1. DRAFT
I N S E A R C H O F S A L A F I J I H A D I S T
S T R A T E G I C T H O U G H T : M I N I N G T H E
WORDS OF THE TERRORISTS
MARK STOUT1
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
The written works of a small but intellectually vigorous community of Salafi jihadist
thinkers in and associated with al Qaida provide proof that strategic thought exists
within their terrorist movement. This strategic thought is grounded in the mainstream of
world thought on revolutionary warfare. A key concern for these strategic thinkers,
however, is the extent to which the rank and file of the movement ignores their
strategically prudent prescriptions and instead engages in disjointed, often
counterproductive operations. In the face of these problems, the movement’s strategic
thinkers are adapting, taking on ideas more consonant with “leaderless resistance”. The
Federal Government is soon to open a very large collection of captured terrorist
documents at a new Conflict Records Research Center. These documents will provide a
rich field of inquiry for such analyses.
Terrorism, like war, is a form of political struggle. Thus, it is interesting that the scholars of these two
forms of political struggle approach their respective fields quite differently. Most often those who study
terrorism take a bottomup approach. Focusing on the individual, they ask such questions as, “why do
people become terrorists?” or “is there a psychology unique to terrorists?”1 Traditionally, scholars who
study war have started from a topdown perspective. They talked about nation states, national interests,
great captains, and strategy. Within the specific field of military history, in fact, it has been only
relatively recently that the “new military history” has focused on the connections between armies and the
societies that spawn them.2
1
This paper was presented at the International Studies Association 2008 Convention, San Francisco, California,
March 29, 2008. It was written at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) as part of a project sponsored by the
Department of Defense. However, this paper represents only the author’s personal views. It does not represent the
views of IDA, the Department of Defense or any command or agency of the Department. This paper discusses
research by analysts at the Institute for Defense Analyses in support of US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). In
particular, this paper draws upon Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler with Jim Lacey, The
Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements,
(Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2008), hereafter, Stout, et al, TPP. JFCOM, having determined that the public
interest would be served by the broader dissemination of this report, arranged for its publication in the form of a
book. I would like to thank Mary Kathryn Keegin for her important contributions to this paper. Any errors of fact
or interpretation are, of course, mine. I would also like to thank Jessica Huckabey, Elizabeth Nathan, and Kevin
Woods for their comments on this paper.
1
2. DRAFT
The idea that strategic thought might exist and be important within modern terrorist groups has received
insufficient attention. However, ideas do matter and there is much useful topdown work to be done on
the ideas of terrorists. This paper will argue that strategy and strategic thought are worthy topics of
inquiry in the realm of terrorism analysis and it will discuss some findings of the “Terrorist Perspectives
Project” (TPP).3 This paper looks at the strategic perspectives of “al Qaida and associated
movements” (AQAM). It concludes by describing an opportunity for other scholars to work with the
same (indeed, the growing) body of primary source materials from international terrorist groups.
DATA
People deliver their ideas largely through words. Thus, a goal of the TPP has been to work with the
unmediated words of the members of AQAM. This work depends centrally upon two sets of primary
source materials from AQAM: captured documents and opensource materials. Though issues of
translation sometimes are substantial, these materials allow us to study the issues on the minds of the
jihadists in their own words.
During the course of the War on Terrorism, American forces routinely capture enemy documents. These
range from handwritten pocketlitter to published books as well as various visual and electronic media.
Once acquired, the documents are scanned or copied and stored in a Defense Department electronic
database. This database links the original document, usually in PDF format, to a metadata page that
“gists” the document and describes the circumstances surrounding its capture. It also links to any English
translation that exist. The database contains hundreds of thousands of terrorist documents.4 It is difficult
to estimate the total number of pages, because a document may range in size from a single page to
hundreds of pages.
Regardless of the route by which they got to us, most of the opensource materials originated on the
Internet. They range from videos released by Salafi jihadists to blog postings to published ebooks and e
magazines. These open materials come largely through the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Opensource
Center (OSC), formerly known as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Other important
opensource information came from the SITE Intelligence Group (formerly the SITE Institute) and other
nongovernmental institutions. Some information we acquired from the Internet or from the few books
published in the west that were written by former members of the Salafi jihadist movement.
Captured documents are a useful complement to opensource materials. Sometimes, the distinction
between the two blurs when texts that are available in opensource also appear in captured documents.
This is a testimony to the fact that AQAM reads its own open literature. It is also a result of a broader
fact: namely that this adversary tends to say in public what it says in private. The discourse of the open
literature is not appreciably different from that of the documents written purely for internal consumption.
Thus, one can reasonably conclude that this enemy is generally sincere in its public discourse.
The literature of the Salafi jihadists is not purely propaganda. Nor does it consist entirely of bomb
manuals, poison recipes, and religious tracts. In fact, the content of both the captured and opensource
2
3. DRAFT
documents varies widely. It ranges from the equivalent of grocery lists, to the kind of trashtalking
common to young people and soldiers around the world, to detailed discussions of weapons and tactics, to
treatises on Islam, to propaganda tracts and so on. However, it also includes important and oft
overlooked discussions of strategy and politics that are often remarkably light on religious bombast. This
paper concentrates primarily on those works that Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer have dubbed
“jihadi strategic studies.”5
SALAFI JIHADISM
The membership of Al Qaida and associated movements is defined by its adherence to an understanding
of Sunni Islam which they and outsiders often refer to as “Salafi jihadism.”6 It is important to note that
most Salafis are not “Salafi jihadists” and many Salafis deny that “Salafi jihadists” are Salafis at all.7
Though there are many issues in play, a witting or unwitting adherence to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb
(19061966) and a personal commitment to action are the two best markers of a Salafi jihadist. In fact,
Qutb’s short book, Milestones, first published in 1964, plays a role for Salafi jihadists somewhat
analogous to that played by the Communist Manifesto for Communists.8
Qutb, an Egyptian, began with the premise that Islam, as manifested in the Quran and the Sunnah,
contains all the answers that mankind needs and that all other ideologies are oppressive and corrupt.
Furthermore, Qutb longed for a future when men would be free to worship Allah as He wants to be
worshipped.2 Islam, he wrote, “is really a universal declaration of the freedom of man from servitude to
other men and from servitude to his own desire…It is a declaration that sovereignty belongs to God alone
and that He is the Lord of all the worlds.” Qutb believed firmly in tawhid, the unity of Allah, meaning
that He is not only the sole sovereign of the universe, but also that He should be the only object of
worship and obedience. To this mix, Qutb added the idea of jahiliyya, an Islamic term which translates
directly as “ignorance,” but which really refers to preIslamic barbarism. He declared that the ummah
(the community of Muslims) was nearly extinct because almost all socalled “Muslims” had, in fact,
reverted to a state of jahiliyya, due to the repressive effects of democracy, communism, and various other
nonIslamic influences. “The foremost duty of Islam in this world,” Qutb maintained, “is to depose
jahiliyya from the leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the
particular way of life which is its permanent feature.” This meant the implementation of sharia (Islamic
law) in all Muslim lands, and the spreading of his understanding of the faith to all the selfstyled Muslims
in the world. 9
Just as MarxismLeninism held that feelings of national patriotism were the product of “false
consciousness,” so, too, does Salafi jihadism, as enunciated by Qutb and elaborated by his followers,
though they do not use that expression. “True Islam” as the Salafi jihadists imagine it sees no distinction
among nationalities or races. It sees only Muslims and nonMuslims. Much as the communists believed
2
This article uses “Allah” and “God” interchangeably for a number of reasons. First, “Allah” is the Arabic word for
“God.” Second, most Muslims believe they worship the same God as Christians and Jews. Third, the translators
upon whose work we draw are not consistent in their usage, but we have been reluctant to edit their work.
3
8. DRAFT
“war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”35 One captured document, for instance,
echoed Clausewitz’s statements about the connection between war and politics: “We talked earlier about
war and politics. However, both have one objective, with different techniques of achieving the target.”36
According to alSuri, the loss of sight of this goal contributed to the failure of the revolt in Syria. “With
the exception of some mujahideen leaders, and some members, most of the people who waged this
revolutionary war were low on religious instruction and lacked political awareness…they did not
comprehend that this war was a means to a political end. Their ignorance made them incapable of
developing a comprehensive strategic plan.”37 Abu Ubayd alQurashi has noted that:
based on what [Clausewitz] the famous plotter has declared centuries ago, Mao Tse Tong
has mentioned in his book about the revolutionary war, the basic relation between war
and politics; a relation which render[s] military operations relevant to the political
leadership. In this regard, Mao declared, ‘war can never be separated from politics.’ He
added, ‘politics is a war itself, but without shedding any blood.’ Thus Mao further says
that all the operations executed by the revolutionary arm especially the military ones…
should be an implementation of political aims.38
In particular, then, AQAM’s thinkers interpret the centrality to their struggle of political efforts as
meaning that they must be one with the people. To a substantial degree, one can understand the efforts of
AQAM’s strategists as a continuing quest to find the formula for rallying the support of the masses. In
the late 1980s’, alSuri realized the importance of this as well. “No matter how big or capable the
vanguard organization is,” he wrote,
The war it wages is waged on behalf of the masses, those masses are its source of
information, supplies, personnel, and refuge a gang warfare theorist once said (the
masses are the sea in which the vanguard organization should swim like a fish). All
revolutionary wars that were able to mobilize the masses on their behalf were successful;
such as Algiers, China, and Vietnam, however, the revolutionary wars that failed to
achieve that and were isolated from their masses ended up in defeat, like Malaysia,
Philippines, and Greece {Refer to the translated book: The War of those deemed weak.}39
[As written]
One might argue that there is a disjuncture between the jihadists’ strategic influences, which largely talk
about revolutionary warfare within countries, and the task the jihadists actually face, a nearglobal
revolution. To be fair, there are no good templates or models for global insurgency, so the jihadist
strategists are bringing their own ideas to the table, as well.40 It follows that their strategic thought is not
and cannot be entirely made up of rehashed communist revolutionary thought.
Since 1996, al Qaida has enunciated and refined a twotrack strategy for the reestablishment of the
Caliphate, though not all Salafi jihadist groups share al Qaida’s global perspective.41 The first track is
largely military. It calls for the violent expulsion of the United States (and to lesser and varying degrees,
depending on the location in question, other “colonial” powers such as Britain, France, and Australia)
8
13. DRAFT
Become a strategic phenomenon, following the model of the Palestinian Intifada against
occupation forces, the settlers, and all who aid them. However, it should be broadened
and embrace all corners of the Islamic world, reaching with its deterrent arms the heart of
the invading United States and its allies of infidels, from every race and every place.59
AlSuri characterized this new strategy as entailing a “system, not organization.” The system should pass
on only “a common aim, a common doctrinal program, and a comprehensive educational program.” The
general guidance and common educational program would entail promulgating material to incite the
masses to “resistance” and to educate them in conducting the struggle. This would mean widely
disseminating “military training manuals, and courses, and popular guides to popular resistance” in
Arabic and also translating them into Turkish, Urdu, Malaysian, and Indonesian, “as well as to other
Islamic languages” and perhaps even into English, French, and Spanish.60
As might be predicted, no other member of the jihadist intellectual elite has made an argument as
comprehensive as alSuri’s. However, there are indications that at least two strategists are thinking along
similar lines. In the summer of 2006, Lewis Atiyatallah seemed to urge delay in creating a model Islamic
state—with all the bureaucracy and infrastucture that alSuria loathed—even if the jihadists should attain
victory in Iraq over the United States. AlSuri would certainly have agreed with his reasoning:
Establishing a nation in the real meaning (which includes being attached to a certain piece
of land with presence of establishments, departments on the land, and the people who are
on a certain piece of land…etc.) We are not in a hurry for that; it consumes energy and
will be an easy target for the enemy (the Americans and their followers have long arms,
which are the air weapons and the weapons of mass destruction, we must be aware of
that).61
Muhammad Khalil alHakaymah, a senior al Qaida operational leader and propagandist (whose work, it
must be admitted, is often highly derivative) has presented a vision that is more expansive than
Atiyatallah’s. In the autumn of 2006, he urged AQAM to find a “new method” of fighting. Previously,
they had operated in “open battlefields,” “prov[ing] that they are incomparable fighters.” This brought
about “victories” in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia. However, the jihadists had proved incapable of
standing up to American military might because the Americans used “a new fighting technique” to which
the jihadists were not accustomed. This entailed isolating the “victimized country” and ruthless
application of military force through extensive use of local collaborators and “air and missile
13
17. 1
For example: Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004);
Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the TwentyFirst Century, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2008); Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, (New York: Ecco, 2003); Scott
Atran, “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2:5 (March 2008), pp. 310. For an excellent
survey of the work of psychologists on such questions see Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, (Tampa: University of
South Florida, 2004). As counterexamples, see Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of alQaida Strategist Abu
Mus’ab alSuri, (London: Hurst & Company), 2007 and Martha Crenshaw, “Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory
of Terrorism,” paper prepared for the conference on “Trajectories of Terrorist Violence in Europe,” 911 March 2002,
Harvard University.
2
Robert M. Citino, “Military History Old and New: A Reintroduction,” American Historical Review, (October 2007), pp.
10701071.
3
The author has led the TPP at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under the sponsorship of the United States
Department of Defense since 2004. One result of this project was Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler,
Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of al Qaida and Associated Movements,
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008). This paper draws heavily on that book.
4
This database is not open to the public. However, the TPP was written with full access to it. One small but important
sample of the documents in the database is already available to scholars through the website of the United States Military
Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center: http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp.
Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the
5
Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004), pp. 355–375.
For one example of its use by people within the movement, see William McCants’ translation of Abu Bakr Naji’s The
6
Management of Savagery, p. 7, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/olin/images/Management%20of%20Savagery%20
%2005232006.pdf, accessed 21 March 2008. For useful discussions of Salafi jihadism, see Mary Habeck, Knowing the
Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) or Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A
Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, (2005), pp. 7597.
7
See Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, (2006), pp.
207239 for a useful typology of the Salafi movement that clearly describes the marginal status of the Salafi jihadists even
within the Salafi world.
8
A translation of Milestones is available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/hold/index_2.asp,
accessed 27 February 2008. Qutb’s works are increasingly available in print in English. See, for example, Albert J.
Bergesen, ed., The Sayyid Qutb Reader, (New York: Routledge, 2007). There is a condensed version of Qutb’s Milestones
in Jim Lacey, ed., The Canons of Jihad, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
9
Qutb, Milestones.
Captured document “Basic Principles of the Jihad War in Tajikistan.” Open Source Center (hereafter OSC)
10
GMP20021030000045. Some captured documents are publicly available at the website of the Combating Terrorism Center.
See fn. 4. The Federal Government has decided to make public a large collection of additional captured documents,
hopefully including all those referred to in this paper and the TPP. For details on this “Conflict Records Research Center,”
see the last section of this paper.
11
OSC GMP20020108000197, OSC SAP20011007000086, OSC GMP2002103000045, OSC GMP20030122000038. See
also Jarret Brachman and William McCants, “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting alQaida’s Organizational
18. Vulnerabilities,” February 14, 2006, p. 2, http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq.asp.
12
Fred Kaplan’s The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) is the best work on this topic.
13
For a remarkable biography of alSuri and explanation of alSuri’s strategic thought, see Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global
Jihad: The Life of alQaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab alSuri, (London: Hurst & Company, 2007). This book contains two
chapters of alSuri’s work in translation.
An important section of that work was captured on the battlefield and has been made available by the United States
14
Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center. An English translation can be found at:
http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP2002600080Trans.pdf. The Arabic original can be found at:
http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP2002600080Orig.pdf, accessed 27 February 2008.
15
The Call to Global Islamic Jihad has circulated widely on the Internet and elsewhere both in full text and in summarized
form. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, contains a translation of two chapters of alSuri’s book. Jim Lacey, ed., A Terrorist’s
Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab alSuri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008) is
a condensed version of the entire book.
For an example, see Abu Ubayd alQurashi, “Bush Under the Microscope,” in Jim Lacey, ed., The Canons of Jihad,
16
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 138146.
17
OSC GMP20080204342003.
OSC GMP20080109342004. OSC GMP20080129078001. For alternate translations, see SITE Intelligence Group, “The
18
Real War and the Symbolic War: Pros and Cons of Ambiguity and Declaration in Claiming Attacks,” 19 October 2007 and
SITE Intelligence Group, “Barack Obama’s US Presidential Campaign Observed by Jihadists as Provoking Racial Crisis
and Fall in America,” 24 January 2008.
Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the
19
Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004), pp. 355–375.
20
http://www.dni.net/ , http://dni2.wordpress.com/ , and http://smallwarsjournal.com/ .
21
Then there are those who want it both ways. Note the title of the captured book, “The Position of the Scholar Mujahidin
in the Event of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan.”
22
OSC GMP20050201000226, OSC GMP20050221000155.
23
See among others OSC GMP20031022000038, SEG20040602000101.
Captured documents, “Jihad in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Other Obstacles Faced in Jihad; Strategy, Tactics and
24
Operational Concerns, Military and Political.” “Basic Principles of Jihad War in Tajikistan.” Naji, The Management of
Savagery, p. 7.
25
Qutb, Milestones. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 28.
26
SITE Intelligence Group, “The Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare: Ambush and Attack,” 17 October 2007.
OSC SEG200406020000101, OSC SEP20031214000010, OSC GMP20020805000114. See also captured documents
27
“Memorandum about the War of Struggle or the Guerrilla Warfare” and “Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in
Syria.” The latter is available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq_600080.asp. See also a 2006 letter from a senior al Qaida leader
19. called Atiyah to Abu Musab alZarqawi, http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/pdf/CTCAtiyahLetter.pdf
28
OSC GMP20040120000262, OSC GMP20040121000214, OSC GMP20040209000260 and OSC GMP20040209000260.
Captured document, “Summary of the Three Stages of Guerrilla Warfare and Its Effects, from a Mujahidin Perspective,”
29
OSC SEG20040602000101. See also the captured “A Booklet that Tackles the Following Issues: War, Gang War, Codes,
Assassinations and Kidnapping, Captured in Afghanistan in 2005.”
30
See, e.g. Abu Ubayd alQurashi in OSC GMP20070923281002.
31
Captured document “MiniManual of the Urban Mujahideen.”
http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP2002600080Trans.pdf, accessed 27 February 2008. See Qurashi’s “A Strategic Study
32
of the Pioneer Experience of the Commandos War inside the Cities” in the captured document “Various Researches on
Explosive and Instructions to Educate the Resistant Groups on Making Bombs.” This document is also available as OSC
GMP20070923281002. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 225226.
Two translations are available of alFaqir’s message on this subject. SITE Intelligence Group, “Barack Obama’s U.S.
33
Presidential Campaign Observed by Jihadists as Provoking Racial Crisis and Fall of America,” 24 January 2008 and OSC
GMP20080129078001.
SITE Intelligence Group, “’The Power of Truth’ – Video Documentary from asSahab on the War Between Islam and the
34
United States and the West,” 20 September 2007. SITE Institute, “AsSahab Video of Third Interview with Dr. Ayman al
Zawahiri – 5/2007,” 5 May 2007.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
35
1976), p. 87. AlQurashi once footnoted this very edition of On War. See OSC GMP20030122000038.
Captured document “Jihad in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Other Obstacles Faced in Jihad; Strategy, Tactics and
36
Operational Concerns, Military and Political.”
37
Captured document “Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria.”
38
See Qurashi’s “A Strategic Study of the Pioneer Experience of the Commandos War inside the Cities” in the captured
document “Various Researches on Explosive and Instructions to Educate the Resistant Groups on Making Bombs.” This
document is also available as OSC GMP20070923281002.
Captured document “Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria.” “The War of Those Deemed Weak”
39
appears from context to be a reference to Taber’s War of the Flea.
40
A partial exception might be the work that Lin Paio did, building on Mao’s theories. In the 1960s, Lin proposed a way
for the “rural areas of the world” to encircle the “cities of the world,” but his ideas do not seem to have lasted. Nor have we
noted them being referred to in the works of the Salafi jihadists. Lin Piao, “Encircling the Cities of the World,” in Walter
Laqueur, The Guerrilla Reader: An Historical Anthology, (New York: New American Library, 1977), pp. 197202.
41
OSC FTS19960902000438.
42
Stout, et al, Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 138140.
There is an excellent discussion of this problem of “agency theory” in the context of the Salafi jihadist movement in
43
Brachman and McCants, Harmony and Disharmony, pp. 1319.
20. 44
Captured document “64 Pages of Historical Overview of the Events in Afghanistan during the Soviet Invasion and the
Early Days of Establishing al Qaida, ‘Chat from the Top of the World Number 6’; Includining al Qaida’s Ties to Egyptian
Jihad.”
SEE Stout, et al, p. 61fn104. See also captured document “Applications to Join the Mujaheedin of Tajikistan Islamic
45
Resistance at AlFarooq Camp.”
Center for International Issues Research, “Insurgent Media Organization Attempts to Impose Discipline on Military
46
Forum Participants,” Global Issues Report, November 17, 2006.
47
OSC GMP 2001112000057.
OSC GMP20011207000085. Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants discuss the “Shayma effect” in their “Stealing
48
AlQa’ida’s Playbook,” US Military Academy, Combating Terrorism Center, February, 2006, pp. 910.
49
Aukai Collins, My Jihad, (Guilford: The Lyons Press, 2002), p. 150.
“AlQurashi, “A Strategic Study of the Pioneer Experience of the Commandos War inside the Cities” in the captured
50
document “Various Researches on Explosive and Instructions to Educate the Resistant Groups on Making Bombs.”
51
OSC GMP20060328336001.
52
Captured document, “Captured document “Excerpt from a Book Entitled Introduction to Guerrilla Wafare.”
53
See, for instance, Lacey, ed., A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad, pp. 1112 and 142144.
54
Captured document, “AlQaida Organization Charter and Duty Description for All Members and Their Qualifactions.”
55
See Stout, et al, chapter 3 which was written by Jessica M. Huckabey. See also “Security and Intelligence” volume from
the “Encyclopedia of Jihad” which is available at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/secure/English/Encyclopedia/Security_and_Intelligence.pdf.
56
AlSuri, Call to Global Islamic Resistance.
57
David Ignatius, “The Fading Jihadists,” Washington Post, 28 February 2008, p. A17.
58
For the seminal discussion of “leaderless resistance,” see. Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,”
http://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm , accessed 8 March 2008. (Neither the author nor any person or organization
associated in any way with this paper endorses the political views expressed on that website.) Beam, a white supremacist,
first published this article appeared in 1983. Interestingly, Beam credits a retired US military officer, Ulius Amoss, with
having originated the core idea in 1962. Purportedly Amoss, who was an anticommunist, not a white supremacist,
envisioned Americans applying leaderless resistance in case of a communist takeover of the country. However, Amoss died
in 1961, so the actual provenance of the idea is unclear. Though “leaderless resistance” is an idea that groups all across the
political spectrum use, it may be the only truly important modern idea in revolutionary warfare to originate with the right.
59
AlSuri, Call to Global Islamic Resistance.
60
Ibid.
61
SITE Institute, “Q&A with Lewis Attiya Allah: Thoughts on Jihad in Saudi Arabia, Legitimacy of Striking Oil Targets,
and Mujahideen in Yemen and Algeria,” July 28, 2006. Ellipses in original.