Rethinking securityA discussion paperThe Ammerdown Grou.docx

Rethinking security:
A discussion paper
The Ammerdown Group
May 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Ammerdown Group brings together practitioners and
academics in search of a new
vision for the future of our common peace and security. The
group includes participants
from Conciliation Resources, Campaign Against Arms Trade,
International Alert, Joseph
Rowntree Charitable Trust, Oxford Research Group, Quaker
Peace and Social Witness,
Saferworld, and Three Faiths Forum, as well as independent
practitioners, and academics
from the universities of Bradford, Coventry, Kent, Leeds
Beckett and Oxford Brookes.
The Ammerdown Group takes its name from the Ammerdown
Centre, a retreat and
conference centre in Somerset, where the group meets together.
The views expressed
in this document do not necessarily represent those of the
Ammerdown Centre’s staff or
trustees, but the Ammerdown Centre fully supports the work of
the Ammerdown Group

as part of its charitable commitment to promoting justice, peace
and reconciliation and
to facilitating free and open discussion on these issues.
The Ammerdown Group has produced this publication to
stimulate debate about the
UK’s approach to security. The group welcomes feedback on the
paper and is interested
in working with others to promote further discussion about the
security challenges of
the 21st century. For more information, visit
rethinkingsecurity.org.uk
The Ammerdown Group, 2016.
This report may be distributed freely for non-commercial
purposes. Please cite as:
Ammerdown Group. (2016). Rethinking Security: A discussion
paper.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial 4.0
International Licence. To view a copy of the licence, visit:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Ammerdown Group brings together peacebuilding
practitioners and academics concerned about the effects of

geopolitics
on the security of people worldwide. The group is seeking a
public conversation in search of a new vision for peace and
security. This paper is one contribution. It explores the
security strategies of Western states, particularly the UK, and
proposes principles for a more effective approach in the
common interest. We welcome responses from all quarters.
To download the complete paper with references please visit
A failing response to growing insecurity
People across the world face growing insecurity. Violent
conflict is spreading and intensifying,
economic inequality is widening, and the natural ecology on
which human life depends is in jeopardy.
The world’s poorest people bear the brunt, while those in rich
countries are also increasingly affected.
The preferred responses of Western states are manifestly not
working and have often made matters
worse. The UK’s primary response has been to ‘project power’,
joining the US and other Western
states in a series of military interventions and restricting civil
liberties.
The expectation that this approach would shape the global
security environment for the better has not

been borne out. It has exacerbated insecurity, allowed global
problems to worsen, and added to the
harm already suffered in countries targeted for intervention.
These trends are daunting, but a future that better provides for
the security of all is not beyond our
collective wit and means, provided that we are willing to change
course.
An outmoded narrative
The UK and its NATO allies account for half of the world’s
military spending, so the deficiency in
Western responses to insecurity is not a lack of military
capability. The problem lies in the dominant
narrative about what security means, whom it should benefit,
and how it is achieved. That narrative:
1. privileges UK national security as a supreme imperative, to
which the needs of others may be
subordinated, rather than recognises security as a common right,
to which all have equal claim;
2. aims to advance ‘national interests’ defined by the political
establishment, including corporate
business interests and UK ‘world power’ status, and so
dissociates the practice of security from the
needs of people in their communities;

3. assumes a short-term outlook and presents physical threats as
the main risks, largely
overlooking the long-term drivers of insecurity; and
4. proposes to respond by extending control over the strategic
environment, achieved principally
through offensive military capabilities, a superpower alliance,
and restrictions on civil liberties.
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A failing strategy
The UK’s National Security Strategy (2015) is premised on the
same, dominant narrative. It presumes
the supremacy of the UK’s interests; it is preoccupied with
economic and political power; it takes a
near-term view and overlooks the systemic drivers of insecurity;
and it marginalises non-military
responses. It also ignores deeply harmful actions by Western
powers from colonial times to the present
day. In addition, the strategy does not define ‘security’,
identify the principles by which it may be built

and sustained, or set out a ‘road map’ against which to measure
progress.
Within these constraints, the strategy proposes that the principal
threats to the UK’s interests are:
competing nations, particularly Russia; transnational insurgent
groups, particularly ISIS; and ‘instability’,
particularly in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. The
proposed responses are broadly the same
as those adopted in the past, which have been largely ineffective
even on their own terms. The threat
of atrocities by non-state groups has grown; the stand-off
between NATO and Russia has worsened;
and interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria have
added to regional and global volatility.
At the same time, chronic causes of insecurity have persisted
largely unchecked. Fatalities from violent
conflict have risen threefold since 2008 to a post-Cold War high
of 180,000 in 2014. Human security is
deteriorating as the effects of our ecological crisis are felt
across the world. Refugee flows are on the
increase. Economic inequalities have grown more extreme.
Global progress towards greater
democratisation and freedom seen in the 2000s is also now
being reversed. These problems receive

scant attention in the UK’s published security strategy.
A reluctance to adapt
The UK strategy, which is allied to that of the US, has changed
little since the atrocities of 11
September 2001. At the end of the 2000s, new leadership in the
UK and US encouraged an expansion
in strategic emphasis to include long-term problems such as
climate change, scarcity, poverty, and
nuclear proliferation. This move met resistance from the
political establishment in both countries. A
number of factors appear to impede a productive change of
approach:
1. the dominance of the narrative by a small and exclusive
group, composed of a social elite, to
the general exclusion of other voices;
2. the disproportionate influence of business interests on the
policymaking process, particularly
the preference shown to the arms industry;
3. institutional inertia and political calculations inclined to
dismiss alternative approaches.
4. the preference for values associated with hegemonic
masculinity, which reduces the discourse
to a calculus of threats and coercive responses, at the expense

of a comprehensive conversation
about the social and ecological conditions of security; and
5. a discourse abstracted from its real-life impacts, as
experienced by people around the world who
are affected by the decisions of Western states.
Nonetheless, the prevailing security narrative has met with
growing public scepticism. Support for
Western military interventions since 9/11 has waned among the
British and wider European public,
raising the threshold for the use of coercive military power. In
certain respects, the public appears to
be recognising the shortcomings of the prevailing approach.
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Security for the many
The proper goal of security should be grounded in the wellbeing
of people in their social and
ecological context, rather than the interests of a nation state as
determined by its elite. This first

requires a collective effort to build the conditions of security
over the long-term. A commitment to
the common good should guide the approach, recognising that
security is a shared responsibility and
its practice should be negotiated democratically; when security
is the preserve of a few, it will not
serve the many and is likely to fail everyone.
Principled engagement
This paper proposes four cardinal principles of security as a
practice:
1. Security as a freedom. Security may be understood as a
shared freedom from fear and want, and
the freedom to live in dignity. It implies social and ecological
health rather than the absence of risk.
2. Security as a common right. A commitment to commonality
is imperative; security should not,
and usually cannot, be gained for one group of people at others’
expense. Accordingly, security
rests on solidarity rather than dominance – in standing with
others, not over them.
3. Security as a patient practice. Security grows or withers
according to how inclusive and just
society is, and how socially and ecologically responsible we

are. It cannot be coerced into being.
4. Security as a shared responsibility. Security is a common
responsibility; its challenges belong to
all of us. The continuing deterioration of security worldwide
testifies against entrusting our
common wellbeing to a self-selected group of powerful states.
Some European states show that similar commitments can shape
policy for general benefit. In
contrast, the UK’s heavily militarised approach is incongruous
in context. Compared with the rest of
the European Union, for example, no state spends as much on
its military, exports as many arms, or
has joined US-sponsored military interventions as often as the
UK.
A shift in priorities
The primary concern of Western states is to prevent further
atrocities by non-state groups. That risk is
real, yet cannot be addressed in isolation from the profound
security challenges arising from how we
organise our societies. The following, which are now
marginalised in the UK’s security strategy,
deserve priority attention:
1. Scarcity and climate change. Depletion of the Earth’s natural

resources is already aggravating
tensions, entrenching violent conflicts, and displacing ever
more people, leading to further conflict.
The impact of the changing climate on vital resources, soil
productivity, sea levels and flooding are
predicted to lead to widespread scarcity, mass migration and
conflict. The UN has said that people
displaced by climate change will ‘test global solidarity in ways
that are radically different from
anything experienced before’.
2. Inequality. Half of the world’s wealth is now enjoyed by 1%
of the population, while two billion
people subsist on the equivalent of $2 or less per day. The
injustice of growing inequality is feeding
multiple violent conflicts worldwide. It has also been
instrumental in the rise of ISIS from the
humanitarian crisis precipitated by the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
3. Militarism. The world’s most powerful states are among
those that have normalised a militarist
outlook. These states are the world’s largest military spenders
and arms exporters; they show no

4
sign of renouncing nuclear weapons; and they have initiated
some of the most devastating wars of
this century, frequently bending or ignoring international law to
do so.
4. Violent conflict. When Western states have intervened in
violent conflict, their preferred means
have often been coercive. In contrast, ‘conflict transformation’
approaches, which support local
people to transform conflict with a view to just and inclusive
settlements, still receive little support.
Practicable alternatives
It has been suggested that the UK sees itself as a ‘warrior
nation’, and that without extensive offensive
military capabilities it would be left ‘naked and undefended’ in
a dangerous world. This paper argues
that the UK’s approach, which relies on a rate of military
spending that far exceeds the European
average, provides no appreciable advantage in response to the
risks that the government has prioritised.
The risk of a military crisis involving Russia
The government believes that Russia is unlikely to attack a

NATO country using conventional means
but could try to undermine neighbouring states covertly. In
response, senior figures in the British
defence establishment have called for new military investments.
NATO currently outspends Russia ten times over on its military,
with the US accounting for most of
the difference. It is not plausible that the UK’s level of military
spending is a factor in Russia’s
calculations, or that British conventional forces, however large,
could deter Russia from using covert
tactics against NATO states.
Russia and NATO share responsibility for their rivalry in a self-
serving competition for global
influence. Both have legitimate complaints against each other,
but rather than seek a frank dialogue
with a view to détente, each party’s rhetoric has sought to use
its grievances as a fulcrum for its own
advantage. First steps towards improving relations might
include toning down the rhetoric,
deploying diplomacy in preventive mode, and looking for
confidence-building measures.
Intermediaries have been working to these ends and could be
better supported.

The threat posed by ISIS
A US-led alliance, including the UK, aims to ‘destroy’ ISIS
militarily. In addition, the UK government
has extended surveillance of Muslim communities and
challenged them to conform to its own list of
‘British values’.
It is widely acknowledged that ISIS cannot be defeated by air
attack. It is doubtful that a ground
offensive would be any more successful and it could bolster
ISIS’ long-term strategy.
There is no blueprint solution to the problem of ISIS in the
short term. In the longer term, effective
responses will have to pay heed to the factors that have allowed
the movement to flourish. These
include the devastation of the Iraq war and its aftermath; a
humanitarian crisis that has prompted
fighters to join the movement for economic reasons; widespread
anger at the West’s actions in the
region; and the Wahhabist ideology of the group’s leadership,
incubated in Saudi Arabia, a Western ally.
Western states must critically examine their own role in
generating the conditions for insurgent
movements to flourish – much Western policy in the Middle
East continues to be self-serving and

counterproductive. In the UK, the government should preserve
spaces for non-violent dissent,
however unpalatable, and heed warnings about the counter-
productive effects of much of its
domestic ‘counter-terror’ policy. It could also do more to listen
and respond to the longstanding
grievances of minority groups, particularly those relating to
social and economic inequality.
5
‘Instability’
Commentators in the defence establishment have proposed that
coercive military power, with or
without UN approval, can supplement the UK’s diplomatic and
aid effort in conditions of regional
instability. Similar arguments have been used to justify British
military action in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria.
NATO’s war over Kosovo in 1999 is widely lauded as a model
military intervention, in which coercive

power was both necessary for, and effective in, reversing a
humanitarian crisis. This paper argues that
the Kosovo war is a poor example to follow. NATO’s action
was tactically successful in thwarting a
bellicose Serb government, but by exacerbating the
humanitarian crisis and leaving the dispute over
Kosovo unresolved, the war was a strategic failure. It also had
an intolerable impact on the people of
Serbia; it broke and thus weakened international law; and it was
extremely expensive. Viable
alternatives to war were available long before the NATO action,
even at the eleventh hour, but
NATO’s leadership, particularly the UK and US, preferred
overwhelming military power. The episode
encouraged the British establishment to apply the same
principles in Iraq, with disastrous results.
In other respects, the UK has taken a progressive approach to
humanitarian crises; it has been the
largest contributor in Europe to the UN’s Syrian refugee appeal,
for example. The UK’s Building
Stability Overseas Strategy is also forward-looking, defining
‘stability’ in terms of inclusive democracy,
equitable access to vital resources, and the effective
management of conflict. This approach

could be brought closer to the heart of the official security
discourse, as it was in 2008 when the Brown
government published its security strategy, Security in an
interdependent world.
A ‘common home’
As Pope Francis has suggested, we share a ‘common home’,
which it is our common responsibility to
keep. Seen from this perspective, the practice of ‘security’
cannot be limited to neutralising threats, but
must encompass a commitment to build peace with justice. It
has to evolve away from exercising
control over world affairs towards facilitating genuinely
democratic participation in them. Security
discourse will need to become more reflexive and inclusive if it
is to do more than merely legitimate a
dysfunctional status quo.
The most successful societies are better able, as Gregory
Raymond has put it, to ‘recast conflicts of
interest as problems to be solved, not bouts to be won’.
People’s movements and civil society
initiatives of many kinds, the approaches of some nation states,
and some of the work of regional and
international institutions, further demonstrate that there is
nothing inevitable about the current cycles

of injustice and violence that are jeopardising the security of
everyone. The UK can play a more
effective part, too, by displacing the desire to ‘punch above its
weight’ with a commitment to security as
a common right for everyone.
May 2016
More responses to Rethinking Security…
‘This publication offers a thought-provoking analysis of current
security
policy at a crucial time when the status quo is not working.
These
insights from peacebuilding and security experts will
undoubtedly
provide a valuable perspective and enrich this much-needed
debate.’
Miqdaad Versi, Assistant Secretary General, Muslim Council of
Great Britain
‘Does security policy actually protect citizens from the
insecurities
spreading through an interdependent and fast-changing world?
Have “humanitarian” interventions in developing countries
helped the
poor and vulnerable people they claim to protect, or have they

instead
sown the seeds of further violence and insecurity? This
pathbreaking
paper compellingly demonstrates that current UK and European
security policies largely fail these tests. Even more important, it
provides
a roadmap towards an alternative and less narrowly state-centric
approach.’
Dr. Robin Luckham, Emeritus Fellow, Institute of Development
Studies,
University of Sussex
‘The Ammerdown Group presents a genuine re-think of security
that
proposes a healing process rather than short-term fixes.’
Mohammad Ehsan Zia, Former Minister of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development,
Afghanistan
Across the world, people face growing insecurity as a
consequence of a global crisis with
ecological, economic, and political dimensions. The principal
response of the world’s most
powerful states – dominance of their environment by means of
extended military and
surveillance powers – has been making matters worse.
This discussion paper asks why and how the current approach
has been failing, and what
kind of alternative could be more productive in the long term. It
argues that a more secure
future for all depends on finding new answers to fundamental

questions: what does
‘security’ mean, whom should it benefit, how is it achieved, and
whose responsibility is it?
The Ammerdown Group brings together peacebuilding
practitioners and academics seeking
a public conversation in search of a new vision for peace and
security.
‘The West’s self-defeating approach to security since the end of
the
Cold War is examined in detail throughout this important work.
The paper spells out the case for this country to stand with
those who
need our help and not stand over them. As someone who
believes that
our armed forces should be designed to meet the real threats of
climate
change, scarcity, inequality and for conflict resolution, I found
the study
compelling.’
Major General Patrick Cordingley (ret’d)
‘This profoundly useful document constitutes essential reading
for
every minister, every military planner, every official and every
supplier
concerned with British defence and security policy. Why?
Because if
the findings in this report are not digested and applied, this
country

will continue to waste money on defence projects that simply do
not –
and cannot – address current challenges and future threats.’
Scilla Elworthy, founder, Oxford Research Group and Peace
Direct
‘As the world continues to grapple with spreading insecurity,
and few
of the conventional responses seem to really work, a debate on
the
very definition of security is long overdue. In presenting a new
definition
of global security, one that is based on a broad social and
ecological
perspective rather than a narrow politico-military perspective,
this
paper makes an important contribution to this crucial debate.’
Ambassador Jawed Ludin, former Deputy Foreign Minister of
Afghanistan
Cover photo: Children in Gaza. © Natalia Cieslik/World Bank.
ISBN 978-1-909390-45-4
ITS 833 – INFORMATION GOVERNANCE
Chapter 10 - Information Governance and Information
Technology Functions
Dr. Geanie Asante
[email protected] Asante 2019
1

1
CHAPTER GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Identify current trends that are considered weaknesses in IT
processes
Describe IG best practices in the area of IT governance
Identify the foundational programs or areas that support the IG
efforts in IT
What is meant by data governance? How does it differ from IT?
What would be the steps in implementing an effective data
governance program?
Who created the data governance framework? Why?
What is information management? What are its subcomponents?
What is master data management (MDM)?
What is information lifecycle management?
What is data modeling?
What are the different approaches to data modeling?
What is the goal of IT governance?
Be able to identify or give examples of several IT governance
frameworks and tell the distinguishing features of each
What is the ISACA organization and what is it responsible for?
Who was responsible for creating ValIT?
2
2
Issues related to IT and IG

IT has not been held accountable for the output in its custody
3
Ig best practices that assist it in delivering business value
Focus on the business impact instead of the technology itself
Customize IG approach for the specific business, applying
industry specific best practices where applicable
Tie IG to business objectives
Standardize the use of business terms
3
Programs that support IG effort in IT
Data Governance – Processes and controls that ensure
information at the data level is true, accurate, and unique.
Data Cleansing
De-duplication
Information quality
Master Data Management (MDM)
Accepted IT Standards and Best Practices
4
4
Steps to effective data governance
5

5
Recruit Strong Executive Sponsor – Not easy to do. Executive
management does not want to deal with minutia
Assess Current State – Where does data reside? What problems
are related to existing data
Compute Data Value-compute how much value good data can
add to business unit
Set ideal state vision and strategy-Create realistic vision,
articulate business benefits, articulate measurable impact
Assess Risks-Likelihood of potential data breaches? Cost of
potential data breaches
Steps to effective data governance…continued
6

6
Implement “going forward” strategy – provide a clean starting
point
Manage the Change – Train and Educate as to why and benefits
Assign accountability for Data Quality to Business Unit, not to
IT – Push ownership and responsibility to business unit that
created the data
Monitor Data Governance Program – Look for oversight,
shortfalls and fine-tune
DATA GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (DGI) FRAMEWORK
7
7
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Information Management is a principle function of IT
IM-application of management techniques to collect
information, communicate it within and outside the organization

and process it to enable managers to make quicker and better
decisions.
Components of Information Management
Master Data Management (MDM)-Goal is to ensure reliable,
accurate data from a single source is leveraged across business
units.
Information Lifecycle Management – Managing information
appropriately and optimally at different stages of its useful life
Data Architecture – Design of structured and unstructured
information systems in an effort to optimize data flow
Data Modeling-Illustrates the relationship between data
8
8
KEY STEPS FROM DATA MODELING TO INTEGRATION
9
9
6 Approaches to data modeling
Conceptual data modeling – diagrams data relationships at the
highest level
Enterprise data modeling – business oriented approach that
includes requirements for the business or business unit
Logical data modeling – Illustrates the specific entities,
attributes and relationships involved in the business function

Physical data modeling – implementation of a logical data
model
Data Integration – merges data from two or more sources,
processing data and moving it into a database
Reference data management modeling – refers to data in
categories using look up tables, categorizes data found in a
database – often confused with MDM
10
10
COMPARISONS OF DATA MODELS
11
11
COMPARISONS OF DATA MODELS
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12
Efficiency
Value Creation
Method by which stakeholders ensure that investment in IT

creates business value
Focus on software development’
Keep CEO and Board of Directors in the loop
13
It governance
13
CobiT®
ITIL
CobiT 5
ValIT®
ISO38500
14
It governance frameworks
14
As an independent, nonprofit, global association, ISACA
engages in the development, adoption and use of globally
accepted, industry-leading knowledge and practices for
information systems. Previously known as the Information
Systems Audit and Control Association, ISACA now goes by its
acronym only, to reflect the broad range of IT governance
professionals it serves.
SACA got its start in 1967, when a small group of individuals
with similar jobs—auditing controls in the computer systems

that were becoming increasingly critical to the operations of
their organizations—sat down to discuss the need for a
centralized source of information and guidance in the field. In
1969, the group formalized, incorporating as the EDP Auditors
Association. In 1976 the association formed an education
foundation to undertake large-scale research efforts to expand
the knowledge and value of the IT governance and control
field. Previously known as the Information Systems Audit and
Control Association®, ISACA now goes by its acronym only, to
reflect the broad range of IT governance professionals it serves.
Today, ISACA’s constituency—more than 140,000 strong
worldwide—is characterized by its diversity. Constituents live
and work in more than 180 countries and cover a variety of
professional IT-related positions—to name just a few, IS
auditor, consultant, educator, IS security professional,
regulator, chief information officer and internal auditor. Some
are new to the field, others are at middle management levels and
still others are in the most senior ranks. They work in nearly all
industry categories, including financial and banking, public
accounting, government and the public sector, utilities and
manufacturing. This diversity enables members to learn from
each other, and exchange widely divergent viewpoints on a
variety of professional topics. It has long been considered one
of ISACA’s strengths.
Offers a number of certifications in:
Certified Information Systems Auditor
Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control
Certified Information Security Manager
Certified in the Governance of Enterprise IT
Cybersecurity NEXUS – CSX – Certificate and CSX-P
Certification
(source: www.isaca.org)
15
ISACA

15
COBIT
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
Is a process based IT Governance Framework
IT Governance Institute and ISACA
Strengths
Cuts IT risks and gain business value from IT
Assists in meeting regulatory compliance requirements
Improved reporting and management
Improves IT and Information Asset Control
Maps to the ISO 17799 and is compatible with ITIL
(Information Technology Infrastructure Library) which are
accepted practices in IT development and operations
Traditional Paradigm
Plan and Organize
Acquire and Implement
Deliver and Support
Monitor and Evaluate
Detailed description of processed and tools to measure progress
Broken into 3 organizational levels and their responsibilities
Board of Directors and Executive Management
IT and Business management
Line-level governance
4 IT Domains
34 IT processes
210 Control objects
16

16
17
Cobit frAMEWORK
17
Released in 2012
Newest version of the business framework for the governance of
IT from ISACA.
Expands on CobIT 4.1
Integrates other major frameworks, standards and resources that
are in frequent use today
Comprised of 5 key principles for governance and management
of IT at the enterprise (big business) level
Meeting Stockholder needs
Covers Enterprise end-to-end
Applies single integrated framework
Enabling a holistic approach
Separates governance from management
18
It governance frameworks-CobiT 5
Contains 7 categories of enablers
Principles, policies and frameworks
Processes
Organizational Structures
Culture, ethics and behavior
Information

Services, infrastructure and applications
People, skills and competencies
18
IT Governance Institute® The IT Governance Institute
(ITGITM) (www.itgi.org) is a non-profit, independent research
entity that provides guidance for the global business community
on issues related to the governance of IT assets. ITGI was
established by the non-profit membership association ISACA in
1998 to help ensure that IT delivers value and its risks are
mitigated through alignment with enterprise objectives, IT
resources are properly allocated, and IT performance is
measured. ITGI developed Control Objectives for Information
and related Technology (COBIT®) and Val ITTM, and offers
original research and case studies to help enterprise leaders and
boards of directors fulfil their IT governance responsibilities
and help IT professionals deliver value-adding services.
Source: https://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Val-IT-IT-
Value-Delivery-/Documents/Val-IT-Framework-2.0-Extract-Jul-
2008.pdf
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It Governance Institute
19
Value-oriented framework

Complements CobiT
Focus on principles and best practices aimed at gaining
maximum value from IT investments
40 key ValIT management practices = CobiT control objectives
Includes 3 primary processes
Value Governance
Portfolio managemenet
Investment management
When integrated with CobiT 5:
Define relationships between IT and the responsible business
functional areas with governance responsibility
Manage an organization’s portfolio of It enabled business
investments
Maximize the quality of business cases for IT enabled
investment
20
It governance frameworks ValIT®
20
ITIL was created in the 1980's by the UK governments CCTA
(Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency) with the
objective of ensuring better use of IT services and resources.
The ITIL concept emerged in the 1980s, when the British
government determined that the level of IT service quality
provided to them was not sufficient. The Central Computer and
Telecommunications Agency (CCTA), now called the Office of
Government Commerce (OGC), was tasked with developing a
framework for efficient and financially responsible use of IT
resources within the British government and the private sector.

The earliest version of ITIL was actually originally called
GITIM, Government Information Technology Infrastructure
Management. Obviously this was very different to the current
ITIL, but conceptually very similar, focusing around service
support and delivery.
Large companies and government agencies in Europe adopted
the framework very quickly in the early 1990s. ITIL was
spreading far and, and was used in both government and non-
government organizations. As it grew in popularity, both in the
UK and across the world, IT itself changed and evolved, and so
did ITIL.
In year 2000, The CCTA merged into the OGC, Office for
Government Commerce and in the same year, Microsoft used
ITIL as the basis to develop their proprietary Microsoft
Operations Framework (MOF).
In 2001, version 2 of ITIL was released. The Service Support
and Service Delivery books were redeveloped into more concise
usable volumes. Over the following few years it became, by far,
the most widely used IT service management best practice
approach in the world.
In 2007 version 3 if ITIL was published. This adopted more of a
lifecycle approach to service management, with greater
emphasis on IT business integration.
21
It governance frameworks - ITIL
21
ITIL – set of process oriented best practices and guidance
originally developed to standardize delivery of IT service
management

Applicable for both public and private sector
Best practices are the foundation for ISO/IEC 2000
Consists of 5 core published volumes that map the IT service
cycle:
Service Strategy
Service Design
Service Transition
Service Operation
Continual Service Improvement
22
It governance frameworks - ITIL
22
ISO/IEC - International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
and the International Electro technical Commission (IEC).
ISO/IEC 20000 is the first international standard for IT service
management. It was developed in 2005, by ISO/IEC JTC1/SC7
and revised in 2011. It is based on and intended to supersede the
earlier BS 15000 that was developed by BSI Group.
23
It governance frameworks – ISO/IEC 2000
23
ISO/IEC 38500:2008 – International standard for high level

principles and guidance for senior executives and directors for
effective and efficient use of IT
Three main section:
Scope, Application and Objectives
Framework for Good Corporate Governance of IT
Guidance for Corporate Governance of IT
Derived from the Australian 8015 guiding principles
24
It governance frameworks-ISO 38500
24
As it relates to IT functions, best practices have developed to
prevent leakage of data from databases, and from Web services
Implement a uniform set of policies and practices to assist in
compliance and reduce costs
Proven database security best practices include:
Inventory and document
Assess exposure and weaknesses
Shore up the database
Monitor
Deploy monitoring and auditing tools
Verify privileged access
Protect sensitive data
Deploy masking
Integrate and automate standardized security processes
25
IG Best practices for database security and compliance

25
The end
26
26
55
KivimäKi: Do Air rAiDs Protect civiliAns?
© 2015, The Author Middle East Policy © 2015, Middle East
Policy Council
First Do No Harm:
Do air raiDs Protect civiliaNs?
Timo Kivimäki
Dr. Kivimäki is professor of international relations and director
of research
at the University of Bath, UK. His books include Can Peace
Research Make
Peace? (Ashgate, 2012, shortlisted for the Best Book Prize of
the Conflict
Research Society). Dr. Kivimäki was Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari’s
adviser in the Aceh peace talks.
The 3,000th air raid against Is-lamist forces in Iraq and Syria

was carried out just before Easter 2015.1 By the end of the year,
the figure is likely to rise close to 5,000.
Meanwhile, experts have lost count of the
number of people Syria’s autocratic rulers
have murdered and Islamic State (IS) mili-
tants have beheaded. At the time of this
writing (September 2015), over 11 mil-
lion people had escaped the war as either
internally displaced people or refugees,
according to the UN High Commission on
Refugees.2 A recent revelation by one of
world’s legendary peace brokers, Finnish
President (1992-2000) and Nobel Peace
Prize Laureate Martti Ahtisaari, suggests
that perhaps all this could have been avoid-
ed by diplomacy!3
Before IS had started its offensive and
the West was still only fighting the tyranni-
cal rule of President Bashar al-Assad, Pres-
ident Ahtisaari approached the Russian UN
ambassador. At the time, Russian policies
in support of Syria’s dictator were consid-
ered inimical to prospects for democracy
in the country. According to Ahtisaari in an
interview with The Guardian, Ambassador
Vitaly Churkin informed him that Russia
would not object to a solution that persuad-
ed Assad to resign. Ahtisaari informed the
other permanent members of the Security
Council of this new opening, but to his
surprise and dismay, he could not make his
voice heard.4 According to Foreign Policy,
however, it was Russia itself that derailed
a fragile consensus by attaching further

conditions to the purge of Assad.5
According to Ahtisaari, Churkin’s
demands were worth studying. Russia
agreed to persuade Assad to step down,
provided that everything took place in a
dignified manner and the West did not arm
its favorite rebels to ensure their succes-
sion.6 However, the voices of the militant
opposition to Assad drowned out the
voice of diplomacy. As in Libya, where
the Western coalition refused to react to
Muammar Qadhafi’s promise to step down
provided that he was allowed to remain a
symbolic figurehead — “like the Queen of
England”7 — in Syria, too, it was decided
that a dictator with a brutal human-rights
record did not deserve a dignified exit.
Kivimaki.indd 55 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM
56
Middle east Policy, Vol. XXii, No. 4, WiNter 2015
More than a quarter of a million conflict
fatalities later, after the collapse of the Syr-
ian state and the rise of brutal fanaticism,
it is possible to ask whether it might have
been wiser to try the diplomatic solution
that seemed within reach in early 2012.
DID ASSAD DESERVE
FACE-SAVING?

There is a “cosmopolitan” argument
against allowing Assad the dignified exit
that the Russians have suggested. Mary
Kaldor, in her seminal book New and Old
Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era,
suggests that horrific atrocities such as the
ones IS and Assad have committed in Syria
must be dealt with by the enforcement
of global humanitarian norms of civil-
ity rather than negotiation.8 One does not
negotiate with burglars or murderers; they
are captured, tried, convicted and pun-
ished. It should have been clear to Assad
that it is not acceptable for a president to
use chemical weapons against his subjects.
According to Kaldor, cosmopolitan law
enforcement — soldiering and policing —
is the solution to such senseless violence:
“The analysis of new wars suggests that
what is needed is not peacekeeping but
enforcement of cosmopolitan norms, i.e.,
enforcement of international humanitarian
and human rights law.”9 The practice of
enforcement of prevailing cosmopolitan
norms constitutes the existence of a global
order where these norms prevail. The
practice of negotiating disputes that are
ruled by these norms constitutes a real-
ity where common norms do not regulate
global interaction. This is why, according
to this reasoning, Assad did not deserve
face-saving.
Political-realist critics, however, sug-
gest that such a normative global order is a

fantasy, and living in such a fantasy could
be dangerous. Whether it is realistic to
act as if there were a global humanitarian
order depends on four premises:
1. There are common values that can be
enforced.
2. There is an agreement on how to imple-
ment them.
3. There are legitimate actors to enforce
such values and principles, which could
be applied to each situation in a com-
monly accepted manner.
4. There is a need for a full normative
foundation before we can enforce basic
norms.
GLOBAL NORMS AND CONSENSUS
Do rogue states resist consensus
simply to prevent the regulation of shady
interactions that benefit opportunistic lead-
ers? In March 2014, when Russia rocked
the prospects for a UN Security Council
authorization of anti-Assad military in-
tervention in Syria, it was speculated that
Russian leaders wanted to be able to sell
weapons to Assad and avoid becoming the
next autocrats pushed out by the democrat-
ic international powers.10 China, perhaps,
opposed sanctions against Assad because
its sense of responsibility for global gov-

ernance had not yet awakened, as former
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert B.
Zoellick has suggested.11
All this may be partly true. Yet, the
people we try to protect by enforcing
global humanitarian norms also tend to
resist our protection. This, at least, should
be seen as an indication that we have real
problems with the acceptance of the norms
we consider global. In Iraq, Western protec-
tion was always unpopular. In 2008, a U.S.
Defense Department poll suggested that
only 22 percent of Iraqis felt the United
States was contributing to security in their
Kivimaki.indd 56 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM
57
country, while only 3 percent felt the U.S.
security role in their neighborhood was
legitimate.12 A British Ministry of Defence
poll pointed in the same direction. Up to
82 percent of Iraqis were strongly opposed
to the presence of coalition forces in their
country, while less than 1 percent believed
that coalition forces were good for their
security. Problems in Afghanistan testify to
the same problem.13 Even the main domes-
tic beneficiaries of the Western presence
— soldiers that Western forces had selected

to train to take control over the country —
tended to turn against their trainers. The
unpopularity of the U.S. drone program
to protect civilians against terror speaks
loud and clear: the people we protect by
enforcing humanitarian law against tyrants
and terrorists do not share the normative
foundations of our protection.
In Syria, Assad’s regime is obviously
unpopular. There is also little doubt about
the need for the Syrian people to be pro-
tected from both their tyrant and from IS.
However, the radicalization of the anti-
Assad resistance, the appeal of the brutal
Islamic State, and the weakness of the pro-
Western resistance seem to suggest that the
enforcement of our Western interpretation
of globally accepted humanitarian norms
is problematic. According to interviews
conducted by a Guardian journalist, the
appeal of IS lies not so much in what this
violent organization stands for as in its
resistance to the West.14 Even if Russia
and China have ulterior motives in their
opposition to the Western enforcement of
common humanitarian norms, surely the
people we protect with these norms should
share them with us. Yet, this is clearly not
the case in the Middle East, not least in
Syria. It seems clear that Amitai Etzioni is
right: the world still needs dialogue instead
of simple enforcement of global norms.15
In addition to the lack of common
norms, there is the problem of implemen-

tation — mainly the question of where
democracy should be implemented. When
imposing a specific concept of democracy
in Syria, the international community has
emphasized democracy on the level of
nations. At the same time, the exercise of
military power on the international level
has not been democratic. Syrians did not
vote for the United States to bomb them.
As Etzioni has complained in his book
From Empire to a Community, we are im-
posing democracy and freedom on national
institutions but not on the United Na-
tions or the World Health Organization.16
If China and Russia impose the norm of
respect for sovereignty in situations where
the United States is imposing democratic
governance, it is unlikely that either will
get positive results. Yet both are enforc-
ing globally accepted norms. The fact that
norms and interpretations of world politics
vary globally does not mean that we do not
need norms and their interpretations. How-
ever, it seems that we are not yet ready for
their simple enforcement.17
LEGITIMATE AGENCY FOR
ENFORCEMENT?
The peculiarity of the post-September
11, 2001, enforcement of humanitarian
protection of civilians from terror and
tyranny has been the asymmetry be-
tween the willingness to promote global
principles and the refusal to build global
agency for it. As Etzioni has complained,

we have been eager to promote global
governance while at the same time unwill-
ing to promote the development of global
government.18
This is especially problematic as
we subscribe to democratic norms. The
reason democracy is a better method
Kivimaki.indd 57 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM
58
of governance is not that autocrats are
always less capable or morally corrupt,
but that democracy as a power structure
makes it impossible for incompetent and
immoral rulers to make unpopular deci-
sions and stay in power. Democratic rulers
must comply with the interests and moral
conventions of their constituencies. Even
if a Western leader wanted to be unselfish
and humane in his policies towards Syria,
he would not survive politically unless he
promoted the interests and moral framing
of his own constituencies. The interests of
Syrians are irrelevant.
The debate over the extent to which
global norms dictate U.S. policies and are
dictated by selfish interests is focused on
specific events and cases; the big picture

is often hidden behind demagogy. Only
correlational analysis of U.S. foreign
policy in general, on the one hand, and the
democratic credentials of the targets of
U.S. support, on the other, can reveal the
big picture. However, the results of such
an exercise are surprising. Even if one uses
the most respected and conservative (indi-
vidualistic) American dataset on democra-
cy, the Polity IV data, it is inevitable that,
in the Muslim Middle East, an average
U.S. ally is more autocratic than an aver-
age enemy of the United States. While the
average autocracy score of a U.S. political
ally was 6.94 (on a scale from 0 to 10),
the average autocracy score of a “tyranny”
that the United States had to resist was
6.41. The autocratic nature of U.S. military
collaborators in the Middle East was even
more prominent. This has been the pattern
throughout the post-World War II period;
and the rise of the humanitarian agenda
during the presidency of George W. Bush
only worsened the situation.19
Moreover, if one looks at changes in
the polities of Muslim countries of the
Middle East, transitions to democracy are
more often punished by the United States
than rewarded. Syria, for example, has
moved towards democracy twice — in
1950 and 1954 — and both times this
meant closer cooperation with the Soviet
Union. Therefore, American punishment
was forthcoming. There is only one excep-

tion to this in the Middle East: in Bahrain,
where U.S. support increased in 1973 after
some significant but short-lived democratic
reforms.
In addition, transitions to autocratic
rule have been met with more rewards than
punishments since World War II. The U.S.-
backed coup that toppled Syria’s Husni
al-Zaim in 1949 constituted dramatic
democracy backsliding — rewarded by the
United States for strategic reasons; the new
autocrat was seen as sufficiently tough on
communism. Bowing to the strategic secu-
rity interests of U.S. constituencies meant
compromising the humanitarian interests
of Syrians.20
If one looks at the kinds of democratic
processes the United States has opposed,
it becomes clear that U.S. energy needs
have played an important role. Popular
pressures that could lead to the diminution
of U.S. energy supplies in the Middle East
have been actively resisted. U.S. strategic
interests, the war on terror and the protec-
tion of Israel have been more important
rationales for U.S. policies in the Middle
East than the promotion of democracy.21
More generally, domestic pressures on the
U.S. foreign-policy leadership, especially
concerning questions of peace and war,
tend to be driven by nationalism. Accord-
ing to John Mueller, “The public applies
a fairly reasonable cost-benefit analysis
when evaluating foreign affairs, but it vast-

ly overvalues the lives of Americans and
undervalues the lives of foreigners.”22 Here
Kivimaki.indd 58 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM
59
is Mueller again: “When Americans asked
themselves how many American lives it
was worth to save hundreds of thousands
of (foreign) … lives, the answer came out
to rather close to zero.”23 Thus, U.S. con-
stituencies for democracy push decision
makers to favor it only inside the United
States; outside the country, they also think
primarily about American interests. The
fact that the constituencies of the decision
makers in U.S. global governance in the
Middle East live in America has made it
impossible for U.S. decision makers to
prioritize the interests of the people whose
protection U.S. enforcement of humanitar-
ian principles has aimed at.
There is also a lack of local ownership
and agency in the protection of civilians
and the observance of humanitarian norms.
This is not related to the policies of the
West but to the immaturity of most devel-
oping states. Enforcement of global norms
and the external insistence on democracy
has often further weakened developing

states. This was the case in Iraq, Afghani-
stan, Somalia, Yemen and, indeed, Syria.
The idea of enforcing democracy and hu-
man rights in countries where state-build-
ing has not been accomplished is compli-
cated. Most experts agree that successful
state formation has often been messy and
has involved measures that fly in the face
of human-rights principles that we ap-
ply to mature states.24 Yet most scholars
recognize that the formation of states has
pacified interactions and has enabled both
democracy and respect for human rights.25
Without functioning states, the developing
world might lie even further from global
humanitarian norms. Thus, the question of
agency in the protection of civilians should
not be ignored in the debate on global
governance. Cosmopolitan progress needs
inter-civilizational dialogue before it can
gain the consensus and shared ownership
of global values that could be the founda-
tion, not just of global governance, but of
globally owned government.
WHAT IF THERE IS NO
CONSENSUS?
If the global normative order is not en-
tirely ready, does that mean humanitarian
principles cannot be enforced? Mary Kal-
dor suggests that the creation of a cosmo-
politan order and the stopping of Assads
and Saddams cannot wait for a total global
consensus on norms.26 Global governance

has to come first, global government only
later. However, many political realists
suggest that without the commonality of a
normative foundation of order, and without
the legitimacy and common ownership of
the protection of the global humanitarian
order, there is no legitimacy of order, and
it has to be built solely on coercion. As
Henry Kissinger has suggested in his latest
book, World Order, sustainable global gov-
ernance has to rely on order and legitima-
cy, not just on one of the two. Building an
order without commonly shared legitimacy
is not sustainable, according to Kissinger.
Dreaming of normative crusades before
such missions are realistic is not just naive;
it is dangerous.27
Yet, Saddam was stopped, as were the
Taliban, Aideed and Qadhafi. Even Putin
and Assad feel the pressure of Western
enforcement of global norms. Can we then
say that enforcement by means of eco-
nomic coercion or military intervention
has been efficient despite the lack of global
consensus? Could a principled approach
to Assad have worked? It seems uncontro-
versial that sanctions can prevent the West
from becoming complicit in genocides and
violations of humanitarian norms. Sanc-
tions that limit the capacity of elites to steal
Kivimaki.indd 59 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM

60
from their people, such as freezing their
assets, tend to have a relatively high suc-
cess rate. Using the sanctions data of Gary
Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott
and Barbara Oegg,28 I have calculated that
up to 80 percent of cases after World War I
in which financial sanctions have been used
strictly against elites have been somewhat
successful — if these elites were already
weakened by domestic pressures against
them. In these cases, due to popular pres-
sure and the
limited target
of the sanc-
tions, it has
been possible
to create local
consensus on
the norms that
can be applied and enforced.
More generally, however, sanctions
that punish entire states tend to have less
success. Sanctions, in general, manage to
significantly affect their targets in only
one in three cases, according to studies by
Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott.29 Using the
more up-to-date dataset mentioned earlier,
I have calculated that sanctions imposed by
hostile nations have an even worse record
of success. In the cases of sanctions to pro-
mote human rights or democracy, sanction-

ers perceived as hostile by the target of the
sanctions failed totally in 80 percent of the
cases.30 Sanctions tend to fail if they are
imposed by states that are acting according
to their own normative code and are thus
perceived as unfair by the target of the sanc-
tions. Thus, if sanctions are imposed in the
absence of a common consensus, they tend
to fail; imposed against whole countries,
they are detrimental to humanitarian values.
Karl and John E. Mueller call measures to
punish and regulate tyrants by economic
coercion “sanctions of mass destruction.”31
Furthermore, when sanctions or military
force are used against entire countries and
manage to push dictators or terrorists out of
power or out of a certain territory, the result
has often been the emergence of even worse
rulers. The Western support of anti-Assad
forces should suffice as an example.
The track record of military enforce-
ment of global humanitarian norms is even
bleaker. The fact that Western humanitar-
ian interventions tend to escalate conflicts
and inten-
sify killing —
even in Syria
— seems to
testify to the
intensity of
the resistance
to imposed

Western values. Syria’s experience is not
exceptional. When looking at northeast
and southeast Asia after World War II, we
can calculate from the battle-death data
of Oslo’s Peace Research Institute32 that
two-thirds of the region’s conflict fatali-
ties were produced in originally internal
disputes where outsiders imposed their
solutions. In such conflicts, 98 percent of
fatalities were produced only after outsid-
ers had entered the domestic dispute with
their military might.33 In Syria, the num-
ber of direct conflict fatalities more than
tripled after the West initiated air strikes
against IS and the CIA started its indirect
military interference in the war.34
Recent global trends testify to this re-
sult. Based on Uppsala University’s battle-
death dataset, the willingness to protect has
turned global conflict trends upside down.
After a steady decline in conflict fatalities
following the Cold War, one could begin
to see some increase. During the Cold War,
both the Soviet and U.S. camps were eager
to intervene in Third World wars. However,
In Syria, the number of direct conflict
fatalities more than tripled after the
West initiated air strikes against IS and
the CIA started its indirect military
interference in the war.
Kivimaki.indd 60 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM

61
this eagerness disappeared until the turn of
the millennium. Only then did the impulse
to protect people from the malign influence
of state power and terrorist violence arise.
One can see that this eagerness to protect
people who generally do not want to be
protected has given rise to a new kind of
warfare: protection wars, or New Interna-
tional Wars, as these wars were motivated
by the international condemnation of
violence in new wars. The war in Syria is a
good example. Others include those under-
taken in Somalia, Iraq, northern Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Yemen to enforce humani-
tarian rules and protect civilians from terror
and tyranny. These wars caused, according
to the Uppsala University data, 45 percent
of the world’s conflict fatalities in 2013
and 74 percent in 2010. In other years of
the Obama presidency, deaths from en-
forcement/protection wars fell somewhere
between these two percentages.35 At the
time of writing, statistics for 2014 were not
available in their entirety, but the fact that
Syria had become the greatest source of
conflict fatalities in the world suggests that
the share of deaths in protection wars had
remained substantial.
Not all fatalities in countries where

Westerners have intervened recently have
been caused by the enforcement of global
principles. There could be conflicts that
have little or nothing to do with Western
intervention. But, in these cases, one could
say that the power of the state to contain
such conflicts has been degraded by the
penetration of norm-enforcing Western
countries. However, it would be possible
to consider only those cases as protection
wars where the explicit contradiction has
been related to protection. One would then
also have to take into account conflicts
where protection takes place in countries
that are not fully penetrated by outsiders.
Such cases include the following:
1. The protection by the UN multinational
Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
FIGURE 1.
Fatalities of Enforcement of Global Protective Humanitarian
Norms as a Percentage of
All Conflict Fatalities
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

0%
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09

20
11
20
13
Kivimaki.indd 61 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM
62
tion Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),
which fought in Mali against a home-
grown Tuareg jihadist organization,
“Movement of Defenders of the Faith”
(Harakat Ansar al-Dine), and several
al-Qaeda-inspired or -affiliated organi-
zations, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), its splinter group the
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
Africa (MUJAO), and the “Signed in
Blood Battalion”
2. France’s military involvement to protect
civilians in Mauritania against AQIM
3. France’s operation in the Central
African Republic against the Union of
Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR),
allegedly supported by the terror-sup-
porting Sudanese government
4. The United Kingdom’s operation in Si-

erra Leone against the New War terror
group the West Side Boys (WSB)
Adding these fatalities to those in
Somalia, Iraq, northern Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, Yemen and Syria (since Syrian fatali-
ties of war between international protectors
and internal terrorists and tyrants did not
start until 2014, the latest Uppsala statistics
do not yet reveal them), one can see that,
even with the very conservative coding
rules (ruling out many internal conflicts
in countries that coalitions of the willing
had already penetrated with their military
forces), these protection wars have become
the main source of violence in the world,
occasionally contributing over 50 percent
of total conflict fatalities.
Clearly, the enforcement of humanitar-
ian principles in the absence of a global
consensus has become a major problem.
Thus, it was never realistic to assume suc-
cess in the military operation in Syria.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, the enforcement of humani-
tarian norms is resisted by the people such
enforcement is intended to protect when the
effort shifts — by rule rather than by excep-
tion — from the original aim to protecting
the self-interest of the protecting nations.
When global humanitarian governance fails
to develop global agency, “protection” can
end up killing the civilians it was supposed

to protect. This is clearly the case in Syria.
Thus, one could infer that the enforcement
of humanitarian norms, before consensus
behind them has been achieved and before
the emergence of global agency for humani-
tarian protection, has been a failure. With-
out a genuine interest in the development
of a global humanitarian regime, effective
global governance will be impossible.
Clearly, norms are disputed, their
interpretation is not agreed upon and the
enforcement agency is missing. As a result,
the simple enforcement of norms we think
are commonly accepted is not an adequate
substitute for dialogue and negotiation.
Global policing is not feasible if there is no
legal system to enforce. The emergence of
“cosmopolitan protection wars” or “new
international wars” shows that the diagno-
sis was wrong. New wars were not apoliti-
cal and criminal; they could not be tackled
by means of neutral policing. Efforts at
that have led us to the kind of enforcement
of norms of protection that kill the people
we intend to protect. Therefore, instead of
enforcement, we should continue to focus
on dialogue and the creation of a norma-
tive consensus on global humanitarian pro-
tection. Western ambassadors should have
listened to President Ahtisaari and tried
to negotiate the solution that was on offer
with the softening of the Russian position
on Assad.
Kivimaki.indd 62 11/20/2015 2:39:05 PM

63
1 “U.S. Central Command,” News, Daily,
http://www.centcom.mil/en/news.
2 “Quick Facts: What You Need to Know about the Syria
Crisis,” Mercy Corps, 2015, http://www.mercy-
corps.org/articles/turkey-iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria/quick-facts-
what-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis.
3 Martti Ahtisaari, “The Future of World Peace — Old Ways
and New Thinking,” Kim Dae-jung Forum on
World’s Future, Seoul, Korea, March 12, 2015.
4 Julian Borger and Bastien Inzaurralde, “West ‘Ignored
Russian Offer in 2012 to Have Syria’s Assad Step
Aside,’” Guardian, September 15, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/west-ignored-
rus-
sian-offer-in-2012-to-have-syrias-assad-step-aside.
5 Colin Lynch and Dan De Luce, “Did the West Really Miss a
Chance to End the Syrian War?,” Foreign
Policy, September 15, 2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/15/did-the-west-really-miss-a-
chance-to-end-
the-syrian-war/.
6 Martti Ahtisaari, Discussion with President Martti Ahtisaari,
June 2014.
7 Henry Samuel, “French Say Col. Muammar Gaddafi ‘Prepared
to Leave,’” Telegraph, July 12, 2011, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/lib
ya/8632560/French-say-Col-Muammar-
Gaddafi-prepared-to-leave.html; Adrian Blomfield, “Col.
Muammar Gaddafi ‘Offers to Give up Power

in Libya,’” Telegraph, July 5, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianoce
an/
libya/8618646/Col-Muammar-Gaddafi-offers-to-give-up-power-
in-Libya.html.
8 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a
Global Era (Stanford University Press, 1999);
and Mary Kaldor, “Comment on Security Cosmopolitanism,”
Critical Studies on Security 1, no. 1 (2013):
42–45, doi:10.1080/21624887.2013.801135.
9 Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global
Era, 124-125.
10 Raf Sanchez, “Syria: Russia Dooms Hopes of UN Security
Council Resolution,” Telegraph, March 4, 2014,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/1
0266737/Syria-Russia-dooms-hopes-of-UN-
Security-Council-resolution.html.
11 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to
Responsibility?” Department Of State Office of
Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, September 21,
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zoellick/rem/53682.htm.
12 U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq,” September 2008, …
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Text1: Galtung, Johan.Text2: The State/Nation Dialectic: Some
Tentative Conclusions Text3: Searching for peace : the road to
TRANSCEND / Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobsen and Kai
Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen. London ; Sterling, VA : Pluto Press,
2002. 2nd ed. pp. 126-141

International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 16, Number 2,
Winter 2011
Responsibility to Protect after Libya
Jake Lynch
Abstract
Academic writing about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
frequently adopts a position of advocacy,
with researchers concentrating, in recent texts, on prospects for,
and modalities of, practical
application of this new ‘norm’ in the ‘international community’.
Such endeavours, in both research
and non-research environments, have gained impetus from the
perceived success of Operation
Unified Protector, the NATO mission in Libya to implement UN
Security Council Resolution 1973.
However, the portents are mixed, with news reports about
continuing chaos in the country, and
complaints that NATO exceeded its mandate. It is a moment,
this article argues, for critical
examination of some of the assumptions, both theoretical and
methodological, underpinning
scholarly research on R2P. The typical approach of what are
called, in the article, ‘R2P-o-philes’ takes
a behaviourist view of political agency, and a case-by-case,
problem-solving approach to evaluating
the options for and consequences of particular humanitarian
interventions. These assumptions are

revised, and an alternative methodology proposed, in light of
Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional model
of power. Different views of selected cases are then put
forward, drawing on the proposed
methodology, and elements of the ‘paths not taken’ are
examined, for pointers to human protection
issues left out of the dispensation of global governance of
which R2P is one of the key components.
Introduction
In his latest book, Global Politics and the Responsibility to
Protect, Alex J Bellamy
(2011a) pays tribute to “collaborators” in helping to develop
and spread the concept as a new
and rapidly accepted norm in the international community: a list
that includes senior NGO
personnel, policy-makers and media commentators as well as
fellow academic researchers.
These are the R2P-o-philes: advocates allied with analysts, and
contributors of many an
articulate exhortation in both printed and spoken word, as well
as a considerable body of
scholarly writing, nowhere more impressively represented than
in the works of Bellamy
himself.
In their ardour, however, they neglect some important counter-
arguments. They are
presently ‘stuck’ at 1973. Methodologically stuck, since their
characteristic, case-by-case,
problem-solving approach has recently seen them poring over

the UN Security Council
Resolution of that number – authorising the use of force to
protect civilians in Libya – for
portents and precedents. And stuck there, too, in their
theoretical approach, which seems to
exist in a prelapsarian state from before the debate over
political agency summarised,
elaborated and further catalysed by the publication in 1974 of
Steven Lukes’ landmark essay,
Power: A Radical View.
To refresh the reader’s memory, Lukes criticises the “one-
dimensional view of
power” as over-reliant on a “behavioural” methodology to
detect its workings and effects:
concentrating on the overt words and deeds of decision-makers.
A “two-dimensional view…
[entails] attend[ing] to those aspects of power that are least
accessible to observation…
60 Jake Lynch
[recognising] that, indeed, power is at its most effective when
least observable” (1974/2005:
1). Hidden interests may contrive to manipulate political
agendas ‘in advance’, so to speak,
ensuring that “decisions are prevented from being taken on
potential issues over which there
is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests” (ibid.: 24-
25). The one-dimensional view
can be misleading: notably, Lukes argues, by making it appear
that power is more widely
dispersed, and political structures more “pluralistic”, than they

really are.
Take, by way of brief illustration, a phrase familiar from
countless news reports: “the
American-sponsored Middle East peace process”. Applying, in
turn, Lukes’ first two views
of power lead us to make opposite meanings out of this
statement. A one-dimensional view
would infer, from the overt words and deeds of US diplomats,
engaging with Israel and the
Palestinians down the years, that America is in favour of peace.
Following Lukes, I ought
immediately to disaggregate ‘America’, to make it clear that I
am referring to dominant
factions of the Washington power elite. It may serve their
presentational interests to position
the US as working for peace, in political and media discourses,
and having an ongoing ‘peace
process’ creates an indispensable role for America in the region,
which is seen by those
factions as a major strategic asset. The attainment of peace, on
the other hand, would risk
obviating this role, so, on a two-dimensional view, ‘America’
may not, in structural terms, be
in favour of peace after all.
This is not the space for an exhaustive trawl of the record to
attempt to ‘prove’ this
proposition, but several landmarks stand out as offering at least
prima facie support for it.
The Camp David meeting brokered by President Clinton in 2000
was doomed, according to
an account a clef by Robert Malley (Clinton’s special adviser
for the talks) and Hussein Agha
in the New York Review of Books (Malley and Agha, 2001).
The White House had turned a

blind eye as Prime Minister Ehud Barak disregarded interim
steps provided for in the Oslo
accords, with “excessive” willingness to make allowances for
his domestic political
predicament. Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, by contrast,
was expected simply to
“deliver” his people, tribal-style, to whatever was cooked up in
the talks, or take the blame
for their failure.
An under-pressure Clinton humiliated one Palestinian negotiator
after another by
shouting at them, red-faced, when they refused to offer the
expected “concessions”,
according to another insider, Martin Indyk, who served as US
Ambassador in Tel Aviv.
Washington’s “capriciousness” as a mediator is attributable,
Indyk admits, to the
“asymmetry” of America’s relations with the two parties (Indyk,
2009: 308). The later Taba
proposals did set out a plan potentially acceptable to the
Palestinians but by then the three
leaders involved – Clinton, Barak and Arafat – lacked the
political capital to push them
through, and in any case Barak’s Chief of Staff had written
secretly to the Americans
expressing “reservations”, it was later revealed (in Morris,
2009): a ‘back-channel’ relying on
Washington’s eventual preference, in every such case, for the
interests of its ally over those
of peace.
By June 2008, Barak’s successor-but-one, Ehud Olmert, was
engaged in the
Annapolis process brokered by Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, when he was summoned

to the White House to meet, not Rice herself but President Bush
and Vice-President Dick
Cheney. When he touched back down at home, the steps of his
plane were still visible in the
background as he declared to waiting reporters that the
“pendulum is swinging” towards an
attack on Gaza (in Berger, 2008). The Goldstone report found
that an Egyptian-brokered
ceasefire was breached by Israeli commandoes, months later,
whereupon the Bush
Administration transferred “bunker-busting bombs” to Israel
followed by another large
consignment of arms containing 5.8 million pounds of explosive
weight (Reuters, 2009,
quoted in Philo and Berry, 2011: 154). Bush provided
diplomatic protection for long enough
for an attempt to inflict a decisive blow on Hamas – seen in
Washington as a tool of Iran, a
Responsibility to Protect after Libya 61
rival potential regional hegemon – before the Obama
Administration took office.
A third dimension
The two-dimensional view may afford greater insight into such
episodes, but it offers
only a “qualified” form of behaviourism, Lukes notes. It still
attributes agentic influence to

the choices of rational individual actors, albeit they may
contrive to conceal their true
motivations. A three-dimensional view, by contrast, allows that
“the bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and
reinforced in ways that are
neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular
individuals’ choices”
(Lukes, 1974/2005: 25).
The impetus for developments in conflict can take shape around
and between individuals, as
well as within them. There is no evidence that Bill Clinton,
Condi Rice, George Mitchell and
others were knowingly insincere when they made statements in
favour of peace. They may
merely have lacked the self-knowledge (or access to an
acceptable political vocabulary) to
address the asymmetry built into the system of relations
connecting the US, Israel and the
Palestinians, and the glaring contradiction with America’s
perceived strategic interests, which
filter the options able to be openly discussed.
In a later edition, Lukes considers Michel Foucault’s
contributions to the debate over
political agency and, while repudiating some of the “ultra-
radical” implications of the
decentred self in its relation to power, clearly regards some now
familiar Foucauldian ideas
as complementary to his own. “There is no power that is
exercised without a series of aims
and objectives”, we read, in The History of Sexuality. “But this
does not mean that it results

from the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not
look for the headquarters that
presides over its rationality” (Foucault, 1978: 95). While, in a
particular context, “the
rationality of power is characterised by tactics that are often
quite explicit at the restricted
level where they are inscribed (the local cynicism of power)”,
Foucault tells us, this is far less
significant than the existence of what Lukes calls “networked
power”, which can be
recognized precisely by its “context-transcending ability”
(Lukes, 1974/2005: 75).
The Responsibility to Protect was adumbrated in 2001 in a
report of the same name
by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, which proposed six
“precautionary principles” for the non-consensual use of force
to prevent “large-scale loss of
life”. The first of these is “Right intention: The primary purpose
of the intervention, whatever
other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or
avert human suffering” (ICISS,
2001: 19).
This is to be expected in a document drawn up by policy-
makers, seeking
opportunities to make a difference with their own decisions.
What is perhaps more notable is
how far this linear notion of intentionality persists in the R2P
scholarly literature.
Contributions by five researchers to a recent ‘roundtable’ in the
academic journal, Ethics and
International Affairs, on ‘Libya, RtoP and Humanitarian
Intervention’, for instance, are full
of references to “policy-makers”, “policy analysts” and

“diplomats” as agentic actors. But the
insights of Lukes, Foucault and others effectively problematised
the notion of intentionality,
in the terms I have briefly sketched here.
A familiar term for one dominant faction of the Washington
power elite is, of course,
the military-industrial complex, with its potential to wield
“unwarranted influence” over
decision-making at “every level of government” (to quote the
warning issued by President
Eisenhower in his famous valedictory broadcast on leaving
office in 1961). But these terms
62 Jake Lynch
are conspicuous by their absence from any of the writings of the
R2P-o-philes (noted in
Lynch 2012) – in public media, scholarly articles and books
alike.
The communications scholar, Manuel Castells, made the
influential contention that
we now inhabit a “network society… characterized by the pre-
eminence of social
morphology over social action” (Castells, 1996: 500). That is to
say, when individual
decision-makers reach the point of taking action, their options
are always already constrained
by the influence of networks, “induc[ing] a social determination
of a higher level than that of
the specific social interests expressed through the networks: the
power of flows takes

precedence over the flows of power” (Castells, 1996: 500).
Something of the effect is captured in the anecdote recounted by
Chalmers Johnson in
the opening passage of Blowback, when Bill Clinton, as
President of the United States,
Commander-in-Chief and ostensibly the most powerful man on
earth, regarded as politically
impossible the call for him to sign the Ottawa Treaty banning
landmines, because he “could
not risk a breach with the military establishment” (Johnson,
2000: 70). The way in which
prospects for a pre-emptive US military strike on Iran have
entered the political agenda, via
debates between candidates for the Republican nomination for
the White House in 2012 (with
concomitant pressure on the incumbent Obama Administration
to be seen to respond in kind),
supplies a further illustration. The sheer implicit overhang of
military-industrial capability –
especially as engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya
appeared to be drawing down –
was mobilizing, through political and media networks, its own
strategic logic.
Lukes identifies media representations as one of the means by
which the “bias of the
system can be mobilized” in favour of responses to suit
powerful interests, and the ICISS
report itself discusses, as a phenomenon of growing importance
in this context, the
emergence of “media institutions with worldwide reach”. These,
it says, are prime examples
of
“an increasingly diverse array of new non-state actors [which]

have forced the debate
about intervention for human protection purposes to be
conducted in front of a
broader public, while at the same time adding new elements to
the agenda” (ICISS,
2001: 4).
At times, indeed, the report appears to remit the job of triage,
among all the sites with
potential applicability for R2P interventions, to media coverage,
by positing “conscience-
shocking situations” as the trigger for action (a phrase that has
endured to become something
of a slogan for the R2P-o-philes). How is our conscience to be
shocked, after all, except if
such situations are drawn to our attention, and how are they to
be drawn to our attention
except by media?
This brings further problems in its wake. The sheer
conventionality of news reporting
skews the agenda for devising and applying measures to protect
human life towards
paradigmatic responses; responses, that is to say, to events that
interrupt the flow of
normality. It generally ignores or downplays the syntagmatic –
the grinding everyday reality
– even when it produces effects of equal or greater gravity for
the people involved.
Something that happens is a ‘story’; something that continues to
happen is not (to paraphrase
Galtung and Ruge, 1965).
The operation of news conventions can be glimpsed vividly in
differential media

responses to the Asian tsunami, of Boxing Day 2004, and the
associated death toll; and a
contemporaneous UN report on the number of children who
perish through sheer deprivation,
of basic needs such as food, clean drinking water and
elementary medicine. By late the
following January, the former had been established at a quarter
of a million or more: a figure
familiar at the time to readers and audiences of media the world
over. The latter, at 11,000
per day, was described by the Harvard development economist
Jeffrey Sachs as testimony to
the “silent tsunamis” devastating communities in poor countries
on an ongoing basis – and
yet it struggled to attain more than a modicum of passing
attention from journalists (in Lynch,
2008).
The effect is directly relevant to a critique of the R2P-o-philes’
characteristic
methodological and theoretical approaches. Firstly, the process
by which media highlight
conscience-shocking situations and the suggestion that they are,
in the words of the ICISS
report, “crying out for action” is the product of a complex
relationship with power whose
precise modalities are contested, in relevant research, but in
which it is acknowledged to be
much more difficult to disentangle who is responding to whom,

than suggested in the ICISS
formulations.
On the so-called ‘CNN effect’, in which media coverage
supposedly prompts
interventions that would not otherwise have taken place, the
‘centre of gravity’ of scholarly
opinion is, as characterized by Balabanova, that “if it occurs it
is only rarely and in situations
of extremely dramatic and persistent coverage, lack of clear
governmental policy and chaotic
policymaking” (2010: 72). In several celebrated cases, such as
‘Operation Provide Hope’, the
implementation of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, and
humanitarian aid to Kurds fleeing the
vengeance of Saddam Hussein, in 1991 – identified by Shaw as
journalism’s “finest hour”
(Shaw, 1996) – strategic priorities had already been set, and
were indeed a prime factor
behind the concentration of media attention in the first place
(Natsios, 1996). To interpret
“conscience-shocking” news as a prompt, in a drama of
prospective intervention, is to risk
recursivity, since the incidence of such coverage may itself
indicate that biases in systems
have already been mobilized, in an ongoing drama of
complicity.
An alternative model to the CNN effect, and one more attuned
to Lukes’ three-
dimensional view of power is supplied by Der Derian, who
updates the concept of the
military-industrial complex to MIME-Net, the “Military-
Industrial-Media-Entertainment
Network” (2009). Wars in the post-Cold War space are
increasingly “virtual” in operation, he

points out, as drones are controlled from thousands of miles
away to bomb villages at the
click of a mouse, and “embedded” journalism mimics the
representations of first-person
shooter computer games (a form closely associated with the
military, as Ottosen (2008) has
shown). They could, moreover, be presented as “virtuous”, Der
Derian suggests, because of
“new ethical and economic imperatives for [spreading] global
democratic reform and
neoliberal markets”.
These imperatives were gathered and articulated in the UN
Millennium Report, We
the Peoples, presented by then Secretary General Kofi Annan.
In advocating “a more human-
centred approach to security as opposed to the traditional state-
centred approach” (United
Nations, 2000, np), it heralded what Bellamy et al, in a standard
text on peacekeeping, call a
“post-Westphalian” era of intervention in conflict (2010: 4) –
fashioning an R2P-shaped hole,
perhaps, in the repertoire, just before its iteration in those terms
(by the ICISS report, released
the following year).
In this and other texts, Annan makes copious use of the term,
“human capital”. These
emphases – on human security and human capital – are twin
faces of a neo-liberal
governmentality, whose implications are made more explicit in
a subsequent report, Investing
in Development. In it, Annan argues for countries to meet the
Millennium Development
Goals by investing in core infrastructure and human capital,
with the aim of “convert[ing]

subsistence farming to market-oriented farming”, thereby
“establish[ing] the basis for private
sector-led diversified exports and economic growth” and
“enabl[ing] a country to join the
global division of labour” (United Nations, 2005: 7). The human
subject now constituted as a
‘globalized’ individual first and foremost and a member of a
political community second if at
all, is to be secured in order to be successfully inserted into
global markets – above the heads,
where necessary, of states that may wish to pursue different
policies.
64 Jake Lynch
It is in this context that R2P has been successfully implanted. It
is part of a global
ascendancy of neo-liberalism, challenged only at the margins,
which can be denoted by
Lukes’ term, “the biases of the system”. Humanitarian
interventions are responses to
perturbations in this system that occur in a time, place and
manner consonant with
widespread conventions of media coverage: event-driven, and
closely tied to official agendas.
Reciprocal parts of the same system take effect in a myriad of
ways that generally
elude media attention, but they may have grave implications for
human protection in general.
Vandana Shiva, accepting the Sydney Peace Prize in 2010,
likened the conversion of
subsistence to commercial farming to:

“A war against the earth… Pesticides, which started as war
chemicals, have failed to
control pests. Genetic engineering was supposed to provide an
alternative to toxic
chemicals. Instead, it has led to increased use of pesticides and
herbicides and
unleashed a war against farmers…
…The high-cost feeds and high-cost chemicals are trapping
farmers in debt – and the
debt trap is pushing farmers to suicide. According to official
data, more than 200,000
Indian farmers have committed suicide in India since 1997”
(Shiva, 2010: np).
Some of the most potentially conscience-shocking issues of
human protection arising from
the neo-liberal dispensation of global governance are
syntagmatic, not paradigmatic.
Despite – or perhaps because of – the free-market policies
adopted by the Indian
government since the early 1990s, according to the
Multidimensional Poverty Index
(developed by Oxford Poverty and Human Development
Initiative with UN support), eight
Indian states were home in 2010 to more of the world’s poorest
people than the 26 poorest
African countries combined (BBC, 2010: np). The nutrition
available to the poor had actually
fallen, in absolute terms, during India’s years of market-driven
growth: according to Patnaik
(2008: np), the proportion of the rural population unable to

access 2,400 calories a day
climbed from 75% in 1993-94 to a record high of 87% by 2004-
05.
Between them, the reforms of the neo-liberal era of global
governance can be seen as
an implicit ‘grand bargain’. At the start of the period in the
1970s, switching responsibility
for setting the terms of trade from UNCTAD to the GATT and
then the WTO instituted a bias
in favour of free trade, with its supposed trickle-down effect.
That superseded calls for
implementation of managed-trade agreements with
compensatory terms, for countries
disadvantaged by colonial legacies, built in (Bello, 2005).
The free trade system overrode state prerogatives where these
offered barriers to
capital accumulation, so minimum standards of welfare and
protection (the Millennium
Development Goals and R2P) were offered as a ‘safety net’ by
way of compensation for the
citizens of countries now being left further behind by the
growing gap between rich and poor.
This offers a potential political utility analogous to that of
‘social safety nets’ in a
constitutional order that Bobbitt called the “market state”
(2003). By reassuring us that
departures from normality that shock our conscience will be met
with effective action – and
victims preserved from falling too far into degradation or peril
– it may serve to drain
political impetus from alternative, more avowedly redistributive
agendas.
A new methodology for R2P research

Bellamy presents the forward-oriented agenda for R2P research
in the following
terms:
“Working out what combination of measures works best in
different circumstances,
and precisely where available and willing capacity lies, is a
major and as yet unmet
challenge for researchers” (2011b: 268).
It typifies an approach labelled, by Robert W Cox, as “problem-
solving”, which:
“Takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and
power relationships and
the institutions into which they are organised, as the given
framework for action. The
general aim of problem-solving is to make those relationships
and institutions work
smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of
trouble” (1981: 128-129).
Drawing on Lukes’ three-dimensional model of power, I have
identified, and provided
reasons to revise, certain theoretical commitments inscribed in

such an approach when
applied to R2P. That done, I now propose some concomitant
methodological changes, the
better to assess particular developments against criteria of
general human protection via the
reduction of all forms of violence: structural, as in the
experience of Indian farmers, as well
as direct. Then I re-examine some well-rehearsed cases, to show
how different conclusions
can be drawn from the application of a revised theoretical and
methodological approach.
1. Much more critical scrutiny is warranted, of the hidden
agendas of the would-be
intervening powers, not just ‘tactically’, in the here-and-now
and the identified
conflict arena, but in general, and with a conception of power as
networked, and able
to transcend context.
2. Research needs to find ways of exploring the ‘path not
taken’: the options for
response kept off the agenda by the tacit advance operation of
power which is most
effective when least visible. Pattison justifies the Libya
intervention, for example, on
the grounds familiar from the ICISS document that “it is a
response to a sufficiently
serious situation and thus has sufficient scope to do enough
good to outweigh the
harms of military force” (2011: 253). This is the familiar
‘bomb-or-do-nothing’ dyad,
but it excludes meaningful consideration of other alternatives
for action, as I discuss
in detail below.
Common to the Afghanistan and Libya cases has been the

exclusion of what is called,
in the jargon, a ‘heavy footprint’ for the UN, as implied by, for
instance, the
formation of a Transitional Administration with a peacekeeping
mandate. In
Afghanistan, the Organisation reluctantly accepted a ‘light
footprint’ – confined to a
monitoring role – and in Libya the job of protecting civilians
was devolved to NATO.
Discussion of a more extensive role for troops and other
personnel directly under UN
auspices and command was forestalled in both cases because
such provisions are seen
by dominant factions in Washington, and allied capitals, as
unacceptable constraints
on the scope for military operations.
3. Discussions of the consequences of military interventions,
both actual and
prospective, need likewise to be conducted across a much
broader canvas of conflict
formation, in space and time. This needs to include an
acknowledgement that what are
presented as humanitarian interventions may also act as periodic
reminders of
capacity and willingness to – as Rogers puts it – “keep the lid
on dissent” (2008: 154)
from the global system of market-driven economic relations, at
the expense of calls
for system-level reforms.
Bellamy quotes an international coalition of NGOs as opposing
the inclusion of
measures to address poverty and inequality, in discussions of
how the Responsibility
to Protect could be operationalised, as “unhelpful” because they
risked

“subordinat[ing] R to P to decades-old political disagreements”
(2011a: 93).
66 Jake Lynch
Attempts to assess the consequences of any particular third-
pillar R2P ‘episode’ must
include its ‘gravitational pull’ on global attention; not only
towards itself but also
thereby away from critical scrutiny of the effects on people of
immersion into global
systems, in the forms of violence – both structural and direct –
experienced away
from the ‘spotlight’.
How, then, could some of the familiar case studies be revisited
in light of these proposals,
and what assessments could be made?
Kosovo
The International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty was set up by
the British and Canadian governments: two of the protagonists,
through NATO, of Operation
Allied Force, the 78-day campaign of aerial bombardment
against the rump federal state of
Yugoslavia in 1999.
Pattison briefly references what has become received wisdom
among the R2P-o-
philes, that this was an “intervention… to protect the Kosovar

Albanians from ethnic
cleansing” (Pattison, 2011: 251). But there is abundant evidence
of hidden …

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