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Affordable trustworthy-systems
- 1. Can Truly Dependable Systems Be Affordable? @GernotHeiser NICTA and UNSW Australia 1 APSys'13 Keynote
- 2. Copyright Notice These slides are distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License • You are free: – to share—to copy, distribute and transmit the work – to remix—to adapt the work • under the following conditions: – Attribution: You must attribute the work (but not in any way that suggests that the author endorses you or your use of the work) as follows: • “Courtesy of Gernot Heiser, [Institution]”, where [Institution] is one of “UNSW” or “NICTA” The complete license text can be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 2 COMP9242 S2/2014 W01
- 3. Present Systems are NOT Trustworthy! ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 3 APSys'13 Keynote Yet they are expensive: • $1,000 per line of code for “high-assurance” software! 3
- 4. Fundamental issue: large stacks, need isolation E.g. medical implant • 1 kLOC critical code • 20–100 kLOC trusted computing base (TCB) • 100s of bugs • dozens of exploits! 1,000 LOC 4 APSys'13 Keynote Control, monitoring, maintenance Network stacks Device drivers Processor >10,000 LOC >10,000 LOC ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 4 Life-supporting RTOS 1,000 LOC 1,000 LOC
- 5. High Assurance Bad Practice Uncritical/ untrusted Processor ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 5 Sensitive/ critical/ trusted • TCB of millions of LOC • Expect 1000s of bugs • Expect 100s of vulnerabilities Hacker’s delight! Isolation? Xen/VMware/KVM hypervisor Huge TCB 5 APSys'13 Keynote
- 6. High Assurance Best Practice Uncritical/ untrusted Processor ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 6 Sensitive/ critical/ trusted • Isolate • Minimise the TCB • Assure TCB by • testing • code inspection • bug-finding tools Separation kernel Minimal “trusted computing base” (TCB) base” Always incomplete! 6 APSys'13 Keynote
- 7. State of the Art: NICTA’s seL4 Microkernel Uncritical/ untrusted Processor ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 7 Strong Isolation Sensitive/ critical/ trusted seL4 microkernel Truly dependable TCB 7 APSys'13 Keynote • Provable isolation! • Provable assurance! No place for bugs to hide!
- 8. NICTA’s seL4: Mathematical Proof of Isolation Proof Proof Proof ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 8 APSys'13 Keynote Integrity Abstract Model C Imple-mentation Confiden-tiality Availability Binary code Functional correctness [SOSP’09] Isolation properties [ITP’11, S&P’13] Translation correctness [PLDI’13] Exclusions (at present): • Initialisation • Privileged state & caches • Multicore • Covert timing channels Timeliness [RTSS’11] 8
- 9. ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 99 Cyber Security August'13
- 10. NICTA’s seL4 Microkernel: Unique Assurance ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 10 APSys'13 Keynote First and only operating-system with functional-correctness proof: operation is always according to specification First and only operating-system with proof of integrity and confidentiality enforcement – at the level of binary code! First and only protected-mode operating-system with complete and sound timing analysis World’s fastest microkernel on ARM architecture Predecessor deployed on 2 billion devices 10
- 11. seL4: Cost of Assurance Proof Proof Proof ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 11 APSys'13 Keynote Integrity Abstract Model C Imple-mentation Confiden-tiality Availability Binary code 20.5 py 4.5 years 1 py 4 months 0 py By construction 4.5 py 2 py, 1.5 years Mostly for tools 11 2 py, 1 year Mostly for tools $400 per line of code! Estimate repeat cost: $200/LOC
- 12. Cost of Assurance Industry Best Practice: • “High assurance”: $1,000/LOC, no guarantees, unoptimised • Low assurance: $100–200/LOC, 1–5 faults/kLOC, optimised State of the Art – seL4: – $400/LOC, 0 faults/kLOC, optimised • Estimate repeat would cost half – that’s about the development cost of the predecessor Pistachio! • Aggressive optimisation [APSys’12] – much faster than traditional high-assurance kernels – as fast as best-performing low-assurance kernels 12 APSys'13 Keynote ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 12
- 13. What Have We Learnt? Formal verification probably didn’t produce a more secure kernel • In reality, traditional separation kernels are probably secure But: • We now have certainty • We did it probably at less cost Real achievement: • Cost-competitive at a scale where traditional approaches still work • Foundation for scaling beyond: 2 ⨉ cheaper, 10 ⨉ bigger! How? • Combine theorem proving with – synthesis – domain–specific languages (DSLs) 13 APSys'13 Keynote ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 13
- 14. Boeing Unmanned Little Bird (AH-6) Deployment Vehicle ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 14 SMACCMcopter Research Vehicle Next Step: Full System Assurance DARPA HACMS Program: • Provable vehicle safety • “Red Team” must not be able to divert vehicle 14 APSys'13 Keynote
- 15. Control Board Mission Board Verified RTOS Radio control ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 15 C&C File system seL4 – verified microkernel Hardware Hardware Sensors • gyro, • accel, • … C&C Radio Micro-controller Control Monitor CAN bus controller Network camera Proces-sor Untrusted Linux kernel, image processing Device drivers CAN Bus Key: Trusted Trusted, NICTA Untrusted System Structure 15 APSys'13 Keynote
- 16. Architecting System-Level Security/Safety Architecture Specification Requirements (specific set of security/safety properties) Component Model Untr trusted Untr Correctness Formal ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 16 Automatic Analysis (Requirements fulfilled) Component Implementations Untr trusted Untr Verified Glue Code seL4 Kernel Glue Code Proof seL4 Proof proof Synthesis Functional correctness Security Automatic Generation of Glue code Communication Init 16 Cyber Security August'13
- 17. Synthesis: Device Drivers [SOSP’09] Formal Formalise specs! Formal ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 17 driver.c OS Interface Spec Device Spec 17 APSys'13 Keynote
- 18. Actually works! (On Linux & seL4) IDE disk controller W5100 Eth shield Intel PRO/1000 Asix AX88772 USB-to-Eth adapter ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 18 Ethernet SD host controller UART controller 18 APSys'13 Keynote
- 19. Synthesis: Device Drivers In progress: • Extract device spec from device design work-flow • Manual optimisations • Verified synthesis ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 19 driver.c APSys'13 Keynote Formal OS Interface Spec Formal Device Spec 19
- 20. Hardware Design Workflow Informal specification High-level model Manual transformation Register-transfer-level description netlist ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 20 Too detailed (for now) • Low-level description: registers, gates, wires. • Cycle-accurate • Precisely models internal device architecture and interfaces • “Gold reference” 20 APSys'13 Keynote
- 21. Hardware Design Workflow Informal specification High-level model Manual transformation Register-transfer-level description netlist Use for now ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 21 • Captures external behaviour • Abstracts away structure and timing • Abstracts away the low-level interface bus_write(u32 addr, u32 val) { ... } 21 APSys'13 Keynote
- 22. DSLs: File System ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 22 Abstract Spec (Isabelle) Component Component Spec Component Component Spec (Isabelle) Component Spec (DSL) Spec (DSL) Spec (DSL) Component Implementation (C) Component Implementation (C)Generated Component Implementation (Generated C) Manual Proof Generated Proof Component Spec (Isabelle) Gene- (Isabelle) rator APSys'13 Keynote File-system properties: • Multiple, pre-defined abstraction levels • Naturally modular • Lots of “boring” code • (de-)serialisation • error handling 22
- 23. File System Code and Proof Co-Generation Proof Proof Manual, FS-specific Manual, FS-independent Generated Proof Proof ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 23 CSDL code Declarations of Types, Functions verified filesystem code Verified C code DDSL code generation Control Code Data layout Control Code ADT Code (De-)seriali-sation Code Isabelle specs & proofs Control Code Spec ADT Code Spec (De)-serial. Code Spec Functional spec Proof Proof generation generation APSys'13 Keynote Case study: Flash file system • Linux-compatible • Fits between VFS and flash abstraction (UBI) 23
- 24. Future: Full-Scale Trustworthy System Untrusted Apps Verified Resource Management ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 24 Cyber Security August'13 Verified critical application Verified microkernel Verified File systems Verified Device Drivers Processor Devices Verified Network Stacks Verified High-level runtime Untrusted VM Untrusted Linux Untrusted Apps 24
- 25. Lessons Learnt So Far Formal methods are expensive? • Cost-effective for high assurance on small to moderate scale • $200-400/LOC for 10kLOC We think we can scale bigger and cheaper: • Componentisation – verify components in isolation – enabled by seL4 guarantees – cost – performance tradeoff • Synthesis • Abstraction: DSLs, HLLs increase productivity Big challenge: Proof composition 25 APSys'13 Keynote ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 25
- 26. Where To Find More • UNSW Advanced Operating Systems Course http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~cs9242 • NICTA Trustworthy Systems research http://trustworthy.systems • seL4 open-source portal http://sel4.systems • L4 Microkernel Headquarters http://l4hq.org • Gernot’s blog: http://microkerneldude.wordpress.com/ • Gernot’s research home page: http://ssrg.nicta.com.au/people/?cn=Gernot+Heiser ©2013 Gernot Heiser, NICTA 26 COMP9242 S2/2014 W01