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  Advanced Persistent Threats
  (Shining the Light on the Industries'
  Best Kept Secret)
  Will Gragido | CISSP, CISA, IAM, IEM
  John Pirc | CEH, IAM, SANS Thought Leader


  Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
2
  Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      Agenda
     •  Introductions
     •  Advanced Persistent Threats – An Introduction
     •  Dynamic Shifts In the Threat Landscape
     •  Foreign Country Activity – Session Analysis
        Validation
     •  Subversive Multi-Vector Threats
     •  Gods of War: Blended Attacks
     •  Cryptovirology
     •  CrimeWare as a Service (CaaS)
     •  Question and Answer
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Advanced Persistent Threats:
      An Introduction
     •  Well Documented and                                •  Advanced Persistent
        Quite Old                                             Threats”
         ▫  Earliest known instances                        ▫  Named by the United
            date to the early 1990s                            States Air Force
               Department of Defense                       ▫  What’s old is new again:
                Parlance
                  “Events of Interest”                        Origination points
         ▫  State Sponsored                                     State sponsored infowar
                                                                 labs
         ▫  Industrial Espionage
                                                                Intelligence agencies
         ▫  Colloquially referred to as                         The underground
            ‘events of interest’
                                                                  Though not not necessarily
                                                                   in the same fashion which
                                                                   threats such as ‘MyDoom’,
                                                                   ‘CodeRed’, or ‘Sql Slammer’
                                                                   did; this is simply not the
                                                                   case
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Advanced Persistent Threats:
      An Introduction
        •  Easy Definition for a Non-                      •  Sophistication Level:
           Trivial Challenge:                                ▫  Only as sophisticated as they
            ▫  Opportunistic form of cyber                      need to be
               attack developed and designed to              ▫  Sophistication is determined and
               meet the needs of its architects in              dictated by aggressors after
               compromising a specific system                   intelligence gathering has
               or group of systems in order                     occurred
               acquire and exfiltrate data to
               those behind the original attack
        •  Historical Targets of
           Opportunity & Interest:
            ▫    Military
            ▫    Intelligence
            ▫    Defense Intelligence Base
            ▫    High Tech (Intellectual Property
                  Lucent Technologies,
                 Motorola etc.)
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      Advanced Persistent Threats
                                        The Classics                               The Subversives
                                                                                        SMT’s

   Eligible
                                   Moonlight                Byzantine                         Operation
   Receiver                                                                      Exxon
                                   Maze                     Foothold                          Shockwave


            1997           1998            1999            2004         2007       2009       2010


                        Solar                          Titan                   US Power Aurora
                        Sunrise                        Rain                    Grid
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Dynamic Shifts in Threat Landscape
     •  Your Father’s Internet
        ▫  Perimeters use to be will defined and so was the protection
             Static & Informational
             Firewall and AV saved the day
             Web defacements and breaking into a network through open
              ports or OS vulnerabilities were par for the course
     •  Today’s Internet (Better have a virtual hazmat suit)
        ▫  Floating perimeters
        ▫  Dynamic, Interactive & Mobile
        ▫  App Driven
        ▫  Web browsers and plugins
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

     U.S. military OKs use of online social
     Seriously…Seriously?
       Washington (CNN) -- U.S. military personnel are officially allowed to tweet.
       That's the upshot of the Pentagon's long-awaited policy on rank and file
       personnel using online social media, unveiled Friday. The new rules
       authorize access to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media Web
       sites from nonclassified government computers -- as long as such
       activity doesn't compromise operational security or involve
       prohibited activities or Web sites.
      •  Security Risk & Social Media Trade-off
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


       Hacking not Required
       Imagine the Possibilities
Cassandra Security                                                                   Non-Intentional Act	

                                                                                           Intentional Act	

Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


          Routes to the Cyber Market
       Expertise	

            +	

   Motivation	

       +	

 Attack Vector	

            =	

           Result	


                                                                      Email	

           None	

                        Notoriety	

                                                                       and 	

                    Compromise of an Asset/Policy 
      (Normal End-User)	

                                         Attachments	

                            and/or 
                                                                                                     Intellectual Property 	


                                         Destruction	

            Novice                                              IM,IRC,P2P	

        (Script Kiddie)	

                                                                                                              Espionage
                                            Money	

                                                    Corporate/Government   	

                                                                  Web Browsers	

                                                                    Apps	

         Intermediate
                                           Moral
       (Hacker for Hire)	

                                           Agenda	

                                                                       Open 	

                                                                       Ports	

                               Theft	

             Expert	

                    Unwitting	

     (Foreign Intel Service, 
     Terrorist Organization 
    and/or Organized Crime)	

                                     Vulnerable
                                                                 Operating System	

                           Fame	

                                             Fun
Foreign Country Activity – Drive-By
                    Why Session Based Analysis in Needed!
                       Compliments of Netwitness ;-)
                                   1. Examine traffic to foreign countries
                                   2. Follow the clues




  Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Suspicious outbound traffic to various
      countries….


                                                           Destination China
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Instant Correlation
                                                   Breadcrumb




                                                       Mostly unknown service




                                                     Executables exist
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Anti-Virus triggered on content
      rendering          Breadcrumb




                                                           JavaScript

                                                             www.333292.com??




           Must be bad…
                                                           Get: 1.exe,2.exe,…
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      Malicious Content in the same session

                                                           Bogus 404 error




                                                     Obfuscated JavaScript




                                         Executables downloaded
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      Foreign Country Traffic Summary
        •  Scrutinize outbound traffic to China
        •  Unknown services with .exe transfers
        •  Content review triggered Anti-Virus - “Infostealer”
        •  Content review shows malicious obfuscated JavaScript
           and .exe downloads
        •  Classic drive-by exploit

        •  Rule Example:
             ▫  Dst.country = “China”  extension =“exe”
        •  FlexParse Example:
             ▫  Obfuscated Javascript patterns
             ▫  Executable file signatures – for those that don’t have
                correct extension
Subversive Multi-Vector Threats (SMTs)




  Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


           Subversive Multi-Vector Threats
   •  Definition:                                          •  Subversive Multi-Vector
       ▫  Highly sophisticated, well                          Threats (SMTs) are complex
          crafted, executed attacks                           unions of human intelligence,
          designed to use and exploit as                      information security,
          many possible threat vectors as                     communications intelligence /
          necessary to accomplish the                         signals intelligence
          missions milestones. What                           (COMINT)/ (SIGINT), and
          makes them different than other
          threats is the willingness to                       open source intelligence
          utilize people, process and                         (OPSINT) and differ greatly in
          technology weaknesses in order                      this sense from other threat
          to meet their ends                                  classes such as the Advanced
       ▫  These threats are designed to, in                   Persistent Threat (APT), as a
          a dynamic fashion, place a                          result. (Gragido 12122009
          greater or lesser amount of effort
          and emphasis in one area versus                     http://
          another over time as dictated by                    cassandrasecurity.com/?
          the mission’s goals and the                         p=960)
          leadership behind them
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
      Subversive Multi-Factor Threats (SMT) and Advanced Persistent Threats

      (APT)

        •  Differ dramatically from other well-            •  The greatest differences noted between
           known threat types in a number of ways,            the types of threats
           some more obvious than others                      ▫    Lies in the targets of interest
                                                              ▫    Approaches employed in selecting and
                                                                   exploiting the target
                                                              ▫    Whether they be targets of opportunity or
                                                                   selected targets, exploitation mechanisms
                                                                   will vary in the world of the Subversive
                                                                   Multi-Vector Threats whereas in the
                                                                   world of the Advanced Persistent
                                                                   Threats (APT)
                                                                       The avenues for exploitation may change
                                                                        though their overall relevance is entrenched in
                                                                        the realm of the technical
                                                              ▫    As such, APTs, contrary to popular belief
                                                                   are focused and rely upon technological
                                                                   vulnerabilities present within a system or
                                                                   enterprise in order meet its goals
                                                              ▫    Not so with the Subversive Multi-Vector
                                                                   Threat
                                                                       These threats are not bound to technology
                                                                        alone as an avenue of exploitation but rather
                                                                        often assess both people and process weakness
                                                                        equally in order to identify the path of least
                                                                        resistance while capitalizing upon the weakness
                                                                        of others.
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

       Identifying and Addressing Subversive Multi-Vector Threats (SMT)


                                                           •  Uncompromising Diligence Is Required
        •  Subversive Multi-Vector Threats
           (SMTs)
            ▫  Employment of intellectual honesty          •  Progressive approaches required
                  Reality dictates we will be targeted       ▫  Creativity
                  “When” not “If”                            ▫  Collaboration
            ▫  Requires risk management                       ▫  Iron sharpens Iron
            ▫  Repeatable processes and
               procedures are non-negotiable;
               they are imperative                         •  Innovative technological solutions coupled
                                                              with innovative comprehensive approaches
            ▫  Metrics employed
                                                              to practical, risk based information security
                  What gets measured gets results
                                                              management imperative
                  Aids in establishing the known from
                   the unknown while demonstrating             ▫  Are there technologies which can aid us
                   progression or regression                      in achieving these goals?
                  Our assertion is that in doing so an              Yes
                   organization can quickly identify
                   areas where vulnerabilities and             ▫  Are they already in our environments?
                   deficiencies exist which leave them               Perhaps, but odds are they are not
                   exposed to potential exploitation of
                   people, process and technology                     but will be or should be considered in
                                                                      the near future
Gods of War: Blended Attacks




  Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      Gods of War: Blended Attacks
        •  ZeuS (also known as Zbot /                      •  Crimeware kit which is best
           WSNPoem                                            known for its tenacity, intelligent
                                                              design and ability to steal
                                                              credentials (in a voluminous
                                                              manner), from a truly impressive,
                                                              disparate base of sources
                                                              including but not limited to the
                                                              following:
                                                              ▫  Social Networks (Facebook, Twitter,
                                                                 MySpace, Linkedin, Foursquare, Yelp
                                                                 etc.)
                                                              ▫  Online financial accounts (Banking,
                                                                 Brokerage, Retirement etc.)
                                                              ▫  FTP accounts (yes people still use
                                                                 unsecured ftp accounts…)
                                                              ▫  E-Mail accounts (Phishing / Spear
                                                                 Phishing)
                                                              ▫  Cloud Computing Based
                                                                 Environments (Amazon EC2)
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


               Gods of War: Blended Attacks
 •  ZeuS’ DNA
     ▫    Crimeware Kit which contains the following
                                                                      •  ZeuS Botnet Features:
          modules                                                        ▫    Framework design
              A web interface for administering and                              Unintelligent program which hooks itsef into
               managing the botnet (ZeuS Admin Panel)                              the Operating System (need to verify if it is
                                                                                   hooking at ring 3 or 0) and hides itself
              A customized tool used in the creation of the
               Trojan binaries and in encrypting the                              All logic for the botnet itself is contained within
               configuration file (commonly referred to as an                      the configuration file
               executable generator)                                              The configuration file for ZeuS / Zbot acts like
                                                                                   a definitions database for AV products; without
     ▫    ZeuS Hosts                                                               this the bot is fairly benign
              Typically Consist of Three Components                                    Often times lists of targets (financial
                   A configuration file (most commonly associated                       institutions for example) are contained within
                    file name extension is *.bin)                                        it in addition to other data such as urls for
                   A binary file which contains the newest version                      other components the bot relies upon for
                    of the ZeuS Trojan code (updated periodically                        command  control purposes, the lists of
                    by the Bot Master to ensure highest degree of                        information gathered from targets to populate
                    functionality and feature use / availability)                        fields which the bot completes in order to steal
                   A dropzone (most commonly seen as a php file                         details / credentials and other information
                    used for storage)                                                   The configuration file is always ciphered; it’s
                                                                                         never found in clear
                                                                                          ▫  The older versions of ZeuS used a hard-
                                                                                              coded cipher which could be reverse
                                                                                              engineered however the current versions
                                                                                              use a more sophisticated level of
                                                                                              cryptovirology (using unique keys for
                                                                                              encrypting the config file, the key is then
                                                                                              stored in the executable – which is also
                                                                                              ‘packed’); this eliminates the potential for
                                                                                              deciphering all botted hosts universally
                                                                                          ▫  The key is 256 bytes long making it a non-
                                                                                              trivial task for brute forcing




               Courtesy of abuse.ch ZeuS Tracker
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      Gods of War: Blended Attacks
      Credentials Capturing                                 Integrated SOCKS-Proxy
            HTTP                                            Web based form for
            HTTPS                                            searching captured
            FTP                                              credentials
            POP3                                            Ciphered configuration
            Botnets Protected Storage                        files
             Area (PSTORE)                                   Kill Operating System
      Organize / Assemble /                                  Functions (becoming
       Group infected hosts into                              more common in botnets
       different botnets for:                                 the world over)
          Ease of use                                       Well QA’d
          Flexibility                                         Exhaustively tested before
          Meeting customer needs                               release
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


   CryptoVirology
    •  What is cryptovirology?
        ▫  A wonderful question with a myriad of plausible
           responses
        ▫  What cryptovirology is not is obvious, common, trivial or
           new
        ▫  Cryptovirology as a discipline has a lineage dating back
           to the mid to late 1990s something that seems to be
           (along with other things in our industry as of late), often
           over looked
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      CryptoVirology:
        •  The earliest observed instances                 •  An attack by any other name
           where crypto viral attacks were                    would smell as sweet…
           utilized have become known as                     ▫  The intent and logical outcomes
           ‘cryptoviral extortion’.                             are the same: via a virus, worm,
        •  AKA ‘cryptoviral ransom’                             Trojan etc a victim’s files
                                                                (whether discriminately chosen
           attacks however                                      or not so), are identified and
                                                                encrypted with the file owner
                                                                being notified that should she
                                                                wish to receive them back intact,
                                                                she must first make payment to
                                                                the author of the malicious code
                                                                in question in order to receive
                                                                the proper session key.
                                                             ▫  If payment is not brought
                                                                forward the author / attacker
                                                                may make a variety of threats /
                                                                claims as to what he / she will do
                                                                with the files to and including
                                                                destruction.
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      CryptoVirology
        •  There are many examples of                      •  Historical Examples Include Are
           malicious code and contact which                   Not Limited To the Following:
           use questionable encryption                       ▫  ZeuS
           schemes however the distinction                   ▫  Blazebot
           which must be made and taken                      ▫  Storm / Waldec
           note of is the purpose for which it
           is used today versus the past
        •  In the past, cryptography was
           used by malicious code and
           content authors to solely avoid
           detection by mitigation solutions
           such as Anti-Virus. In these
           scenarios the payload was not
           ciphered and thusly not
           considered ‘ransomware’. Today,
           the world has changed and as such
           payloads are ciphered and
           subsequently the game has
           changed.
Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences

      CrimeWare as a Service (CaaS): Service
      with a Smile
     •  Globalization  The World                          •  As a result a myriad of
        Is Flat! (Friedman)                                   service offerings and
         ▫  Leveled the playing for some                      providers have emerged the
         ▫  Introduced the game and                           world over ready, willing,
            built the field for others                        and able to meet your needs
         ▫  Torn the game asunder                             better than their
            rendering it forever changed                      competitors while offering
            for still others                                  you maximum RO
         ▫  Ensured that the free hand of                    ▫    Hacking as a Service (HaaS)
            the open market is allowed to                    ▫    Fraud as a Service (FaaS)
            move freely for all including
            criminals                                        ▫    DDoSing as a Service
                                                             ▫    Spamming as a Service
                                                             ▫    Spear phishing as a Service
                                                             ▫    Designer / Custom Malware
                                                                  Creation as a Service
28
  Cassandra Security
Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences


      Key Point’s

    ▫  Known Current Solutions Not Good Enough

    ▫  Advanced Persistent Threats Will Become Pervasive

    ▫  Subversive Multi-Vector Threats Will Eclipse APTs

    ▫  Cryptovirology Is Alive and Well

    ▫  Inaction Equals To Acceptance

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Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept Secret) - Will Gragido and John Pirc

  • 1. BSidesSanFrancisco Advanced Persistent Threats (Shining the Light on the Industries' Best Kept Secret) Will Gragido | CISSP, CISA, IAM, IEM John Pirc | CEH, IAM, SANS Thought Leader Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
  • 2. 2 Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Agenda •  Introductions •  Advanced Persistent Threats – An Introduction •  Dynamic Shifts In the Threat Landscape •  Foreign Country Activity – Session Analysis Validation •  Subversive Multi-Vector Threats •  Gods of War: Blended Attacks •  Cryptovirology •  CrimeWare as a Service (CaaS) •  Question and Answer
  • 3. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Advanced Persistent Threats: An Introduction •  Well Documented and •  Advanced Persistent Quite Old Threats” ▫  Earliest known instances ▫  Named by the United date to the early 1990s States Air Force   Department of Defense ▫  What’s old is new again: Parlance   “Events of Interest” Origination points ▫  State Sponsored   State sponsored infowar labs ▫  Industrial Espionage   Intelligence agencies ▫  Colloquially referred to as   The underground ‘events of interest’   Though not not necessarily in the same fashion which threats such as ‘MyDoom’, ‘CodeRed’, or ‘Sql Slammer’ did; this is simply not the case
  • 4. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Advanced Persistent Threats: An Introduction •  Easy Definition for a Non- •  Sophistication Level: Trivial Challenge: ▫  Only as sophisticated as they ▫  Opportunistic form of cyber need to be attack developed and designed to ▫  Sophistication is determined and meet the needs of its architects in dictated by aggressors after compromising a specific system intelligence gathering has or group of systems in order occurred acquire and exfiltrate data to those behind the original attack •  Historical Targets of Opportunity & Interest: ▫  Military ▫  Intelligence ▫  Defense Intelligence Base ▫  High Tech (Intellectual Property  Lucent Technologies, Motorola etc.)
  • 5. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Advanced Persistent Threats The Classics The Subversives SMT’s Eligible Moonlight Byzantine Operation Receiver Exxon Maze Foothold Shockwave 1997 1998 1999 2004 2007 2009 2010 Solar Titan US Power Aurora Sunrise Rain Grid
  • 6. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Dynamic Shifts in Threat Landscape •  Your Father’s Internet ▫  Perimeters use to be will defined and so was the protection   Static & Informational   Firewall and AV saved the day   Web defacements and breaking into a network through open ports or OS vulnerabilities were par for the course •  Today’s Internet (Better have a virtual hazmat suit) ▫  Floating perimeters ▫  Dynamic, Interactive & Mobile ▫  App Driven ▫  Web browsers and plugins
  • 7. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences U.S. military OKs use of online social Seriously…Seriously? Washington (CNN) -- U.S. military personnel are officially allowed to tweet. That's the upshot of the Pentagon's long-awaited policy on rank and file personnel using online social media, unveiled Friday. The new rules authorize access to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media Web sites from nonclassified government computers -- as long as such activity doesn't compromise operational security or involve prohibited activities or Web sites. •  Security Risk & Social Media Trade-off
  • 8. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Hacking not Required Imagine the Possibilities
  • 9. Cassandra Security Non-Intentional Act Intentional Act Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Routes to the Cyber Market Expertise + Motivation + Attack Vector = Result Email None Notoriety and Compromise of an Asset/Policy (Normal End-User) Attachments and/or Intellectual Property Destruction Novice IM,IRC,P2P (Script Kiddie) Espionage Money Corporate/Government Web Browsers Apps Intermediate Moral (Hacker for Hire) Agenda Open Ports Theft Expert Unwitting (Foreign Intel Service, Terrorist Organization and/or Organized Crime) Vulnerable Operating System Fame Fun
  • 10. Foreign Country Activity – Drive-By Why Session Based Analysis in Needed! Compliments of Netwitness ;-) 1. Examine traffic to foreign countries 2. Follow the clues Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
  • 11. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Suspicious outbound traffic to various countries…. Destination China
  • 12. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Instant Correlation Breadcrumb Mostly unknown service Executables exist
  • 13. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Anti-Virus triggered on content rendering Breadcrumb JavaScript www.333292.com?? Must be bad… Get: 1.exe,2.exe,…
  • 14. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Malicious Content in the same session Bogus 404 error Obfuscated JavaScript Executables downloaded
  • 15. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Foreign Country Traffic Summary •  Scrutinize outbound traffic to China •  Unknown services with .exe transfers •  Content review triggered Anti-Virus - “Infostealer” •  Content review shows malicious obfuscated JavaScript and .exe downloads •  Classic drive-by exploit •  Rule Example: ▫  Dst.country = “China” extension =“exe” •  FlexParse Example: ▫  Obfuscated Javascript patterns ▫  Executable file signatures – for those that don’t have correct extension
  • 16. Subversive Multi-Vector Threats (SMTs) Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
  • 17. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Subversive Multi-Vector Threats •  Definition: •  Subversive Multi-Vector ▫  Highly sophisticated, well Threats (SMTs) are complex crafted, executed attacks unions of human intelligence, designed to use and exploit as information security, many possible threat vectors as communications intelligence / necessary to accomplish the signals intelligence missions milestones. What (COMINT)/ (SIGINT), and makes them different than other threats is the willingness to open source intelligence utilize people, process and (OPSINT) and differ greatly in technology weaknesses in order this sense from other threat to meet their ends classes such as the Advanced ▫  These threats are designed to, in Persistent Threat (APT), as a a dynamic fashion, place a result. (Gragido 12122009 greater or lesser amount of effort and emphasis in one area versus http:// another over time as dictated by cassandrasecurity.com/? the mission’s goals and the p=960) leadership behind them
  • 18. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Subversive Multi-Factor Threats (SMT) and Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) •  Differ dramatically from other well- •  The greatest differences noted between known threat types in a number of ways, the types of threats some more obvious than others ▫  Lies in the targets of interest ▫  Approaches employed in selecting and exploiting the target ▫  Whether they be targets of opportunity or selected targets, exploitation mechanisms will vary in the world of the Subversive Multi-Vector Threats whereas in the world of the Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)   The avenues for exploitation may change though their overall relevance is entrenched in the realm of the technical ▫  As such, APTs, contrary to popular belief are focused and rely upon technological vulnerabilities present within a system or enterprise in order meet its goals ▫  Not so with the Subversive Multi-Vector Threat   These threats are not bound to technology alone as an avenue of exploitation but rather often assess both people and process weakness equally in order to identify the path of least resistance while capitalizing upon the weakness of others.
  • 19. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Identifying and Addressing Subversive Multi-Vector Threats (SMT) •  Uncompromising Diligence Is Required •  Subversive Multi-Vector Threats (SMTs) ▫  Employment of intellectual honesty •  Progressive approaches required   Reality dictates we will be targeted ▫  Creativity   “When” not “If” ▫  Collaboration ▫  Requires risk management ▫  Iron sharpens Iron ▫  Repeatable processes and procedures are non-negotiable; they are imperative •  Innovative technological solutions coupled with innovative comprehensive approaches ▫  Metrics employed to practical, risk based information security   What gets measured gets results management imperative   Aids in establishing the known from the unknown while demonstrating ▫  Are there technologies which can aid us progression or regression in achieving these goals?   Our assertion is that in doing so an   Yes organization can quickly identify areas where vulnerabilities and ▫  Are they already in our environments? deficiencies exist which leave them   Perhaps, but odds are they are not exposed to potential exploitation of people, process and technology but will be or should be considered in the near future
  • 20. Gods of War: Blended Attacks Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences
  • 21. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Gods of War: Blended Attacks •  ZeuS (also known as Zbot / •  Crimeware kit which is best WSNPoem known for its tenacity, intelligent design and ability to steal credentials (in a voluminous manner), from a truly impressive, disparate base of sources including but not limited to the following: ▫  Social Networks (Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Linkedin, Foursquare, Yelp etc.) ▫  Online financial accounts (Banking, Brokerage, Retirement etc.) ▫  FTP accounts (yes people still use unsecured ftp accounts…) ▫  E-Mail accounts (Phishing / Spear Phishing) ▫  Cloud Computing Based Environments (Amazon EC2)
  • 22. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Gods of War: Blended Attacks •  ZeuS’ DNA ▫  Crimeware Kit which contains the following •  ZeuS Botnet Features: modules ▫  Framework design   A web interface for administering and   Unintelligent program which hooks itsef into managing the botnet (ZeuS Admin Panel) the Operating System (need to verify if it is hooking at ring 3 or 0) and hides itself   A customized tool used in the creation of the Trojan binaries and in encrypting the   All logic for the botnet itself is contained within configuration file (commonly referred to as an the configuration file executable generator)   The configuration file for ZeuS / Zbot acts like a definitions database for AV products; without ▫  ZeuS Hosts this the bot is fairly benign   Typically Consist of Three Components   Often times lists of targets (financial   A configuration file (most commonly associated institutions for example) are contained within file name extension is *.bin) it in addition to other data such as urls for   A binary file which contains the newest version other components the bot relies upon for of the ZeuS Trojan code (updated periodically command control purposes, the lists of by the Bot Master to ensure highest degree of information gathered from targets to populate functionality and feature use / availability) fields which the bot completes in order to steal   A dropzone (most commonly seen as a php file details / credentials and other information used for storage)   The configuration file is always ciphered; it’s never found in clear ▫  The older versions of ZeuS used a hard- coded cipher which could be reverse engineered however the current versions use a more sophisticated level of cryptovirology (using unique keys for encrypting the config file, the key is then stored in the executable – which is also ‘packed’); this eliminates the potential for deciphering all botted hosts universally ▫  The key is 256 bytes long making it a non- trivial task for brute forcing Courtesy of abuse.ch ZeuS Tracker
  • 23. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Gods of War: Blended Attacks   Credentials Capturing   Integrated SOCKS-Proxy   HTTP   Web based form for   HTTPS searching captured   FTP credentials   POP3   Ciphered configuration   Botnets Protected Storage files Area (PSTORE)   Kill Operating System   Organize / Assemble / Functions (becoming Group infected hosts into more common in botnets different botnets for: the world over)   Ease of use   Well QA’d   Flexibility   Exhaustively tested before   Meeting customer needs release
  • 24. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences CryptoVirology •  What is cryptovirology? ▫  A wonderful question with a myriad of plausible responses ▫  What cryptovirology is not is obvious, common, trivial or new ▫  Cryptovirology as a discipline has a lineage dating back to the mid to late 1990s something that seems to be (along with other things in our industry as of late), often over looked
  • 25. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences CryptoVirology: •  The earliest observed instances •  An attack by any other name where crypto viral attacks were would smell as sweet… utilized have become known as ▫  The intent and logical outcomes ‘cryptoviral extortion’. are the same: via a virus, worm, •  AKA ‘cryptoviral ransom’ Trojan etc a victim’s files (whether discriminately chosen attacks however or not so), are identified and encrypted with the file owner being notified that should she wish to receive them back intact, she must first make payment to the author of the malicious code in question in order to receive the proper session key. ▫  If payment is not brought forward the author / attacker may make a variety of threats / claims as to what he / she will do with the files to and including destruction.
  • 26. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences CryptoVirology •  There are many examples of •  Historical Examples Include Are malicious code and contact which Not Limited To the Following: use questionable encryption ▫  ZeuS schemes however the distinction ▫  Blazebot which must be made and taken ▫  Storm / Waldec note of is the purpose for which it is used today versus the past •  In the past, cryptography was used by malicious code and content authors to solely avoid detection by mitigation solutions such as Anti-Virus. In these scenarios the payload was not ciphered and thusly not considered ‘ransomware’. Today, the world has changed and as such payloads are ciphered and subsequently the game has changed.
  • 27. Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences CrimeWare as a Service (CaaS): Service with a Smile •  Globalization  The World •  As a result a myriad of Is Flat! (Friedman) service offerings and ▫  Leveled the playing for some providers have emerged the ▫  Introduced the game and world over ready, willing, built the field for others and able to meet your needs ▫  Torn the game asunder better than their rendering it forever changed competitors while offering for still others you maximum RO ▫  Ensured that the free hand of ▫  Hacking as a Service (HaaS) the open market is allowed to ▫  Fraud as a Service (FaaS) move freely for all including criminals ▫  DDoSing as a Service ▫  Spamming as a Service ▫  Spear phishing as a Service ▫  Designer / Custom Malware Creation as a Service
  • 28. 28 Cassandra Security Analysis of the Security Industry and that it influences Key Point’s ▫  Known Current Solutions Not Good Enough ▫  Advanced Persistent Threats Will Become Pervasive ▫  Subversive Multi-Vector Threats Will Eclipse APTs ▫  Cryptovirology Is Alive and Well ▫  Inaction Equals To Acceptance