L. Chandra Kumar v/s U.O.I [A.I.R 1997 SC 1125]- IRAC

L. Chandra Kumar v/s U.O.I [A.I.R 1997 SC 1125]
IRAC
3rd InternalAssignment -AdministrativeLaw
ABSTRACT
This research deals with the critical analysis of the case, L. Chandra
Kumar v. U.O.I [1997].Efforts havebeen made to explain the
jurisprudentialpremiseof Articles 323-A and 323-Bof the Constitution
of India, 1950. Efforts havebeen made to understand the legislative
intent behind the AdministrativeTribunals Act of 1985.
Name: Utkarsh Kumar
Roll No.: 356
PRN No.: 12010123356
Division: D- BA LLB
Batch: 2013-14

CONTENTS
INTRODUTION……………………………………………………………………………………………3
FACTS…………………………………………………………………………………………………………4
ISSUES………………………………………………………………………………...………………………7
ANALYSIS………………………. …………………………………………………….……………………8
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………….……………………….……14
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….………………………...……19
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………….……………..……21

Petitioner ……………L. Chandra Kumar
Vs.
Respondent: ..……Union of India and others
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Ahmadi,
C.J.I., M.M. Punchhi, K. Ramaswamy,
S.P. Bharucha, S. Saghir Ahmad,
K. Venkataswami and K.T. Thomas, JJ.
A person cannot go directly to the Supreme Court from a decisionofa Tribunal,
without first going to the High Courts. The Tribunals cannot oust the jurisdiction
of the High Courts under Arts. 226/227 and that of Supreme Court under Art. 32
which is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. While this
jurisdiction cannot be ousted even by a constitutional provision, other courts and
Tribunals may perform a supplemental as opposed to a substitutional role.
The power vested in the High Courts to “exercise judicial superintendence over the
decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions” is also
part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES REFERRED:
1. J.B. Chopra v. Union of India 1986;
2. R.K. Jain v. Union of India 1993;
3. Dr. Mahabal Ram v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research 1994;
4. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India 1985;
5. R.K. Jain v. Union of India 1993;
6. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala 1973
7. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Naraian 1975;
8. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India 1980;
9. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillu 1993;
10. Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India 1980;
11. Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat 1991;
12. Pratibha Bonnerjea v. Union of India 1996;
13. Marbury v. (1803)Madi 1 Cranch 137;
14. State of Madras v. V.G. Row 1952;
15. K.K. Dutta v. Union of India 1980;
16. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI [(1987) 2 SCC 124];
17. J.B. Chopra v. UOI [(1987) 1 SCC 422];
18. M.B. Majumdar v. UOI [(1990) 4 SCC 501];
19. Amulya Candra Kalita v. UOI [(1991) 1 SCC 181];
20. R.K. Jain v. UOI [(1993) 4 SCC 199];
21. Dr. Mahabal Ram v. ICAR [(1994) 2 SCC 401];
22. Kesavananda Barati v. State of Kerala [1973 (4) SCC 225];
23. Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [(1965) 1 SCR 413];
24. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1975 (Supp) SCC 1];
25. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. UOI [(1980) 3 SCC 625]

RULES
 Constitution of India - Article 31; Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 -
Section 3,
 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 4,
 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 6, Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985 - Section 7,
 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 14, Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985 - Section 15, Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 16,
Act, 1985 - Section 18,

6
 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 28;
 Wealth Tax Act, 1957 - Section 27;
 Gift Tax Act, 1958 - Section 26;
 Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 - Section 18;
 Customs Act, 1962 - Section 130;
 Central Excises Act, 1944 - Section 354;
 Representation of the People Act, 1951 ;
 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

FACTS
There were special leave petitions, civil appeals and writ petitions which formed a
batch of matters, brought before the Supreme Court in this case, owing their origin to
separate decisions of different High-Courts and several provisions in different
enactments- - thereby raising several distinct questions of law, which were grouped
together in this case for the purpose of adjudication upon them. These matters were
broadly pertaining to- the constitutional validity of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of
Article 323-A and sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323-B of the Constitution of
India, 1950; and also in regards to the constitutional validity of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985; moreover what was also the subject of challenge was whether
the Tribunals constituted under Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India can be
effective substitutes for the High-Courts in discharging the power of judicial review.

ISSUES
I. Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or State Legislatures, as
the case may be, by sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323-A or by sub-
clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323-B of the Constitution, totally exclude
the jurisdiction of all courts, except that of the Supreme Court under
Article 136, in respect of disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1)
of Article 323-A or with regard to all or any of the matters specified in
clause (2) of Article 323-B, runs counter to the power of judicial review
conferred on the High-Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?
II. Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323-A, or under
Article 323-B of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the
constitutional validity of a statutory provision/rule?
III. Whether these Tribunals, as they are functioning at present, can be said
to be effective substitutes for the High-Courts in discharging the power of
judicial review? If not, what are the changes required to make them
conform to their founding objectives?

RULES
 Constitution of India - Article 31; Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 -
Section 3,
 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 6, Administrative Tribunals Act,
1985 - Section 7,
Act, 1985 - Section 15, Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 16,

10
 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 28;
 Wealth Tax Act, 1957 - Section 27;
 Gift Tax Act, 1958 - Section 26;
 Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 - Section 18;
 Customs Act, 1962 - Section 130;
 Central Excises Act, 1944 - Section 354;
 Representation of the People Act, 1951 ;
 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

ANALYSIS
In this case the impact of Arts. 323-A and 323-B (under which theTribunals were
created) on the power of the judicial review and superintendence of the High Courts
(under Art. 226) and of Supreme, Court (under Art. 32) was in question. The clause
2(d) of Art. 323-A and clause 3(d) of Art. 323-B to the extent they exclude the
jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court were held to be
unconstitutional.
It was held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Arts.
226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Art.32 is part of the inviolable basic
structure of the Constitution of India. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other
courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental — as opposed to a substitutional —
role in discharging the powers conferred by Arts.226/227 and 32 of the Constitution.
The Tribunals will continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of
law for which they have been constituted.
The Court further held that under the present prevailing arrangement, direct
appeal lie from all Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Art. 136. Now, no appeal
from the decision of a tribunal will directly lie to the Supreme Court; the aggrieved
party win been titled to move the High Court under Arts. 226/227 and from High
Court‘s decision the party could then move the Supreme Court under Art. 136.
The Supreme Court held that “judicial review is a basic and essential feature
of the Constitution”. The Court observed as follows:
i. The origin of the power ofjndicial review of legislative action may well be
traced to the classic enunciation of the principle by Chief Justice John
Marshall of the US Supreme Court Marbury v Madison. So when the
Framers of our Constitution set about their monumental task, they were
well aware that the principle that courts possess the power to invalidate

12
duly-enacted legislations had already acquired a history of nearly a century
and a half.
ii. Broadly speaking, judicial review in India comprises three aspects: judicial
review of legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions and
judicial review of administrative action. The judges of the superior courts
have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is
maintained and that he legislature and the executive do not, in the
discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is
equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those
who man the subordinate courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict
standards of legal correctness and judicial independence.
iii. The Constitution of India while conferring power of judicial review of
legislative action upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important
safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our
Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would
indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the
independence of the judiciary. These attempts were directed at ensuring
that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide
powers of judicial review
iv. The statement of Dr. Ambedkar in the Drafting Committee of the
Constituent Assembly that Art.32 was the “most important "article and
that “it is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it” has
been speciﬁcally reiterated in several Supreme Court’s decisions. So also
the power of constitutional courts in lndia in respect of judicial review of
legislative action has been affirmed in several decisions.
v. The Supreme Court has always considered the power of judicial review
vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Arts. 226 and
32 respectively, enabling legislative action to be subjected to the scrutiny
of superior courts, to be integral to our Constitutional scheme. While
several judgments have made speciﬁc references to this aspect
[Gajendragadkar, CI. in Keshav Singh case; Beg, J. and Khanna, J. in
Kesavananda Bharati case; Chandrachud, CJ. And Bhagwati, J. in Minerva
Mills; Chandrachud, C1. In Fetilizer Kamgar; K.N. Singh, J. in Delhi

13
Judicial Service Asscn.; etc.] the rest have made general observations
highlighting the signiﬁcance of this feature.
vi. Therefore, the power of judicial review is an integral and essential feature
of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily,
therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the
constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
Further, the power vested in the High Courts to “exercise judicial superintendence
over the decisions of all courts and tribunals ‘within their respective jurisdictions”
is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation
where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that
of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided.]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
In pursuance of the power conferred upon it by Clause (1) of Article 323- A of the
Constitution, the Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985, the Central
Administrative Tribunal (CAT) comprising of five Benches was established on 1
November 1985. However, even before CAT had been established, several writ
petitions had been filed in various high-courts as well as the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutional validity of Article 323- A, as also the provisions of the
Administrative Tribunals Act 1985. The principal violation complained of was that
of the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution, and that of the high-courts under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The exclusion of judicial review under Articles 226, 227 and 32 was questioned as
violating the basic structure of the Constitution in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI. Two
questions arose for consideration in this case:
1. Whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of High-courts under Article 226 and
227 of the Constitution in service matters specified in Section 28 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction
in such service matters in the administrative tribunals to be constituted under
the impugned Act, subject to an exception in favour of the jurisdiction of
Supreme Court under Article 136, is unconstitutional and void?  
2. Whether the composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of
appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members have the effect of
introducing a constitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the
impugned Act?  
Chief Justice Bhagwati and Justice Ranganath Misra delivered two separate, but
concurring judgements.
Chief Justice Bhagwati reiterated the earlier view expressed by him in Minerva

15
Mills v.UOI1 about the power of Parliament to set up effective alternative institutional
mechanism
or arrangements for judicial review by amending the Constitution. If, by such
constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review of the high-court is taken
away and vested “in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be
violative of the basic structure doctrine, so long as the essential condition is fulfilled,
i.e., the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by Parliamentary
amendment is no less effective than the high- court.”
The learned Chief Justice said that as question involving interpretation of Articles 14,
15, 16 and 31 arises for decision, it is necessary that, “those who adjudicate upon
these questions should have some medium of legal training and judicial experience.”
In that view, he agreed with Justice Ranganath Misra about the invalidity of Clause
(c) of Section 6 (1) of the impugned Act, which prescribed qualifications for the
office of Chairman of the tribunal, that is-- at least two years experience as Secretary
to the Government of India or any other post under the Central Government or state
governments carrying the scale of pay which is not less than that of the Secretary to
Government of India.
The appointment of the Chairman, the Vice- Chairman and Administrative Members
should be made, in the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, only after the consultation
with and the recommendations of the Chief Justice of India, unless there are cogent
reasons for not accepting the same. Another suggestion was that district judge or an
advocate who is qualified to be a judge of the High-Court should be regarded as
eligible for being the Vice- Chairman of the administrative tribunal and if, to such an
effect amendment was not carried out, the impugned Act would have to be declared to
be invalid, since it cannot be severed from the other provisions.
Hence, in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI, in the final decision the Court held that
Section 28 which excludes jurisdiction of the High-Courts under Articles 226/227 is
not unconstitutional. The Court ruled that this section does not totally bar judicial
review. It also said that Administrative Tribunals under the 1985 Act are substitute of
High- Courts and will deal with all service matters even involving Articles 14, 15 and
1 AIR 1986 SC 2030

16
16. It also advised for changing the qualifications of Chairman of the tribunal. As a
result, the Act was further amended in 1987. In UOI v. Parmanand2, a two-judges
Bench upheld the authority of the Administrative Tribunals to decide the
constitutionality of service rules.
The Sampath Kumar ruling examined the constitutionality of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 and did not consider the Constitutional validity of Article
323-A (2) (d).Subsequently, a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High- Court in
Sakinala Harinath v. State of A.P.3, declared sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of
Article 323-A unconstitutional. It was held that this provision is repugnant to the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Kesavanand Bharati v. State of Kerala.4
In J.B. Chopra and Ors v. UOI5, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had an
occasion to consider the question that: Whether the CAT constituted under the
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has the authority and the jurisdiction to strike
down a rule framed by the President of India under the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution, as being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.
When the matter came up before the Division Bench, it deferred its judgement till the
final pronouncement of the decision in Sampath Kumar. Thereafter, the Division
Bench analysed the Constitution Bench’s decision to arrive at the conclusion that:
“The Administrative Tribunal being a substitute power of the High Court had
the necessary jurisdiction, power and authority to adjudicate upon all disputes
relating to service matters including the power to deal with all questions
pertaining to the Constitutional validity or otherwise of such laws as offending
Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.”
In M.B. Majumdar v. UOI6, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had to confront
the contention, based on the premise that in Sampath Kumar the Supreme Court had
equated the tribunals established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 with
high-courts, and that the members of CAT must be paid the same salaries as were
2 AIR 1989 SC 1185
3 (1994) 1 APLJ (HC) 1
4 AIR 1973 SC 1461
5 AIR 1987 SC 357
6 AIR 1990 SC 2263

17
payable to judges of the high court. The court, after analysing- the text of Article
323-A of the Constitution, the provisions of the impugned Act, and the decision
in Sampath Kumar, rejected the contention that the tribunals were the equals of the
high-courts in respect of their service conditions. The Court clarified that in Sampath
Kumar the tribunals under the Act had been equated with high- courts only to the
extent that the former were to act as substitutes for the
latter in adjudicating service matters, the tribunals could not, therefore, seek parity for
all other purposes.
In R.K. Jain v. UOI7, a three judge Bench of Supreme Court had occasion to deal with
complaints concerning the functioning of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control
Appellate Tribunal, which was set-up by exercising the power conferred by Article
323-B. In his leading judgement, Justice Ramaswamy analysed the relevant
constitutional provisions; the decision in Sampath Kumar, J.B. Chopra and M.B.
Majumdar, and held that the tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B could
not be held to be substitutes of High- Courts for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
Having had the benefit of witnessing the working, for more than five years, of these
alternative institutional mechanisms, anguish was expressed over their ineffectiveness
in exercising the power of judicial review. It was regretted that their performance had
left much to be desired. Thereafter, it was noted that the sole remedy provided, that is,
of an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, had (as seen
over the years) proved to be prohibitively costly, while also being inconvenient on
account of the distances involved. It was suggested that an expert body like the Law
Commission of India should-- study the feasibility of providing an appeal to a Bench
of two judges of the concerned High- Court, from the orders of the tribunals; and also
to analyse the working of the tribunals since their establishment, the possibility of
inducting members of the Bar to such tribunals etc.
It was hoped that the recommendations of such an expert body would be immediately
adopted by the Government of India, and remedial steps would be initiated to
overcome the difficulties faced by the tribunals, making them capable of dispensing
7 (1993) 4 SCC 119

18
effective, inexpensive, and satisfactory justice.
Law laid down in L. CHANDRA KUMAR v. UOI: In L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI8, a
Division Bench of the Supreme Court expressed the view that the decision rendered
by the Constitutional Bench of five Judges in Sampath Kumar case needed to be
“comprehensively reconsidered”, and a “fresh look by a larger Bench over all the
issues adjudicated in Sampath Kumar case was necessary”. In the light of the opinion
of the Division Bench, the matter was placed before a larger Bench of seven Judges.
8 (1995) 1 SCC 400

CONCLUSION/ REMARKS
The position of law as it subsists today is that Administrative Tribunals can perform a
supplemental role as opposed to a substitutional role, so far as the High-Courts are
concerned. It is a settled proposition that the High-Courts by nature are Constitutional
Courts and ousting their jurisdiction, so vested in them by Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution is against the Doctrine of Basic Structure. Moreover, it has already been
decided overtime by plethora of judgements that- Tribunals under Part XIV-A of the
Constitution shall be ‘forums of first redressal’ in regards to matters—for the
adjudication of which they have been established; likewise on grounds desirable and
legally correct, appeals shall lie to the High- Courts and thereafter to the Supreme
Court respectively, as the case may be, is well agreed and appreciated.
It is agreed that Tribunals are free from the trappings of the courts and expound
justice on the principles of natural justice, thereby ensuring time effective and cost
effective justice, however based on observations made in the R.K. Jain’s case nothing
can concretely be said about the ‘quality of justice’ delivered or dispensed with.
Opening the forum in regards to appeal to the High-Courts and there from to the
Supreme Court, as from the orders of the Tribunals on one hand is necessary to ensure
that justice delivered or dispensed with is quality justice- in the nature of Fiat Justitia
Ruat Caelum but on the other hand, it may result in docket explosion in Constitutional
Courts- to ensure lesser burdening of which Part XIV- A of the Constitution was
enacted in the first place.
The scenario as it stands today is that, by establishment of Tribunals what can be
ensured is that, speedy justice is delivered (as tribunals are free from the trappings of
the Courts) but only to the extent of the lower realms of the judiciary, and the scenario
becomes the same as the case progresses the High-Court or the Supreme Court; that is
situation similar to any other case for adjudication of which no tribunals are
established and thereby are adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts.
The contentions raised in the present case and decisions rendered in regards to same
are well appreciated and can be summarised as follows- (1) Articles 323-A and 323-B
are unconstitutional to the extent they exclude jurisdiction of the High-Courts under

20
Articles 226/227 and of Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution; (2) The
tribunals constituted under Part XIV- A of the Constitution are possessed of the
competence to examine the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules
except statutes establishing these tribunals; (3) These tribunals will continue to work
as the courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been
constituted. The litigants cannot move the High Court directly; (4) No appeal will lie
under Article 136 to the Supreme Court directly from the decisions of these tribunals.
Special leave petitions will lie from the decision of the High-Court.
But in the light of cases discussed in the present case along with the opinions of
expert bodies such as the Law Commission of India and the Malimath Committee,
what can be said is that experience in regards to tribunals in India constituted under
Part XIV- A of the Constitution of India, has been bitter and far from satisfaction and
no concrete solution for the same has been provided for or has been discussed in the
present case. The SC in the present case was more concerned with deciding- whether
or not the jurisdiction of the High-Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and that of the
SC under Article 32, can be ousted by the Administrative Tribunals; the SC did
acknowledge that functioning of Administrative Tribunals in India has been very poor
but was still against the idea of their abolishment; what is note-worthy is that the SC
did not provide any concrete solution as to how the functioning of the Administrative
Tribunals be improved, except of the opinion that these Tribunals must be placed
under the scrutiny of the High-Courts so as to ensure that these Tribunals deliver
quality justice—irrespective of the fact that the problem of docket explosion with
which the High-Courts are suffering at present will remain un-resolved.
Overall the Judgement is well-written but the Bench has not adjudicated upon all the
issues of vital importance i.e. Judgement doesn’t seem to be far-sighted (with all due
Respect to the Hon’ble Judges). The Judgement settles the debate that the jurisdiction
of the Constitutional Courts can never be ousted; and too great extent also proves that
the purpose for which the Tribunals were formed i.e. reducing the piling of the cases
in the Constitutional Courts, largely remains un-resolved (it is not that the Tribunals
require sometime to establish themselves fully- well and only then there functioning
should be judged- because when this Judgement was delivered nearly a decade had
already elapsed since the Tribunals were first established).

BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Lok Sabha Debates, 5th Series, Vol. LXV, No. 7, Nov. 1st, 1976, Col. 117A
 H.C. Dholakia, 'Forty-second Minus Forty-fourth some Plus Points', (1979) 13
JCPS 393-409
 Rajeev Dhavan, 'Amending the Amendment : The Constitution (Forty-fifth
Amendment) Bill, 1978', 20 J.I.L.I. (1978) 249-272 at p. 267
 Dr M.L. Upadhyay, 'Administrative Tribunals : No Alternative Mechanism for
Judicial Review', Central India Law Quarterly, Vol. 2 (1989) 433-444;
 K.I. Vibhute, 'Administrative Tribunals and the High Courts : A Plea for
Judicial Review', 29 J.I.L.I. (1987) 524-546.
 Balram K. Gupta, 'Administrative Tribunals and Judicial Review : A
Comment on Forty-second Amendment', pp. 401-425, in Indian Constitution :
Trends and Issues, (ed.) Rajeev Dhavan and Alice Jacob (N.M. Tripathi, Pvt.
Ltd., Bombay 1978).
 K.I. Vibhute, supra, n. 22 at p. 539, 540

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L. Chandra Kumar v/s U.O.I [A.I.R 1997 SC 1125]- IRAC