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FB1H2S aka Rahul Sasi www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackers.com Garage  4 Hackers http://www.garage4hackers.com Cracking Salted Hashes Web Application Security:  The Do and Don'ts of  Cryptography.
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com An Introduction Garage  4 Hackers http://www.garage4hackers.com
[object Object],[object Object],Garage  4 Hackers http://www.garage4hackers.com www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Application that doesn’t use cryptography hashes: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],onclick="javascript:document.frm.id.value='user'; document.frm.passwd.value='value'; this.form.passwd.value=(hex_md5('CC6AB28BA9FAD121184B09E00F1DD6E7'+this.form.passwd.value)); this.form.submit(); www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
So now what if the data are Encrypted , IS it secured ?? www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Hash Functions:  Cracking The Salted Hashes:  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
So what is that you could do to figure out the Hashing Algorithm used?? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
My hashes were  13 char long and no where in the cheat sheet, but I was able to figure it out using few programming tutorial websites. ,[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
A simple walk through of of the Php crypt function:  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com <?php $password = crypt('password'); ?> Hashes: laAsfestWEiq1 Here password hashes generated would be on basis of a random 2 digit salt. Or we could provide our on salt. <?php $password = crypt('password',’salt’); ?> Hashes: sih2hDu1acVcA And the  password verification code would be as follows:   if (crypt($user_password, $password) == $password) {    echo &quot;Correct Password&quot;; } ?>
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Slated  Hashes. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com $password = &quot;password&quot;;  //user input $salt = &quot;salted&quot;; $password = md5($salt.$password); //saved in db md5(saltedpassword) Hashes: 1423de37c0c1b63c3687f8f1651ce1bf Salt: salted
For verifying such algorithms we need to try the following things. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Cracking the salt: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com We know : Md5(‘password’)== “5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99” Now question is  Md5(‘password’ + “????WHAT????”)  === “1423de37c0c1b63c3687f8f1651ce1bf”
Salt/Hash algorithm with Random Salt: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com $password = user_input(); //user i $salt = rand(5); &quot;; $password = md5($salt.$password); //saved in db md5(saltedpassword) Hashes: 6f04f0d75f6870858bae14ac0b6d9f73:14357 (Hash:Salt) Salt: 14357
A Scenario for the Requirement for a new tool. ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
How it should work ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Finding an unknown Hash Algorithm: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com <?php $password = sha1('password');  //  de4he6la fe4oe6late4he6lade4he6lade4he6la $final_password= md5($password) Final Password Hashes: 1423de37c0c1b63c3687f8f1651ce1bf
Algorithm_Bruter ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Algorithm_Bruter.php www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com
Thank You ,[object Object],www.fb1h2s.com www.garage4hackkers.com

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Salt Cryptography & Cracking Salted Hashes by fb1h2s

Notas del editor

  1. www.garage4hackers.com