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Client-side password
Encryption

Pedro Fortuny & Carlos Amieva
(& Rafael Casado “in absentia”)
Client-side password
Encryption

No worries, James, let the sysadmin deal with the problem.
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?

I mean
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?
Client-side password
Encryption
Honestly:

Can you trust your sysadmin?

really?
Client-side password
Encryption

I said really
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Ways to minimize data exposure to the
sysadmin
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Ways to minimize data exposure to the
sysadmin
One step
Client-side password
Encryption
We need
Ways to minimize data exposure to the
sysadmin
One step
Protecting passwords from local access /
MITM
Client-side password
Encryption

The Sibyl v2.0
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust

Client
Server
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

Server
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

Server

no

ol
fo
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

no

ol
fo

Server

zorg:~# a=`pidof mysql`
zorg:~# strace -p $a -e crypt -f
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

no

ol
fo

Server

zorg:~# a=`pidof mysql`
zorg:~# strace -p $a -e crypt -f
[pregnant silence]
Client-side password
Encryption
State of affairs 2013 - blind trust
TLS/SS
L
Client

, this i

s SAFE

, oooo
hh!

I

se
u

r yp
sc

I’m
t,

no

ol
fo

Server

zorg:~# a=`pidof mysql`
zorg:~# strace -p $a -e crypt -f
[pregnant silence]

[pid 9] crypt(“patata”,“$7$21212104040SaLt.$”)
Client-side password
Encryption

?

Do you
really
think
hackers
do NOT
use
strace
Client-side password
Encryption

BUT
Your sysadmin is
good
(tm)

[assumming you have not been rooted]
Client-side password
Encryption

BUT
Your sysadmin is
good
(tm)

[assumming you have not been rooted]

Trust in me...
Client-side password
Encryption

Can do better
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Server
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Store “RSA(scrypt(pwd))”
on the server

Server
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Store “RSA(scrypt(pwd))”
on the server

Server

RSA channel
Sibyl

Use a hardware
module to authenticate
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Server

Sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

Server

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)
Server

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)
Server

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)
Server

msg=PUBi(hash)
Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L
Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side
msg=PUBi(hash)

- but “
trust

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)

Server
Priv(PUB0(hash))
==
Login?
Priv(PUBi(hash))
Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption
TLS/SS
L

- but “
trust

Client
[Pub key]
hash=scrypt(pwd) is run
on the client side
msg=PUBi(hash)

in me.

..”

only stores
PUB0(hash)

Server
Priv(PUB0(hash))
==
Login?
Priv(PUBi(hash))

Only the Sibly can answer this

Sibyl
[Priv, Pub] RSA pair
Client-side password
Encryption

There is no encryption
performed
on the server
Client-side password
Encryption

The Sibyl can be
completely dumb
[not yet implemented]
no access to the priv. key
Client-side password
Encryption

The sysadmin has no
way to MITM or whatever
Trustless pwd management
Client-side password
Encryption
Isn’t it better to trust
people, Charlie Brown?
Client-side password
Encryption
Isn’t it better to trust
people, Charlie Brown?

No, Lucy, no...
Client-side password
Encryption

Details
[...]
skip if necessary
Client-side password
Encryption
client

server

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)

server

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)
[V1,V2]

sibyl
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]
decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]

yes/no

decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]

yes/no
grant/deny

decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption
client

V1=RSAi(pwd)
[login,V1]

server V2=RSA0(pass)
(stored)

sibyl

[V1,V2]

yes/no
grant/deny

much gorier
(already
done)

decrypt(v1)
==?
decrypt(v2)
Client-side password
Encryption

Thank you

??

And don’t forget to
have a nice meal

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The Sibyl: NoConName 2013