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WEP

        PRESENTED BY
 SUDEEP KULKARNI (W5097046)
SWAPNIL KULKARNI (W5097047)
  SNEHAL LOKARE (W5097048)
 ABHISHEK MULAY (W5097056)
INTRODUCTION

 Wireless network connectivity is becoming very important
    part of computing environments
   One of the most popular wireless network standard is
    802.11 i.e. WLAN. In this standard data is transmitted over
    radio waves
   Wireless networks rely on Open Medium
   With an open network medium, unprotected traffic can
    be seen by anybody
   Guarding against such attacks constitutes the domain of
    Cryptography
What is WEP?


 WEP is “Wired Equivalent Privacy” or “Wireless
  Encryption Protocol”
 It is the original wireless security protocol for the
  802.11 standard.
 It uses the RC4 stream cipher, using a 64-bit key
  consisting of:
    A 24-bit master key
    A 40-bit initialization vector (IV)
 It also employs a CRC integrity checksum
WEP Cryptographic Operations


 Three major objectives of communication security
   Confidentiality
   Integrity
   Authentication

 WEP provides operations that attempt to meet these
  criteria
 Frame body encryption supports confidentiality.
 An integrity check sequence protects data in
  transit and allows receivers to validate that the
  received data was not altered in transit.
WEP Data Processing

 Confidentiality and integrity are handled
  simultaneously.
 Before encryption, the frame is run through an
  integrity check algorithm, generating a hash
  called an integrity check value (ICV)
 The ICV protects the contents against tampering by
  ensuring that the frame has not changed in transit.
 The frame and the ICV are both encrypted, so
  the ICV is not available to casual attackers
WEP Data Processing

 As input, WEP requires Three Items viz.
   Payload

   Key

   Initialization Vector (IV)

 After processing, WEP has a single output.
   Encrypted Frame
WEP Keys

 Mapped Keys/Station Keys
   For Unicast traffic.

 Default Keys
 WEP keys have an associated number. Up to four
  keys may be defined in an 802.11 station.
 Each station receives two keys from the access point
    A mapping key (0)
    A default Key (1)
WEP key numbering and Storage

 To efficiently encrypt frames, many 802.11 chipsets
  include a data structure known as Key Cache.
 Most chipsets include four key slots.
 Two types of Key Distribution:
    Static/Manual
    Dynamic
 Static WEP uses one key slot whilw dynamic WEP
 uses two.
WEP Encapsulation

 When WEP is in use, the frame body expands by
 8 bytes.
    4 bytes for IV Header
    Remaining 4 for ICV Trailer
Design flaws of the WEP System

 Key management
    Manual key management is a minefield of problems
    Static WEP offers a shared secret of only 40 bits.
 Key Reuse
    Stream ciphers are vulnerable to analysis when the key
     stream is reused.
 IV reuse:
    WEP's IV size is 24 bits.
    WEP uses the same IV for different data packets.
    An attacker can decrypt packets that were encrypted with
     the same IV.
 Inappropriate Integrity check:
    MD5 or SHA-1 algorithms are more suitable for
     cryptographic hash than CRC-32.
Attacks on WEP

 FMS Attack
   Fluhrer, Martin and Shamir published the first key recovery
    attack onWEP.

     If the first 2 bytes of enough key stream are known -> The RC4
      key is discovered

     The first 8 bytes of WEP packet is a known SNAP-SAP header

     AirSnort implements this attack
         Recovers key after 20,000 packets = 11 seconds
Attacks on WEP


 IP redirection:

    Change the destination of an encrypted packet to a machine
     controlled by the attacker on the wired network.

    Send modified frame to AP that will decrypt it and send to
     attacker machine

    Derive keystream from this ciphertext, plaintext pair

    Attacker can reuse keysteam to send/receive WLAN traffic
Attacks on WEP

 Bit Flipping
Solutions to improve security of WEP


 Multiple Security measures along with WEP.


 Using VPN.


 Using Efficient key management techniques as an
  additional measure.

 Using alternative encryption techniques like IPsec instead
  of WEP.
Conclusions


 WEP does little to secure the WLAN’s from
 attackers.

 Better to use WEP rather than not using any
 encryption.

 New standards and specifications which will
 replace WEP can be expected to provide sufficient
 security for wireless LAN’s.
THANK YOU

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WEP

  • 1. WEP PRESENTED BY SUDEEP KULKARNI (W5097046) SWAPNIL KULKARNI (W5097047) SNEHAL LOKARE (W5097048) ABHISHEK MULAY (W5097056)
  • 2. INTRODUCTION  Wireless network connectivity is becoming very important part of computing environments  One of the most popular wireless network standard is 802.11 i.e. WLAN. In this standard data is transmitted over radio waves  Wireless networks rely on Open Medium  With an open network medium, unprotected traffic can be seen by anybody  Guarding against such attacks constitutes the domain of Cryptography
  • 3. What is WEP?  WEP is “Wired Equivalent Privacy” or “Wireless Encryption Protocol”  It is the original wireless security protocol for the 802.11 standard.  It uses the RC4 stream cipher, using a 64-bit key consisting of:  A 24-bit master key  A 40-bit initialization vector (IV)  It also employs a CRC integrity checksum
  • 4. WEP Cryptographic Operations  Three major objectives of communication security  Confidentiality  Integrity  Authentication  WEP provides operations that attempt to meet these criteria  Frame body encryption supports confidentiality.  An integrity check sequence protects data in transit and allows receivers to validate that the received data was not altered in transit.
  • 5. WEP Data Processing  Confidentiality and integrity are handled simultaneously.  Before encryption, the frame is run through an integrity check algorithm, generating a hash called an integrity check value (ICV)  The ICV protects the contents against tampering by ensuring that the frame has not changed in transit.  The frame and the ICV are both encrypted, so the ICV is not available to casual attackers
  • 6.
  • 7. WEP Data Processing  As input, WEP requires Three Items viz.  Payload  Key  Initialization Vector (IV)  After processing, WEP has a single output.  Encrypted Frame
  • 8. WEP Keys  Mapped Keys/Station Keys  For Unicast traffic.  Default Keys  WEP keys have an associated number. Up to four keys may be defined in an 802.11 station.  Each station receives two keys from the access point  A mapping key (0)  A default Key (1)
  • 9. WEP key numbering and Storage  To efficiently encrypt frames, many 802.11 chipsets include a data structure known as Key Cache.  Most chipsets include four key slots.  Two types of Key Distribution:  Static/Manual  Dynamic  Static WEP uses one key slot whilw dynamic WEP uses two.
  • 10. WEP Encapsulation  When WEP is in use, the frame body expands by 8 bytes.  4 bytes for IV Header  Remaining 4 for ICV Trailer
  • 11. Design flaws of the WEP System  Key management  Manual key management is a minefield of problems  Static WEP offers a shared secret of only 40 bits.  Key Reuse  Stream ciphers are vulnerable to analysis when the key stream is reused.  IV reuse:  WEP's IV size is 24 bits.  WEP uses the same IV for different data packets.  An attacker can decrypt packets that were encrypted with the same IV.  Inappropriate Integrity check:  MD5 or SHA-1 algorithms are more suitable for cryptographic hash than CRC-32.
  • 12. Attacks on WEP  FMS Attack  Fluhrer, Martin and Shamir published the first key recovery attack onWEP.  If the first 2 bytes of enough key stream are known -> The RC4 key is discovered  The first 8 bytes of WEP packet is a known SNAP-SAP header  AirSnort implements this attack  Recovers key after 20,000 packets = 11 seconds
  • 13. Attacks on WEP  IP redirection:  Change the destination of an encrypted packet to a machine controlled by the attacker on the wired network.  Send modified frame to AP that will decrypt it and send to attacker machine  Derive keystream from this ciphertext, plaintext pair  Attacker can reuse keysteam to send/receive WLAN traffic
  • 14. Attacks on WEP  Bit Flipping
  • 15. Solutions to improve security of WEP  Multiple Security measures along with WEP.  Using VPN.  Using Efficient key management techniques as an additional measure.  Using alternative encryption techniques like IPsec instead of WEP.
  • 16. Conclusions  WEP does little to secure the WLAN’s from attackers.  Better to use WEP rather than not using any encryption.  New standards and specifications which will replace WEP can be expected to provide sufficient security for wireless LAN’s.