This lecture discusses elements of coercive diplomacy and military coercion. It provides three examples: the Battle of Britain in 1940, the bombing of Germany in WWII, and NATO's air war against Serbia in 1999. The Battle of Britain and bombing of Germany failed to coerce their targets due to miscalculations of pain thresholds and unwillingness of leaders to negotiate. NATO initially struggled against Serbia due to limited attacks and mixed messages, but escalated attacks combined with political isolation eventually coerced Serbia's leader to agree to demands. Effective coercion requires capability, credibility, clear communication, and understanding one's opponent.

1. Professor Joel Hayward

2. By the end of this lecture students should be able to:
• Understand the elements of deterrence and military coercion
• Determine appropriate tools of statecraft for implementing coercive
strategies
• Assess the complexity of coercion via military means

3. Coercive diplomacy is ordinary undertaken first and often brings success
without the need for military violence
Diplomatic strategy to persuade an opponent that:
• ending a certain course of action will bring reward / benefits
• continuing it will bring pain /costs

4. • Bargaining, inducements, and compellence based on such things as
political isolation, economic sanctions and other punishments
• The threat of force
• If the enemy won’t comply, a strategy of military coercion is often then
undertaken

5. “Speak softly and …"

6. A clarification:
“War is a continuation of politics by other means”
“ … eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs … ”

7. A clarification:
“War is a continuation of politics by other means”
“ … eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs … ”
dialogue or discourse or communication
= a continuation of a two-way discourse, exchange
of expectations between opponents

8. “War is simply the continuation of political discourse with the addition
of other means. We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of
other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself
does not suspend political discourse or change it into something
entirely different. In essentials that discourse continues, irrespective of
the means it employs.
— Clausewitz, On War

9. "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."
― Clausewitz, On War
Thus, ALL war is coercive
But coercion can also occur as a military activity outside war

10. Deterrence involves preventing unwanted actions by threatening intense
consequences
“Don’t even thinking about doing it, otherwise you won’t believe the pain”

11. Whereas deterrence seeks to dissuade the target from doing something the
coercer does not want, compellence attempts to make the target change its
behavior in accordance with what the coercer does want
A deterrent threat: “if you do A, I will do B,”
A compellent threat: “Until you do X, I will do Y.”
―Johnson, Mueller, and Taft, The Theory of Coercion

12. Two kinds of military coercion: denial and punishment
Denial = the use of military force to deny an opposing state the physical
means of undertaking unacceptable (usually military) activities
“If you don’t stop doing this, I’ll take away your means of doing it”
The targets are usually military units, assets and systems

13. Punishment = convincing the opposing state to cease its unacceptable
behavior by inflicting unbearable costs
“If you don’t stop doing this, I’ll hurt you until you stop”
Force is threatened or used against targets not necessarily directly
connected with a traditional battlefield

14. Problem with the punishment approach:
• Recipient of violence actually holds initiative
• Pain threshold is very difficult to gauge
• If recipient holds firm, the coercer must either: cease or escalate
• If the coercer actually destroys a lot, he may have nothing left to
threaten. The recipient might have little left to lose

15. The essential elements of effective military coercion:
 A thorough understanding of the opponent
 Full openness to military guidance
 Realistic assessment that change is possible
 Clearly conveyed and received expectations, inducements and threats

16.  Credible force at hand
 Political/domestic /alliance will to see it through
 The demonstration of necessity to third-parties
 The demonstration of compliance with international law

17. Example 1
The Battle of Britain, 1940

18. Battle of Britain 10 July — 31 October 1940

19. Battle of Britain 10 July — 31 October 1940
German aim: to coerce Britain to sign an armistice or peace treaty
British very weak after defeat in France
Attempted method: destruction of Britain’s air defenses and fighter force

20. Each side lost c. 1,750 aircraft Brits lost 1,500 aircrew, Germans 2,500
Result: total coercive failure and utter waste of German resources

21. Causes of failure:
• Hitler would not listen to military advisors
• Churchill despised Hitler / impossibility of negotiation
• 5 September Hitler shifted focus from destruction of RAF to attacks on
London = massive relief of pressure
• Germans could not inflict sufficient pain
• Attacks on civilians hardened British morale and defiance

22. Example 2
Bombing of Germany, WWII

23. Bombing of Germany 1940-1945

24. British aim: to devastate civilian life; break morale; thereby coerce
Germany into armistice or other settlement
American aim (1942-45): to break German morale; to degrade German
manufacturing of systems essentials (transportation, ball bearings, oil)
Type of coercion: destruction of morale, punishment, denial

25. British Air Staff paper, 23 September 1941:
“The ultimate aim of an attack on a town area is to
break the morale of the population which occupies
it. To ensure this, we must achieve two things: first,
we must make the town physically uninhabitable
and, secondly, we must make the people conscious
of constant personal danger. The immediate aim, is
therefore, twofold, namely, to produce (i)
destruction and (ii) fear of death.”

26. Result:
• Killed 500,000 – 850,000 German civilians
• Degraded German industrial capabilities by 2 - 7 %
(Zero-sum game for Britain)
• Shortages of oil crippled German war effort after September 1944
• Strengthened German will to resist, eventually reduced German ability
to resist
• Led to changes in international law

27. Causes of failure:
• Hitler was almost entirely un-coercible
• State control of people and even governing elite was very tight
• German people convinced by propaganda that Allies were barbaric and
that any Allied occupation would therefore be horrific
• No room for negotiation after the Allies declared their implacable goal
of Germany’s “unconditional surrender” in January 1943
• German generals realized that fighting on was only solution

28. Example 3
NATO’s Air War against Serbia 1999

29. NATO’s air war against Serbia 24 March – 6 June 1999

30. NATO’s aim: within 2-3 days to end Milošević's defiance; to coerce Serbia
to return to negotiations over Kosovo; to reduce or end Serbia’s bloody
counterinsurgency campaign vs. KLA
Result: after 78 days Milošević signed an agreement with the G8

31. Kenneth Bacon, Pentagon spokesman, 23 March: "we have plans for a
swift and severe air campaign. This will be painful for the Serbs. We hope
that relatively quickly ... the Serbs will realise that they have made a
mistake [in declining to sign the Rambouillet documents]".
Secretary of State Madeleine Madeleine, 24 March: "I don't see this as a
long-term operation. I think it is achievable within a relatively short period
of time.”
Why did they think Serbia was so easy to coerce?

34. NO U.N. mandate authorizing force = Milošević thought NATO would
therefore be timid and passive because of world opinion
Clinton said there would be no ground campaign = Milošević knew that
NATO was divided and unlikely to agree to any major campaign

37. General Buster Glosson, USAF retired: "When you fly less than 50
bombing sorties per day for seven days, you're not serious about what
you're doing.
On 28 April, Tom DeLay, the US House Majority Whip:
“The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff told us that this was no big deal, that we were
going to bomb for a couple of days, 48 hours, and then stop bombing, and
Milosevic would come to the table.“

38. General Michael Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff, lamented on 4 June:
“Admittedly, the campaign did not begin the way that America normally
would apply air power - massively, striking at strategic centres of gravity
that support Milosevic and his oppressive regime - but we are not in this
conflict alone. We now have 18 NATO partners, some of whom were
prepared to wage only a phased air operation to show NATO's resolve in
the hope of achieving an early settlement".

39. 14 April 1999: Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin as his chief Balkans
envoy, signaling Russia's desire to chart a new Kosovo policy
23 - 24 April NATO summit: military leadership promised free hand
10 May: Clinton began stating that "no options are off the table.”
24 May: Milošević indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
3 June: Dep. Sec. State Strobe Talbott, Chernomyrdin and Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari presented demands to Milošević in person

40. Causes of initial failure:
Because of NATO reluctance, US administration miscommunicated :
Limited attacks
Limited duration
No ground offensive
Military hamstrung = No big stick

41. Causes of eventual success:
Serbia’s political isolation
Eventual direct communication of expectations
Dramatic escalation of air campaign
Threat of ground offensive

42. Coercion during peacetime:
• Risk of appearing aggressive / disproportionate / immoral
• Risk of illegality without UN resolution
• Risk of alienating populace, allies and/or third-parties
• Opposing population will probably rally behind govt
During wartime:
• Far greater freedom, more choices, less accountability
• Difficulty of communicating with opponent
• Opponent embittered = unlikely to budge

43. Final thoughts:
• Coercion must be based on capability and credibility
• Is psychologically very difficult
• Communicating effectively is the key
• Success is not the norm and the coercer may end up with a different
outcome to that intended

44. Thank you