1. Crisis in Cambodia: A Defense of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine
By
Cody Phillips
A Junior Paper
submitted to the Department of Politics
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for
the degree of Bachelor of Arts
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey
3 May 2016

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Introduction
On April 17, 1975, Saloth Sar—henceforth known as Pol Pot—and his Khmer Rouge
army converged on Phnom Penh and declared the establishment of a new age of Cambodia
under the name Democratic Kampuchea. In the following three years, eight months, and
twenty days, one in four Cambodians—almost 2 million people—would die at the hands of
this regime.1
As the state took control of agriculture and industry, rigidly controlling every
aspect of society, famine, disease, and state crackdowns on dissenters resulted in widespread
death, across all social and economic classes. How was it that such massive atrocity occurred
unabated? How could the international community stand by for almost four years as a quarter
of the population of a nation was wiped out? Questions like these continue to ring loud in
human rights discourse as scholars and politicians alike look back on the atrocities and the
lack of international response in Cambodia and ask what more should or even could have
been done. While critics on each side acknowledge that violations of human rights leading to
genocide by a state government against its own citizens are deplorable and ought never be
allowed to occur, debate rages over who has authority to prevent such atrocities, and how
such prevention ought to be carried out. In this short piece, I seek to demonstrate how the
way forward for the international community in preventing future atrocities against human
rights lies in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, advocated and recently adopted by the
UN. In light of the crisis in Cambodia, I attempt to chart a path forward, contingent on the
cooperation and coordination of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as they help to
redefine international norms and coordinate new understandings of state sovereignty.
Definitional Overview
1
David Chandler, “Revolution in Cambodia,” A History of Cambodia. Vol.4. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2008. Print. 258
2
J.L Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” Humanitarian Intervention:

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In this endeavor, it first must be understood what is to be defined as humanitarian
intervention. In his political handbook on humanitarian intervention, political theorist J.L
Holzgrefe specifically demarcates humanitarian intervention as
“the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human
rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state
within whose territory force is applied.”2
This definition focuses debate on cases where states must act with the explicit threat or use of
military force in order to stop atrocities. The question of intervention, therefore, comes down
to definitions and responsibilities of state sovereignty, because any humanitarian intervention
inherently involves one or more outside actor imposing its collective political, diplomatic,
and military will over that of the offending state. In 1966, Stanley Hoffman found that the
World Court defined state sovereignty to mean that the state “is subject to no other state, and
has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction.”3
Even recently, realist political theorist
John J. Mearsheimer has written in a defense of realism that sovereignty “inheres in states,
because there is no higher ruling body in the international system. There is no ‘government
2
J.L Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” Humanitarian Intervention:
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
18. Print.
3
Stanley Hoffman, “International Systems and International Law,” in The Strategy of World
Order, vol. II: International, ed. Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (New York: World
Law Fund, 1966), 164, accessed in Keck, Margaret E. and Katrhyn Sikkink, “Transnational
Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction,” Activists beyond Borders:
Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998),
36.

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over governments.’”4
This realist understanding of state sovereignty as absolute in the
international landscape demonstrates the traditional understanding of the great magnitude of
a state engaging in military intervention, even for human rights purposes; intervention is
tantamount to war, as each requires states to breach the walls of sovereignty. Additionally,
Mearsheimer provides three more assumptions of states within a realist understanding of
international politics:
“states are potentially dangerous to each other,” because of their military power;
“states can never be certain about the intentions of other states…because intentions
are impossible to divine with absolute certainty”; and finally, “the most basic motive
driving states is survival.”5
From these assumptions of states, Mearsheimer and other realists deem international
institutions as incredibly ineffective and unimportant in determining state actions. They ask,
if state sovereignty is absolute, then why would states worry about international norms,
courts, or doctrines? International law theorists like Bruce Broomhall have continued to
argue in favor of a realist dogma of state sovereignty, stating that “either one supports the
rule of law, or one supports state sovereignty. The two are not…compatible.”6
Therefore, because state sovereignty continues to hold such a solid place in
international politics, in order to justify humanitarian intervention and encourage states to act
in order to halt human rights atrocities, most political theorists promote moral or rational
4
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International
Security 19, 10.
5
Ibid 10.
6
Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, at 56, accessed in
Robert Cryer, “International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?” The
European Journal of International Law 16 no.5 (2006): 979-1000

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justifications for intervention; indeed, they are necessary so as to provide grounds for
undertaking this massive step of imposing on state sovereignty, as it has been traditionally
understood. Specifically, Holzgrefe delineates a few main tracks of justification within the
realm of humanitarian intervention theory, specifically as it relates to the enforcement and
guarantee of human rights. From naturalist theories, which “contend that morally binding
international norms are an inherent feature of the world”; to consensualist theories, which
“claim that the moral authority of any given international norm derives from the explicit or
tacit consent of the agents subject to that norm”; to individualist theories, “concerned
ultimately only with the welfare of individual human beings”, political theorists have
advocated every spectrum of moral justification for why human rights ought to be applied
and protected universally.7
As far as justifications for humanitarian intervention is concerned,
Holzgrefe delineates utilitarian arguments for intervention8
—in line with Bentham—natural
law justifications for intervention9
, and social contractarianist arguments10
—in the vein of
Rawls “veil of ignorance”11
—as valid lines of reasoning towards justifying military
intervention. Although philosophers and political theorists have argued such a plethora of
moral arguments to justify the necessity of universal human rights and the moral imperatives
for transnational use of force in order to enforce those rights, in an international landscape
defined by self-interested states, such justifications may not be enough to motivate action to
actually protect human rights.
7
J.L Holzgrefe, 19.
8
Ibid 20
9
Ibid 25
10
Ibid 28
11
John Rawls, “The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice,” A Theory of Justice. Cambridge,
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 208

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Even in his defense of non-intervention, a foil to most traditional political theorists,
John Stuart Mill advocates on moral and philosophical grounds. He argues that “all,
therefore, who either speak or act in the name of England, are bound by the strongest
obligations, both of prudence and of duty, to avoid giving either of those handles for
misconstruction.”12
Mill beseeches English statesmen in this piece to stop their pursuit of
intervention, because of their failure to uphold their patriotic and moral duty of representing
English values well internationally. Aside from poor rhetoric, however, Mill’s true complaint
with English intervention in the 19th
century stems from English greed and self-interest, as he
states:
“But, of all attitudes which a nation can take upon the subject of intervention, the
meanest and worst is to profess that it interferes only when it can serve its own
subjects by it.”13
Intervention, according to Mill, is an extremely base endeavor when it is only undertaken in
order to advance imperialist or economic interests—as was often the case with 19th
century
England. While this may serve as a qualified critique of the justifications for humanitarian
intervention, it also may provide a clear look into realist political theory as well. If states, in
reality, act largely out of self-interest, either for self-promotion or self-protection, any
motivation for humanitarian intervention must take this into consideration. Moral arguments
provide the essential starting point for any explanation of why humanitarian intervention is
necessary, in order to guarantee natural rights and in order to contribute to the security of
every international citizen, but states react to real world incentives. Positive and negative
12
John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Dissertations and Discussions:
Political, Philosophical, and Historical. New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1882.
Print. 242
13
Ibid 243

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reinforcement inform states decision-making processes in ways that philosophical or moral
justifications are unable to duplicate.
In observing the action and inaction of the United States on the international scale
over the last century, the world has seen a maverick for personal liberty and the primary
advocate for human rights fail time and again to intervene when its own political incentives
didn’t line up with the moral justifications for intervention. Therefore, because such moral
arguments or ethical thresholds are not sufficient motivations for states to intervene to halt
atrocities, an international system of incentives is necessary in order to ensure that atrocities
like Cambodia will never occur again. As will be made clear in what follows, Cambodia
provides an excellent look at impediments to intervention, and offers a crucial opportunity to
learn from history’s mistakes in order to create a system to lay a clear framework for
intervention moving forward.
Case Study in Cambodia
In examining the specific case of the Cambodian genocide at the hands of the Khmer Rouge
and the ensuing failure of the United States and the international community to intervene, we
can clearly see the necessity and possibility of international intervention, and find a specific
path forward via institutions of the United Nations working in concert with nongovernmental
actors.
By beginning this discussion with an understanding of state sovereignty as carrying
serious weight on the international landscape, we may begin to understand processes of
interstate intervention. In the specific case of Cambodia, the United States clearly treated
sovereignty as individually and supremely held by the state, which seriously impeded any
possible incentive for intervention. Specifically, this view of sovereignty stemmed from the

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recent political history of Cambodia. After finally gaining independence from France in
1953, after a decade long process of France slowly releasing its hold on Indochina, Cambodia
stood under the authority of Norodom Sihanouk, the King of Cambodia. However, in 1955,
the Geneva Convention which had granted Cambodia military autonomy, also stipulated that
elections be held, which promptly led to a reorganization of a “Democrat” party, as well as
an opposition Communist party.14
Although in the early stages of this attempt at democratic
practices Sihanouk maintained much of the political authority, it provided the groundwork
for the possibility of a transfer of power. As parties continued to grow in power, elections
grew continually more representative, and power became less centralized in the person of
Sihanouk. David Chandler writes that in the 1966 elections, “candidates favoring local
interests triumphed over those whose main credentials were based on their loyalty to
Sihanouk.” Additionally, these elections were “the first since 1951 in which candidates had
to relate to the voters.”15
Although Sihanouk maintained high approval and continued to
wield the majority of the political power in Cambodia, the political institutions were in place
for a transfer of power.
This understanding of the Cambodian state is essential for understanding its relations
with the international community, specifically the United States, as they ultimately failed to
intervene because of their respect for the sovereignty of Cambodia and of its surrounding and
allied states. In the early 1960s, the United States’ primary concern with Southeast Asian
political systems was to promote democracy and fight the spread of communism. While
actively supporting South Vietnam against the Communist Viet Cong in the Vietnam War,
14
David Chandler, “Revolution in Cambodia,” A History of Cambodia. Vol.4. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2008. Print 235
15
Ibid 238.

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the U.S demonstrated their commitment to supporting any kind of democracy rather than
seeing communism spread. The U.S had largely supported Sihanouk and the Cambodian
pursuit of independence via military aid, beginning in 1955, with the establishment of a
Military Advisory Group, but after Sihanouk broke off all U.S aid in 1963, the U.S began to
question its loyalty to democracy.16
Therefore, when the U.S’s interests in Vietnam crossed
into Cambodia as Viet Cong militants took refuge in North Cambodia, the U.S looked within
the Cambodian political system, namely Sihanouk’s opposition party, in order to utilize the
institutions in place to transfer power to a more pro-American leader. By providing air
strikes, military support and aid to Lon Nol, the leader of a 1970 coup, the U.S attempted to
prop up yet another weak, disorganized, vaguely pro-American regime in Southeast Asia.
However, this campaign was doomed to fail, as Samantha Power points out in A Problem
From Hell, because Lon Nol was “corrupt, repressive, and incompentent,” and his troops
were “equipped for parades, not warfare.”17
The U.S failed to see this corruption, which ultimately laid the path for communism
to prevail, because they were blinded by what Samuel Huntington has described as the
“second reverse wave” against democratization in Asia. Cambodia mirrored Korea, where,
Syngman Rhee’s new ‘semiauthoritarian’ regime “was legitimated by elections in 1963 but
turned into a full-scale highly authoritarian system in 1973.”18
As Cambodia turned in the
same direction, the U.S withheld any harsh reaction for fear of upsetting the already fragile
16
From the U.S Federal Records, “Records of Interservice Agencies.” 334.5.2 Records of
MAAG Cambodia
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/334.html#334.5.2
17
Samantha Power, “Cambodia: ‘Helpless Giant,’” A Problem From Hell. New York, NY:
Basic Books, 2013. Print. 92, 93.
18
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 20

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political makeup of the region. In line with its severe anti-communist foreign policy, the U.S
refused to intervene and failed to stop the Cambodian state from pursuing an authoritarian
regime type, largely because it remained anti-communist initially, and had been legitimated
by pseudo-democratic institutions, such as elections and political parties. The problem in the
case of Cambodia may, therefore, be termed as a problem of “regime recognition.” Because
they were unable to correctly identify the weakness of the incumbent regime, and the
inevitability of the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge, but instead deemed it a legitimate
regime, with international political clout, the United States failed to prevent its rise to power
in the early 1970s.
As it became evident that American support was failing to prevent the Khmer Rouge
from gaining authority in the early 1970s, President Nixon faced serious public and political
outcry against any further involvement in the region, largely because the American public
saw Cambodia as just another domino in the line of Southeast Asian states that would fall to
communism, despite American efforts—even though this was far from the truth. In
Congressional meetings in May, 1970, House member Dante B. Fascell expressly opposed
any further involvement in Indochina, saying he “was expressing the spirit of the concerned
citizens.”19
Additionally, he brought forth a May 3 article from the Miami Herald article
which stated that “it is a desperate gamble taken in the belief that the war may be ended more
quickly by cutting the Communist supply line through Cambodia…ultimately, Southeast
Asia will be lost to the West no matter what course we pursue.”20
19
Congressional Record for May 18, 1970, House Proceedings, Volume 116, part 12.
Sourced from ProQuest Congressional, April 14, 2015.
20
“John S. Knight’s Notebook: Grave Peril Embodied in the President’s Decision.” From the
Miami (Fla.) Herald, May 3, 1970, accessed in Congressional Record of proceedings May

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Although incredibly persuasive, this public sentiment was largely off base, as the new
administration of the Khmer Rouge had no clear ties to Vietnam, as Saloth Sar had
descended on Phnom Penh without approval from his Vietnamese allies, and had no desire to
pursue collective, Communist interests.21
This fact didn’t matter, however, for perception
among the general public and Congress was that the Khmer Rouge was simply just one of
many conjoined in the network of Asian Communism, and that they were “simply an
extension of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.”22
Although it soon became all too
clear that Saloth Sar had an extremely unique, radical ideology in mind for his new regime,
and didn’t align himself with either the Vietnamese, or Chinese Communist Party, the U.S
refused to address the Khmer Rouge independent of its region or see the ensuing disaster as a
singular issue, and simply washed their hands of all things related to the region. John Roush
brought forward testimony indicative of the sentiment towards U.S involvement in Cambodia
in 1975, as he argued for complete economic and political withdrawal from the region,
saying:
“day after day we see pictures and hear reports of the human suffering in Cambodia,
suffering that occurs because of the war that is going on in that faraway land.
Suffering that is being prolonged because of our continual support of that war.”23
In advocating for simply accepting the Khmer Rouge’s victory over Lon Nol and the
incumbent regime, Roush and others acknowledged it’s political legitimacy over the nation,
18, 1970, House Proceedings, Volume 116, part 12, 15808-15857. Sourced from ProQuest
Congressional, April 14, 2015.
21
David Chandler, “Revolution in Cambodia,” A History of Cambodia. Vol.4. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2008. Print. 258.
22
Samantha Power, “Cambodia: Helpless Giant,” 97
23
Senator Roush, addressing the House on situation in Cambodia from Congressional
Record, February 27, 1975, House Proceedings Volume 121, part 4, 4590

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placing blame on the wrong actors, rather than identifying the KR as the guilty perpetrators.
This sentiment ultimately got as far as the White House, as President Nixon, in his statement
on the evacuation of the U.S Mission in Phnom Penh, which signaled the official withdrawal
of the U.S from the nation, acknowledged the legitimacy of the nation under the new regime,
and stated, “The United States wishes Cambodia to find its place in the world as an
independent, neutral and united country, living in peace…Despite that evacuation, we will
continue to do whatever possible to support an independent, peaceful, neutral and unified
Cambodia.”24
Such rhetoric left the Khmer Rouge open to implement their genocidal
policies, and tied the U.S’s hands significantly for any future intervention. Returning to a
region where it had previously failed was all but impossible with what the lack of public
interest, which has been referred to as “Southeast Asia Fatigue,” that was so prominent in the
U.S.25
Here, then, lies the ultimate problem with the lack of intervention in Cambodia, as the
U.S had no political incentive to intervene because they had previously validated the
regime’s presence by leaving the region in 1973. Sovereignty had been granted to the Khmer
Rouge, so any ensuing intervention would not only have to justify the present intervention,
but also make sense of the past decision to halt military and political action. Incentives for
U.S interaction in Southeast Asia, let alone intervention in the region, were severely limited
during this time, however, and not nearly sufficient to overcome the lack of political will that
prevailed in this period. Incentives to intervene wouldn’t come from the power of the
24
“Statement on the Evacuation of the United States Mission in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.”
Unnumbered Executive Orders, Directives and Proclamations, sourced from ProQuest
Congressional, originally sourced from Public Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1983. April
12, 1975. Accessed 21 April 2016.
25
Samantha Power, “Cambodia: Helpless Giant,” 110

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selectorate, as Power writes, because “as soon as U.S troops returned home, the American
public’s appetite for news from the region shrank.”26
Power notes that in 1976, the year after
foreigners were expelled from Phnom Penh, the Washington Post and New York Times
published only 126 stories concerning Cambodia, down from over 700 per year in the
previous half of the decade during the U.S’s involvement in the region. Few of these stories
even addressed the important issues in the region, as Power found that only two to three per
year discussed the human rights violations occurring in Cambodia.27
Additionally, even when information regarding the authoritarian brutality and social
cleansing of the Khmer Rouge began to leak out of Cambodia, the United States still didn’t
respond with intervention because it lacked incentives to invest either its political capital or
its military might. In July 1977, the U.S Foreign Service’s chief Cambodian officer, Charles
H. Twining and Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke brought one of the first
government reports on the atrocities in Cambodia to the House International Relations
subcommittee. Holbrooke noted that while some “guess that between half a million and 1.2
million have died since 1975,” what is certain is that “the number of deaths appears to be in
the tens if not hundreds of thousands.”28
Holbrooke and Twining also testified to the
thousands of Cambodian refugees still fleeing the country, and to the fact that only one in
five refugees would make it out of the country due to Cambodian “scorched earth policy”
near their border. While Holbrooke and Twining stipulated that it was necessary to continue
providing aid to those fleeing the region, little else came of the meeting. Power notes that
26
Ibid 110
27
Ibid 111
28
Murrey Marder, “The Tragedy of Cambodia,” Washington Post, July 27, 1977. Accessed
online https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/07/27/the-tragedy-of-
cambodia/6f1f370d-7d35-4226-b68e-fdafbd13737e/

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Twining, who had seen firsthand the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge, bemoaned, ““It was easy
to come before Congress because I was so sure about what was going on. When it came to
‘what to do’ though, I just had this overwhelming feeling of helplessness.’”29
While the
genocidal tendencies, blatant human rights violations, and brutal practices of the Khmer
Rouge against its own citizens became painfully clear throughout 1977 and into 197830
, the
U.S had no sustained push for intervention from the political elite, no constitutional or
international mandate to follow, and very limited public pressure to incentivize state action.
Additionally, because information was so limited coming out of Cambodia, there was
no clear path forward even if the incentives to intervene were present. Because journalists
and foreign nationals had been expelled from the country in 1975 and limited firsthand
accounts were available, the majority of information regarding the Khmer Rouge came from
refugee reports. Power notes that the problem with such reports was not that they weren’t
being published and disseminated throughout the U.S, but rather, that reports were rarely
taken at face value. She states,
“The words were available, describing death marches, roadside executions, and the
murder of the rich, the intellectuals and even office assistants. But…with the country
sealed tight, statesmen and citizens could take shelter in the fog of plausible
29
Power, “Cambodia: Helpless Beast,” 130.
30
An entire congressional report, filed by Senator McGovern resulted in an extenuated push
for military action, although it failed to gain any traction because, as noted in the
congressional hearings, “it is not clear what course of action the world community will
decide to take.”
From Congressional Record from September 28, 1978, Senate Proceedings, Volume 124,
Part 24, 32133

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deniability…It would take years to promote the raw, unconfirmed data to the status of
knowledge.”31
Because the U.S lacked all these incentives to intervene, they justified the crisis in political
terms, refusing to violate the sovereignty of the Cambodian state for fear of distressing the
political makeup in the region. Therefore, any answer to the question of what would a system
that can prevent genocide look like, must begin by addressing these incentive issues.
Responsibility to Protect
This clear way forward has been most recently argued as the Responsibility to Protect
Doctrine, recently adopted and codified as official UN doctrine concerning humanitarian
intervention. In their groundbreaking report on the topic, Gareth Evans and Mohamed
Sahnoun of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
articulated the importance of changing the understanding of humanitarian intervention from a
motivation to intervene, to a right to protect. Specifically, they alter the definition of state
sovereignty in order to place the burden of achieving equal and accessible rights for all world
citizens not only on a citizen’s home country, but also on the entire international community.
Specifically, they state
“although this responsibility [to protect] is owed by all sovereign states to their own
citizens in the first instance, it must be picked up by the international community if
that first-tier responsibility is abdicated, or if it cannot be exercised.”32
By changing this terminology from humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect,
the mandate on the international community becomes increasingly more proactive and all
31
Ibid 121
32
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs
81.6 (2002): 99-110. Print.

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encompassing in order to ensure that the UN Charter, which guarantees every international
citizen his or her innate human rights, is upheld. Specifically, it “implies evaluating the
issues from the point of view of those needing support, rather than those who may be
considering intervention.”33
In the case of Cambodia, this issue was preeminent for the
United States’ decision-making process. Because they viewed Southeast Asia in political
terms, they were only incentivized to intervene militarily as they deemed it would benefit
their political goals of stopping Communism, but ultimately didn’t because of issues of
sovereignty. Under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, however, military intervention in
any region is only permissible with just cause, which is defined as when
“civilians must be faced with the threat of serious and irreparable harm”—large-scale
loss of life, actual or anticipated , with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of
deliberate state action, state neglect, inability to act, or state failure. The second is
large-scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or anticipated, whether carried about by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.” 34
Therefore, the U.S would’ve been contractually obligated to intervene, because Cambodia
had failed in its duties to protect its citizens.
While this justification provides the necessary mandate for outside state protection, it
is only helpful inasmuch as the mandate would work. The UN General Assembly adopted a
resolution at the 2005 World Assembly, which clarified the definitions of state sovereignty,
specifically to
“acknowledge that collective security depends on effective cooperation, in
accordance with international law, against transnational threats,” such that “each
33
Ibid 100
34
Ibid 103

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16
individual state has responsibility to protect its populations…[and] the international
community, through the UN, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help to protect populations.”35
This international commitment to protecting the rights guaranteed every international citizen
by the UN Charter is an essential first step towards preventing future genocides. Indeed, in
the case of Cambodia, the State Department opposed intervention, even after information
regarding the atrocities was clear, stating in a press release that although the Carter
administration was aware of the situation, it “had no intention of resolving ‘the terrible
situation in Kampuchea by military force,” adding that they were not “aware of any
international support for [such] a plan.”36
While it should have been clear in this case that the
Khmer Rouge was massively abusing the Genocide Convention, nothing was done. Although
tying all consenting members of the UN to this doctrine of the responsibility to protect
provides legal incentives for intervention, the problem of sufficient political will that was so
prevalent in the case of Cambodia, still prevails.
Non-Governmental Organizations
Political will, specifically within democracies, must necessarily come from the voting
public, because it is from them that politicians ultimately draw their authority and ability to
act. However, as we have seen in the case of Cambodia, because information issues and
access often prove to be important roadblocks that keep the voting public from calling for
35
UN General Assembly, “Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16
September 2005,” 60th
Session, Resolution 138-139. 24 October 2005.
36
State Department press release, Facts on File, September 1, 1978 cited in Power, A
Problem from Hell, 135-36.

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political action, the political will for intervention never reaches the threshold necessary to
incentivize action. Because of these informational issues, the U.S couldn’t be completely
certain regarding the political situation in Phnom Penh during the three year period under the
Khmer Rouge, and weren’t comfortable intervening. Unsure of the motives or goals of the
new government, they were unwilling to engage diplomatically or militarily in order to halt
the rise of the regime. Unable to validate or disseminate the testimony of refugees or other
firsthand witnesses, the American public remained unconvinced of the scope of the tragedy
occurring at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. Finally, because no Western organizations or
institutions remained within the closed borders, the U.S had no recourse for interceding
humanitarianly by providing resources or aid to citizens in the country. Nongovernmental
organizations and actors could serve extremely well in providing solutions to these three
problems.
In Cambodia, Amnesty International may have been able to serve in this important
role if they had been more established at the time of the atrocities, but having been founded
in 1961, their scope was limited. Even so, they provide a glimpse at the course NGOs may be
able to take in functioning on the borders of state conflict, providing essential information,
and exerting pressure on offending countries. For example, in their 1975-76 Annual Report,
they documented the fall of Phnom Penh and the ensuing detrimental human rights atrocities,
even while lamenting that “in the absence of any independent observers, allegations of mass
executions and reprisals were impossible to substantiate.”37
Power notes that Amnesty was
unable to dispatch field monitors to closely monitor the situation, and were reticent to shame
the Khmer Rouge publicly, but did “send letters to the regime requesting further information
37
“Cambodia”, Amnesty International Annual Report 1974/75,. London: Amnesty
International Publications, 86

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18
on specific reports of torture and disappearances.”38
While in the early 1970s organizations
like Amnesty International were limited in their ability to serve as watchdogs for the
international community by providing information and serving as indicators of human rights
crises, the future of protection would seem to provide every opportunity for cooperation
between NGOs and the UN in pursuing peaceful resolutions to flare-ups. Although the U.S in
the 1960s and 1970s failed to correctly diagnose and identify the Khmer Rouge as a truly
genocidal regime, in the 21st
century, NGOs may fill these gaps, as they work internationally,
on every continent and nearly every country across the globe, reporting on regimes’ actions,
goals and policies accurately and thoroughly. These transnational actors provide great hope
for providing the missing information and guidance to alert nations to opportunities to
engage in intervention to protect human rights.
NGOs like Amnesty International ought to provide the way forward in this pursuit of
an international community tied together by the Responsibility to Protect, because as Keck
and Sikkink write, nongovernmental organizations, specifically Transnational Advocacy
Networks (TANs), are “organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms and they
often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a
rationalist understanding of their ‘interests.’”39
Because advocacy organizations, NGOs and
other idealistic organizations carry extremely limited ulterior motives or outside interests,
they are uniquely suited for interacting within the gaps between state sovereignty. NGOs are
unique as well in the type of power they are able to wield within the international
community:
38
Power, A Problem From Hell, 114.
39
Keck, Margaret E. and Katrhyn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in
International Politics: Introduction,” Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 8-9.

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“Since they are not powerful in the traditional sense of the word, they must use the
power of their information, ideas and strategies to alter the information and value
contexts within which states make policies. The bulk of what networks do might be
termed persuasion or socialization, but neither process is devoid of conflict.”40
These tactics of persuasion and socialization are imperative for stimulating public opinion,
creating political will, and pressuring governments to follow through on commitments.
NGOs and TANs primarily serve in this capacity as they construct “cognitive frames”
for general publics and political actors to understand crises.41
By providing information, and
firsthand, validated accounts, NGOs are able to provide “not only facts but testimony.”42
This
lack of testimony—the inability to turn raw data into knowledge, or a true understanding of
the situation—severely inhibits states from ever moving towards action, as was the case in
Cambodia. Because people were unable to understand and contextualize the atrocities that
were occurring in the region, and were unable to reconcile the actual political consequences
of an intervention, they simply embraced isolation and abstention. Additionally, politicians
failed to intervene because they had worked to create distance between themselves and
Southeast Asia, so while reports from refugees of deaths and famine and disease were painful
to hear, politicians were devoid of exact information, named victims, or precise figures in
order to truly understand the scope of the effects of the Khmer Rouge. Advocacy
organizations specialize in framing stories and presenting information in ways that are
compelling to a general audience. Framing, therefore, not only plays an essential role for
political actors, but also lowers the perceived domestic political costs by informing the
40
Ibid 16
41
Ibid 16-17
42
Ibid 19

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general public in innovative ways in order to bring energy to a crisis that is occurring across
the world in a foreign, and unloved region of the world.
Besides this access to and dissemination of information, NGOs also may play an
essential role on the international scale via leverage politics, or in their ability to influence
political actors by reinforcing humanitarian situations with political and economic
incentives.43
Here is where NGOs are essential in the implementation and enforcement of the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine. While R2P provides an essential hope for the future of
international enforcement of human rights law, it is only as effective as its ability to actually
be implemented. Therefore, NGOs provide the solution, by exerting moral and political
leverage both over perpetrators of human rights abuses, but also over target actors and
signatories of the R2P doctrine. Keck and Sikkink write that,
“Network activists exert moral leverage on the assumption that governments value
the good opinion of others; insofar as networks can demonstrate that a state is
violating international obligations or is not living up to its own claims, they hope to
jeopardize its credit enough to motivate a change in policy or behavior.”44
Therefore, by linking states to international codes and norms of intervention, namely the
Responsibility to Protect, NGOs may motivate states to act for fear of backlash from either
the domestic or international audience. In pursuing this type of accountability politics, in
order to expose and bring charges against states—both offenders and failed responders—
NGOs begin to meld into the new, more fluid understanding of state sovereignty, and help to
create new, international norms. Keck and Sikkink write, “When a state recognizes the
legitimacy of international interventions and changes its domestic behavior in response to
43
Ibid 23
44
Ibid 23-24

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international pressure, it reconstitutes the relationships between the state, its citizens and
international actors.”45
The establishment of new international norms is imperative if the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is to achieve any real results and change the narrative
around intervention. Norms are only established, however, as states are able to practice
engaging in behavior that treads down a path towards that new norm. NGOs are essential in
this process, as they form the necessary framework for intervention, provide essential
information, and exert pressure on those who refuse to uphold their responsibility.
Additionally, NGOs may serve essential roles in strengthening the existing
international institutions in order to reinforce these norms. By taking advantage of their
international presence and working to inform the international community, NGOs could
serve in important roles as liaisons to state officials and institutions. Political historians
Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun point to the work of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) as an example of an international NGO working in concert with
military and political actors to provide impartial communication in addition to aid in times of
conflict46
. In this manner, NGOs may prove to provide the important missing piece, which
will allow future prevention of atrocity as states fulfill their responsibility to protect.
Additionally, NGOs play an essential role in facilitating peaceful resolutions to
conflict. Such resolutions to intervention may be every bit as important as the initial
intervention itself, as every case of military intervention inherently consists of one state
breaching another’s sovereignty. Such serious breaches carry significant post-conflict
45
Ibid 37
46
Charlotte Ku and Joaquín Cáceres Brun, “Neutrality and the ICRC Contribution to
Contemporary Humanitarian Operations,” Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs. London,
England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Print. 60.

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implications for the infrastructure and political makeup of the offending country. Canadian
political theorist Francis Kofi Abiew writes,
“the primary task in securing peace today is one of assisting in the longterm political
and social transformation of war-shattered societies. Comprehensive peace operations
thus need to address not only the immediate military and humanitarian concerns, but
also the longer-term tasks of state building, reforming the security sector,
strengthening civil society and promoting social reintegration.”47
Here is where NGOs thrive. By working with NGOs that already exist on the ground in
countries where intervention has just taken place, the international community may more
efficiently and effectively implement aid distribution, and pursue strategies for infrastructure
rebuilding and institutional reform.
Conclusion
As we have seen with the example of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, genocide has
often occurred over the past two centuries of world history while the international
community stands by, lacking incentives to intervene, even if they embrace the moral or
ethical justifications for intervention. Any realist understanding of state sovereignty offers no
hope for altruistic solutions; rather a system of incentives is necessary to achieve any real
results. In recent years, the UN commitment to the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect has
provided an essential framework for intervention, which provides the necessary incentives
for an international response to human rights atrocities and genocide. By analyzing both the
legal framework of this doctrine, and with an understanding of the reasons for the failure of
the U.S in Cambodia, it becomes exceedingly clear that NGOs may offer the international
47
Francis Kofi Abiew, “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations,” Mitigating Conflict:
The Role of NGOs. London, England: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Print. 32.

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community’s best hope for any realistic, normative solution to humanitarian intervention. As
they minimize information problems, frame conflict and atrocities in consumable and
provocative ways, and provide frameworks for post-conflict aid distribution and institutional
reform, NGOs may yet offer a solution towards ensuring that crisis in Cambodia will never
repeat itself.

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This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.
X Cody Phillips