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DNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and Security
Julien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien Pivotto
RMLL Security Track
July 5th, 2016
whoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhois
Julien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien Pivotto
• Sysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.eu
• From small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgs
• Automation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & Monitoring
• @roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie on irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/github
inuits.eu
DNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNSDNS
What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?
• TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTL;DR Translates domain name to IP
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIn facto, stores much more data than IP
How it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it works
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License
https://www.flickr.com/photos/frans16611/6139595092
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License
Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License
Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License
Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License
Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License
Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
DNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-critical
• HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHolds IP addresses
• HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHolds service definitions
• HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHolds hostnames, TXT records
DNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practices
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDo not mix Authoritative and Recursive
servers
• MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMix your DNS server `brand'
• HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHide your DNS masters
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDo not invent new TLD
Data stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNS
• AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA records: IP addresses
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCNAME: Cannonical names
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSRV: Service record
• MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMX: Mail servers
• TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTXT: Text record
SRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV records
_xmpp−client._tcp.inuits.eu. IN SRV
0 5 5222 xmpp.inuits.eu.
TXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT Records
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSPF record: Sender Policy Framework
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDKIM
• KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKeybase.io
• LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLet's Encrypt DNS challenge
Not secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by design
• 11111111111111111983
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDesigned for scale, not security
• EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEarly 2000: birth of DNSSec
DNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSec
• 22222222222222222000's DNSSec RFC
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec hit DNS root in 2010
• MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMultiple iteration of RFC
The Domain Name System Security
Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin
authentication and data integrity to the
Domain Name System.
RFC 4033
What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPProof of origin and integrity
• ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZones and records signing
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPProof of non-existence
Two types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keys
• ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZSK: Zone Signing Key
• KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKSK: Key Signing Key
Zone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing key
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPrivate/Public key pair
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSign the Records
• eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.g sign the A records, the MX records …
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRolled out frequently
Key Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing Key
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPrivate/Public key pair
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSign the ZSK
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDesigned to be stronger than the ZSK
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIts fingerprint is stored in parent zone
DNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records types
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRSIG: Signature
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSKEY: Public key
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDS: Hash of a DNSKEY (parent zone)
DNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records types
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNSEC: Next secure
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRReturns the next secure entry
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRReturned when next secure is not found
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNSEC/NSEC3 records are signed
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNSEC3 prevents zone walking
In PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn Practice
BindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBind
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRReference DNS Server
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDeveloped by the Internet Systems
Consortium
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCurrent version: bind9
• bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbind10 project is abandoned
Bind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind features
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSupports everything
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRecurive, Authoritative
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDynamic updates
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec
Bind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSec
• FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFull support + NSEC3
• MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMManual signing
• AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAutomated signing
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec and dynamic zones
Generating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keys
mkdir /etc/bind/keys
cd /etc/bind/keys
dnssec−keygen rmll.example
dnssec−keygen −f KSK rmll.example
Generating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keys
dnssec−keygen −a NSEC3RSASHA1 −b 2048 rmll
.example
dnssec−keygen −a NSEC3RSASHA1 −b 4096 −f
KSK rmll.example
Generating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keys
dnssec−dsfromkey −f /var/bind/rmll.
example −K /etc/bind/keys/ rmll.example
rmll.example. IN DS 18025 8 1
E223065EE5EE66F08CA1C89D8
rmll.example. IN DS 18025 8 2 522
D8EA3287FFF41186169A30
Enable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bind
options {
dnssec−enable yes;
dnssec−validation yes;
}
Enable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zone
Manually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signed
zone "rmll.example" IN {
type master;
file "rmll.example.zone.signed";
};
Enable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zone
Auto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto Signing
zone "rmll.example" IN {
type master;
file "rmll.example.zone";
key−directory "/etc/bind/keys";
auto−dnssec maintain;
inline−signing yes;
};
Manually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zone
dnssec−signzone −S −o rmll.example −K /etc
/bind/keys/ /var/bind/master/rmll.
example.zone
• Creates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone file
DANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANE
DANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANE
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNS-based Authentication of Named
Entities
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNew record types to store public keys
hashes
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIndependant from DNSSec (!)
TLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA records
• HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHash the fingerprint of a TLS key
• """""""""""""""""Replacement" for the CA (https)
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNot implemented natively in browsers
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIImplemented in IRC clients (irssi)
TLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA records
_443._tcp IN TLSA 3 0 1 2
bfa3214fda53315b140e65fe66
_443._tcp.www IN TLSA 3 0 1 2
bfa3214fda53315b140e65
_6697._tcp.irc IN TLSA 3 0 1 2
bfa3214fda53315b140e6
Generating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hash
openssl x509 −in cert.pem −outform DER |
openssl sha256
SSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSHSSH
TOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFU
• TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTrust on first use
• WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWorks on slowly moving env's
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNowadays we populate new hosts all the
time
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNowadays we rebuild existing hosts
SSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP records
• HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHash the fingerprint of a SSH server
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIImplemented in OpenSSH
• UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUses DNS to recognize SSH key
IN SSHFP 1 1
e0fd9112d2fc6974597fe8968665ad6b420c
IN SSHFP 1 2 9
de5bc066a898733420bcfaae8f43e80e532
IN SSHFP 2 1 223
e89447a53a3178be02fee6fdd5b44228a
IN SSHFP 2 2 2644
fcbd2a1b179091a195207e395d009b16
VerifyHostKeyDNS no
VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
VerifyHostKeyDNS ask
$ ssh −o VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes rmll.example
The authenticity of host 'rmll.example
(1.2.3.4)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:
f8zwQD3RU62PXgwCw5WRk2OIyVY.
Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS
Are you sure you want to continue?
Populating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fields
• WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWhat if we have a single source of truth?
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSomething that can scale, and be quick
enough?
Config ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig Management
• QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQuickly moving env often use Cfgmgmt
Tools
• TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTThey know the env, store data
• WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWe use Puppet+The foreman
PuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppet
• AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Config Management Tool
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDeclarative
• EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEnforces a desired state
Puppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet Facts
• VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVValues collected on the host
• OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOS version, Uptime, kernel
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSH fingerprints
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSent back to master
facts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfp
• hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhttps://github.com/jpmens/facts2sshfp
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPython script
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRead facts yaml files
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCConverts Puppet facts to SSHFP records
• UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUses Puppet as single source of truth
• fffffffffffffffffacts2sshfp.py -T nsupdate.template -D
a.aa.
• OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOutput to templates, nsupdate commands…
The Foreman
The Foreman
Provisioning
The Foreman
Provisioning Configuration
The Foreman
Provisioning Configuration
Monitoring
The Foreman
Provisioning Configuration
Monitoring
Reporting
Foreman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman Proxies
• FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFForeman works with a GUI + Proxies
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDHCP proxy, Puppet Proxy, DNS proxy…
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNS Proxy is pluggable: bind9, powerdns…
Foreman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is great
• OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOpen Source
• BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBacked by Red Hat
• TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTThe main brick behind Red Hat Satellite 6
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPProvides a REST API
Building a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) host
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCreate/update DNS entries
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCreate/update DHCP entries
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCreate the VM in libvirt
• BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBoot the VM
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSServe a kickstart
• RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRun Puppet
The Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxy
• PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPuppet Collects and save Facts on the
machines
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIt can send it back to the Foreman
• FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFForeman can graph them, query them…
facts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfp
• hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhttps://github.com/jpmens/facts2sshfp
• fffffffffffffffffacts2sshfp.py -T nsupdate.template
--foreman-url=https://foreman.example -D
a.aa.
ConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusionConclusion
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 License
https://www.flickr.com/photos/haslamdigital/17191280202/sizes/h/
DNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocks
• NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNeeded everywhere
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDistributed
• CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCContains lots of data
• MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMakes our life easier
DNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implement
• AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAutomation is key
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIImplemented in most of the tools
• AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAnd most of the DNS servers
DANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more security
• SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSH fingerprint
• IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIRC, SMTP certificates hashes
• EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEExisting client-side implementations
DNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANE
• DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec and Dane are more useful together
• MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMake sure your resolver supports DNSsec!
• TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTThe power to check certificates without CA
ContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContact
Julien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien Pivotto
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DNSSec

  • 1. DNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and SecurityDNS and Security Julien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien Pivotto RMLL Security Track July 5th, 2016
  • 2. whoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhoiswhois Julien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien Pivotto • Sysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.euSysadmin at inuits.eu • From small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgsFrom small to large scale orgs • Automation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & MonitoringAutomation & Monitoring • @roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie on irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/githubon irc/twitter/github
  • 5. What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS?What is DNS? • TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTL;DR Translates domain name to IP • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIn facto, stores much more data than IP
  • 6. How it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it worksHow it works Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License https://www.flickr.com/photos/frans16611/6139595092
  • 7. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
  • 8. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
  • 9. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
  • 10. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
  • 11. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 License Inspired by @jpmens - Icons by http://jcartier.net/spip.php?aticle39
  • 12. DNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-criticalDNS is mission-critical • HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHolds IP addresses • HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHolds service definitions • HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHolds hostnames, TXT records
  • 13. DNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practicesDNS practices • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDo not mix Authoritative and Recursive servers • MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMix your DNS server `brand' • HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHide your DNS masters • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDo not invent new TLD
  • 14. Data stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNSData stored in DNS • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA records: IP addresses • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCNAME: Cannonical names • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSRV: Service record • MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMX: Mail servers • TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTXT: Text record
  • 15. SRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV recordsSRV records _xmpp−client._tcp.inuits.eu. IN SRV 0 5 5222 xmpp.inuits.eu.
  • 16. TXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT RecordsTXT Records • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSPF record: Sender Policy Framework • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDKIM • KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKeybase.io • LLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLLet's Encrypt DNS challenge
  • 17. Not secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by designNot secure by design • 11111111111111111983 • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDesigned for scale, not security • EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEarly 2000: birth of DNSSec
  • 18. DNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSecDNSSec • 22222222222222222000's DNSSec RFC • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec hit DNS root in 2010 • MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMultiple iteration of RFC
  • 19. The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. RFC 4033
  • 20. What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec?What is DNS Sec? • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPProof of origin and integrity • ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZones and records signing • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPProof of non-existence
  • 21. Two types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keysTwo types of keys • ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZSK: Zone Signing Key • KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKSK: Key Signing Key
  • 22. Zone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing keyZone Signing key • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPrivate/Public key pair • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSign the Records • eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.g sign the A records, the MX records … • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRolled out frequently
  • 23. Key Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing KeyKey Signing Key • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPrivate/Public key pair • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSign the ZSK • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDesigned to be stronger than the ZSK • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIts fingerprint is stored in parent zone
  • 24. DNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records types • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRSIG: Signature • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSKEY: Public key • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDS: Hash of a DNSKEY (parent zone)
  • 25. DNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records typesDNS Records types • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNSEC: Next secure • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRReturns the next secure entry • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRReturned when next secure is not found • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNSEC/NSEC3 records are signed • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNSEC3 prevents zone walking
  • 26. In PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn PracticeIn Practice
  • 27. BindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBindBind • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRReference DNS Server • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDeveloped by the Internet Systems Consortium • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCurrent version: bind9 • bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbind10 project is abandoned
  • 28. Bind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind featuresBind features • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSupports everything • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRecurive, Authoritative • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDynamic updates • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec
  • 29. Bind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSecBind and DNSSec • FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFull support + NSEC3 • MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMManual signing • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAutomated signing • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec and dynamic zones
  • 30. Generating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keys mkdir /etc/bind/keys cd /etc/bind/keys dnssec−keygen rmll.example dnssec−keygen −f KSK rmll.example
  • 31. Generating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keysGenerating keys dnssec−keygen −a NSEC3RSASHA1 −b 2048 rmll .example dnssec−keygen −a NSEC3RSASHA1 −b 4096 −f KSK rmll.example
  • 32. Generating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keysGenerating DS keys dnssec−dsfromkey −f /var/bind/rmll. example −K /etc/bind/keys/ rmll.example rmll.example. IN DS 18025 8 1 E223065EE5EE66F08CA1C89D8 rmll.example. IN DS 18025 8 2 522 D8EA3287FFF41186169A30
  • 33. Enable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bindEnable DNSSec in bind options { dnssec−enable yes; dnssec−validation yes; }
  • 34. Enable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zone Manually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signedManually signed zone "rmll.example" IN { type master; file "rmll.example.zone.signed"; };
  • 35. Enable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zoneEnable DNSSec for a zone Auto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto SigningAuto Signing zone "rmll.example" IN { type master; file "rmll.example.zone"; key−directory "/etc/bind/keys"; auto−dnssec maintain; inline−signing yes; };
  • 36. Manually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zoneManually Sign a zone dnssec−signzone −S −o rmll.example −K /etc /bind/keys/ /var/bind/master/rmll. example.zone • Creates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone fileCreates a .signed zone file
  • 38. DANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANEDANE • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNS-based Authentication of Named Entities • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNew record types to store public keys hashes • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIndependant from DNSSec (!)
  • 39. TLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA records • HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHash the fingerprint of a TLS key • """""""""""""""""Replacement" for the CA (https) • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNot implemented natively in browsers • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIImplemented in IRC clients (irssi)
  • 40. TLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA recordsTLSA records _443._tcp IN TLSA 3 0 1 2 bfa3214fda53315b140e65fe66 _443._tcp.www IN TLSA 3 0 1 2 bfa3214fda53315b140e65 _6697._tcp.irc IN TLSA 3 0 1 2 bfa3214fda53315b140e6
  • 41. Generating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hashGenerating a hash openssl x509 −in cert.pem −outform DER | openssl sha256
  • 43. TOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFUTOFU • TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTrust on first use • WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWorks on slowly moving env's • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNowadays we populate new hosts all the time • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNowadays we rebuild existing hosts
  • 44. SSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP recordsSSHFP records • HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHash the fingerprint of a SSH server • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIImplemented in OpenSSH • UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUses DNS to recognize SSH key
  • 45. IN SSHFP 1 1 e0fd9112d2fc6974597fe8968665ad6b420c IN SSHFP 1 2 9 de5bc066a898733420bcfaae8f43e80e532 IN SSHFP 2 1 223 e89447a53a3178be02fee6fdd5b44228a IN SSHFP 2 2 2644 fcbd2a1b179091a195207e395d009b16
  • 47. $ ssh −o VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes rmll.example The authenticity of host 'rmll.example (1.2.3.4)' can't be established. ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256: f8zwQD3RU62PXgwCw5WRk2OIyVY. Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS Are you sure you want to continue?
  • 48. Populating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fieldsPopulating SSHFP fields • WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWhat if we have a single source of truth? • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSomething that can scale, and be quick enough?
  • 49. Config ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig ManagementConfig Management • QQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQuickly moving env often use Cfgmgmt Tools • TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTThey know the env, store data • WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWe use Puppet+The foreman
  • 50. PuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppetPuppet • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA Config Management Tool • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDeclarative • EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEnforces a desired state
  • 51. Puppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet FactsPuppet Facts • VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVValues collected on the host • OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOS version, Uptime, kernel • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSH fingerprints • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSent back to master
  • 52. facts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfpfacts2sshfp • hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhttps://github.com/jpmens/facts2sshfp • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPython script • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRead facts yaml files • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCConverts Puppet facts to SSHFP records • UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUses Puppet as single source of truth • fffffffffffffffffacts2sshfp.py -T nsupdate.template -D a.aa. • OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOutput to templates, nsupdate commands…
  • 58.
  • 59.
  • 60.
  • 61. Foreman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman ProxiesForeman Proxies • FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFForeman works with a GUI + Proxies • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDHCP proxy, Puppet Proxy, DNS proxy… • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNS Proxy is pluggable: bind9, powerdns…
  • 62. Foreman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is greatForeman is great • OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOpen Source • BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBacked by Red Hat • TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTThe main brick behind Red Hat Satellite 6 • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPProvides a REST API
  • 63. Building a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) hostBuilding a (libvirt) host • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCreate/update DNS entries • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCreate/update DHCP entries • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCreate the VM in libvirt • BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBoot the VM • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSServe a kickstart • RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRun Puppet
  • 64. The Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxyThe Foreman - Puppet proxy • PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPuppet Collects and save Facts on the machines • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIt can send it back to the Foreman • FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFForeman can graph them, query them…
  • 67. DNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocksDNS rocks • NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNeeded everywhere • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDistributed • CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCContains lots of data • MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMakes our life easier
  • 68. DNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implementDNSSec is easy to implement • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAutomation is key • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIImplemented in most of the tools • AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAnd most of the DNS servers
  • 69. DANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more securityDANE adds more security • SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSH fingerprint • IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIRC, SMTP certificates hashes • EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEExisting client-side implementations
  • 70. DNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANEDNSSec+DANE • DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDNSSec and Dane are more useful together • MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMake sure your resolver supports DNSsec! • TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTThe power to check certificates without CA
  • 71. ContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContactContact Julien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien PivottoJulien Pivotto julien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eujulien@inuits.eu @roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie@roidelapluie inuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuitsinuits https://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.euhttps://inuits.eu info@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.euinfo@inuits.eu +32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636+32 473 441 636