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Cyber terrorism/warfare
A packet can’t fly a plane…
Typical types of attack:
  –Denial of service
  –Breeching the perimeter
Problems with these attacks
  –Does not hurt enough
  –Not effective
What we really need is…
Attacks that are:
  –Targeted / Closely focused (T)
  –Closely coordinated
  –Wide enough to cripple a country
  –Very effective (E)
  –Too fast for human intervention – i.e.
  automated (A)
Part I: A very nasty worm…
Internal networks are weak
Perimeters are strong
Internal network:
  –Machines are never patched
  –Installed with unpatched software
  –New machines are added
  –Not segmented on network layer
A multi–exploit worm’s paradise
Part I: A very nasty worm…
Let’s see:
   1.   Microsoft IIS Unicode / 2x decode
   2.   Microsoft IIS MSADC
   3.   Microsoft IIS .printer extensions
   4.   Microsoft IIS WebDAV
   5.   Microsoft SQL with blank SA configured
   6.   Blank local administrator passwords on Microsoft
        Windows hosts
   7.   …slammer…
   8.   Apache Chunked Encoding
   9.   OpenSSL < 0.9.6
Part I: A very nasty worm…
Finding more food
   Targeting on internal network and Internet
      very different.
   1. Find your current network/mask
   2. SNMP queries all around
   3. Traceroute to Internet
   4. Pingsweep one class C higher and lower
   5. …brute force…
Part I: A very nasty worm…
Denial of service on internal networks is fun:
   –Wire speed flooding
   –ICMP redirection
   –MAC/ARP table trickery
   –DHCP lease exhaustion
   –Hijacking of TCP connections
Since we are here…:
   –DOC/XLS/ZIP/MDB file corruption
   –BIOS flashing
   –Pop-up messages
   –Disable all routers you can find – island-ification
IP/MASK   TRACEROUTE

                        LOCAL EXE INFECTION




SNMP      BRUTE FORCE                                                   FLOODS


                               TESTER                      BIOS FLASH ETC
                                                                                 POP-UPS

                                                                    MAC/ARP POISON


                        COPY
                                   REMOTE EXEC                               DHCP EXHAUST




                                              MESSAGE PROTOCOL
Part II: Delivery
Who needs 0day silent delivery when you
  can mail an EXE to someone:
   •   Using the correct language
   •   From marketing@companyXX.com
   •   Subject: “New screensaver for companyXX –
       click here”
   •   With HTTPS link to
       intranet.companyXX.com…and then some
       funny characters…☺
   •   SSL neatly bypass all content level filters
(even PowerPoint thinks its valid)
Part II: Delivery
Some stats:
– Target group : IT security team – bank
– 13 people in group

– 8 downloaded the EXE
– 5 executed it
One guy executed it 3 times…
Part III: Targeted delivery
How do you find someone on the Internet?
•     Google is your friend
•     +@companyXX.com -www.companyXX.com
•     Scrape it (TOC of Google)
•     Example…Hurriyet Newspaper in Turkey
    # perl emails.pl hurriyet.com.tr
    Received 83 Hits:
    [bavci@hurriyet.com.tr]
    [tturenc@hurriyet.com.tr]
    [ecolasan@hurriyet.com.tr]
    [yatakan@hurriyet.com.tr]
    [dhizlan@hurriyet.com.tr]
    [fsever@hurriyet.com.tr]
    [rcaglayangil@hurriyet.com.tr]
    </snip>
Part III: Footprinting a country
We can extract email addresses from companies
   – we need to find companies for each
   country in the following sectors:
   –   Telecommunication
   –   Energy providers (hydro, nuclear, fossil fuel, oil etc.)
   –   Government departments / Military
   –   Media providers
   –   Financial services
   –   Prominent businesses
   –   Emergency services
   –   Transport
Part III: Footprinting a country
Private sector/Public sector
Private:
•    Problems with online directories (e.g.
     Google/DMOZ)
•    Solution is specialized directories
•    Some online (http://www.world-newspapers.com/),
     some better to extract (pros/cons)
•    Challenge – mapping company name to domain
     name
•    Method – page 9 of paper.
Part III: Footprinting a country
Private sector/Public sector
Public – government and military
Concept of sub TLD – e.g. gov.za
Not the same for every country – e.g. France (gouv.fr)
Interested in sub domains – maps to departments
•    We have Google scraper
•    We scrape gov.za (for example)
•    Look at all the subdomains
•    These becomes targets
Many military domains contained in gov sub TLD.
Recursive scraping…finding *all* the sub domains
Part IV: Putting it all together
Years in the industry
taught us well-
you need a GUI…!
We love Turkey




                            Conclusion
            Focused cyber attacks are possible
            This method would most likely have negative impact

            How does it compare to real life attacks?
            Is this YABMT? (yet another bigger mouse trap)

            What’s the chances of this happening?
            Should we worry?

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Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism

  • 1.
  • 2. Cyber terrorism/warfare A packet can’t fly a plane… Typical types of attack: –Denial of service –Breeching the perimeter Problems with these attacks –Does not hurt enough –Not effective
  • 3. What we really need is… Attacks that are: –Targeted / Closely focused (T) –Closely coordinated –Wide enough to cripple a country –Very effective (E) –Too fast for human intervention – i.e. automated (A)
  • 4. Part I: A very nasty worm… Internal networks are weak Perimeters are strong Internal network: –Machines are never patched –Installed with unpatched software –New machines are added –Not segmented on network layer A multi–exploit worm’s paradise
  • 5. Part I: A very nasty worm… Let’s see: 1. Microsoft IIS Unicode / 2x decode 2. Microsoft IIS MSADC 3. Microsoft IIS .printer extensions 4. Microsoft IIS WebDAV 5. Microsoft SQL with blank SA configured 6. Blank local administrator passwords on Microsoft Windows hosts 7. …slammer… 8. Apache Chunked Encoding 9. OpenSSL < 0.9.6
  • 6. Part I: A very nasty worm… Finding more food Targeting on internal network and Internet very different. 1. Find your current network/mask 2. SNMP queries all around 3. Traceroute to Internet 4. Pingsweep one class C higher and lower 5. …brute force…
  • 7. Part I: A very nasty worm… Denial of service on internal networks is fun: –Wire speed flooding –ICMP redirection –MAC/ARP table trickery –DHCP lease exhaustion –Hijacking of TCP connections Since we are here…: –DOC/XLS/ZIP/MDB file corruption –BIOS flashing –Pop-up messages –Disable all routers you can find – island-ification
  • 8. IP/MASK TRACEROUTE LOCAL EXE INFECTION SNMP BRUTE FORCE FLOODS TESTER BIOS FLASH ETC POP-UPS MAC/ARP POISON COPY REMOTE EXEC DHCP EXHAUST MESSAGE PROTOCOL
  • 9. Part II: Delivery Who needs 0day silent delivery when you can mail an EXE to someone: • Using the correct language • From marketing@companyXX.com • Subject: “New screensaver for companyXX – click here” • With HTTPS link to intranet.companyXX.com…and then some funny characters…☺ • SSL neatly bypass all content level filters (even PowerPoint thinks its valid)
  • 10. Part II: Delivery Some stats: – Target group : IT security team – bank – 13 people in group – 8 downloaded the EXE – 5 executed it One guy executed it 3 times…
  • 11. Part III: Targeted delivery How do you find someone on the Internet? • Google is your friend • +@companyXX.com -www.companyXX.com • Scrape it (TOC of Google) • Example…Hurriyet Newspaper in Turkey # perl emails.pl hurriyet.com.tr Received 83 Hits: [bavci@hurriyet.com.tr] [tturenc@hurriyet.com.tr] [ecolasan@hurriyet.com.tr] [yatakan@hurriyet.com.tr] [dhizlan@hurriyet.com.tr] [fsever@hurriyet.com.tr] [rcaglayangil@hurriyet.com.tr] </snip>
  • 12. Part III: Footprinting a country We can extract email addresses from companies – we need to find companies for each country in the following sectors: – Telecommunication – Energy providers (hydro, nuclear, fossil fuel, oil etc.) – Government departments / Military – Media providers – Financial services – Prominent businesses – Emergency services – Transport
  • 13. Part III: Footprinting a country Private sector/Public sector Private: • Problems with online directories (e.g. Google/DMOZ) • Solution is specialized directories • Some online (http://www.world-newspapers.com/), some better to extract (pros/cons) • Challenge – mapping company name to domain name • Method – page 9 of paper.
  • 14. Part III: Footprinting a country Private sector/Public sector Public – government and military Concept of sub TLD – e.g. gov.za Not the same for every country – e.g. France (gouv.fr) Interested in sub domains – maps to departments • We have Google scraper • We scrape gov.za (for example) • Look at all the subdomains • These becomes targets Many military domains contained in gov sub TLD. Recursive scraping…finding *all* the sub domains
  • 15. Part IV: Putting it all together Years in the industry taught us well- you need a GUI…!
  • 16. We love Turkey Conclusion Focused cyber attacks are possible This method would most likely have negative impact How does it compare to real life attacks? Is this YABMT? (yet another bigger mouse trap) What’s the chances of this happening? Should we worry?