy
• This announcement signaled the start of the fifth broad defense “build-
down” since the end of World War II
– And an accompanying “strategic review” to inform the required budget
decisions
• DoD received successive savings targets:
– Initially: $400 billion in cuts to planned defense spending over 12 years
($33Bn/yr)
o At this point, each MILDEP was told to prepare an Alt POM that cut $49Bn over
FYDP
– Then: $400 billion in cuts over 10 years ($40Bn/yr)
– Then: $464 billion in cuts over 10 years ($46.4Bn/yr)
– Finally: $489 billion in cuts over 10 years ($48.9Bn/yr)
o Front-loaded, with $263 billion in cuts in first FYDP ($52.6Bn/yr)
o Forced OSD to sweep the entire Alt POMs of all three MILDEPs, and to delay
making “buy-backs” until after the completion of the strategic review 10

11. However, it would be a big mistake to think
of this as a simple budget drill
• As President Obama said:
– “[We have] failed to appreciate the connection between our
national security and our economy. Our prosperity
provides a foundation to our power. It pays for our military. It
underwrites our diplomacy.”
– “…I’d encourage all of us to remember what President
Eisenhower once said — that “each proposal must be weighed
in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain
balance in and among national programs.” After a decade of
war, and as we rebuild the source of our strength — at
home and abroad — it’s time to restore that balance.”
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12. Bottom line: getting our economic house in
order is now a strategic imperative
• “Today, our foreign and economic relations remain indivisible.
Only now, our great challenge is not deterring any single
military foe, but advancing our global leadership at a time
when power is more often measured and exercised in
economic terms….[E]verywhere I travel, I see countries
gaining influence less because of the size of their armies than
because of the growth of their economies…A strong economy
has been a quiet pillar of American power in the world. It gives us
the leverage we need to exert influence and advance our interests.
It gives other countries confidence in our leadership and a greater
stake in partnering with us.”
12

13. Simply put, we are seeking a different, more
sustainable path for continued US global
leadership
(Dollars in Billions)
Iraq/Afghan
800
Korea 701.6
700 688.0
633.4 Post- OIF/OEF
622.9 Reagan Buildup FY10 - 17: -24%
Vietnam
600
Post-Korea Post-Vietnam 551.8 Post- Cold War
533.6 530.9
FY52 - 56: -40% FY68 - 76: -30% FY86 - 98: -33%
500
400 371.5
369.7
300
Cold War: “Forever War”
200 187.9 506 months, 271 months,
138 months at 130 months at
100 war war
1 month at war for (and still
0 every 2.67 counting)
Fiscal Year
50 52 54 56 58
months at peace
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
W:P ratio falls to
98 00 02 04 06 08 10 11 12 14 16 17
1:1.08
Total Defense BA in Constant FY 2011 Dollars
Projections (red bars) assume OMB guidance plus OCO placeholder of $70B in FY14, trending to $20B in FY17
2

14. Military power will not be any less
important in the coming decade…but its
role is changing in National Grand Strategy
“The United States remains the only nation able to project and
sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances.
We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive
enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that
are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way, our
military continues to underpin our national security and global
leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and
leadership is reinforced. But when we overuse our military
might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools,
or act without partners, then our military is overstretched,
Americans bear a greater burden, and our leadership around
the world is too narrowly identified with military force.”
14

15. Part II: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
“This country is at a strategic turning point after a
decade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint
Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner,
but will be agile, flexible, ready, and
technologically advanced. It will have cutting edge
capabilities, exploiting our technological, joint, and
networked advantage…It will remain the world's finest
military.
President Barack Obama, 2012
15

16. We are assuming our more normal Global
Expeditionary Posture
Alaska
3Alaska
rd
Wing UK
4th Airborne
(2 Sqdns) and Germany
48th Fighter Wing Germany
2nd Stryker
354th and
(1 Sqdn) (3 Tactical Sqdns)
1st Stryker 52nd Cavalry Wing
Fighter
Fighter Wing
Brigades (1 Tactical Sqdn)
Regiment
Italy Japan
173rd Airborne Korea 35th Fighter Wing
Brigade 8th (2 Sqdns) and (2 Tactical Sqdns)
Italy
31st Fighter Wing 51st (2 Sqdns)
(2 Tactical Sqdns) Fighter Wings South Korea Okinawa
8th Army 18th Wing
(2 Tactical Sqdns)
Guam
36th Wing
Hawaii
Hawaii (No Tactical Sqdns)
25th15th Wing
Infantry
(1 Tactical Sqdn)
Division
U.S. Air Force Laydown
U.S. Army Laydown 16

17. “Sustaining US Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense”
• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent—if possible with a
smaller nuclear force.
• Sustain freedom of access throughout the global commons.
• Sustain US global freedom of action even in the face of increasingly
sophisticated anti-access and area-denial threats.
• Rebalance the focus of U.S. military forces toward the Asia-Pacific region.
• Rely on non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to
address instability to reduce the demand for significant troop
commitments to nation-building or stability operations.
17

18. “Sustaining US Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense”(II)
• Develop a long-term strategic partnership with India, to support its role
as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the Indian
Ocean.
• Maintain U.S. and allied military presence in—and support of—
partner nations in and around the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but
with less emphasis on large numbers of boots on the ground.
• Reduce our land-based posture in Europe while increasing forward-
stationed naval forces there
• Pursue innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to
achieve security objectives in Africa and Latin America.
Hard to imagine a more maritime friendly strategy, or one 18
that calls for more expeditionary excellence

19. Part III: Implications for the Navy
“To enable economic growth and commerce, America,
working in conjunction with allies and partners around
the world, will seek to protect freedom of access
throughout the global commons—those areas beyond
national jurisdiction that constitute the vital
connective tissues of the international system. Global
security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on
the free flow of goods shipped by air and sea.”
Sustaining US Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense
19

20. The Navy is particularly well-aligned with
the emerging strategic environment
“If a service does not possess a well-defined strategic
concept, the public and the political leaders will be
confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the
necessity of its existence, and apathetic or hostile to the
claims made by the service upon the resources of the
society.”
Samuel P. Huntington, 1954
20

21. Departments/services well aligned to the
strategy will inevitably do well in resource
allocation fights
• Three key elements of any service:
₋ Strategic concept: a description of how, when, and where the
military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to
its security.
₋ Organizational structure: how the service groups the resources
allocated by society…most effectively to implement the strategic
concept. Thus the nature of the organization is likewise dependent
upon the nature of the strategic concept.
₋ Resources: fiscal, technological, institutional, and human capital
21

22. Department of the Navy’s strategic concept
• As part of a combined National Fleet, the Navy-Marine Corps Team is an
expeditionary force for an expeditionary age—built and ready for war,
and operated forward to preserve the peace
⁻ The Navy-Marine Corps Team is the world’s preeminent expeditionary
organization
– Core competencies:
o High readiness
o Distributed, networked operations
o Disaggregated, networked operations
o Low-cost, innovative, unobtrusive presence
o Partnership building
– Key guarantor of access to maritime global commons
– Key guarantor of access to combat theaters, even in face of anti-
access/area denial threats
– Ideally matched for challenges in PACOM and CENTCOM
22

23. The “National Fleet” is the sum total of US
maritime capabilities and capacities
• Navy Battle Force
• US Marine Corps
• US Coast Guard
• Navy and Marine Corps air
• Maritime Patrol and Recon Force
• NECC
• Navy-Marine SOF/Cyber
• Special Mission Fleet
• Prepo Fleet/Surge Sealift
• Ready Reserve Force
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• Industrial base partners

24. Navy’s organizational construct:
“Total Force Battle Network”
• Used to be known as FORCEnet: the
operational construct and architectural
framework for naval warfare in the
information age, integrating warriors,
sensors, command and control, platforms,
and weapons into a networked,
distributed combat force.
• Sensor grid(s)
₋ Tied into National/Joint Grid
₋ Navy Multi-band Terminal
• C5I grid(s)
₋ CANES
₋ Jointly Interoperable
₋ TENTH FLT; MARFORCYBER
• Effects grid(s)
₋ Joint Network-enabled Weapons (JNEW)
24

25. TFBN: Key design principles
• Optimize the network, not the platform: Modular missile batteries (VLS)
₋ “All platforms sensors; all sensors netted” Modular platforms
₋ Sensors and payloads take precedence over
platforms (“trucks”)
• Design for rapid capabilities insertion
– Open architecture combat systems
– Modular, open architecture missile batteries UAVs
– Flexible payload space
• Build energy-efficient platforms with:
Helos
₋ Smaller crews (automation)
₋ Air and surface interfaces PBs
USVs
• Field multiple manned and unmanned “second- RHIBs
stage” (off-board) systems
₋ Helos + UAVs UUVs
₋ USVs + RHIBs + Boats
₋ UUVs
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• Develop network-enabled weapons

26. TFBN Battle Force emphasizes self-deployable, multi-
role/mission platforms with reconfigurable payload
bays and open combat systems
Medium Large X- XX- Large
Multi-mission Large
Small Multi-role/multi-mission
Multi-role
26

27. A globally distributed, fully netted force
27

28. People: our true secret weapon
High School Diploma Grads, %
AFQT Category I – IIIA (Score of 50+), %
Unprecedented quality , unequalled talent
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Source: CNRC, MCRC, OSD(P&R)

29. The Navy-Marine Corps Team:
An Expeditionary Force for an Expeditionary Age
Norway
MCPP-N
Kodiak
WHEC Poland
Seattle Aegis
WHEC Ashore
Alameda Norfolk
NSC Norfolk
CFFC Romania Japan
WHEC MDZ-Lant
MARFORLANT Aegis Ashore CVN Amphibs
Japan
Naples
DDG MCM
MDZ-Pac CLNC Rota 6th Fleet 7th Fleet
So. CA CG LCS
San Diego Charleston MEF
II DDG Okinawa
3rd Fleet
WHEC WHEC
Naples Bahrain III MEF
I MEF Guam
4th Fleet 5th Fleet
LCS
Hawaii
Hawaii MCM MEB
SSN
PACFLT
DDG
WHEC PC MPSRON
AS
MARFORPAC
CG WPB
Diego Garcia Singapore
MPSRON
AS LCS
Australia
MAGTF
BAMS Orbit
P-8 MOB & FOB
P-8 & BAMS CSL
USMC Forward-Stationed&Operating Bases (MOB & FOB)
P-8 Main and Cutters & AccessOrbits Locations (CSL)
USCG ForwardMAGTFs & Defense Zones Laydown
USN Fleet MARFOR Pre-Positioning
USN / USCG Maritime Laydown
MajorBAMSForward-Stationed
P-8 & BAMS Contingency Support
Port UAS Agreements

30. Given all that happening, it is easy to think
the wheels are starting to come off…
Declining budgets…
Chief’s Mess
…Reduced manning…
…Shrinking O&M…
Navy
6-month CR
Looming sequestration
30

31. But, by and large, US navy is very well
positioned for the emerging strategic
environment
• As part of a combined National Fleet, the Navy-Marine Corps Team is an
expeditionary force for an expeditionary age—built and ready for war,
and operated forward to preserve the peace
⁻ The Navy-Marine Corps Team is the world’s preeminent expeditionary
organization
31

32. Discussion and Questions
Under
MCPON
32

33. This posed a stiff challenge to the DON, since
the base budget build-up was not nearly as
substantial as the headlines suggested
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16
Total Funding $111 $112 $110 $116 $121 $141 $138 $149 $161 $162 $173 $172 $179 $179 $173
Baseline Funding $111 $112 $110 $115 $121 $129 $132 $135 $138 $137 $148 $153 $161 $161 $158 $159 $159 $160 $162
54% increase in total
200 40% increase in baseline
180 45% increase in baseline
19 19 15
25 19
(Constant Year FY11)
160
Billions of Dollars
22 26
140
12 15
0 6
1 72 69 66 67 68 69 70
120
63 67
46 51 51 54 55
100 44
38 40 37 43
80
40 42 43 44 46 47 48 46 47 47
60 38 41 38 39 39
33 34 34 33
40
20 40 39 38 38 39 43 42 44 44 43 43 44 45 45 46 45 45 44 44
0
FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16
MilPers O&M Investment OCO 33

34. Indeed, the build-up was just large enough to
help mask some serious structural budget
problems which forced many “hard choices”
• For example, the cost to maintain an AVF rose by about 20-28%
since FY98
– Cost per Sailor FY98: $70,822
– Cost per Sailor FY10: $83,656 (+ 18%)
– Cost per Marine FY98: $56,727
– Cost per Marine FY10: $68,753 (+ 21%)
• Only reason Departmental manpower costs rose only about 10%
was because we reduced active duty end strength:
– DoN active duty end-strength FY98: 555K
– DoN active duty end-strength FY10: 531K (-24K)
o Navy end strength dropped by over 40K
34

35. We also had to shift money to maintain
(aging) equipment
• Overall, the DON share of topline devoted to O&M rose by
about 40%
• Maintenance funding per ship FY98: $13.5M
Maintenance funding per ship FY10: $22.3M (+ 65%)
• Maintenance funding per a/c FY98: $226K
Maintenance funding per a/c FY10: $383K (+ 73%)
• Partly reflected the fact that we decommissioned ships and
aircraft and slowed procurement, causing equipment to age
– Avg age per ship increased from 17.91 to 21.70 yr
– Avg age per a/c increased from 15.76 to 18.74 yr
35

36. Very high fleet optempo also contributed to
higher O&M costs (and was wearing out the
force faster than expected)
• Ship operations FY98: $2.67B
Ship operations FY10: $4.64B (+ 74%)
40-45% of fleet deployed! (compared to about 25% in the
Cold War)
• Air operations FY98: $2.95B
Air operations FY10: $5.04B (+ 71%)
• Marine Corps operations FY98: $2.17B
Marine Corps operations FY10: $5.14B (+ 137%)
36