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Reputation Systems II
Sybil Attack, BlogRank, B2Rank, EigenRumor,
             MailRank, TrustRunk



         Yury Lifshits
         Caltech
         http://yury.name


                   Caltech CMI Seminar
                      March 4, 2008


                                          1 / 22
Outline

1   Sybil Attack

2   Ranking Blogs

3   Reputations For Fighting Spam

4   Conclusions



                                    2 / 22
1
Sybil Attack




               3 / 22
Sybil Attack

   Graph of trust-weighted edges

   n honest nodes + adversary

   overall trust value on attack edges
   (honest-malicious) is limited




                                         4 / 22
Sybil Attack

   Graph of trust-weighted edges

   n honest nodes + adversary

   overall trust value on attack edges
   (honest-malicious) is limited


Question: whether splitting adversarial node
into many is beneficial for acquiring higher
reputation (rank)?

                                               4 / 22
Negative Result


 Assume reputation scores remain the same
           under isomorphism.
             Is it sybilproof?




                                            5 / 22
Negative Result


 Assume reputation scores remain the same
           under isomorphism.
             Is it sybilproof?

Unfortunately, no. Attack strategy?




                                            5 / 22
Negative Result


 Assume reputation scores remain the same
           under isomorphism.
             Is it sybilproof?

Unfortunately, no. Attack strategy?

Answer: double the graph.




                                            5 / 22
Positive Results (1/3)

General form of trust flow reputations:

            r(x) = max           trust(p)
                   Ptx
                         p∈Ptx

Notation:

   t is pre-trusted node

   Pxy is a family of disjoint paths from t to x



                                               6 / 22
Positive Results (2/3)

Assumptions:
 1
     Extending path nonincreases the trust(p)
 2
       and trust are monotone to number of
     paths and edges values, respectively
 3
     Splitting a path into two does not increase
       value




                                                7 / 22
Positive Results (2/3)

Assumptions:
 1
     Extending path nonincreases the trust(p)
 2
       and trust are monotone to number of
     paths and edges values, respectively
 3
     Splitting a path into two does not increase
       value
 4
       = max


                                                7 / 22
Positive Results (3/3)


Under assumptions (1-3) sybil attack does not
increase adversary’s reputation




                                            8 / 22
Positive Results (3/3)


Under assumptions (1-3) sybil attack does not
increase adversary’s reputation

Under assumptions (1-4) sybil attack does not
increase adversary’s rank




                                            8 / 22
Positive Results (3/3)


Under assumptions (1-3) sybil attack does not
increase adversary’s reputation

Under assumptions (1-4) sybil attack does not
increase adversary’s rank

                   Proof?




                                            8 / 22
SybilGuard (1/2)


   Assume number of attack edges is
   A = o( n/ log n)

   System is distributed, honest nodes follow
   the same protocol

   Can an honest node t identify (w.h.p.)
   2A + 1 nodes in such a way that at most A
   of them are powered by adversary?



                                            9 / 22
SybilGuard (2/2)
   For every node fix a bijective mapping
   from in-edges to out-edges
   Take a walk from t of length at most
     n log n using bijection routing
   At some point make a random switch,
   than continue another n log n steps using
   backwalk routing
   Report a point. Repeat, until 2A + 1 points
   are collected



                                             10 / 22
SybilGuard (2/2)
   For every node fix a bijective mapping
   from in-edges to out-edges
   Take a walk from t of length at most
     n log n using bijection routing
   At some point make a random switch,
   than continue another n log n steps using
   backwalk routing
   Report a point. Repeat, until 2A + 1 points
   are collected

Claim
w.h.p. at most A reported nodes are malicious
                                             10 / 22
2
Ranking Blogs




                11 / 22
Ranking Blogs: Factors

   Entities: blogs, posts, communities,
   comments, brand names, external
   websites

   Frineds, blogroll, subscriptions, hyperlinks,
   visitors, clicks, votes

   Time

   Tags


                                              12 / 22
BlogRank

     Any ideas how to rank blogs?




                                    13 / 22
BlogRank

       Any ideas how to rank blogs?

Why not just PageRank?




                                      13 / 22
BlogRank

        Any ideas how to rank blogs?

Why not just PageRank?
Wait a minute, for which graph?




                                       13 / 22
BlogRank

        Any ideas how to rank blogs?

Why not just PageRank?
Wait a minute, for which graph? Linked blogs:

   Hyperlinks, blogrolls
   Common commentors/authors, tags, co-references
   to news



                                               13 / 22
B2Rank
B2Rank(x) = BlogReputation × PostQuality




                                           14 / 22
B2Rank
B2Rank(x) = BlogReputation × PostQuality

BlogReputation is computed in PageRank style
for blogroll graph with one change:

   Blogroll links are weighted by activity level
   (frequency of blogging and commenting)




                                              14 / 22
B2Rank
B2Rank(x) = BlogReputation × PostQuality

BlogReputation is computed in PageRank style
for blogroll graph with one change:

   Blogroll links are weighted by activity level
   (frequency of blogging and commenting)

PostQuality is average for PageRank-style
score of blog posts

   Post-to-post links are weighted by
   referring post activity and time difference
                                              14 / 22
EigenRumor (1/2)




Picture from “The EigenRumor Algorithm for Ranking Blogs” paper
                                                                  15 / 22
EigenRumor (2/2)
Notation:
    ¯: reputation score for posts
    r
    ¯ ¯
    a, h: authority and hub scores for bloggers
    P, E: provision and evaluation matrices




                                                  16 / 22
EigenRumor (2/2)
Notation:
    ¯: reputation score for posts
    r
    ¯ ¯
    a, h: authority and hub scores for bloggers
    P, E: provision and evaluation matrices

                      ¯
¯ = αPT a + (1 − α)ET h
r       ¯
          ¯
a = P¯, h = E¯
¯    r         r




                                                  16 / 22
EigenRumor (2/2)
Notation:
    ¯: reputation score for posts
    r
    ¯ ¯
    a, h: authority and hub scores for bloggers
    P, E: provision and evaluation matrices

                      ¯
¯ = αPT a + (1 − α)ET h
r       ¯
          ¯
a = P¯, h = E¯
¯    r         r

Solution: iterative algorithm for ¯:
                                  r
       T             T
¯ = (αP P + (1 − α)E E)¯
r                       r

                                                  16 / 22
3
Reputations For Fighting Spam




                                17 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph




                       18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes




                       18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes
  Spam nodes




                       18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes
  Spam nodes
  Reputation propagates in a forward
  manner




                                       18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes
  Spam nodes
  Reputation propagates in a forward
  manner
  Spam score propagates backwards




                                       18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes
  Spam nodes
  Reputation propagates in a forward
  manner
  Spam score propagates backwards
  Compute spam scores a-la PageRank




                                       18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes
  Spam nodes
  Reputation propagates in a forward
  manner
  Spam score propagates backwards
  Compute spam scores a-la PageRank
  Reweight hyperlink graph and pre-trusted
  nodes

                                         18 / 22
Combining Two Scores
  Hyperlink graph
  Pre-trusted nodes
  Spam nodes
  Reputation propagates in a forward
  manner
  Spam score propagates backwards
  Compute spam scores a-la PageRank
  Reweight hyperlink graph and pre-trusted
  nodes
  Compute reputations a-la PageRank      18 / 22
4
Conclusions




              19 / 22
Challenges
  Measurable objectives?
  Model for input data?
  Dynamic aspects of reputations?
  Digg-style ranking?
  Price of attack?
  Ranking in social networks?
  Ranking in RDF data?
  Billion dollar question: how to avoid arms
  race?
                                           20 / 22
References
  K. Fujimura, T. Inoue, M. Sugisaki
  The EigenRumor Algorithm for Ranking Blogs

  A. Kritikopoulos, M. Sideri, I. Varlamis
  BlogRank: ranking weblogs based on connectivity and similarity features

  M.A. Tayebi, S.M. Hashemi, A. Mohades
  B2Rank: An Algorithm for Ranking Blogs Based on Behavioral Features

  A. Cheng, E. Friedman
  Sybilproof reputation mechanisms

  H. Yu, M. Kaminsky, P.B. Gibbons, A, Flaxman
  SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks

  P.A. Chirita, J. Diederich, W. Nejdl
  MailRank: using ranking for spam detection

  Z. Gyongyi, H. Garcia-Molina, J. Pedersen
  Combating web spam with TrustRank

  M. Dalal
  Spam and popularity ratings for combating link spam
                                                                            21 / 22
http://yury.name
http://yury.name/reputation.html
Ongoing project: http://businessconsumer.net




                                               22 / 22
http://yury.name
http://yury.name/reputation.html
Ongoing project: http://businessconsumer.net


    Thanks for your attention!
           Questions?



                                               22 / 22

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Reputation Systems II

  • 1. Reputation Systems II Sybil Attack, BlogRank, B2Rank, EigenRumor, MailRank, TrustRunk Yury Lifshits Caltech http://yury.name Caltech CMI Seminar March 4, 2008 1 / 22
  • 2. Outline 1 Sybil Attack 2 Ranking Blogs 3 Reputations For Fighting Spam 4 Conclusions 2 / 22
  • 4. Sybil Attack Graph of trust-weighted edges n honest nodes + adversary overall trust value on attack edges (honest-malicious) is limited 4 / 22
  • 5. Sybil Attack Graph of trust-weighted edges n honest nodes + adversary overall trust value on attack edges (honest-malicious) is limited Question: whether splitting adversarial node into many is beneficial for acquiring higher reputation (rank)? 4 / 22
  • 6. Negative Result Assume reputation scores remain the same under isomorphism. Is it sybilproof? 5 / 22
  • 7. Negative Result Assume reputation scores remain the same under isomorphism. Is it sybilproof? Unfortunately, no. Attack strategy? 5 / 22
  • 8. Negative Result Assume reputation scores remain the same under isomorphism. Is it sybilproof? Unfortunately, no. Attack strategy? Answer: double the graph. 5 / 22
  • 9. Positive Results (1/3) General form of trust flow reputations: r(x) = max trust(p) Ptx p∈Ptx Notation: t is pre-trusted node Pxy is a family of disjoint paths from t to x 6 / 22
  • 10. Positive Results (2/3) Assumptions: 1 Extending path nonincreases the trust(p) 2 and trust are monotone to number of paths and edges values, respectively 3 Splitting a path into two does not increase value 7 / 22
  • 11. Positive Results (2/3) Assumptions: 1 Extending path nonincreases the trust(p) 2 and trust are monotone to number of paths and edges values, respectively 3 Splitting a path into two does not increase value 4 = max 7 / 22
  • 12. Positive Results (3/3) Under assumptions (1-3) sybil attack does not increase adversary’s reputation 8 / 22
  • 13. Positive Results (3/3) Under assumptions (1-3) sybil attack does not increase adversary’s reputation Under assumptions (1-4) sybil attack does not increase adversary’s rank 8 / 22
  • 14. Positive Results (3/3) Under assumptions (1-3) sybil attack does not increase adversary’s reputation Under assumptions (1-4) sybil attack does not increase adversary’s rank Proof? 8 / 22
  • 15. SybilGuard (1/2) Assume number of attack edges is A = o( n/ log n) System is distributed, honest nodes follow the same protocol Can an honest node t identify (w.h.p.) 2A + 1 nodes in such a way that at most A of them are powered by adversary? 9 / 22
  • 16. SybilGuard (2/2) For every node fix a bijective mapping from in-edges to out-edges Take a walk from t of length at most n log n using bijection routing At some point make a random switch, than continue another n log n steps using backwalk routing Report a point. Repeat, until 2A + 1 points are collected 10 / 22
  • 17. SybilGuard (2/2) For every node fix a bijective mapping from in-edges to out-edges Take a walk from t of length at most n log n using bijection routing At some point make a random switch, than continue another n log n steps using backwalk routing Report a point. Repeat, until 2A + 1 points are collected Claim w.h.p. at most A reported nodes are malicious 10 / 22
  • 18. 2 Ranking Blogs 11 / 22
  • 19. Ranking Blogs: Factors Entities: blogs, posts, communities, comments, brand names, external websites Frineds, blogroll, subscriptions, hyperlinks, visitors, clicks, votes Time Tags 12 / 22
  • 20. BlogRank Any ideas how to rank blogs? 13 / 22
  • 21. BlogRank Any ideas how to rank blogs? Why not just PageRank? 13 / 22
  • 22. BlogRank Any ideas how to rank blogs? Why not just PageRank? Wait a minute, for which graph? 13 / 22
  • 23. BlogRank Any ideas how to rank blogs? Why not just PageRank? Wait a minute, for which graph? Linked blogs: Hyperlinks, blogrolls Common commentors/authors, tags, co-references to news 13 / 22
  • 24. B2Rank B2Rank(x) = BlogReputation × PostQuality 14 / 22
  • 25. B2Rank B2Rank(x) = BlogReputation × PostQuality BlogReputation is computed in PageRank style for blogroll graph with one change: Blogroll links are weighted by activity level (frequency of blogging and commenting) 14 / 22
  • 26. B2Rank B2Rank(x) = BlogReputation × PostQuality BlogReputation is computed in PageRank style for blogroll graph with one change: Blogroll links are weighted by activity level (frequency of blogging and commenting) PostQuality is average for PageRank-style score of blog posts Post-to-post links are weighted by referring post activity and time difference 14 / 22
  • 27. EigenRumor (1/2) Picture from “The EigenRumor Algorithm for Ranking Blogs” paper 15 / 22
  • 28. EigenRumor (2/2) Notation: ¯: reputation score for posts r ¯ ¯ a, h: authority and hub scores for bloggers P, E: provision and evaluation matrices 16 / 22
  • 29. EigenRumor (2/2) Notation: ¯: reputation score for posts r ¯ ¯ a, h: authority and hub scores for bloggers P, E: provision and evaluation matrices ¯ ¯ = αPT a + (1 − α)ET h r ¯ ¯ a = P¯, h = E¯ ¯ r r 16 / 22
  • 30. EigenRumor (2/2) Notation: ¯: reputation score for posts r ¯ ¯ a, h: authority and hub scores for bloggers P, E: provision and evaluation matrices ¯ ¯ = αPT a + (1 − α)ET h r ¯ ¯ a = P¯, h = E¯ ¯ r r Solution: iterative algorithm for ¯: r T T ¯ = (αP P + (1 − α)E E)¯ r r 16 / 22
  • 32. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph 18 / 22
  • 33. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes 18 / 22
  • 34. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes Spam nodes 18 / 22
  • 35. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes Spam nodes Reputation propagates in a forward manner 18 / 22
  • 36. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes Spam nodes Reputation propagates in a forward manner Spam score propagates backwards 18 / 22
  • 37. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes Spam nodes Reputation propagates in a forward manner Spam score propagates backwards Compute spam scores a-la PageRank 18 / 22
  • 38. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes Spam nodes Reputation propagates in a forward manner Spam score propagates backwards Compute spam scores a-la PageRank Reweight hyperlink graph and pre-trusted nodes 18 / 22
  • 39. Combining Two Scores Hyperlink graph Pre-trusted nodes Spam nodes Reputation propagates in a forward manner Spam score propagates backwards Compute spam scores a-la PageRank Reweight hyperlink graph and pre-trusted nodes Compute reputations a-la PageRank 18 / 22
  • 40. 4 Conclusions 19 / 22
  • 41. Challenges Measurable objectives? Model for input data? Dynamic aspects of reputations? Digg-style ranking? Price of attack? Ranking in social networks? Ranking in RDF data? Billion dollar question: how to avoid arms race? 20 / 22
  • 42. References K. Fujimura, T. Inoue, M. Sugisaki The EigenRumor Algorithm for Ranking Blogs A. Kritikopoulos, M. Sideri, I. Varlamis BlogRank: ranking weblogs based on connectivity and similarity features M.A. Tayebi, S.M. Hashemi, A. Mohades B2Rank: An Algorithm for Ranking Blogs Based on Behavioral Features A. Cheng, E. Friedman Sybilproof reputation mechanisms H. Yu, M. Kaminsky, P.B. Gibbons, A, Flaxman SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks P.A. Chirita, J. Diederich, W. Nejdl MailRank: using ranking for spam detection Z. Gyongyi, H. Garcia-Molina, J. Pedersen Combating web spam with TrustRank M. Dalal Spam and popularity ratings for combating link spam 21 / 22