The Future of Airpower

h"p://www.sldinfo.com
h"p://www.sldforum.com
1

A
mix
of
non-‐kine9c,
kine9c
and
informa9on
warfare
elements
are
blended
into
an
asser9ve
adversary
poli9cal-‐military
policy
against
democra9c
interests.
In
effect,
the
democracies
are
working
together
in
either
an
explicit
or
implicit
set
of
alliances
to
protect
their
interests.
The
US
is
certainly
a
key
player
in
this
system,
but
what
might
be
called
a
lead
na9on
approach
is
emerging
within
which
the
key
regional
players
are
taking
primary
responsibility
for
their
own
interests
and
allies
are
in
a
posi9on
to
support
the
lead
na9on
or
na9ons.
The
US
might
be
the
“first”
among
equals
within
this
dynamic,
but
it
is
just
that:
in
the
lead
some9mes,
but
in
support
more
oKen
than
not.
2

The
past
decade
has
been
shaped
by
the
ground
wars,
but
under
the
influence
of
events
in
Europe
and
the
Middle
East,
an
evolving
pa"ern
of
21st
century
conflict
is
emerging.
It
is
a
pa"ern
in
which
state
and
non-‐state
actors
are
working
to
reshape
the
global
order
in
their
favor
by
genera9ng
conflicts
against
the
interests
of
the
democracies
but
which
the
democracies
are
slow
to
react.
The
assump9on
of
ISIS
terrorists
and
Pu9n’s
Russian
Ukrainian
adventure
and
the
Chinese
leadership
relying
in
part
on
the
PLA
to
expand
the
domain
of
Chinese
sovereignty
is
that
the
slow
decision
making
cycles
of
democracies
can
be
exploited
to
make
gains.
And
gains
can
be
achieved
on
a
piecemeal
basis,
rather
than
going
for
the
big
grab
which
can
provide
a
drama9c
event
usable
by
democra9c
leaders
to
mobilize
public
opinion
and
generate
resources
to
respond.
3

I
think
the
advance
here
is
you
don’t
have
to
do
that
anymore.
We
have
you
on
a
JTAC
but
it
does
also
talk
to
the
fact
that
we
own
the
sky.
And
we
owned
the
sky
in
Vietnam,
but
we
didn’t
know
how
to
use
it.
We
didn’t
know
how
to
use
it
because
we
didn’t
have
GPS.
Even
as
late
as
the
First
Gulf
War;
the
close
air
support
revolved
around
stand-‐off
lines
where
the
Marine
experience
allowed
for
‘closer
air
support’
than
the
Army.
If
I
can
light
up
the
area
with
an
overhead
camera,
I
suddenly
see
maneuver
space
that
I
never
saw
before.
I
now
have
a
Napoleonic
map
that
shows
the
red
guys
all
lined
up,
the
blue
guys
all
lined
up.
In
this
new
baNlespace,
as
long
as
America
owns
the
skies,
the
exploitaOon
of
this
dominance
allows
the
JTAC
and
the
forward
arOllery
controller
are
one
in
the
same
people.
The
JTAC
is
an
arOllery
spoNer,
but
he’s
got
a
far
beNer
map.
Even
transmiPng
the
stuff
back
to
the
FADCCs,
the
Fire
and
DirecOon
Control
Center,
it
is
a
miracle
if
I
could
get
the
same
picture
as
the
guy
on
the
ground.
Here’s
a
picture
from
the
ground,
here’s
the
bird
taking
a
picture
and
now
you
can
see
where
the
“arOllery”
is
landing
ordinance.
This
is
like
a
miracle.
We
can
now
place
this
indirect
fire
wherever
anybody
wants.
It’s
a
revoluOon
in
connecOng
shooters
and
sensors
together
and
how
do
we
do
it?
What
the
Air
Force
brought
to
Iraq
and
Afghanistan
was
an
extraordinarily
push
of
technology
into
a
system
that
didn’t
understand
how
you
would
use
that
kind
of
sensor-‐
shooter
connecOon.
Some
people
got
it;
the
arOllery
guys
got
it,
but
not
the
infantry
guys.
The
special
operators,
especially
the
joint
teams
got
it
early;
as
was
evidenced
by
the
early
days
of
Afghanistan
with
controllers
on
horseback
and
B-‐52’s
in
direct
fire
support
to
the
Northern
Alliance.
Their
experience
morphed
into
the
Rover
RevoluOon.
4

We
should
hover
over
the
concept
developed
by
Ed
Timperlake
and
presented
at
the
annual
conference
of
the
Air
Force
Associa9on
of
“Aegis
as
my
wingman.”
This
is
a
concept
which
challenged
tradi2onal
thinking
but
pointed
to
the
central
reality
of
the
“off
boarding”
concept
associated
with
the
F-‐35
with
regard
to
weapons
use.
With
the
combinaOon
of
Aegis
with
F-‐35,
the
sensors
are
combined
into
wide
area
coverage.
With
a
new
generaOon
of
weapons
on
the
F-‐35,
and
the
ability
to
operate
a
broad
wolfpack
of
air
and
sea
capabiliOes,
the
F-‐35
can
perform
as
the
direcOng
point
for
combat
acOon.
With
the
Aegis
and
its
new
SM-‐3
missiles,
the
F-‐35s
can
leverage
a
sea-‐based
missile
to
expand
its
area
of
strike.
With
a
combinaOon
of
the
F-‐35
and
the
Aegis,
the
defense
of
land-‐bases
and
sea-‐bases
is
expanded
significantly.
h"p://www.sldinfo.com/pacific-‐strategy-‐vii-‐“aegis-‐is-‐my-‐wingman”/
(Many
of
these
themes
were
developed
in
our
Joint
Forces
Quarterly
ar9cle
on
the
F-‐35
and
the
future
of
power
projec9on
h"p://www.ndu.edu/press/the-‐f-‐35.html).
5

Lt.
General
Jouas,
7th
USAF
Commander:
We
have
a
tough
problem
with
North
Korea,
obviously.
You
have
to
understand
that
this
is
a
different
type
of
adversary
with
capabiliOes
that
concern
us,
and
we
need
the
best
tools
possible
in
order
to
contend
with
it.
We
should
not
mirror
image
when
we
consider
the
North
Korean
nuclear
strategy.
North
Korea
has
seen
what
happened
in
Libya,
and
with
Kaddafi,
and
that’s
reinforced
their
strategy.
And
while
this
may
be
a
North
Korean
problem
right
now,
there’s
a
strong
possibility
it
won’t
remain
so.
And
that
creates
real
danger
to
our
allies
and
our
homeland.
We
have
to
think
about
a
world
in
which
we
have
more
than
one
North
Korea,
in
which
those
capabiliOes
are
held
by
other
naOons
whose
interests
and
strategy
are
very
different
from
ours.
6

Reducing
the
F-‐35
to
a
linear
x-‐y
axis
improvement
or
to
stealth
simply
misses
the
point.
The
F-‐35
is
now
going
to
take
technology
into
a
revolu>onary
three-‐
dimensional
situa>onal
awareness
capability.
This
capability
establishes
a
new
vector
for
TacAir
aircraB
design.
This
can
be
measured
on
a
“Z”
axis.
Historically,
C3I
was
external
to
1,2,3,
and
4th
GeneraOons
TacAir.
C3I’s
goal
was
enhancing
fleet
wide
combat
performance
for
all
Type/Model/Series
(T/M/S)
of
TacAir.
This
is
the
modern
AWACS
baNle
concept.
Now
using
a
three-‐dimensional
graph
the
“Z-‐axis”
takes
airpower
into
a
totally
different
domain.
The
shii
is
from
externally
provided
C3I
to
C4ISR-‐D
in
the
cockpit
carried
by
the
individual
air
plajorm.
This
is
the
revoluOonary
step
funcOon
that
breaks
the
linear
progression
of
previous
GeneraOons.
The
“Z”
axis
in
which
the
F-‐35
is
the
prototype
for
the
first
“C4ISR
–D
(for
decision)
cockpit”
h"p://www.sldinfo.com/21st-‐century-‐agility-‐leveraging-‐the-‐f-‐35b-‐as-‐a-‐strategic-‐
asset/
The
focus
is
upon
the
cockpit
and
the
integrated
systems,
which
the
pilot
can
use
in
the
cockpit
to
become
a
distributed
decision-‐maker.
We
have
referred
to
the
F-‐35
cockpit
as
enabled
by
an
integrated
combat
systems
enterprise,
which
allows
the
pilot
to
see
360
degrees
around
the
aircraK
and
manage
that
space
to
more
than
800
miles.
This
is
the
Z
axis
in
ac9on.
7

Advanced
sensor
fusion
in
5th
genera9on
fighters
performs
three
dis9nct
func9ons:
build
the
picture,
task
the
sensors,
then
communicate
the
result.
No9ce
there
is
an
extremely
9ght
control
and
performance
feedback
loop
being
executed
by
the
advanced
sensor
fusion
engine.
This
loop
essen9ally
isolates
the
pilot
from
the
drudgery
of
controlling
and
monitoring
the
individual
sensors.
The
output
from
the
advanced
fusion
engine
is
a
picture
of
baBlespace.
It
is
designed
to
be
easily
interpreted
by
the
pilot
so
that
he
can
act
quickly
and
decisively.
Remember,
the
dominant
will
exercise
his
OODA
loop
more
quickly
than
his
opponent.
The
picture
is
the
most
visible
part,
but
there
is
much
going
on
behind
the
scene.
Automa9c
sensor
control
is
giving
9me
back
to
the
pilot
and
the
system
is
automa9cally
communica9ng
results
with
the
other
aircraK
on
the
link.
This
is
2me
needed
to
make
decisions
and
act
upon
the
situa2on.
8

What
is
the
current
state
of
play
with
regard
to
the
Wedgetail?
According
to
the
Squadron
Commander,
the
system
is
“on
the
books”
and
ready
to
go
to
serve
Australian
needs
and
to
contribute
to
coali9on
defense.
The
Squadron
Commander
highlighted
that
the
message
going
forward
with
the
squadron
was
three
fold:
grow,
integrate
and
prepare.
Growth
meant
simply
to
fill
out
the
squadron
and
enhance
its
opera9onal
capabili9es.
Integrate
meant
to
build
the
squadron’s
ability
to
work
within
the
ba"lespace,
to
work
effec9vely
with
the
other
Aussie
forces
and
with
coali9on
partners.
Prepare
for
the
system
will
always
be
evolving.
The
always
evolving
part
of
it
is
not
widely
appreciated.
This
is
a
soCware
upgradeable
aircraC
with
a
defined
launch
point
(IOC)
but
no
fixed
end
point
(FOC).
The
system
will
always
be
evolving
and
growing
as
the
soCware
code
gets
rewriBen
to
reflect
events
and
demands
from
the
squadron.
The
squadron
works
through
its
experience
and
shapes
change
orders
which
get
sent
to
the
procurement
authori9es
to
sort
out
priori9es
for
the
next
round
of
upgrading
the
aircraK.
The
difference
between
older
and
such
a
new
system
was
outlined
by
one
par9cipant
in
the
roundtable
as
follows:
“We
have
in
the
same
9me
frame
bought
a
CRC
system
full
up
which
will
look
pre"y
much
like
it
is
in
20
years;
with
Wedgetail
it
will
look
nothing
like
it
does
now
in
20
years.”
9

The
F-‐35
is
built
on
a
founda9on
of
21st
century
technology.
The
F-‐35’s
onboard
computer,
microchips
and
soKware
are
among
its
most
cri9cal
components.
The
Integrated
Core
Computer
(ICP)
was
designed
from
the
start
to
undergo
capability
upgrades
every
few
years,
as
technology
progresses.
System
soKware
will
be
upgraded
over
9me
through
a
block
process.
Each
block
represents
the
most
mature
capability
for
the
aircraC
at
the
2me
of
release.
The
aircraC
is
combat
ready
beginning
with
Block
2.
In
a
real
sense,
the
soCware
will
never
be
finished
on
the
F-‐35.
As
new
code
is
wriBen
and
capability
refreshes
are
completed,
the
F-‐35
soCware
will
evolve
over
2me
to
further
enhance
the
aircraC’s
performance.
The
airplane
was
designed
with
technical
refreshes
in
mind,
the
program
knew
they
would
want
to
upgrade
the
hardware
and
soKware
along
the
way,
even
in
the
System
Development
and
Demonstra9on
(SDD)
phase
of
the
program.
The
technical
refreshes
are
primarily
hardware
and
do
not
necessarily
affect
the
soKware.
By
refreshing
the
hardware
we
gain
processing
reserve
in
advance
of
future
soKware.
With
each
block,
new
capability
is
added
to
the
founda9onal
soKware
from
the
previous
block.
10

In
other
words,
the
previous
soKware
isn’t
thrown
away
but
merely
built
upon.
Block
2
introduces
the
various
data
links.
Block
2
also
introduces
many
advanced
air
and
surface
weapons
capability
making
the
F-‐35
ready
to
go
to
war
for
the
first
9me.
The
sensors
are
integrated
and
fusion
is
working
at
Block
2.
It
is
worth
no9ng
that
the
capabili9es
in
Block
2
are
sufficient
for
the
Marines
to
declare
Ini9al
Opera9onal
Capable
(IOC).
Block
3
soCware
builds
on
top
of
Block
2
by
including
the
full
weapon
set
and
some
addi2onal
sensor
modes.
With
Block
3,
by
the
end
of
SDD,
the
plane
is
fully
capable.
The
aircraK
itself
isn’t
really
changing.
When
we
say
“hardware
upgrade”
many
think
we
are
talking
about
a
new
sensor.
This
is
not
the
case.
All
of
the
sensors
are
resident
in
the
Block
1
airplane.
We
are
simply
upgrading
the
computers
in
order
to
run
the
next
block
of
soCware.
Here’s
an
example
we
can
all
relate
to:
you
buy
a
new
laptop
and
you
know
the
moment
you
buy
it’ll
be
obsolete
in
six
months.
There’ll
be
something
be"er
by
then.
So
what
if
the
seller
said,
“In
order
to
preserve
your
edge
let’s
plan
on
installing
a
be"er
processor
six
months
from
now.
We’ll
make
it
as
good
as
the
one
we’re
going
to
sell
in
six
months.”
You
would
say,
“Yea,
that
makes
sense”
because
otherwise,
as
a
consumer,
you’d
keep
wai9ng
in
an9cipa9on
of
a
be"er
laptop
in
six
months.
That
is
exactly
what
the
F-‐35
program
did.
11

Ques9on:
The
last
9me
we
met,
we
learned
that
you
had
become
the
first
ACC
Commander
to
actually
fly
the
F-‐22.
We
were
impressed.
From
your
perspec9ve,
how
will
the
challenge
of
working
the
F-‐22s
and
the
F-‐35s
be
worked
with
the
legacy
fleet?
General
Hostage:
You
mean
the
Re-‐norming
air
opera9ons
if
I
were
to
steal
a
term?
Well,
I
was
fortunate
to
fly
the
airplane,
I
learned
what
I
didn’t
know.
I
was
wri9ng
war
plans
in
my
previous
job
as
a
three
star
using
the
F-‐22s
in
a
manner
that
was
not
going
to
get
the
most
out
of
them
that
I
could’ve
because
I
didn’t
truly
understand
the
radical
difference
that
the
fiKh
gen
could
bring.
People
focus
on
stealth
as
the
determining
factor
or
delineator
of
the
fiKh
genera9on,
it
isn’t,
it’s
fusion.
Fusion
is
what
makes
that
planorm
so
fundamentally
different
than
anything
else.
And
that’s
why
if
anybody
tries
to
tell
you
hey,
I
got
a
4.5
airplane,
a
4.8
airplane,
don’t
believe
them.
All
that
they’re
talking
about
is
RCS
(Radar
Cross
Sec9on).
Fusion
is
the
fundamental
delineator.
And
you’re
not
going
to
put
fusion
into
a
fourth
gen
airplane
because
their
avionic
suites
are
not
set
up
to
be
a
fused
planorm.
And
fusion
changes
how
you
use
the
planorm.
What
I
figured
out
is
I
would
tell
my
Raptors,
I
don’t
want
a
single
airplane
firing
a
single
piece
of
ordinance
un9l
every
other
fourth
gen
airplane
is
Winchester.
Because
the
SA
right
now
that
the
fiKh
gen
has
is
such
a
leveraging
capability
that
I
want
my
tac9cs
set
up
to
where
my
fourth
gen
expend
their
ordinance
using
the
SA
that
the
fiKh
gen
provides,
the
fiKh
gen
could
then
mop
up,
and
then
protect
everybody
coming
in
the
next
wave.
It’s
radically
changing
how
we
fight
on
the
baBlefield.
We
are
fundamentally
changing
the
tac9cal
ba"lefield.
How
a
tac9cal
planorm
operates
with
the
fusion
of
fiKh
gen.
What
the
aviators
do
is
fundamentally
different
in
a
fiKh
gen
planorm
versus
fourth
gen
in
the
tac9cal
fight.
12

SLD:
In
other
words,
you
are
highligh9ng
a
mini-‐fleet
in
opera9on?
Lt.
General
Schmidle:
That
is
right.
We
need
to
get
people
away
from
talking
about
this
as
a
replacement
for
an
F/A-‐18,
for
an
AV-‐8;
to
get
a
be"er
understanding
at
the
senior
officer
level
about
exactly
what
the
airplane
can
do.
We
are
going
to
put
together
a
general
officer
/
flag
officer
familiariza9on
event
at
Fort
Worth,
of
two
day
dura9on.
The
role
of
the
simulator
in
training
of
pilots
provides
a
very
realis9c
sense
of
what
the
plane
can
deliver
with
the
soKware
we
will
have
in
our
ini9al
deployed
airplanes.
I
have
asked
the
F-‐35
team
to
link
several
simulators
together
to
begin
to
understand
what
an
integrated
fleet
can
bring
to
the
combat
team.
13

SLD:
How
important
are
the
fiKh
genera9on
aircraK
to
shaping
the
“combat
cloud”
which
you
see
as
essen9al
to
the
next
phase
of
air
combat
capabili9es?
Hostage:
They
are
central
to
the
transi9on.
We
are
opera9ng
in
contested
air
space,
and
need
to
shape
a
distributed
air
opera9ons
capability.
The
F-‐22s
aggregated
in
appropriate
numbers
can
do
some
amazing
and
essen2al
tasks,
and
with
a
significant
number
of
F-‐35s,
we
can
reshape
the
opera2onal
space.
The
ability
of
the
planes
to
work
with
each
other
over
a
secure
distributed
ba"lespace
is
the
essen9al
founda9on
from
which
the
air
combat
cloud
can
be
built.
And
the
advantage
of
the
F-‐35
is
the
nature
of
the
global
fleet.
Allied
F-‐35s
and
American
F-‐35s,
whether
USAF,
USN,
or
USMC,
can
talk
with
one
another
and
set
up
the
distributed
opera9onal
system.
Such
a
development
can
allow
for
significant
innova9on
in
shaping
the
air
combat
cloud
for
distributed
opera9ons
in
support
of
the
Joint
Force
Commander.
SLD:
Historically,
the
evolu9on
of
aircraK
has
been
described
in
terms
of
change
in
the
form
factor.
This
is
really
changing
with
the
F-‐35.
What
is
your
thinking
on
the
impact
of
this
change
and
the
introduc9on
of
soKware
upgradeable
aircraK?
Hostage:
The
fiCh
genera2on
aircraC
will
enable
the
air
combat
cloud
and
allow
me
to
use
my
legacy
assets
differently.
Many
of
my
4th
Genera9on
fighters
can
be
used
to
extend
the
network
of
linked
systems
providing
reinforcing
fires,
and
I
can
focus
on
the
fiKh
genera9on
assets
as
the
core
nodes
shaping
distributed
joint
capabili9es.
And
when
we
come
to
the
evolu9on
of
“next”
genera9on
systems,
the
form
factor
could
stay
quite
similar
as
we
evolve
the
capabili9es
within
the
planes
or
in
terms
of
how
the
flying
systems
can
interact
and
operate
together.
Rather
than
thinking
of
6th
genera9on
aircraK
in
form
factor
terms,
we
can
operate
the
new
air
combat
cloud
and
leverage
that
moving
forward.
14

Command
and
control
are
two
words.
The
way
ahead
is
clearly
a
distributed
force
integrated
through
command
and
control
whereby
one
develops
distributed
mission
tacOcal
orders
(with
well
understood
playbooks)
reflecOng
the
commander’s
direcOons
and
then
to
have
the
ability
to
control
the
assets
to
ensure
that
the
sensors
and
shooters
accomplish
their
mission.
Shaping
an
integrated
enterprise
is
not
a
futuris9c
mission
for
the
integra9on
of
Patriots,
Aegis
and
THAAD
is
already
a
work
in
progress,
but
General
Carlisle
sees
the
approach
geqng
be"er
over
9me
as
new
systems
come
to
the
Pacific,
including
a
fleet
of
allied
and
US
F-‐35s.
We
need
to
get
beNer
at
aNack
operaOons
to
take
out
the
shooter.
How
do
we
do
that
beNer?
It
is
clear
that
an
F-‐35
fleet
coupled
with
the
new
long
range
strike
systems
will
play
a
key
role
in
that
funcOon.
We
also
need
to
shape
game
changers
in
terms
of
the
missiles
used
to
intercept
missiles.
The
current
generaOon
is
expensive
and
we
need
to
drive
down
the
cost
point
for
interceptors.
SM-‐6
is
coming
which
is
an
important
asset
but
DOD
is
working
hard
on
ways
to
drive
down
the
cost
of
future
interceptors.
And
we
are
working
the
passive
defense
piece
of
the
puzzle
as
well
including
hardening,
concealment,
dispersal
of
assets,
rapid
runway
repair
and
support
for
a
fluid
force
operaOng
in
a
distributed
manner.
15

Given
the
evolving
threats
from
North
Korea
to
South
Korea
and
the
PRC
throughout
the
Pacific
as
well
as
con2nuing
Russian
pressure
as
well,
it
is
hardly
surprising
that
the
US
and
its
allies
are
not
standing
idly
by
and
le]ng
their
adversaries
conducted
a
one-‐sided
RMA.
In
fact
in
an
interview
earlier
this
year
with
General
“Hawk”
Carlisle,
PACAF
and
about
to
become
the
Air
Combat
Commander,
the
General
underscored
the
way
ahead:
The
PACCOM
Commander
has
put
me
in
charge
of
how
we
are
going
to
do
integrated
air
and
missile
defense
for
the
Pacific
theater,
which
represents
52%
of
the
world’s
surface.
This
is
clearly
a
major
challenge
and
is
clearly
both
a
joint
and
coali9on
opera9on.
16

To
really
consider
this;
we
need
to
break
apart
opera9ons
into
the
Offensive
Enterprise;
and
the
Defensive
Enterprise.
These
two
are
different,
and
assets
can
be
deployed
in
different
ways.
For
example,
the
United
States
relies
on
geographic
distance
for
its
major
coastal
defense;
but
employing
Remotely
Piloted
Vehicles
could
drama9cally
enhance
the
integra9on
of
available
defenses;
even
providing
early
warning
rela9vely
inexpensively,
Air
to
Air
Missiles;
and
some
Air
to
surface
missiles
are
an
addi9onal
enhancement
to
even
low
speed
planorms.
These
are
being
flown
currently
by
Na9onal
Guard
and
Reserve
Squadrons;
and
allowing
their
integra9on
into
the
off
shore
airspace
adds
enormously
to
detec9ng
and
deterring
threats.
In
a
very
similar
way;
around
some
of
the
distant
states
and
possessions
of
the
United
States
that
serve
as
staging
areas
or
forward
opera9ng
bases,
a
squadron
of
Remotely
Piloted
Vehicles
equipped
with
SONAR
and
RADAR
together
with
limited
means
of
response
to
threat
would
provide
great
training
and
be
a
part
of
a
layered
defensive
system.
17

Examining
the
Offensive
Enterprise
requires
a
similar
exploita9on
construct
as
any
Military
Force,
but
adds
the
third
dimension
to
the
mix.
This
would
have
the
fiKh
genera9on
planorms
as
the
scouts
and
observers;
and
the
fourth
genera9on
planorms
as
shooters
to
be
thrown
towards
enemy
defenses
to
force
their
response
and
iden9fica9on
as
well
as
be
the
swarm
to
deter
any
further
penetra9on.
This
aspect
requires
rethinking
the
use
of
fourth
genera2on
pla_orms
and
introduces
the
concept
of
using
fourth
genera2on
assets
as
Remotely
Piloted
Vehicles.
They
would,
as
they
can
now,
receive
targets
from
the
fiKh
genera9on
planorms;
be
able
to
verify
and
validate
the
received
target;
and
engage
either
enemy
air
or
enemy
integrated
air
defenses
to
smooth
the
way
for
further
opera9ons.
This
concept
is
‘The
Wolfpack’;
employing
two
fiCh
genera2on
pla_orms
with
four
fourth
genera2on
remotely
piloted
vehicles.
18

SLD:
You
are
describing
a
carrier
which
can
operate
much
more
flexibly
than
a
tradi9onal
carrier,
and
one
which
can
become
a
central
piece
in
a
combat
spider
web,
rather
than
opera9ng
at
the
center
of
a
concentrated
force.
Could
you
talk
to
the
con-‐ops
piece
of
this?
Rear
Admiral
Moran:
The
Ford
will
be
very
flexible
and
can
support
force
concentra9on
or
distribu9on.
And
it
can
operate
as
a
flagship
for
a
distributed
force
as
well
and
tailored
to
the
mission
set.
When
combined
with
the
poten2al
of
the
F35,
FORD
will
be
able
to
handle
informa2on
and
communica2ons
at
a
level
much
greater
than
the
Nimitz
class
carriers.
People
will
be
able
to
share
informa9on
across
na9ons,
and
this
is
crucial.
We
call
it
mari9me
domain
awareness,
but
now
you’ve
included
the
air
space
that’s
part
of
that
mari9me
domain.
There
is
another
aspect
of
the
FORD,
which
is
important
to
handling
the
informa9on
systems
as
part
of
the
evolu9on
of
the
fleet.
We’ve
never
really
talked
about
the
cooling
aspects.
But
if
you
go
down
to
Newport
News
and
take
a
tour
of
the
FORD
right
now,
one
of
the
things
they
really
like
to
brag
about
is
innova9ons
in
the
cooling
system.
All
of
us
know
the
processing
power
takes
its
heat.
And
so,
you’ve
got
to
be
able
to
cool
it.
FORD
more
than
doubles
the
cooling
system
capacity
of
a
NIMTZ
class
carrier.
But
let
me
close
by
circling
back
to
the
future
of
the
airwing
for
the
next
20
years
and
the
value
we
see
in
the
F-‐35C.
We
are
buying
all
produc9on
aircraK
currently.
We
see
the
coming
of
the
FORD
and
the
coming
of
the
F-‐35
as
highly
synergis9c
for
the
fleet
and
its
opera9on
as
a
sea
base.
And
with
the
F-‐35C
must
come
Block
3F
capability,
which
has
a
fully
enabled
set
to
operate
the
weapons
we
use
at
sea,
mul9-‐ship
integra9on
and
a
host
of
other
very
important
capabili9es
important
to
how
we
expect
to
operate
in
the
future.
We
are
not
going
to
accelerate
the
number
of
produc9on
airplanes
un9l
we
get
to
Block
3F
which
will
give
us
the
capability
that
we
need
to
operate
off
the
carrier.
Once
we
marry
up
F35C
with
key
capability
investments
in
the
Super
Hornet,
E2D,
Growlers
and
a
mix
of
unmanned
capabili9es,
we
will
con9nue
to
have
an
airwing
that
can
dominate
in
any
environment.
19

But
the
F-‐35B
was
going
to
provide
the
USMC
aviator
cultures
in
our
Harriers,
Hornets
and
Prowlers
to
coalesce
and
I
think
to
shape
an
innovaOve
new
launch
point
for
the
USMC
aviaOon
community.
We
are
going
to
blend
three
outstanding
communiOes.
Each
community
has
a
slightly
different
approach
to
problem
solving.
You’ve
got
the
expediOonary
basing
that
the
Harrier
guys
are
bringing
to
you.
You
have
the
electronic
warfare
side
of
the
equaOon
and
the
high-‐
end
fight
that
the
Prowler
guys
thing
about
and
the
coms
and
jamming
side
of
the
equaOon,
which
the
Prowler
guys
think
about.
And
you
have
the
mulO-‐role
approach
of
the
F-‐18
guys.
I
think
it
is
going
to
be
a
fantasOc
blending
of
not
only
perspecOves
but
also
aPtudes.
And
what
I
really
look
forward
to
is
not
the
old
guys
like
me,
but
the
very
young
guys
who
will
fly
this
fantasOc
new
capability.
The
older
generaOon
may
have
a
harder
Ome
unleashing
the
power
and
potenOal
of
the
new
gear
–
the
new
capabiliOes.
We
might
say
“why
don’t
you
do
it
this
way”
when
that
approach
might
be
exactly
the
wrong
thing
to
do
from
a
capabiliOes
standpoint.
My
sense
is
the
young
guys
will
blend.
We’ve
already
picked
the
first
Prowler
pilot
to
go
be
an
F35
guy.
He’s
going
to
do
great
and
he’s
going
to
add
perspecOve
and
aPtude
to
the
tribe
down
at
Eglin
gePng
ready
to
fly
the
jet
that’s
going
to
make
a
big
impact
on
the
F35
community.
I
think
it’s
going
to
be
the
new
generaOon,
the
newbies
that
are
in
the
training
command
right
now
that
are
gePng
ready
to
go
fly
the
F35,
who
are
going
to
unleash
the
capabiliOes
of
this
jet.
They
will
say,
“Hey,
this
is
what
the
system
will
give
me.
Don’t
cap
me;
don’t
box
me.
This
is
what
this
thing
can
do,
this
is
how
we
can
best
employ
the
machine,
its
agility
its
sensors
to
support
the
guy
on
the
ground,
our
MEU
Commanders
and
our
Combatant
Commanders
and
this
is
what
we
should
do
with
it
to
make
it
effecOve.”
20

• This
airplane’s
different
because
with
the
data
being
fused,
I’m
not
using
mulOple
different
displays
to
perform
my
air
to
air
and
CAS
missions.
• The
main
difference
that
I
see
between
federated
and
fused
systems
is
in
the
F-‐18,
not
only
was
it
all
in
different
displays,
but
each
sensor
had
its
own
uncertainty
volumes
and
algorithms
associated
with
it.
• It
was
up
to
me
as
an
aviator
knowing
the
capabiliOes
and
limitaOons
in
my
system
to
decipher
and
draw
the
line
between
the
mission
sets.
• In
the
F-‐35,
the
fusion
engine
does
a
lot
of
that
in
the
background,
while
simultaneously,
I
can
be
execuOng
an
air-‐to-‐air
mission
or
an
air-‐to-‐ground
mission,
and
have
an
air-‐to-‐air
track
file
up,
or
mulOple
air-‐to-‐air
track
files,
and
determine
how
to
flip
missions.
• Because
the
fidelity
of
the
data
is
there
right
now,
which
allows
me
to
determine
if
I
need
to
go
back
into
an
air-‐to-‐air
mindset
because
I
have
to
deal
with
this
right
now
as
opposed
to
conOnuing
the
CAS
mission.
• And
I
have
a
much
broader
set
of
integrated
tool
sets
to
draw
upon.
• For
example,
if
I
need
an
electronic
warfare
tool
set,
with
the
F-‐18
I
have
to
call
in
a
separate
aircrai
to
provide
for
that
capability.
• With
the
F-‐35
I
have
organic
EW
capability.
The
EW
capability
works
well
in
the
aircrai.
From
the
Ome
it
is
recognized
that
such
a
capability
is
need
to
the
Ome
that
it
is
used
requires
a
push
of
a
buNon.
• It
does
not
require
that
a
supporOng
asset
be
deployed.
21

The
USS
America
is
the
seabase
from
which
2ltrotar
innova2on
receives
a
significant
boost
and
the
newly
enabled
GCE
will
operate,
with
an
ability
to
sustain
and
support
the
force
at
much
greater
distance
from
the
objec2ve
area,
if
needed.
With
the
coming
of
the
F-‐35B
to
the
USS
America,
the
9ltrotar-‐enabled
force
adds
significant
capability.
This
can
work
a
couple
of
different
ways.
The
ship
can
hold
more
than
20
F-‐35Bs,
but
more
likely
when
F-‐35Bs
are
being
featured
would
have
a
16
F-‐35B
flying
with
4
Osprey
combina9ons.
The
Ospreys
would
be
used
to
carry
fuel
and
or
weapons,
so
that
the
F-‐35B
can
move
to
the
mission
and
operate
in
a
distributed
base.
This
is
what
the
Marines
refer
to
as
shaping
distributed
STOVL
ops
for
the
F-‐35B
within
which
a
sea
base
is
a
key
lily
pad
from
which
the
plane
could
operate
or
could
move
from.
Alterna9vely,
the
F-‐35B
could
operate
as
the
ISR,
C2
and
strike
asset
to
work
with
the
rest
of
the
assault
force.
The
beauty
of
the
F-‐35B
for
the
Marines
is
that
it
allows
them
to
operate
off
of
an
amphibious
ship
with
a
plane
which
can
do
C2
or
provide
forward
leaning
ISR.
And
in
a
recent
experiment
where
the
Marines
assaulted
San
Clemente
Island
in
an
exercise,
the
Marines
began
to
sketch
out
a
new
way
to
think
about
Close
Air
Support.
22

h"p://www.sldinfo.com/special-‐report-‐on-‐italy-‐and-‐the-‐f-‐35/
It
is
also
difficult
to
argue
with
the
proposi9on
that
the
Mediterranean
and
the
Middle
East
will
not
be
a
busy
opera9onal
area
for
NATO
and
allied
forces.
The
F-‐35
fleet
that
rolls
out
from
a
diversity
of
users
will
need
the
kind
of
opera9onal
and
maintenance
support
which
can
be
provided
at
Cameri.
The
Italians
have
built
major
warehouse
facili9es
to
hold
parts
for
the
F-‐35
as
well
as
maintenance
bay
accommoda9ons
secured
to
collateral
SECRET,
and,
with
the
IT
system
which
can
manage
the
parts
which
are
stamped
with
common
parts
iden9fiers,
it
will
be
straighnorward
to
manage
the
inventory
coming
in
and
out
of
these
warehouses
to
support
an
allied
fleet.
A
way
to
look
at
this
would
be
the
shape
a
graphic
as
follows
with
Cameri
as
the
hub
to
support
the
Western
and
Eastern
Mediterranean
and
the
en9re
sweep
of
allied
F-‐35
fleet
opera9ons.
This
could
include
the
USAF,
the
USN,
the
USMC,
the
Italian
forces,
the
Bri9sh
forces,
the
Norwegian
forces,
etc.
The
Italians
have
understood
the
F-‐35
fleet
concept
and
have
laid
down
an
infrastructure
to
support
it
AT
THE
SAME
TIME
as
they
built
their
FACO
and
wing
produc2on
facility.
h"p://www.sldinfo.com/lessons-‐learned-‐at-‐cameri-‐their-‐implica9ons-‐for-‐asia/
23

Although
the
F-‐35
provides
for
a
new
approach,
clearly
the
Italian
Air
Force
and
every
other
F-‐35
partner
will
look
to
use
their
legacy
aircraK
for
a
considerable
period
ahead,
and
seek
to
use
them
more
effec9vely
as
the
F-‐35
fleet
becomes
a
reality.
“This
is
an
important
issue.
One
way
to
think
about
the
way
ahead
is
to
con9nue
to
use
4th
genera9on
aircraK
in
surging
mass
to
more
classic
airpower
situa9ons.
One
would
use
the
F-‐35
as
the
key
asset
up
against
the
distributed
opera9onal
seqngs
or
for
opera9ons
in
denied
air
space.
Another
way
to
look
at
it
will
be
to
find
ways
to
gain
more
synergy
between
the
F-‐35
and
the
legacy
fleet.
How
can
we
be"er
u9lize
our
older
assets
during
the
process
where
the
F-‐35
fleet
becomes
a
reality?
Shaping
combina9ons
of
4th
genera9on
with
the
F-‐35s
will
be
a
mix
and
match
opportunity
in
tailoring
airpower
to
the
missions
ahead.
This
is
a
challenge;
but
it
is
a
key
task
within
which
the
F-‐35s
will
make
the
legacy
aircraK
more
effec9ve;
and
the
4th
genera9on
aircraK
will
add
support
and
strike
capabili9es
to
an
F-‐35
enabled
air
power
force.”
24

• JERICHO
is
not
just
about
modernisa9on
–
it
is
about
modernisa9on
and
transforma9on
informed
by
the
envisaged
future
state
of
the
Air
Force
• CAF
is
focused
on
the
themes
of
breaking
down
the
barriers
within
Air
Force
and
across
the
Service
–
he
is
focusing
on
Joint
Force
Integra9on
25

The
idea
is
to
take
four
Raptors
and
deploy
them
with
a
C-‐17
and
to
rotate
across
the
Pacific
to
go
to
the
point
of
need
for
implemenOng
missions.
This
provided
both
a
tool
for
enhanced
survival
and
an
enhanced
capability
to
apply
the
force
associated
with
a
fiih-‐generaOon
aircrai
as
well.
His
focus
was
upon
leveraging
Air
Force
and
joint
assets
in
ways
that
would
make
that
force
more
expediOonary
and
more
effecOve
in
providing
for
cross-‐domain
synergy.
He
noted
that
the
combinaOon
of
a
large
deck
carrier
with
the
Air
Force
with
the
Amphibious
Ready
Group
and
Marine
ExpediOonary
Unit
(ARG-‐MEU)
air
assets
when
conjoined
within
a
distributed
strike
package
provides
significantly
greater
capability
than
when
each
is
considered
on
its
own.
26

Col.
Orr
discussed
how
the
various
elements
in
the
exercise
worked
together.
“he
F-‐35
surrogate
opened
the
door
to
provide
the
iniOal
cover
for
the
force
inserOon.
We
data
linked
the
informaOon
from
the
F-‐35
through
secure
Wi-‐Fi
technology
to
the
ground
and
air
assets.
The
raid
force
had
access
to
tablets
where
the
informaOon
was
presented
in
a
“user
friendly”
graphical
format.
They
could
see
what
was
happening
in
real
Ome
and
react
to
in
the
changing
tacOcal
situaOon
to
enable
decision-‐making
and
changes
in
the
scenario.
With
streaming
video
and
real
Ome
interacOve
chat,
we
are
changing
significantly
the
threat
informaOon
upon
which
the
inserOon
force
is
operated.
We
have
an
Osprey-‐enabled
force
of
a
small
company
empowered
by
informaOon
directly
from
the
F-‐35
or
other
airborne
sensors,
and
can
make
decisions
directly
from
that
informaOon.
In
effect,
one
is
trying
to
maximize
decision-‐making
superiority
for
the
ini9al
inser9on
of
force
into
a
fluid
ba"lespace.
27

Ques9on:
How
are
opera9ons
different
from
inside
the
aircraK
to
operate
the
Harvest
Hawk
mission?
Captain
Jordan:
It
is
quite
different.
In
Harvest
Hawk
the
pilot
becomes
more
of
a
baNle
manager,
while
the
co-‐pilot
flies
the
plane.
In
the
back
of
the
aircrai
we
have
a
different
crew
as
well.
We
generally
have
two
officers
in
the
back;
a
Fire
Controls
Officer
sits
in
the
right
seat
and
operates
the
sensor
to
provide
for
target
acquisiOon.
Typically,
we
have
an
assistant
in
the
lei
seat
to
aid
with
the
communicaOons
traffic
and
to
assist
the
FCO.
Ques9on:
Where
does
Harvest
Hawk
go
next?
Captain
Jordan:
The
enOre
Harvest
Hawk
experience
highlights
the
uOlity
of
a
“mother
ship”
in
an
air
dominance
environment.
There
is
no
reason
that
we
cannot
take
data
from
UAVs
or
the
F-‐35s
or
the
Harrier
litening
pods
and
be
able
to
contribute
to
combat
management
or
support
to
the
ground
commanders.
28

The
mul9-‐mission
capabili9es
of
the
aircraK
means
that
a
small
footprint
can
bring
diversified
lethality
to
the
fight.
An
F-‐35
squadron
can
carry
inherent
within
it
an
electronic
a"ack
force,
a
missile
defense
tracking
capability,
a
mapping
capability
for
the
ground
forces,
ISR
and
C2
capabili9es
for
the
deployed
force
and
do
so
in
a
compact
deployment
package.
In
addi9on,
an
F-‐35
fleet
can
empower
Air
Defense
Ar9llery
(ADA),
whether
Aegis
afloat
or
Patriots
and
THAAD
Ba"eries,
the
concept
of
establishing
air
dominance
is
moving
in
a
synergis9c
direc9on.
An
F-‐35
EW
capability
along
with
it’s
AA
and
AG
capability
will
introduce
innovate
tac9cs
in
the
SEAD
mission.
Concurrently,
the
F-‐35
will
empower
U.S.
and
Allied
ADA
situa9onal
awareness.
The
current
engagement
of
the
IDF
employment
of
their
Irion
Dome
in
conjunc9on
with
avia9on
a"acks
is
a
demonstra9on
of
this
type
of
emerging
partnership
being
forged
in
ba"le.
To
get
a
similar
capability
today
into
the
Area
of
Interest
would
require
a
diversified
and
complex
aerial
fleet,
whose
very
size
would
create
a
poli9cal
statement,
which
one
might
really
not
want
to
make.
With
an
F-‐35
enabled
ground
inser9on
force,
a
smaller
force
with
significant
lethality
and
flexibility
could
be
deployed
un9l
it
is
no
longer
needed
for
it
is
about
air-‐enabled
ground
forces.
A
9ltrotar
enabled
assault
force
with
top
cover
from
a
360
degree
opera9onal
F-‐35
fleet,
whether
USMC,
USN,
USAF
or
allied
can
allow
for
the
kind
of
flexibility
necessary
for
21st
century
warfare
and
opera9onal
reali9es.
29

This
is
the
third
working
group:
the
first
is
the
Combat
Cloud,
the
second
C2
and
its
evolu9on
and
the
working
groups
are
designed
to
engage
par9cipants
in
the
process
of
change
as
well
as
to
produce
outreach
to
others
to
shape
understanding
of
the
challenges
and
ways
ahead
for
21st
century
airpower.
30

Re-‐shaping
concepts
of
opera9ons
under
the
impact
of
strategic
events,
the
shaping
of
conflict
termina9on
strategies
and
technology
will
be
ongoing.
Sort
of
like
a
21st
century
Maoist
revolu9on.
What
can
we
iden9fy
as
the
drivers
of
con-‐ops
changes,
flash
points
and
drivers
of
demand
for
change?
Here
is
a
tenta9ve
list
beyond
the
ques9on
of
the
impact
of
strategic
failures
and
successes
in
dealing
with
21st
century
threats
and
challenges.
32

The Future of Airpower

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