For this second session, we continue with awareness on web application security (OWASP). A deep dive into the code

1. HACKING 101
Henallux, 28th November 2014
Olivier Houyoux
Technology Security Architect @ Nitroxis Sprl

2. SCHEDULE FOR THE DAY
1. Why are we here?
2. Real Life Examples
3. Owasp – Top 10 (2013)
4. Demo Web Hacking Simulation Walkthrough
5. Summary
6. Questions

3. DO WE NEED WEB APP.
SECURITY?
 Well managed infrastructure
 Important data on web applications
 Malware spreading

4. EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama

5. EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova

6. EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
3. Samy Kamkar

7. EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
3. Samy Kamkar
4. Kevin Poulsen

8. EXAMPLES
1. Barack Obama
2. Maria Sharapova
3. Samy Kamkar
4. Kevin Poulsen
5. …

9. OPEN WEB APPLICATION
SECURITY PROJECT
Make software security visible
 Cheat Sheets, Tutorials, Testing guides…
 Tools (WebGoat, WebScarab, …)
 Library (ESAPI)
 …

10. OWASP TOP 10
Broad consensus about what the most critical web
application security flaws are.

11. OWASP TOP 10
OWASP Top 10 - 2013
A1 - Injection
A2 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
A5 - Security Misconfiguration
A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control
A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A9 - Using Known Vulnerable Components
A10 - Unvalidatde Redirects and Forwards

12. WEBGOAT
is a deliberately insecure web application designed to
teach web application security lessons.

13. A1 – INJECTION
User input injected without checking
 SQL
 LDAP
 Command
 XPATH
 …

14. A1 – SQL INJECTION EXAMPLE 1
Connection conn = pool.getConnection();
String sql = "select * from user where username=‘" + username + "’
and password=‘" + password + "’";
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);

15. A1 – SQL INJECTION EXAMPLE 1
Connection conn = pool.getConnection();
String sql = "select * from user where username=‘" + username + "’
and password=‘" + password + "’";
Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(sql);

16. A2 – BROKEN AUTHENTICATION
 User / Password
Brute force attack
 Birthday paradox
 Weak management functions
Change or recover password

17. A2 – SESSION MANAGEMENT
1. Session Hijacking
 Stealing authenticated user’s session ID
2. Session Fixation
 Forcing user’s session ID

18. A2 – SESSION HIJACKING EXAMPLE

19. A2 – SESSION HIJACKING EXAMPLE

20. A2 – SESSION FIXATION EXAMPLE
public class LoginServlet extends HttpServlet {
…
public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
String user = request.getParameter("user");
String pass = request.getParameter("password");
…
HttpSession session = request.getSession(true);
…
}
…
}

21. A2 – SESSION FIXATION EXAMPLE
public class LoginServlet extends HttpServlet {
…
public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
String user = request.getParameter("user");
String pass = request.getParameter("password");
…
HttpSession session = request.getSession(true);
…
}
…
}

22. A3 – CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)
Untrusted data sent to victim without validation and / or
escaping
XSS allows attackers to execute script in browsers to:
 hijacking users’ sessions,
 redirecting user to malicious site,
 …
1. Reflected XSS
2. Stored XSS

23. A3 – XSS EXAMPLE
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="<%=userBean.getName()%>"/>
</form>

24. A3 – XSS EXAMPLE
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="<%=userBean.getName()%>"/>
</form>

25. A3 – XSS EXAMPLE
<form name="update" method="post" action="...">
<input type="text" value="<%=userBean.getName()%>"/>
</form>
<input type="text" value="who_cares"/><script>...</script>"/>

26. A4 – INSECURE DIRECT OBJECT REF.
Reference to internal object like
 file,
 directory,
 database key
without
 access control check,
 other protection.

27. A4 –DIRECT OBJECT REF. EXAMPLE
String query = "select * from accounts where account = ?";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(query);
stmt.setString(1, request.getParameter("account"));
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();

28. A4 –DIRECT OBJECT REF. EXAMPLE
String query = "select * from accounts where account = ?";
PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement(query);
stmt.setString(1, request.getParameter("account"));
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
http://foo.com/app/accountInfo?account=notmyaccount

29. A5 – SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION
 Secure configuration defined and deployed for the:
 application,
 frameworks,
 application server,
 web server,
 database server,
 platform.

30. A5 – MISCONFIGURATION EXAMPLE

31. A5 – MISCONFIGURATION EXAMPLE
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<Server port="8005" shutdown="SHUTDOWN">
<GlobalNamingResources>
<Resource name="UserDatabase" auth="Container" … />
</GlobalNamingResources>
<Service name="Catalina »>
<Connector port="80" protocol="HTTP/1.1" … />
<Connector port="443"
protocol="org.apache. … .Http11Protocol" … />
</Service>
</Server>

32. A5 – MISCONFIGURATION EXAMPLE
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<Server port="8005" shutdown="SHUTDOWN">
<GlobalNamingResources>
<Resource name="UserDatabase" auth="Container" … />
</GlobalNamingResources>
<Service name="Catalina »>
<Connector port="80" protocol="HTTP/1.1" … />
<Connector port="443"
protocol="org.apache. … .Http11Protocol" … />
</Service>
</Server>

33. A6 – SENSITIVE DATA EXPOSURE
Protect sensitive data such as
 credit cards,
 authentication credentials
 …
Apply extra protection (encryption at rest or in transit) and
precautions when exchanged with browser.

34. A6 – DATA EXPOSURE EXAMPLE 1
An application encrypts credit card numbers in a database
using automatic database encryption.
However, this means it also decrypts this data
automatically when retrieved, allowing an SQL injection
flaw to retrieve credit card numbers in clear text.

35. A6 – DATA EXPOSURE EXAMPLE 2
A site simply doesn’t use SSL for all authenticated pages.
Attacker simply monitors network traffic (like an open
wireless network), and steals the user’s session cookie.

36. A7 – MISSING ACCESS CONTROL
Verify function level acces:
 before making functionality visible in GUI ✓
 when each function is accessed ✗

37. A7 – ACCESS CONTROL EXAMPLE
@Stateless
public class OrderBean implements Order {
public String getDetail(String id) {
…
}
public String approve(String id) {
…
}
…
}

38. A7 – ACCESS CONTROL EXAMPLE
@Stateless
public class OrderBean implements Order {
public String getDetail(String id) {
…
}
public String approve(String id) {
…
}
…
}

39. A8 – CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY
2. User visits forum.com 1. User authenticates to bank.com
3. Page contains tag
<img
src=bank.com/transfer.jsp?account=atta
cker&amount=300000>
4. User’s browser makes GET request
bank.com/transfer.jsp?account=attacker&
amount=300000
without user knowing

40. A8 – CSRF EXAMPLE
Nearly everything is susceptible to CSRF, so no need to
hunt the bug …

41. A9 – USING VULNERABLE COMPONENTS
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database (https://cve.mitre.org)

42. A10 – UNVALIDATED REDIRECT
1. Lure the user into clicking a redirect link
http://www.trusted.com/redirector?to=http://www.evil.com
2. Code does not perform any validation
String location = (String) request.getParameter(« to »);
response.sendRedirect(location);
3. User thinks (s)he’s accessing trusted.com but is in fact
at evil.com

43. SUMMARY
LAYERS OF DEFENSE IN DEPTH
Policies, Procedures,
Awareness
Physical
Perimeter
Internal Network
Host
App
Data

44. AND NOW …
 bWAPP
 OWASP Top 10
 CWE 25
 Mitigations (SANS, OWASP Cheat Sheets, …)
 Web Services (SOAP & REST)
 Mobile
 And more …

45. QUESTIONS ?

46. FOLLOW US ON …
nitroxis Nitroxis.BE
@Nitroxis_sprl
Nitroxis sprl
Training and Certification for
information Security
Professionals

47. ADD DEPTH TO YOUR INFORMATION SYSTEM
Olivier Houyoux Technology Security Architect
Version 1.1
Date 28/11/2014
Mail Contact (at) nitroxis.be
Website www.nitroxis.be