4. +
More detail ...
Previous attempts to identify conscious experiences outside
attention have failed
gist experience: best candidates without attention probably not
conscious
imagistic experience: there is more to attention than the focus:
attention prioritizes some and suppresses other information
phenomenal experience: no clear argument to show why
representation of, say, the full Sperling display are conscious. Why
not preconscious?
New candidate: conscious immersion
clearly conscious
in no way is “within the reach of attention”
5. +
What is consciousness?
“that which separates dreamless sleep from dreaming” (p. 4)
Aside
Why not:
a state or activity is conscious iff
there is something it is like to be in
that state or engage in that activity?
6. +
What is attention?
“[Attention] is a voluntary act of prioritization by the subject,
where “voluntary” is taken to include everything from volitional
direction of attention to voluntary acceptance of attention to a
stimulus [...] This prioritization is best understood through the
concept of resource distribution” (p. 3)
7. +
What is attention?
“[Attention] is a voluntary act of prioritization by the subject,
where “voluntary” is taken to include everything from volitional
direction of attention to voluntary acceptance of attention to a
stimulus [...] This prioritization is best understood through the
concept of resource distribution” (p. 3)
For Carolyn attention is always voluntary!
9. +
Against conscious gist perception
Excellent points!
But maybe some (medium fast) gist perception is both
conscious and outside attention? (What do the subjects
report?)
10. +
Broadening attention beyond the
focus
Carolyn:
outside the focus of attention ≠ outside the reach of attention
What would show (in perception) that information is not
suppressed by attention but outside its reach?
12. +
It doesn’t seem to!
Sometimes attention is automatically drawn to something
against our will.
Sometimes attention drifts aimlessly.
13. +
But maybe that’s too fast!
The intentionality criterion for automaticity
Attempts by a subject to prevent an automatic process from
proceeding are not successful (Yantis and Jonides 1990)
14. +
But maybe that’s too fast!
The intentionality criterion for automaticity
Attempts by a subject to prevent an automatic process from
proceeding are not successful (Yantis and Jonides 1990)
15. +
But maybe that’s too fast!
Result 1:
RT btw. onset and
no-onset target
does not differ
Result 2:
onset distractor
does not seem to
capture attention
against the
subject’s prior
intentions
Yantis and Jonides 1990, Figure 3
16. +
But maybe that’s too fast!
Tentative conclusions from these and other experiments:
Attention capture is not automatic according to the intentionality
criterion
What captures attention and how is contingent on the subject’s
goals, intentions and task: contingent capture
See also: Folk, Remington and Yet against see: Theeuwes 1991,
Johnston 1992; Yantis 1993; Bacon and Theeuwes 1994;Theeuwes 2004; for a
Egeth 1994; Yantis and Egeth 1999; (opinionated) review: Theeuwes 2010
Serences et al. 2005; Folk and
Remington 2006; Chen and Mordkoff
2007; Ansorge and Horstmann 2007;
Kiss et al. 2008; etc.
17. +
Distinctions
1. Attention is always directly controlled by the subject. ✖
2. Attention is always an act that is sensitive to a subject’s
goals, intentions, tasks, etc.
✔
3. Attention is always an act that is under the subject’s voluntary
control (p. 3)
✔
?
i.e. the subject can voluntarily control attention (in a sense in which
she cannot control, say, what she sees).
18. +
Does conscious immersion
involve no attention?
19. +
Carolyn’s claim
Conscious immersion is a kind of conscious experience that
lies beyond the reach of attention.
20. +
What is conscious immersion?
"I understand “conscious immersion” to be conscious
engrossment in a task, activity, or process that proceeds via
unconscious, involuntary control" (p. 20/21)
close to flow consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi)
21. +
Flow without attention?
The opposite seems true!
22. +
A Dancer
"Your concentration is very
complete. Your mind isn't
wandering, you are not
thinking of something else; you
are totally involved in what
you are doing ....”
Csikszentmihaly, Flow, p. 53
23. +
A chess player
"... the concentration is like
breathing - you never think of it.
The roof could fall and, if it
missed you, you would be
unaware of it”
Csikszentmihaly, Flow, p. 53/54
24. +
Flow without attention?
“The first symptom of flow is a narrowing of attention on a
clearly defined goal. We feel involved, concentrated,
absorbed.” (Csikszentmihaly, Evolving Self, p. xiii)
25. +
Not only Csikszentmihaly!
When absorbed in intellectual
attention we may become so
inattentive to outer things as to
be 'absent-minded,’ [...].”
W. James, Principles, p. 418/419
26. +
But Carolyn has an argument!
1. Immersion experience is conscious. ✔
2. Immersion experience is involuntary.
3. Attention is always voluntary.
Hence 4. Immersion is outside the reach of attention.
27. +
But Carolyn has an argument!
1. Immersion experience is conscious.
2. Immersion experience is involuntary.
Ambiguity!
3. Attention is always voluntary.
Hence 4. Immersion is outside the reach of attention.
28. +
But Carolyn has an argument!
1. Immersion experience is conscious.
2. Immersion experience is not directly controlled ✔
voluntarily.
3. Attention is always directly controlled voluntarily. ✖
Hence 4. Immersion is outside the reach of attention.
29. +
But Carolyn has an argument!
1. Immersion experience is conscious.
2. Immersion experience is not directly controlled ✔
voluntarily.
3. Attention is always directly controlled voluntarily. ✖
Hence 4. Immersion is outside the reach of attention.
30. +
But Carolyn has an argument!
1. Immersion experience is conscious.
2. Immersion experience is not sensitive to the
✖
subject’s goals, intentions, and tasks.
3. Attention is always sensitive to the subject’s goals, ✔
intentions, and tasks.
Hence 4. Immersion is outside the reach of attention.
31. +
Csikszentmihaly again ...
“The first symptom of flow is a narrowing of attention on a
clearly defined goal. We feel involved, concentrated,
absorbed.” (Csikszentmihaly, Evolving Self, p. xiii)
“When goals are clear, feedback relevant, and challenges and
skills are in balance, attention becomes ordered and fully
invested [...] There is no space in consciousness for
distracting thoughts, irrelevant feelings” (Csikszentmihaly,
Finding Flow, p. 31)
32. +
But Carolyn has an argument!
1. Immersion experience is conscious.
2. Immersion experience is not sensitive to the
✖
subject’s goals, intentions, and tasks.
3. Attention is always sensitive to the subject’s goals, ✔
intentions, and tasks.
Hence 4. Immersion is outside the reach of attention.
34. +
So what is going on?
When immersed or in flow there is a sense in which we do not
focus our attention on what we are doing.
35. +
So what is going on?
Yet there is also a sense in which our attention is completely
focused on what we are doing!
36. +
Distinction (from A. White)
Spectator attention
paying attention to what you are doing third-personally
Agent attention
paying attention to what you are doing first-personally
Rough synonyms for agent attention to your own φ-ing:
φ-ing attentively.
concentrating (attention) on φ-ing.
37. +
Agent Attention
involves prioritizing some things (what you are doing right now)
while suppressing others (your environment, distracting thoughts
etc.
is sensitive to the subject’s goals, intention, and plans.
because it is not an activity distinct from the activity you are
performing attentively (the activity is a way your attention may be
engaged)
is something the subject is doing (in the same way the attentively
performed activities are things she is doing)
38. +
Claim
In conscious immersion there is
no spectator attention to what what we are doing!
a lot of agent attention to what we are doing!
39. Conclusion
+ Agent attention might be
voluntary and essential for the
conscious immersion
