1. Comments on Watson
Sebastian Watzl (CSMN, Oslo)

2. The Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika View
Faculty Attention is a mental faculty that allocates resources.
Separation Attention is distinct from consciousness
Necessity Attention is necessary (but not sufficient) for
consciousness
Self There is unified persisting subject of experience.
Control Attention is always directly controlled by the subject.

3. The Buddhist View
time
experiential events
No Faculty No unified mental faculty that allocates resources.
No Self No unified persisting subject of experience.
Temporal Atomism Every fundamental experience momentary.
IntrinsicnessAttentiveness is an intrinsic feature of experiences.
No Control Attention never controlled by the subject.
attentive experiential events

4. The Buddhist Argumentative Strategy
 Focus of the Debate:
What explains the character of the experiential
stream?
(not: what is the character of the experiential stream)
 The Buddhist argues for a sparse, deflationary,
atomistic mental ontology.
 Methodological advice
 Don’t introduce entities beyond necessity!
 If something is not needed to explain the character of the
experiential stream, don’t believe it exists!

5. The Buddhist Argumentative Strategy
Discussion Points 1
 Why should a defender of
the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika view
accept this methodological
advice?
 Seems to presuppose a
strong presumption in favor
of the sparse ontology.
 Alternative methodological
advice:
 Ask what best explains
uncontroversial features of
mental life.
 Ask also about the point or
function of some feature of
mental life.

6. Awareness of Attention and Time
 Are we ever aware of attending or shifting attention?
 Buddhist (?)
 No, nothing beyond the sequence of experiential events is
ever “apprehended”
 That seems false
 Can be (or become) aware of shifting attention.

7. Awareness of Attention and Time
Argument against Temporal Atomism
1. Awareness of shifting attention from red dot to green
dot is awareness of a temporally extended experiential
process or change in experience.
2. This process is not momentary.
3. Awareness of shifting attention is not illusory
________________________________________________
4. Not all aspects of experience are momentary
experiential events.

8. Awareness of Attention and Time
 Objection:
 Should understand awareness of shifting attention from
red dot to green dot as: attentive experience of red dot
followed by attentive experience of green dot.
 If we don’t go beyond experience, there is still no reason
to believe in fundamentally non-momentary aspects of
mental life.
 Reply:
 Same strategy would understand awareness of a moving
dot as: awareness of dot at one location followed by
awareness of dot at different location.
 The don’t go beyond experience strategy then would lead
to the conclusion that everything (not just mental life) is
fundamentally momentary.

9. Awareness of Attention and Time
Discussion Points 2
 Do Buddhists accept the
parallelism between
temporal atomism about
mental life and temporal
atomism generally?
 Do Buddhists (explicitly)
reject the claim that a
change in experience is
not sufficient for an
experience of change?

10. Awareness of Attention and Agent Control
 It seems to me that I can
control my attention. I
can, just like that, focus on
the green dot.
 Attention, in a case like
this, seems to be a
paradigmatic example of a
voluntary activity.
 Central to the Nyāyā-
Vaiśeṣika view
 Also: Reid, Malebranche, W.
James
 Freedom over attention one
of the last bastions of
freedom as we think of
external factors outside our
control and

11. Awareness of Attention and Agent Control
Argument Against the No-Self View
1. There is an experience of actively controlling the focus
of attention.
2. The experience in (1) is an experience as of oneself
controlling the focus of attention.
3. An experience as of oneself controlling the focus of
attention is an experience as of a thing or substance that
does something and has a variety of experiences and not an experience of
one experience event causing another experience
event.
4. The experience in (3) is not illusory
_______________________________________________
5. There is a thing or substance that does something and has a variety of
experiences

12. Awareness of Attention and Agent Control
 The Sāṅkhyas deny (5). But Buddhists don’t.
 Success of this argument would also undercut the
main line of support for the no-self view.
 The Buddhist will probably try to deny (2) or (3).

13. Awareness of Attention and Agent Control
Discussion Point 3
 Do Buddhists discuss
this argument?
 If so, how do they
respond to it?
 Is not, what would they
say?

14. An Argument against Persisting Subjects
Another argument against the Self view
1. If there were a persisting self, then that self would
need to undergo qualitative change over time (since it
is affected by various distinct objects and to be
affected by something requires being changed by it).
2. But the self cannot undergo qualitative change over
time (because then it would have two different natures
at different times).
____________________________________________
_
3. There is no persisting self

15. An Argument against Persisting Subjects
Another argument against the Self view
1. If there were a persisting self, then that self would
need to undergo qualitative change over time (since it
is affected by various distinct objects and to be
affected by something requires being changed by it).
2. But the self cannot undergo qualitative change over
time (because then it would have two different natures
at different times).
____________________________________________
_
3. There is no persisting self
quality
(~ guṇa?)
nature
(~svabhāva?_

16. An Argument against Persisting Subjects
Another argument against the Self view
1. If there were a persisting self, then that self would
need to undergo a change in qualities over time
(since it is affected by various distinct objects and to
be affected by something requires being changed by
it).
2. But the self cannot undergo a change in nature over
time (because then it would have two different natures
at different times).
____________________________________________
_
3. There is no persisting self

17. An Argument against Persisting Subjects
Discussion Point 4
 Have the Nyāyā-
Vaiśeṣikas made this
response?
 If so, how did/would the
Buddhists reply?

18. Explaining Patterns in the Experiential
Mosaic

19. Explaining Patterns in the Experiential
Mosaic
 The Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣikas might argue that their view is
better than the Buddhist view, because it can explain
patterns in the stream of consciousness that for the
Buddhist are brute facts:
 Attentive experiences are accompanied by (other)
inattentive experiences.
 Training can affect attention generally.
 ...

20. Explaining Patterns in the Experiential
Mosaic
Discussion point 5
 Would the Buddhists
allow such explanatory
arguments?
 How far can such
arguments go?

21. Thanks Alex!
and hope to learn more ....

22. The Questions
 The Buddhist Argumentative Strategy
 Awareness of Attention and Time
 Awareness of Attention and Agent Control
 An Argument against Persisting Subjects
 Explaining Patterns in the Experiential Mosaic