ANALYSING WHY THE USA SO CALLED LOST AS PER US GENERAL BOLGER IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

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7
General Bolger in authors
note states his basic

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8
premise about the book as
below:--
Outwardly bombastic and
blunt , this statement has
serious basic analytical
flaws.
Guerrilla wars cannot be
won . They cannot also be

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9
lost . A guerrilla war is
always a state of mind and
both sides in a guerrilla
war can claim victory or
concede defeat.
So much for our authors
bluntness or
trutfulness.May be he was
being truthful but his
definition of the “ truth”
was confused or flawed.

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10
Bolger defines his role in
Afghanistan and Iraq and
sum of his experiences as
below:--
Bolger defines the specific
US failure as below:--

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As one who closely
observed the US Afghan
war , I would respectfully
differ.
US failure was coming to
the wrong place and
following the wrong higher
strategy framed in

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12
Washington DC and not
flawed military leadership.
Bolgers reasoning is also
flawed when he makes te
statement below:--
Afghan war as well as Iraq
wars firstly were “unjust

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13
wars” , about which Bolger
has nothing to say.
Secondly US highest level
political leadership was
confused and this was the
core reason for US so
called failure in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
There are defects in
Bolgers thinking when e

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14
makes the statement
below:--
The central issue is that
the system in USA is
based on winning the next
elections.

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15
As nations degrade , they
stop producing
statesmen.Instead they
produce political con men
with short term agendas of
winning the next elections.
Thus the extension of wars
to years and decades to
which Bolger refers.

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16
Bolgers melodramatical
descriptions as on page 14
are interesting but
unrealistic:--
He compares US Iraq war
of 1990 with Iran Iraq
war, while the two wars
had simply no comparison.

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17
The USA was fighting a
mickey mouse foe in Iraq
in 1991 which the USA
was massively dominating
with excessive
technological and material
superiority , so here
Bolgers melodramatics are
massive exaggerations.
I served in Pakistan Armys
tank corps where we had

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the misfortune to have
tanks almost similar to T
72s whose designs were so
flawed that a tank which
fired a main gun round
could not see where his
round went , simply
because so much dust was
kicked by the tank and the
tanks height was so low.

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Russian T series tanks
were about 1 metre lower
in height than US M series
tanks and this made
seeing where the Russian
tanks main gun round
went impossible.
Gunnery wise there was
simply no comparison
between M Series

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American tanks and T
series Iraqi tanks.
Bolgers comparison with
Iraq Armys Iran war
performance is also far
fetched as both armies
were similar , while US
military in 1991 was
overwhelming superior to
Iraqi Army technically ,

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materially and in every
manner.
Bolgers observation proves
that Iraqis were technically
and gunnery wise
overwhelmingly inferior :--
Bolger has a marked
tendency to inflate US
successes in Iraq war of

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22
1991 which is a negative
and weak part of his
analysis.
Bolgers assertions that
Soviet Russia as it stood in
1991 could invade Saudi
Arabia are far fetched to
the most exaggerated
extreme :--

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23
Bolgers discussion of first
US Iraq war is superfluous
and unnecessary and it
was torture reading his
well known repition of
facts.
While discussing first US
Iraq war Bolger perhaps is
not aware that Saudi
Arabia first asked Pakistan
to field a very large army

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but when the Pakistan
Army chief General Baig
refused , Saudis asked
USA .
Bolger has nothing to say
about how USA ripped off
Saudi Arabia for cost of
troops fielded.

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This is extreme analytical
intellectual dishonesty on
Bolgers part.
While Bolgers discussion of
Iraq war -1 is largely a
waste of time , I am
shocked as well as amused
at the naievette of Bolgers
conclusions like below :--

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26
Bolger is exaggerating OBL
who had a limited role in
US Afghan or Iraq war to
too high a pedestal.
Firstly no lesson was learnt
by anyone.

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27
What we saw in
Afghanistan was greed of
US politicians to make
short term political gains
and pointless sacrifice of
brave young soldiers in a
scenario where there was
no strategy and not even a
worthwhile credible
operational strategy.

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Bolgers conclusions are
naieve and far fetched.
9/11 remains the most
mysterious part of the
whole affair ?
And why go to Afghanistan
in order to avenge 9/11 ?
The British company came
to rule Aden in 1839 but
Bolger wants us to believe

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that it happened in 1832 :-
-
Page 46 one finds a US
general Bolger severely
rocked by one minor
incident in US naval
history i.e the attack on
USS Cole :--

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The problem with modern
USA is not Al Qaeda or its
enemies , but undue and
excessive sensitivity to
even minor loss of life.
It’s a society which as lost
the zest for life and lacks
the necessary previous

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brutality that it once had
to conduct war.
The British for example
faced countless incidents
like the mickey mouse
attack on USS Cole but
they always dealt with
such incidents with
immediate as well as
effective punishment.

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The USA instead is
encumbered with a huge
decision making
bureaucracy that makes a
mountain out of a molehill
and yet remains
supremely indecisive.
Bolgers analysis as on
page 46 lacks historical
context as well as depth:--

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Instead of analyzing US
overkill in Soviet Afghan
war and mobilizing
pointlessly all kind of
Islamist nuts worldwide

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against USSR , Bolger
gives us shallow nonsense
, superficial analysis.
Ex General Ziauddin who
headed Pakistans ISI , in
various conversations with
this scribe on the other
hand always stated that
OBL was viewed by the ISI
as a CIA agent.

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Bolgers conclusions are
myopic and
unsubstantiated as on
page 47:--
How intelligent people can
stretch matters so
unrealistically make such

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massive exaggerations is
hard to understand.
Bolgers narrative lacks
information like on page
50 he fails to note that
OBL was provided Afghan
passports etc by the so
called Mujahideen, Sayyaf
etc who later on allied with
the US :--

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37
Bolgers wild assertions
that OBL lured back the
USA to Afghanistan are
also sheer nonsense and
unsupported by any
factual evidence :-- (page-
51)

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38
He appears to be very
found of playing to the
gallery.
Now OBL was a mickey
mouse player in Talibans
Afghan set up which was
largely a Pakistani state
proxy.But Bolger

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39
exaggerates and highly
overrates OBLs position in
the Taliban set up in
Afghanistan.
Bolgers assessment that
Musharraf was on board
with the USA (page -71) is
highly fallacious:--

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Sources close to Musharraf
indicate that the wily
general had decided from
the onset to deceive the
USA while outwardly
acting as an ally.The
Taliban were regarded as

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41
too precious assets by the
Pakistani security
establishment led by
Musharraf.
Again on page 71 Bolgers
descriptions are
unnecessarily vague:--

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While Panjsher had been
practically abandoned by
Masud, although never
occupied by Taliban ,
Masuds forces were not
holding some districts as
Bolger fallaciously claims
but two provinces i.e
Badakhshan and Taloqan.

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43
Bolgers supreme wisdom
as expressed on page 73 is
wisdom of hindsight :--
Meanwhile Bolger
continues exaggerating Al
Qaeda which in reality was
a very small player in

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44
Taliban controlled
Afghanistan.

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45
On page 75 Bolger starts
talking absolute non
factual nonsense :--
Bolger perhaps is ignorant
of the fact that in the First
Afghan War a private
British company overran

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Afghanistan using a 75 %
Indian private army.
Bolger again perhaps does
not know that in Second
Afghan war the British
defeated Afghanistan with
nominal casualties.
Above all Bolger perhaps
does not know that the
British managed

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Afghanistan with an annual
subsidy of 13 Lakh rupees
per month in return for
which Afghanistan
surrendered its complete
foreign relations to a
private British company.
Bolgers entire idea of
Afghan British history is
highly fallacious.

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48
Bolger continuously
overrates OBL again on
page 75 :--
OBL was a small cog in the
whole machine. Todate it
remains unclear who
carried out 9/11. There is
no denial that it

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happened.But there is
considerable ambiguity
about who did it ?
OBL was a Taliban chattel ,
hiding from US rockets.
Later handed over to
Pakistani state by the
Taliban.
But somehow our so called
brilliant US general

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continuously overrates
OBL and wants us to
believe that it was OBL
who lured USA to
Afghanistan.
One can only term Bolgers
assertion as pure and
unadulterated nonsense.
Bolger massively
exaggerates Mazar Sharif

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battle of late
2001.Whereas the factual
position was that Taliban
were in hostile territory in
Mazar Sharif with the vast
majority of population
against them and the odds
were severely against the
Taliban.
about the fact that

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Afghanistan was captured
by the USA without the
loss of a single soldier in
actual fighting.
Bolger forgets that Taliban
were above all from their
very first days a Pakistani
state proxies and their
actions were planned by
Pakistani handlers.

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What happened was that
Taliban carried out an
organized withdrawal into
Pakistan well before the
actual US onslaught of
Afghanistan took place.
This was by design and
this was the precise reason
why the US forces suffered
zero casualties and the US
allies or vassals Northern

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Alliance suffered very low
casualties.

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55
Bolger misses the real
issue.That is US military
failure to coordinate with
Pakistani military and
create an arrangement
forcing it to interdict
Taliban with US liaison
officers stationed all along
Afghan Pakistan border.
The USA had about two
and half complete months

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to do so but failed .A
major US military
failure.But Bolger has
nothing to say about this.

58
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Chapter four dealing with
Operation Annaoconda is a
massive exaggeration and
at this point I completely
lost faith in Bolgers
credentials as a serious or
credible military historian.

60
60
I am surprised how much
an American general like
Bolger could exaggerate
about Annaconda like as
below , where he quotes
Tommy Franks , another
master of massive
exaggerations:--

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A puny battle exaggerated
to the level of a Cannae or
Borodino !
Later on even in USA these
massive exaggerations
were criticized.

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The US public was simply
being a totally false script
about the heavy odds that
US forces were supposedly
facing in Afghanistan.
I visited Khost in 2002 and
could hardly find as gory
as painted in various US
accounts.

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Bolger has no geographical
sense also , as he places
Taliban in Pakistan in
Pakistans northwest
whereas it was well known
that Taliban citadel was in
Pakistans south west
province of Baluchistan
(page-120 ) :--

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Now disenfranchised
Pashtuns had nothing to
do with Taliban
resurrection.
This was a clear cit
Pakistani strategic
command decision made

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once Pakistani state got
unnerved because of the
escalating Baloch
insurgency in Pakistans
Baluchistan.
Here the major US
strategic failure which our
naieve author failed to
analyse was US inability to
clearly and substantially
address Pakistani fears

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about US intentions in
Afghanistan.
As the adage goes “fear
made men believe in the
worst” and Pakistani state
was believing in the worst
by 2006 middle , as far as
US intentions were
concerned.

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Taliban resurgence as far
we saw and this scribes
sources in Pakistani
decision making echelons
of that time indicated was
a clear cut Pakistani state
decision.So here Bolger is
totally wrong.
Bolger writes
unsubstantiated nonsense
and a great deal of it

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repeatedly like as below :-
-
Only one British regiment
44th
Foot comprising about
700 soldiers
overwhelmingly
outnumbered by 50,000

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Afghans was butchered in
British companys First
Afghan War. So one is at a
loss about which
“regiments” is Bolger
talking about ?
I cannot recollect any
British regiment bolting in
Afghanistan.

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On page 120 Bolger asks
the right question for once
:--
But I was surprised and
rather shocked by the
dumb naievette of our
author where he offered
no worthwhile answer !

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71
The main enemy that US
was facing were the
Pakistani state handlers of
Afghan Taliban , but our
hopeless author has no
analysis to offer.
This scribes own analysis
was as below:--

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Bolger criticizes President
Bush but has no
worthwhile analysis to
offer.
Bolger fails to analyse that
US commanders in
Afghanistan could have
done a lot in addressing
Pakistani fears but this
escapes the sagacity of
Bolger , if he ever

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possessed a quality known
as sagacity or insight !
Bolgers exaggerations
about the odds that USA
faced in Iraq are pure
intelleftual dishonesty
since in Iraq some 80 % of
Iraq i.e majority Shias and
Kurds were staunchly pro
USA so any assertion that
USA faced major odds in

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Iraq on part of Bolger is
far fetched and a total
distortion of reality.
Bolger is right that Iraq
was a strategic failure but
has no analysis to offer .
A major failing of the
book.
How Bolger places a
British battalion at 600 is a

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factual failure (page-289)
:--
And why Bolger has to cite
such figures without
proper knowledge ?
Bolgers analysis about
British in Helmand is
shallow and superficial to

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the highest extreme
(page-290) :--
He has no analysis to offer
why British went to
Helmand and achieved
nothing but beats about
the bush.

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I was based in Helmand in
2004-5 and again in 2006
and there was no Taliban
resurgence in Helmand ,
which our author
fallaciously claims :--
There was no strategic or
operational reason to go to

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Helmand except
dominating the morphia
paste production, but
Bolger makes totally false
premises about Taliban
resurgence.
Below is this scribes
analysis based entirely on
actual presence in
Helmand from 2004 to

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2011 with very frequent
visits:--

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Bolger offers no
worthwhile analysis about
the fact that te British
were operating most
haphazardly in Helmand.
Here he assumes a most
non committal and evasise
posture.
Again I will quote from my
book to illustrate what this

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86
scribe personally
witnessed in Helmand :--

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87
About sacking of Mc
Kiernan again Bolger has
little analysis to offer
which is a serious failing of
this book.
Bolger is non committal
and does not have much
to say.
The bottom line is that Mc
Kiernan was removed

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88
based on whims of the US
political and military
leadership.
If Mc Kiernan was B Class
as US senior decision
makers fallaciously
claimed and Mc Chrystal A
class , then what did A
class achieve ?

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Mc Chrystals strategic
insight was so low that
despite thinking initially
that going to Helmand was
a bad idea he finally went
to Helmand and
distributed US troops in
penny packets ,
condemned to be blown
like partridges by Taliban
IEDs ?

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90
Bolgers unnecessary
buttering up and
projection of General
Petraeus is in bad taste :-
- (page-355 )

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Finally the book offers no
worthwhile analysis of
“why the USA lost in
Afghanistan” .Iraq one
cannot call a US military
defeat . Although it was a
USA strategic political
failure in strengthening
Iran. But then as my
mentor Ed Luttwak
probably said words to te

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affect that Iraq war did
create a massive Shia
Sunni divide in middle east
which the USA can always
exploit .
about the grand strategic
deception that Pakistans
General Musharraf
practiced on US troops in
Afghanistan.

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about the absolutely

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pointless US drone
program in Pakistan which
attacked the wrong
people.
about the idea of General
Mc Kiernan that Taliban
safe havens in Pakistan be
attacked.

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about the damage inflicted
on US troops by naieve
self styled strategists like
Riedel.
Bolger likes to be
supremely non committal
and evasive as speaking
the truth would not help
him in an apple polishing
society like the USA ?

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Bolgers book lacks maps ,
the most essential part of
a military analysis book ?
He is found of talking
absolute non essential
nonsense and always
evades offering worthwhile
analysis.
A sad disappointment and
a rather barren book .

ANALYSING WHY THE USA SO CALLED LOST AS PER US GENERAL BOLGER IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

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ANALYSING WHY THE USA SO CALLED LOST AS PER US GENERAL BOLGER IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ