DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
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DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks CF Chui Solutions Architect, Arbor Networks
![Who is Arbor Networks?
90%
Percentage
of
world’s
Tier
1
service
providers
who
are
Arbor customers
107
Number
of
countries
with
Arbor
products
deployed
#1
Arbor
market
position
in
DDoS
Mitigation
Equipment
in
Carrier,
Enterprise
and
Mobile
markets
[Infonetics Research,
Dec.
2014]
Number
of
years
Arbor
has
been
delivering
innovative
security
and
network
visibility
technologies
&
products
14
$19B
2013
GAAP
revenues
[USD]
of
Danaher
– Arbor’s
parent
company
providing
deep
financial
backing
Amount
of
global
traffic
monitored
by
the
ATLAS
security
intelligence
initiative!
120+ Tbps
We
See
Things
Others
Can’t]()
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DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
- 1. DDoS Threat Landscape Countering Large-scale DDoS Attacks CF Chui, Arbor Networks
- 2. Who is Arbor Networks? 90% Percentage of world’s Tier 1 service providers who are Arbor customers 107 Number of countries with Arbor products deployed #1 Arbor market position in DDoS Mitigation Equipment in Carrier, Enterprise and Mobile markets [Infonetics Research, Dec. 2014] Number of years Arbor has been delivering innovative security and network visibility technologies & products 14 $19B 2013 GAAP revenues [USD] of Danaher – Arbor’s parent company providing deep financial backing Amount of global traffic monitored by the ATLAS security intelligence initiative! 120+ Tbps We See Things Others Can’t
- 3. ATLAS Global Threat Analysis System
- 4. Attack Landscape seen by ATLAS
- 5. ATLAS Demographics • ATLAS provides invaluable data to Arbor customers and the broader operational security community • 330+ participating customers – 32% Europe – 24% North America – 17% Asia – 9% South America – 9% Global • Tracking a peak of over 120Tbps
- 6. DDoS : Attack Types 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2014 2015 2015 • Two-‐thirds of attacks are volumetric, up slightly – No surprise given reflection storm • 90% of respondents report seeing application-‐layer attacks – 4% fall in proportion of application-‐layer attacks 2014 2014 DDoS Attack Types
- 7. Substantial Growth in Largest Attacks • Largest reported attacks ranged from 400Gbps at the top end, through 300Gbps, 200Gbps and 170Gbps • Some saw multiple events above 100Gbps but only reported largest
- 8. Worldwide DDoS attacks trend Period Average Attack size (bps) Change (Q / Q) Peak Attack Size (bps) Change (Q / Q) 2014 Q1 1.12Gbps -‐ 325.06Gbps -‐ 2014 Q2 759.83Mbps -‐32.2% 154.69Gbps -‐52.4% 2014 Q3 858.98Mbps +13.05% 264.61Gbps +71.1% 2014 Q4 830.37Mbps -‐3.3% 267.21Gbps +1% 2015 Q1 804.12Mbps -‐3.1% 334.22Gbps +25% 2015 Q2 1.04Gbps +29.4% 196.35Gbps -‐41% World 2015 Q1 Size Break-‐Out, BPS <500Mbps >500Mbps<1Gbps >1<2Gbps >2<5Gbps >5<10Gbps >10<20Gbps World 2015 Q2 Size Break-‐Out,BPS <500Mbps >500Mbps<1Gbps >1<2Gbps >2<5Gbps >5<10Gbps >10<20Gbps
- 9. § Percentage of attacks over 1Gbps is growing strongly § 16% in 2014, 17.7% in Q1 ‘15, 20.8% in Q2. § Most Growth in the 2 – 10Gbps range § Attack PPS rates also on the rise § 8.7% of attacks over 1Mpps in Q2, up from 5.7% in Q1 and 5.4% in 2014 Attacks size Analysis – Worldwide § Percentage of attacks over 10Gbps resumes growth. § 1.26% in 2014, 0.9% in Q1 ’15, 1.41% in Q2 ’15. § Big jump in 50-100Gbps attacks in June. 2014/2015 Event Size Break-‐Out Month-‐by-‐Month 0 100 200 300 400 500 >50Gbps >100Gbps 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 >10Gbps >20Gbps
- 10. Reflection/Amplification attacks – Worldwide § Looking at attacks with source-ports of services used for reflection. § Q2 2015 shows number of SSDP attacks starting to fall back. § 84K in Q2, 126K in Q1 2015, 83K in Q4 ’14 § 50% of reflection attacks in Q2 targeting UDP port 80 (HTTP/U) § Average attack sizes increase for all vectors except SNMP. § Average duration of reflection attack 20 mins in Q2 (19 mins in Q1). Protocol UDP Source Port Max Size Q2 ‘15 Average Size Q2 ‘15 SNMP 161 10.95bps 1.06Gbps Chargen 19 44.9Gbps 2.2Gbps DNS 53 120.3Gbps 2.78Gbps SSDP 1900 144.91Gbp s 2.42Gbps NTP 123 185.94Gbp s 2.75Gbps Reflection Mechanism as % of Overall Attacks 0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00% 2014 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2015 Q1 2015 Q2 SSDP NTP DNS Chargen MSSQL SNMP
- 11. Period Average Attack size (bps) Change (Q / Q) Average Attack duration Change (Q / Q) 2014 Q1 579.99Mbps -‐ 28m 58s -‐ 2014 Q2 530.51Mbps -‐8.5% 29m +0% 2014 Q3 588.74Mbps +11% 31m 8s +7.3% 2014 Q4 500.68Mbps -‐15% 41m 10s +32% 2015 Q1 483.65Mbps -‐4.4% 46m 11s +12% 2015 Q2 800.01Mbps +65.4% 39m 53s -‐14% Attack traffic size -‐ APAC Q2 2015 >20Gbps 10-‐20Gbps 5-‐10Gbps 2-‐5Gbps 1-‐2Gbps 500Mbps-‐1Gbps <500Mbps Attack duration -‐ APAC Q2 2015 >24 hours 12-‐24 hours 6-‐12 hours 3-‐6 hours 1-‐3 hours 30 mins-‐1 hour <30 mins APAC DDoS attacks trend
- 12. Large DDoS attacks seen in 2015 APAC Peak Attack Growth trend in Gbps 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 88.31 66.63 235.6 127.16 76.29 83.44 76.75 77.25 98.89 113.18 61.15 117.15 334.22 94.13 51.25 136.91 100.99 144.91 Q1 14 Q2 14 Q3 14 Q4 14 Q1 15 Q2 15 235Gbps/63Mpp s to India, NTP reflection attack, 21 min 23 sec 127Gbps/34Mpp s to Malaysia , NTP reflection attack, 29 min 99Gbps/26Mpps to India, NTP reflection attack, 31 min 117Gbps/31Mpp s to India, NTP reflection attack, 15 min 37 sec 334.22Gbps/29. 13Mpps to India, reflection attack, 6 min 45 sec 144.91Gbps/53.6 2Mpps to China, SSDP reflection attack, 10 min 32 sec
- 13. Large Attacks Analysis § Number of attacks > 10Gbps increases significantly in Q2 2015. § Number of attacks > 50Gbps jump from 12 in Q1 2015 to 80 in Q2 2015 Large DDoS attacks analysis – APAC 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun no of events of attack sizes > 10Gbps
- 14. § 99% of the attacks < 1Gbps § 95% of attacks last less than 1 hour DDoS attacks target Malaysia H1 2015 Peak attack size Avg attack size Avg duration Q1 15 94.13 Gbps/18.73 Mpps UDP flooding attack 80.94 Mbps/ 17.93 Kpps 42 min 32 sec Q2 15 27.90 Gbps/2.41 Mpps UDP flooding attack 72.71 Mbps/ 11.99 Kpps 30 min 3 sec Attack traffic size -‐ MY Q2 2015 >20Gbps 10-‐20Gbps 5-‐10Gbps 2-‐5Gbps 1-‐2Gbps 500Mbps-‐1Gbps <500Mbps Attack duration -‐ MY Q2 2015 >24 hours 12-‐24 hours 6-‐12 hours 3-‐6 hours 1-‐3 hours 30 mins-‐1 hour <30 mins
- 15. Average attack sizes – Malaysia 139.05 114.6 119.8 65 64.46 147.51 128.46 209.25 80.94 72.71 0 50 100 150 200 250 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Average attack traffic size (Mbps) per Quarter
- 16. Peak attack sizes – Malaysia 69.69 10.96 7.47 124.77 20.49 127.16 58.33 91.2 94.13 27.9 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Peak attack traffic size (Gbps) per Quarter
- 17. Number of attacks – Malaysia 2356 1179 1493 21361 25844 30147 30957 28036 42428 34605 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 No of attacks per Quarter
- 18. Average attack duration – Malaysia 4740 1984 1471 741 1470 2146 1917 2901 2552 1803 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Average attack duration (sec) per Quarter
- 19. Reflection/Amplification attacks Attacker-Reflector Leg Attacker-Victim Leg SOURCE: Data sourced from tenth Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report and ATLAS data Anatomy of an NTP Reflection Attack Source: ATLAS Data VictimAttacker Unsecured NTP Servers (http://openntpproject.org) Used to reflect and amplify NTP Monlist Request (small) Src IP: Spoofed (Victim’s IP) Dest IP: Unsecured NTP Server Src Port: 80, Dest Port: 123 NTP Monlist Request (large) Src IP: Unsecured NTP Server Dest IP: Victim Src Port: 123, Dest Port: 80 NTP reflection attack was responsible for the largest monitored attack by ATLAS in 2014 325Gbps 89 NTP attacks over 50Gbps including 5 attacks over 200Gbps
- 20. Industry Best Current Practices (BCPs) • BCPs are industry best practices for locking down a network • Deploy these as policy to limit the exposure of your network Network Infrastructure BCPs • Separation of control plane from data plane • Interface ACLs (iACLs) • Source based remote triggered blackhole S/RTBH • Destination based remote triggered blackhole D/RTBH • Flowspec • uRPF Host Based BCPs • OS Hardening • Access control • Antivirus • Patching/Version Control • Application Tuning
- 21. Mitigation Architecture – Options available tACLs – block all unnecessary protocols/ports at network ingress – protect critical resources Flowspec – BGP-based injections of ACLs or routing policy to filter or divert traffic S/RTBH – Source based remote triggered blackhole can be used to block known bad sources D/RTBH – Destination based remote triggered blackhole can be used as a method of last resort to protect the network IDMS – Intelligent DDoS mitigation to protect everything else
- 22. How Can ISPs Defend Against These Attacks? • Deploy antispoofing at all network edges. – uRPF Loose-Mode at the peering edge – uRPF Strict Mode at customer aggregation edge – ACLs at the customer aggregation edge – uRPF Strict-Mode and/or ACLs at the Internet Data Center (IDC) aggregation edge – DHCP Snooping (works for static addresses, too) and IP Source Verify at the IDC LAN access edge – PACLs & VACLs at the IDC LAN access edge – Cable IP Source Verify, etc. at the CMTS – Other DOCSIS & DSL mechanisms
- 23. Customer 1 Downstream ISP Internet Data Center 1 Service Provider Data Center 2 Customer 2 Regional Broadband • Utilize flow telemetry (NetFlow, cflowd/jflow, etc.) exported from all network edges for attack detection/classification/traceback – Open-source flow telemetry collection/analysis tools allow basic visibility;; can be sufficient for high-volume attacks, once impact is evident – Arbor Peakflow SP, which provides automated detection/classification/traceback and alerting of DDoS attacks via anomaly-detection technology Pervasive Detection – The Attack Surface
- 24. Mitigation – IDMS Peer B Peer A Upstream Upstream IXP-W Upstream IXP-E Upstream IDMS
- 25. Mitigation High Availability • Network-Based Redundancy – Regional redundancy using BGP anycast to mitigate traffic at the nearest location – Appliances or blades in a router • Scrubbing Center Redundancy – Multiple TMS appliances in a single scrubbing center – Use of Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) between appliances • Link Redundancy in Datacenter – Deploy APS appliances in redundant datacenter paths – Manually fail over to backup path if system fails into bypass
- 26. BGP Anycast Mitigation Redundancy Peakflow SP TMS Customer Aggregation IP Core Scrubbing Center 1 POP B D1 D2 P1 A2A1 S1 Peers Customer CPE S1 S2 P2 C2C2 S2 S1 Peakflow SP TMS Scrubbing Center 2 D1 D2 S1S1 S2 Transit
- 27. Mitigation Center Redundancy - CEF/ECMP CEF/ECMP load balancing between TMS appliances in a mitigation center Arbor TMS IDMSes TMS Mitigation Cluster Attack Regional Mitigation Center
- 28. IDC On-Premise APS Link Redundancy Pravail 1 Since each APS port-‐pair can also offer hardware bypass, single box failures do not require re-‐convergence. Internet Pravail 2
- 29. Scaling Mitigation Capacity • Currently-shipping largest-capacity Intelligent DDoS Mitigation System (IDMS) – 40gb/sec • 16-IDMS (CEF/ECMP limit) = 640gb/sec per cluster • Multiple clusters can be anycasted • Largest number of IDMSes per deployment currently 100 = 4tb/sec of mitigation capacity per deployment, 10x more than largest DDoS to date. • Deploy IDMSes in mitigation centers at edges - in/out of edge devices. • Deploy IDMSes in regional or centralized mitigation centers with dedicated, high-capacity OOB diversion/re-injection links. Sufficient bandwidth for diversion/re-injection is key! • S/RTBH & flowspec leverage router/switch hardware, hundreds of mpps, gb/sec. Leveraging network infrastructure is required due to ratio of attack volumes to peering and core link capacities!
- 30. • The Flow specification can match on the following criteria: – Source / Destination Prefix – IP Protocol (UDP, TCP, ICMP, etc.) – Source and/or Destination Port – ICMP Type and Code – TCP Flags – Packet Length – DSCP (Diffserv Code Point) – Fragment (DF, IsF, FF, LF) • Actions are defined using Extended Communities: – 0x8006: traffic-rate (rate 0 discards all traffic for the flow) – 0x8007: traffic-action (sample) – 0x8008: redirect to VRF – 0x8009: traffic-marking (DSCP value ) DDoS Mitigation – BGP Flowspec
- 31. • ACLs are still the most widely used tool to mitigate DDoS attacks – But…ACLs are demanding in configuration & maintenance. • BGP Flowspec leverages the BGP Control Plane to simplify the distribution of ACLs, greatly improving operations: – Inject new filter rules to all routers simultaneously without changing configuration. – Reuse existing BGP operational knowledge & and best practices. • Improve response time to mitigate mitigate DDoS attacks! Why Use BGP For ACLs?
- 32. BGP Flowspec Mitigation IPS/ID S Enterprise or IDC Victim Service Provider Network Route r Flowspec filter applied on the external interfaces, only traffic matching that flow is discarded. SP Portal initiates BGP update with ACL filter to be applied at the edge router external interfaces (in theory the customer could also initiate it). Firewal l Botnet Legitimate Users Route r Good traffic Attack traffic BGP Announcement FLOWFLO W • BGP Flowspec route validation performed for eBGP sessions only. Edge routers configured with BGP flowspec sessions, and flowspec filtering enabled on external peering interfaces.
- 33. BGP Flowspec Traffic Redirection DDoS Scrubber Detection & Control Good traffic Attack traffic BGP Flowspec Diversion Internet Internet Scrubbing Center “Dirty” VRF IPS/ID S Enterprise or IDC Victim Route r Firewal l Route r Traffic Reinjection BGP Flowspec filter to redirect only specified traffic that matches rule FLOW Diverted traffic is a subset of all traffic destined to victim
- 34. BGP Flowspec – Vendors • Router vendors supporting BGP Flowspec: – Cisco IOS XR 5.2.0 & XE 3.14 – Alcatel-Lucent 7750 SROS 9.0R1 – Juniper JunOS 7.3 • DDoS mitigation vendors: – Arbor Peakflow SP >5.8 • BGP Tools: – ExaBGP Injector
- 35. Mitigation – S/RTBH or Flowspec Peer B Peer A Upstream Upstream IXP-W Upstream IXP-E Upstream Peakflow SP advertises list of blackholed prefixes based on source or destination addresses, or layer-‐4 flowspec classifier Edge routers drop attack traffic packets based on source or destination address, or layer-‐4 classifier (flowspec) Edge routers drop attack traffic packets based on source or destination address, or layer-‐4 classifier (flowspec)
- 36. SDN Illustrated Northbound API (REST) Controller Southbound API Northbound API (REST) Controller Southbound API WB API Logical View Physical View Controller Policy OpenFlow
- 37. NFV Illustrated Internet Router Arbor APS FW IPS LB Webservers Internet vRouter vAPS vFW vIPS vLB Logical View Physical View Web VMs
- 38. Where SDN Could be Ideal • Meter traffic conditions, application and user behavior • Match those conditions against a set of pre- defined criteria (policy) • Act on the match according to a policy (control behavior) Northbound API (REST) Controller Southbound API Northbound API (REST) Controller Southbound API WB API OpenFlow
- 39. Where SDN Could be Ideal • Meter traffic conditions, application and user behavior • Match those conditions against a set of pre- defined criteria (policy) • Act on the match according to a policy (control behavior) Northbound API (REST) Controller Southbound API Northbound API (REST) Controller Southbound API WB API OpenFlow
- 40. Provider B Provider A Data Center TMS GOOD TRAFFIC BAD TRAFFIC X X X OPENFLOW TMS Blacklist Offload via OpenFlow • Offloads traffic filtering from TMS to the network fabric via SDN protocol for greater scale and performance • Integrates 3rd party SDN controller ‘speaking’ OpenFlow • Similar/extensible to other policy-based protocols: BGP, FlowSpec, NETCONF, etc.
- 41. Mitigation – OpenFlow Peer B Peer A Upstream Upstream IXP-W Upstream IXP-E Upstream TMS
- 42. Summary - Detection/Classification/Traceback/Mitigation • Utilize flow telemetry (NetFlow, cflowd/jflow, etc.) exported from all network edges for attack detection/classification/traceback – Many open-source tools available as well • Enforce standard network access policies in front of servers/services via stateless ACLs in hardware-based routers/layer-3 switches. • Ensure recursive DNS servers are not queryable from the public Internet – only from your customers/users. • Ensure SNMP is disabled/blocked on public-facing infrastructure/servers. • Disallow level-6/-7 NTP queries from the public Internet. • Disable all unnecessary services such as chargen. • Regularly audit network infrastructure and servers/services.
- 43. Arbor Networks’ Product Portfolio
- 44. Thank You