1. The New ‘Deliverology’
14 Years of Evolution
March 2015

2. i
Capstone Project
MPA Programme
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Authors: 46978, 47090, 48907, 52601, 63725, 65717
Client: The Boston Consulting Group
Submission Date: 12/03/2015
Word Count: 14,826 excluding cover page, table of contents, list of tables and figures, labels
of charts, annexes and references

3. ii
Executive Summary
Since the 1980s, public sector management reforms have been increasingly focused around
improving the delivery of public services. As part of this wider trend, a more recent approach
known as ‘deliverology’ has arisen. The aim of this report is to describe the origin,
proliferation, and evolution of deliverology as a mechanism to improve public service
delivery.
At its core, deliverology emphasizes the use of targets and delivery plans with a stringent
focus on implementation as a means to drive performance improvements in critical service
delivery areas. The concept was first developed in the United Kingdom in 2001 under the
Tony Blair administration through the creation of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit; the
purpose of which was to carry out the tasks of deliverology using a target-based performance
management approach. Following its original conception in the UK, various governments
have introduced deliverology through the adoption of delivery units or similar managerial
structures. Since 2001, more than 20 formal delivery units have been created in Africa,
Australia, North America, South America, Asia and Europe.
The objective of this report is threefold:
1. Map out the evolution of the thinking around deliverology since its first development
in the UK;
2. Identify evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real improvements
in outcomes; and,
3. Survey the conditions facilitating the adoption of delivery units.
To address these objectives, the report employs a qualitative approach largely reliant on
primary research methods, including interviews and questionnaires with key deliverology
experts and practitioners. Although the report studies both current and previously existing
delivery units across the globe, four countries were chosen as focal points to provide a more
in-depth understanding. In particular, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and
Malaysia were chosen as hallmark cases of innovation and success, often inspiring their own
distinct offshoots.

4. iii
Having thoroughly researched a wide variety of delivery units and deliverology-inspired
structures, a cross comparative analysis led to the identification of the following key findings,
each corresponding to the objectives outlined above.
First, as the concept of delivery units disseminated across the globe, it has evolved to fit a
wide variety of contexts. What began as a short-term, target-based tool to improve service
delivery outcomes has now evolved to encompass a much broader transformation
surrounding the culture and approach to public service delivery. This is especially true among
many of the newer delivery units, which stand as secondary and tertiary models,
incorporating a broader scope and function, as well as innovations.
Second, while there is no conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of delivery units, common
sense and good governance indicators imply a significant value to these units. Common sense
indicators of effectiveness include the proliferation, replication, and longevity of delivery
units. Good governance indicators suggest that the adoption of delivery units can increase
transparency, strengthen the accountability of public officials, and build necessary capacities
for cross-departmental coordination.
Finally, although delivery units have been adopted under a wide array of economic, political,
institutional and cultural circumstances, the experience of various units point to a certain set
of conditions that better facilitate their successful adoption and sustainability. Among these
are, the ongoing and active involvement of the political principal, the definition of specific
and manageable priorities and targets, a pre-existing culture of performance management,
and a conducive institutional setting.
Based on the above research, analysis, and findings, the report proposes nine
recommendations for the successful adoption and sustainability of delivery units. These
recommendations are broken down into the following three phases of adoption:
Phase One: Planning
 Ensure that a performance management architecture is in place
 Diagnose the reasons for adoption
 Align the design with its intended outcome
Phase Two: Execution
 Implement early

5. iv
 Establish the right synergy with the political principal
 Brand to maximize support
Phase Three: Assessment
 Introduce self-assessment measures and communicate success
 Re-evaluate priorities with external sources
 Be flexible in order to adapt and evolve over time
While the concept and application of deliverology has certainly evolved, and will continue to
do so, it has proven itself a legitimate approach to public management, generating
considerable interest across the globe. Further, given the broad understanding of
deliverology, its openness to interpretation, and its gradual proliferation and adaptation, it is
unlikely the concept will disappear anytime in the near future.
Armed with the above findings and recommendations above, this report will help inform the
successful adoption and sustainability of deliverology in those countries interested both now
and in the future.

6. v
Table of Content
1. Introduction...........................................................................................................................1
2. Scope, Methodology, and Limitations ..................................................................................3
A. Scope...............................................................................................................................3
B. Methodology...................................................................................................................4
C. Limitations......................................................................................................................5
3. Literature review....................................................................................................................7
4. Origin of Deliverology.........................................................................................................11
5. Objective I: Mapping the evolution of the thinking around deliverology since its first
development in the UK .......................................................................................................14
6. Objective II: Evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real
improvements......................................................................................................................32
7. Objective III: Conditions facilitating the adoption of deliverology....................................42
8. Findings and Recommendations .........................................................................................50
9. Annex ..................................................................................................................................54
A. Focal Point Country Summaries...................................................................................54
B. Non-Focal Point Country Summaries...........................................................................61
C. Table on Characteristics and Tools...............................................................................80
D. Interview Coding Tables and Interview Guiding Questionnaires.................................86
1. Interview code – Delivery Unit’s heads and employees ...........................................86
2. Interview code – Leading experts and academics .....................................................88
3. Interview guiding questions.......................................................................................89
4. Delivery unit questionnaire participants....................................................................91
5. Delivery unit questionnaire........................................................................................92
10. References..........................................................................................................................97

7. vi
List of tables
Table 1: PMDU areas of priority .............................................................................................12
Table 2: Evolution of functions of delivery units....................................................................24
Table 3: Indicators of unit’s impact to date .............................................................................40
Table 4: Main conditions facilitating the adoption of a delivery unit......................................49
Table 5: Governor’s Delivery Unit areas of priority ...............................................................57

8. vii
List of figures
Figure 1: Timeline of delivery units ........................................................................................15
Figure 2: Family tree of delivery units ....................................................................................16
Figure 3: Factors motivating the inception and evolution of a delivery unit...........................18
Figure 4: Shared characteristics of delivery units....................................................................27
Figure 5: Shared tools of delivery units...................................................................................30
Figure 6: Key enablers for the adoption of deliverology.........................................................42

9. 1
1. Introduction
The evolution of modern society has seen the decline of governments as mere controlling
establishments, providing only basic protection as a form of public service, to governments
that are more service-oriented (Frost and Sullivan, 2012). With this shift, much attention has
been placed on the delivery of public services, and how that process might be improved. As a
result, public sector management reforms have been enacted in many countries across the
globe. One such reform is the introduction of public service ‘delivery units’, which aim to
drive performance in public services using a managerial approach commonly referred to as
‘deliverology’ (Barber, 2008).
Deliverology emphasizes the use of targets and delivery plans with a stringent focus on
implementation as a means to drive performance improvements in critical service delivery
areas. It first made an appearance in the early 2000s in the United Kingdom through the
development of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) under Tony Blair’s
administration. Using a target-based performance management approach, the delivery unit
aimed to transform the UK traditional approach to service delivery and increase attention to
implementation and tangible results.
Following its original conception in the UK, various governments have introduced concepts
of ‘deliverology’ through the adoption of delivery units or similar managerial structures.
Since 2001, more than 20 formal delivery units have been created in Africa, Australia, North
America, South America, Asia and Europe. These offshoots have been adapted to fit
numerous contexts, from developed to developing and centralized to decentralized countries,
and span various policy areas.
Despite the gradual proliferation of delivery units, there remain many questions regarding the
evolution of deliverology, its ability to deliver real improvements in outcomes, and the
circumstances in which it may be best adopted. To answer these questions, this report will
first provide context and background on deliverology via a literature review, followed by a
detailed account on the origin of deliverology in the UK. Next, it will address the evolution of
deliverology by identifying key influencing factors in the use and adaption of deliverology
across time and space, particularly highlighting common and diverging functions,
characteristics, and tools of delivery units in different countries. It will then explore if there is
conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of these units in producing real improvements in

10. 2
outcomes. Next, the report will present conditions which best facilitate the adoption of a
delivery approach, taking into account both the experiences of units that have persisted over
time and those that have been abolished. Finally, the report will outline general findings and
recommendations.

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2. Scope, Methodology, and Limitations
A. Scope
The main objectives of this report are threefold:
1. Map out the evolution of the thinking around deliverology since its first development
in the UK.
a. Detail the dissemination of delivery units across time and space.
b. Determine the influences of the fiscal and political environment, digital
technologies, and the rise of open data and transparency on the evolution of
deliverology.
c. Identify the common and diverging functions, characteristics, and tools used
by delivery units around the world.
2. Identify evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real improvements.
a. Identify the main challenges in assessing the effectiveness of deliverology.
b. Present empirical evidence of improvements in areas under scrutiny of
delivery units.
c. Highlight indicators of effectiveness of delivery units.
d. Analyse the main critiques presented against deliverology.
3. Survey the conditions facilitating the adoption of delivery units.
a. Analyse the experience of units from inception to their current state with the
aim of identifying factors that facilitate both the successful adoption and
persistence of units over time.
b. Identify those factors and conditions that threaten the success and longevity of
delivery units.

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B. Methodology
In order to answer Objective I, II and III the report uses qualitative methods consisting of
questionnaires and elite interviews:
- The questionnaire was designed to obtain information about the factors that motivated
the inception of the delivery unit, the characteristics and the tools used, and the impact
of transparency and open data in the work of the unit (see Annex D). The
questionnaire was sent to top and middle level management members of the delivery
unit. The response rate was 30 percent.
- Elite interviews were conducted to complement the information obtained through the
questionnaire and to acquire a deeper understanding of particular countries of interest.
In total, 22 interviews were conducted with current and former members of the
delivery units, members of organisations directly involved in the implementation of
delivery units around the world, and a variety of independent experts (see Annex D).
Four hallmark examples of delivery units were chosen as focal point countries: United
Kingdom, United States (Maryland), Australia, and Malaysia (see Annex A). These cases
represent a broad spectrum of historical and political contexts in which deliverology has been
adopted. Specifically, these countries were chosen for the following reasons:
- United Kingdom is not only the country where deliverology was first implemented, it
is also the country that has seen the largest number of transformations in the unit
itself.
- United States (Maryland) provides evidence of data-driven governance in a
decentralized context.
- Australia provides an example of both a centralized and decentralized delivery unit.
The federal unit has endured twelve years in the same or a very similar fashion
despite changes in administrations.
- Malaysia can be considered a second generation deliverology model, as it not only
expanded the scope of its activities significantly beyond those performed by the
PMDU model, but it has also served as an example for other units in developing
countries that have been inspired by the Malaysian approach.

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The remaining delivery units (see Annex B) will be used to shed light on other contexts,
particularly on the more recent inceptions of delivery units in Africa, South America, Asia
and Europe. These have been analysed under the same scrutiny as the focal point countries
above, including the collection of questionnaires from line staff and in some cases interviews.
However, for practicality and time constraint reasons these units could not be interviewed to
the same extent as the focal point countries.
Through the above research, this report will identify trends and common characteristics to
assist in the analysis of the above objectives. Together, they will be used to develop findings
and key insights to ultimately inform final recommendations.
C. Limitations
The report and analysis contained therein is limited by the following factors:
- In being a qualitative study that is highly dependent on interviews and
questionnaires, the overall analysis will be restricted by response rates and
subject to individual biases of the respondents. While the subjectivity of
statements is meant to be counterbalanced by reports of and interviews with
third parties (e.g. international donor organisation, former employees of the
units, academics and experts), in many cases it is likely that for their impact
assessment they interviewed similar people so that the potential biases persist.
- As the use of delivery units and the evolution of deliverology is a relatively
recent development, secondary academic literature is limited. Consequently,
information was largely gathered from primary sources or, where appropriate,
from third parties aiding or consulting the delivery units.
In light of the stated objectives, a quantitative analysis is not well suited for the following
reasons:
1. Some types of governments may be more inclined to adopt a delivery unit, representing a
major endogeneity issue. In particular, it is not possible to isolate the effect of the
delivery unit from the characteristics of a particular type of government that decides to
adopt this type of model.

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2. In cases where one could potentially exploit a quasi-natural experiment at the subnational
level, such as in Wales or Maryland, it is still difficult to do so as delivery units are often
linked to other simultaneous policies at the federal and state level. There are also often
significant differences in how the data is obtained, indicators used and how these compare
to each other. Once again, making it unfeasible to extrapolate the effect of the delivery
unit on service delivery from other policy interventions.
3. Besides the implementation of a delivery unit, there are many other factors that vary
across countries. It is very unlikely to find all the observables that might influence the
outcomes and include them in a regression. As a consequence, the delivery unit variable
might pick up other factors leading to an omitted variable bias.
4. Since delivery units perform different functions and have different scopes, the
independent variables in the quantitative analysis will not have a unique meaning. In the
same way, priorities vary between countries, making it difficult to create a dependent
variable that is common to all delivery units.
5. Given that, and as will be shown later on, policies as well as delivery units’ priorities
often undergo major adjustments after an administration change. As such, it is difficult to
disentangle national policy reforms from delivery units’ priorities.

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3. Literature review
Public administrations have undergone significant public sector management reforms under
the continuous aim to improve governance. The past three decades in particular have seen a
number of reforms from New Public Management (NPM) to Deliverology, reflecting the
evolving managerial thinking within the public sector as well as the role of the state in the
provision of services (Ling, 2002). These have largely been due to the impacts of various
exogenous factors affecting the public sector, such as the rise of technology and the growth of
the private sector. As each reform introduced was designed to improve on the shortcomings
of the latter, understanding the rationale behind each new iteration is important. For this
reason, this section will briefly describe the reforms leading to deliverology.
Governments are typically organised as ‘machine bureaucracies’, based on formal
hierarchical structures with strict rules and working processes (Mintzberg, 1992; White and
Dunleavy, 2010). The adoption of such an arrangement is driven by principles of democracy,
such as those of ‘impersonality, equality, and fairness’ (du Gay, 1994; Cordella and
Willcocks, 2010). However, the restrictions therein have also informed the view of public
administrations as being inefficient and overly bureaucratic, affecting citizen satisfaction with
both government and public services (Clarke, 1994).
In response, NPM emerged redefining managerial and governance practices in the public
sector in line with objectives typical of market economics (Hood, 1985; Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992; Cordella and Bonina, 2012). This private sector-driven approach was
organised to make governments more responsive, accountable, transparent, and results-
driven, as well as decentralized, efficient, and customer-oriented (Cordella and Bonina, 2012;
Currie and Guah, 2007; Gruening, 2001). It was modelled on the notion of ‘value for money’
among private organisations, emphasizing competition by providers for resources from
policymakers (Cordella and Bonina, 2012). This subsequently altered the view of citizens as
simply beneficiaries of public services to customers and consumers with the ability to choose
among different, better, and more customizable services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The
citizen-government relationship was reimagined as a market interaction, wherein citizens
expect a degree of transparency, accountability, and quality in exchange for their tax
contributions. As such, NPM has promoted a public management culture where managerial

16. 8
efficiency supersedes the need for effectiveness in the delivery of services (Self, 2000;
Cordella and Bonina, 2012).
The focus on vertical specialization, intra-organisational rationalization, structural
devolution, professional autonomy, and performance management however also led to
distinct silos among the various ministries and agencies within an administration (Christensen
and Laegreid, 2006; OECD, 2005; Boston and Eichbaum, 2005; Christensen and Laegreid,
2001; Askim et al., 2009). As a result, a fragmented government emerged creating difficulties
in effectively addressing the increasing interdependent and complex nature of policy issues
(Mulgan, 2005; Fimreite et al., 2007; Pollit, 2003a). These so-called ‘wicked problems’,
which span various sectors and policy arenas and continue to be “cross-cutting and
multidimensional” required a different managerial approach (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007;
Alessandro et al., 2014: 1). As a result, the rise of a post-NPM reform emerged during the
mid-late nineties, commonly referred to as ‘Joined-Up Government’ (Ferguson, 2009).
Joined-Up Government (JUG) is focused on the collaboration and integration of various
entities in the delivery of public services. Its adoption is aimed “to present a single face to
those they are dealing with and operate as a unit on problems that are interrelated” (Hood,
2005: 19). While designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public
administrations, its approach in doing so differs (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Self, 2000).
JUG aims to overcome the structural inefficiencies resulting from the decentralization of
government as well as the weaker control over service delivery due to outsourcing practices
by enhancing coordination both between ministries and across governmental levels (Cordella
and Bonina, 2012; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007; Ling, 2002). It focuses on increasing
efficiency and improving service delivery through the pooling of resources in a cost-effective
manner such as by avoiding the repetition and duplication of work across separate
governmental entities (Fimreite et al., 2012). This integrated approach promotes innovation
by bringing people together and increasing the exchange of ideas to create “seamless” public
services, thereby enhancing the citizen experience (Bogdanor, 2005; Perri et al., 2002; Pollit,
2003b; Fimreite et al., 2012).
However, increasing citizen demands for service delivery coupled with the increasing need
for collaboration across government required more accountability and a higher degree of

17. 9
control and oversight. In response, renewed1
attempts to gain central control and coordination
were made through the Centre of Government (CoG) reform during the mid-2000s
(Alessandro et al., 2013: 4; Clarke and Steward, 1997). CoG “refers to the institution or
group of institutions that provide direct support to the country’s chief executive, generally for
the political and technical coordination of government actions, strategic planning,
performance monitoring and communication of government’s decisions and achievements”
(Alessandro et al., 2013: 4). Such a reform was “deemed necessary to provide coherence to
government actions” (ibid.) especially in light of the previous two reforms which focused
more on the efficiency of an administration than its effectiveness. It focused on strengthening
the capacities available at the CoG, such as through setting clear priority goals, aligning
budgets to priorities, monitoring implementation and progress, and intervening when
necessary (IDB, 2014). However, as an inherently input focused approach, it did not directly
address concerns in the output of service delivery, and thus failed to drive tangible
performance improvements.
The rise of technology, digital tools and e-government initiatives were occurring at a
simultaneous pace. Each new round of reform was subject to the increasing prevalence and
availability of technology and, in turn, its impact on government-citizen relationships. Since
2008, e-governance has become much more embraced in administrations as both an internal
and external tool to improve the administration’s work processes (Dunleavy et al., 2006).
More recently, a new approach to the provision of public services has arisen combining key
elements of NPM, COG, JUG and data-driven governance known as ‘deliverology’. In
particular, deliverology is an “approach to managing and monitoring the implementation of
activities that have significant impact on outcomes” (Barber, 2011: 32). It ensures policy
priorities are implemented across departments in such a way as to have the greatest possible
impact, maximizing coordination and effort for the achievement of desired outcomes. At its
core, deliverology is a target-driven, results-based strategy to improve public sector
performance (Gold, 2014).
1
The CoG approach is not a new phenomenon and dates back to 1916 in the UK, 1939 in the US and the 50’s
and 60’s in Latin America (Alessandro et al., 2013:4). More recently, ministries of finance or the treasure
undertook this central steering approach.

18. 10
Often carried out in the form of ‘delivery units’, deliverology is typically comprised of a
small but highly skilled staff mandated with the task of driving performance improvements in
critical service delivery areas. Primarily housed in the centre of government, near the
executive, from whom they derive either formal or informal authority, they play a distinctive
role undertaking all or a combination of the following functions (World Bank, 2010):
1. Focusing political pressure for results through progress-chasing on behalf of the
political principal;
2. Providing a simple and direct monitoring mechanism;
3. Signalling key government delivery priorities;
4. Providing a clear signal that government is holding ministers accountable for public
service delivery; and
5. Supporting innovation and coordination by various ministries, and providing a
forum for problem solving.
Taken as a whole, delivery units communicate administration priorities and work toward their
realization by enhancing efficiency and effectiveness through departmental cooperation and
the use of clear and measurable targets. While many delivery units share the traits and
characteristics described above, they can also vary in a number of ways, as will be seen in the
subsequent sections. To begin, the following section will first detail the origin of deliverology
in the UK.

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4. Origin of Deliverology
The English Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) is the first example of a delivery unit.
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair established it in 2001 under the leadership of Sir Michael
Barber. It was implemented as part of a broader process to modernize public spending,
which, in earlier years, included the introduction of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) as
part of the performance management framework (HM Treasury, 1998). PSAs where
established in 1998 setting performance targets for certain areas of government (Noman,
2008). However, at this first stage it was unclear who was responsible for delivering the
targets as public officials were not accountable for the progress and there lacked a clear plan
of how these targets were going to be achieved in the short-term.
The PMDU was originally created to alleviate these problems, as well as to prove that
changes could be made by strengthening and monitoring public service delivery in key
priority areas. It reported directly to the Prime Minister and was independent from the
Treasury and the departments with whom it worked. The main responsibilities of the PMDU
were the following: assess and report performance, provide analytical support and
recommendations that accelerates delivery capacity in departments and sustains continual
improvement, help departments to identify and remove obstacles to delivery, and develop the
performance management framework and policy on PSAs (World Bank, 2010).
The main idea behind the PMDU was that “a small, flexible, highly capable team, with the
system leader’s backing and the latitude to operate outside the line management chain, can
exercise meaningful influence over the activities of that system, no matter how vast the
bureaucracy” (Barber et al., 2010: 22). As a consequence, the unit was created with a small
team of less than 40 people coming from the Civil Service, local government, and
consultancies.
Rather than being targeted broadly towards improving all domestic policies, the Unit focused
on a small number of the Prime Minister’s key priorities. In doing so, the Unit followed one
of its main objectives, which was to have a specific, narrow, and well-defined scope, with
targets that where easy to define, measure, and monitor (for an overview see table 1).

20. 12
Table 1: PMDU areas of priority
Department Priorities
Health
Heart diseases mortality
Cancer mortality
Waiting lists
Waiting times
Accident and emergencies
Education
Literacy and numeracy at 11
Maths and English at 14
5+A*-C GCSEs
Truancy
Home Office
Overall crime and break downs by type
Likelihood of being a victim
Offenders brought to justice
Transport
Road congestion
Rail punctuality
Source: Barber, 2008.
One of the main changes in the traditional PSA framework was the introduction of delivery
plans. The PMDU asked each department to create a document outlining the strategy to
achieve the objectives established in the PSAs. The following nine key issues were identified
as required to deliver a target: accountability and leadership, project management, levers for
change, feedback and communication, timetable for implementation, risk and constraints,
interdepartmental collaboration, resources, and benchmarking (Barber, 2008). These

21. 13
documents were not published and were only used internally as a tool to plan and monitor
delivery in the different priority areas.
During the first years of implementation the role of the Prime Minister was predominant. The
Unit reported directly to him, and he was present in the majority of the meetings held with the
head of the departments. Tony Blair’s strong presence was a key factor in ensuring the
accountability and full involvement of departments in the commitment to achieve their
targets. Although departments were formally accountable for achieving their PSA targets,
there were no material incentives or sanctions in place to ensure progress against PSA targets.
The incentive to improve rested solely on personal accountability arrangements (Panchamia
and Thomas, 2014).
The PMDU provided regular delivery updates directly to the Prime Minister and gave support
to the departments through the implementation of many tools and processes, as described by
Barber (2008):
- Stocktakes: performance meetings held by the Prime Minister, ministers from
the relevant departments and key officials.
- Priority reviews: short, intense period of work intended to identify and tackle
specific delivery challenges.
- Delivery reports: confidential six-monthly report submitted to the Prime
Minister on each of his priority areas.
- PM monthly notes: briefing sent to the Prime Minister on a monthly basis,
updating on progress towards targets.
- Policy delivery trajectories: graph indicating current status compared with the
timetable for achieving performance.
- Delivery chains: step-by-step description of how the target is going to be
delivered.
- League tables: tool to predict a standardized likelihood of delivery, taking into
account the degree of challenge of the target, the quality of planning, the
implementation and performance management, the capacity to drive progress,
and the stage of delivery.
These tools and characteristics illustrate the first approach to deliverology introduced by
Tony Blair and Sir Michel Barber in 2001, and, like the concept of deliverology, they have
evolved over time and space, responding to various internal and external factors.

22. 14
5. Objective I: Mapping the evolution of the thinking around
deliverology since its first development in the UK
Since its original inception in the UK in 2001, the idea of deliverology has disseminated
across the globe, evolving to fit the various contexts in which it has been adopted. Due to this
evolution, and the modifications inherent therein, both the understanding of deliverology and
the use of delivery units has likewise evolved. Consequently, there is no singular definition of
what constitutes a delivery unit. It follows, then, that there is broad discrepancy across
experts as to how many delivery units exist in the world. For the sake of practicality and
precision, this paper employs a narrow definition of delivery units based on a minimum set of
both necessary and sufficient characteristics derived from the PMDU’s original model. These
characteristics are as follows:
 Overall goal of performance improvement;
 Clear definition of government priorities and objectives;
 Periodic measurement and monitoring of performance improvements;
 Feedback loop to the political principal; and,
 Small size (relative to the number and scope of priorities being pursued).
This section will first detail the spread of delivery units adhering to these necessary and
sufficient characteristics, while recognizing that those countries identified are not meant to be
interpreted as an exhaustive list. It will pay particular attention to the factors that influenced
this dissemination, specifically those related to the fiscal and political environment and the
rise of open data and digital technology.
Having tracked the spread of delivery units chronologically and geographically, this section
will then detail the functions, characteristics, and tools used by the identified units. It is
important to note that while the definition of delivery unit employed in this paper is narrow, it
also recognises adaptations and innovations beyond those necessary and sufficient
characteristics identified above. As such, this section will specifically highlight divergences
from the original PMDU as a means of tracking the evolution in thinking and use of
deliverology.

23. 15
a. Detail the dissemination of delivery units across time and space
One fact to which there is broad consensus is that deliverology and the use of delivery units
originated in the UK. Chronologically and regionally, its dissemination appears as such:
Figure 1: Timeline of delivery units
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
The spread of deliverology can also be illustrated in terms of delivery unit implementation
families, which demonstrates more specifically the relationship between particular delivery
units, emphasizing the way in which the implementation of a delivery unit in one country can
influence its adoption in another (see figure 2).

24. 16
Figure 2: Family tree of delivery units
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
As seen in figure 2, each delivery family branch connects back to the 2001 UK model. This is
due to the fact that the PMDU was involved in each of the subsequent adaptations, either by
serving as a primary or secondary example or through more direct involvement in the
implementation of those units. The different colours emphasize the countries that have made
adaptations to the original UK model and those subsequent countries which have followed
their example.
At the request of both Maryland and Australia, for example, former PMDU members assisted
in the setup of those units sharing best practices and lessons learned2
. While in the case of
Africa and Malaysia, former PMDU stakeholders working with third party organisations
served as consultants in the adoption of delivery units. For Africa, this took place through the
Africa Governance Initiative, a charity set up by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair,
which advises African countries using deliverology type methods3
. Similarly, Malaysia was
introduced to the concept through the management consulting firm McKinsey and Company,
2
Interviews 1 & 9
3
Interview 22

25. 17
where Sir Michael Barber worked as a Partner, while employing the firm to help them with
their government transformation initiative4
. Malaysia is of particular interest as it has inspired
second generation offshoots in both Asia and Africa, namely in Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Tanzania5
. In these cases, the Malaysian model was adapted, rather than the original PMDU
model, and was the basis of inspiration and assisted in the implementation efforts.
The dissemination of delivery units across the globe demonstrates the extent to which
deliverology has resonated as a useful approach to both performance management and
improvement. This leads one to question which factors motivate its adoption and what
aspects of delivery units make them useful and sought after. The following two subsections
will explore these questions further.
b. Determine the influences of the fiscal and political environment, digital
technologies, and the rise of open data and transparency on the evolution of
deliverology
The disparity in adoption of delivery units in terms of both time and location make it difficult
to immediately identify common influencing factors. However, through primary research, a
number of factors have risen to the forefront as possible motivations for the adoption and
implementation of a delivery unit (see figure 3).
4
Interview 2
5
Puttick et al. (2014) also indicate that India receives significant help from PEMANDU in designing their own
delivery unit as well as elaborating a Big Results Now strategy.

26. 18
Figure 3: Factors motivating the inception and evolution of a delivery unit
Source: authors’ own elaboration based on interviews and questionnaire results6
.
Fiscal environment
53% of the delivery units surveyed or interviewed reported
that the fiscal environment motivated the inception of their
unit.
The fiscal environment was found to be a mixed determinant in both the adoption and
evolution of a delivery unit. During times of stagnation or negative growth, the achievement
of efficiency and effectiveness becomes a key goal of government. The idea behind this is to
avoid sacrificing quality of performance in the face of budgetary constraints, or, put more
simply, to ‘do more with less’. Equally though, during times of strong fiscal performance,
governments are tasked with ‘doing more, better’.
While initial delivery units were not intended to act as a ‘rationaliser’ or ‘cost saver’,
testimonials from interviews point to more units increasingly embracing this framework. For
6
Interviews 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Examples of
other
successful
delivery
Fiscal
environment
Demands for
transparency
Public demand
for service
delivery
improvements
Administration
priorities
Increased use
of digital
technologies
Use of open
data
Agree Not present Disagree

27. 19
example, the Malaysian unit7
reported its delivery unit was adopted in 2009 at a time when
the country was facing a large fiscal deficit. Likewise, the Los Angeles unit was adopted in
2006 during a period of budgetary ‘windfall’, but the 2008 financial crisis precipitated deficit
projections and led the unit to shift their framework from problem solving to delivering
effective service but efficiently with less money8
. While a relatively high number of units
were adopted during the peak years of the recent global fiscal crisis, 2007-2009, the financial
environment was not an impetus for adoption, as a ‘cost-cutting’ framework undermines
cooperation, but instead serves as an influence on priorities.
Units adopted in Latin America provide an alternative fiscal rationale, however. As countries
that adopted delivery units in the region were experiencing growth rate, a member of the
IDB9
suggested that, in the face of strong fiscal performance, the focus of these countries was
rather to ‘do more, better’. A member of the Australian Cabinet Implementation Unit (CIU)10
echoed this rationale, noting as a motivator ‘delivering on time’ and in the process using
funds responsibly. Equally, the PMDU was founded during the dotcom bubble in an
economically prosperous time, which lent more support for Barber’s (2008) design of a unit
separate from the treasury to ensure agency cooperation. However, subsequent iterations of
the PMDU were seemingly impacted by the global financial crisis, as priorities were
expanded to include various macro-economic priorities11
.
Political Environment
86% of the delivery units surveyed and interviewed
identified public demand for service delivery improvements
as motivating their inception; similarly, 73% reported
administration priorities as a cause for the inception of
their unit.
As stated in the literature review, a large impetus for the adoption of delivery-focused
reforms was citizen demand for improved public services, which shapes the political climate.
7
Interview 2
8
Interview 11
9
Interview 21
10
Interview 1
11
Interview 5

28. 20
A representative12
specifically identified a “deep public dissatisfaction in areas such as crime,
corruption and education”. Consequently, each of these areas was adopted as a primary
priority of the delivery unit.
Related to citizen demand for improved performance and outcomes, some politicians have
been influenced to create delivery units as a means to demonstrate the fulfilment of party or
campaign promises. A member of the Indonesian unit13
suggested that the President at the
time, Yudhoyono, established the Unit during his second term in a persistent effort to carry
through with his campaign pledges. In this sense, delivery units and the priorities which they
advance serve as proof that the politician or political party is tackling politically salient
issues, while the measure of target achievement communicates their success in doing so.
Digital technology
It had a strong impact on the evolution of the model, but a
mixed impact on the adoption, with only 33% of units
surveyed or interviewed reporting these tools as an
influencing factor for their inception.
The rise of tools associated with digital technologies has influenced the evolution of the
delivery unit model by creating a new arena in which government and citizens can interact.
Social media and other digital platforms provide both an upward and downward mechanism
of external communication, which delivery units may employ as a tool to accomplish core
functions. Upward in the sense that citizens can now report problems to the delivery unit as
opposed to the departments directly, which may be otherwise incentivized to withhold such
information to protect themselves. For instance, through Indonesia’s Public Participation and
Information System, the Delivery Unit gathers feedback from citizens through the use of
mobile phones to express complaints on services, which in turn aids in the Units monitoring
capabilities14
. Other countries have turned to telephone communication, as exemplified by the
presidential hotline in South Africa (see Annex B).
12
Survey respondent 7
13
Interview 13
14
Interview 13

29. 21
The downward mechanism, on the other hand, allows units to publically communicate
priorities and report their performance. To this end, several units such as the Maryland and
Los Angeles unit have established web-based performance dashboards where they publish
target progress in real time. Other communication mechanisms deployed by units, include the
use of Facebook and Twitter accounts as seen in Malaysia15
, and the use of an online
platform provided by the Government Digital Service in the UK’s Implementation Unit16
.
Such measures have enhanced both transparency and accountability. However, as Harris and
Rutter (2014: 79) point out: “Governments have adapted to (…) using digital platforms, but it
is not clear they are as yet as effective at using these as methods for listening as well as
broadcasting”.
While these digital technologies may not be a contributing factor for adoption, they have had
an influence on the evolution of the model. Upward and downward digital technologies give
a delivery unit informal leverage over agencies and departments by making them accountable
to not just the unit but also the public, an incentive for ‘buy-in’. This enhances units’ capacity
to meet core functions while increasing public trust through transparent and accountable
governance. It is, thus, likely more delivery units will employ these digital technologies as
the tool allows functions to be met.
Open Data & Transparency
71% of units surveyed or interviewed cited demands for
transparency had motivated the inception of their unit,
while 50% reported using open data as a tool.
The use of open data has increased with the rise and proliferation of the Internet and greater
public demands for transparency, leading to adoption of open government initiatives. In this
context, open data is a type of online platform that will contain large electronic government
datasets and allow users to freely use, reuse and distribute this government data; this can be a
mode for transparency (StateStat, 2014).
15
Interview 2
16
Interview 6

30. 22
Similar to the tools of digital technologies, open data can be a mechanism for getting more
‘buy-in’ as it incentivizes citizen and civil society participation, a crucial factor as delivery
units do not “work in a vacuum in government”17
. In fact, open data can be seen as a tool
used by both delivery units and citizens. As a way of signalling a transparent and open
government, some delivery units aggregate data sets to measure advances made in public
service provisions, later publishing these datasets, often in relation to the progress made on
targets. In turn, citizens, in theory, can use such data to track the performance of government,
once again serving as an accountability mechanism and strengthening the unit’s credibility18
.
Such is the idea behind Indonesia’s Open Government partnership. While these
programmatic tools would seemingly promote transparency and open governance, the public
value of such tools will depend greatly on what is published and the degree to which the
datasets and websites hosting them are “user-friendly”19
. As such, this may necessitate a
digital tool, such as a performance dashboard, to help synthesize the results in ‘layman's
terms’ as the Maryland Delivery Unit does with their StateStat dashboard. Further, the
availability of such data constitutes a sort of ‘point-of-no-return’ character of governance, in
that, once published, it is hard for the system to become less transparent again20
. Despite this
concern, delivery units are increasingly turning to and prioritising data-driven governance as
a primary tool to enhance service delivery and government transparency (for a more detailed
explanation of the expansion of data-driven governance in the US please see page 23).
17
Interview 9
18
Interview 9
19
Interview 10
20
Interview 9

31. 23
The expansion of Data Driven Governance in the United States
The stat dashboard, StateStat, for the Governor’s Delivery Unit in Maryland developed from
earlier innovations by the New York City Police Department, CompStat, and by then
Baltimore Mayor O’Malley’s CitiStat. These programmes are not alone in the data driven
governance approach. In the United States, many state, city, county, and other government
institutions have begun to embrace open data and rely on digital tools as a mechanism for
encouraging transparency and accountability, government capacity building, and increasing
civic participation. In particular, the country has seen the proliferation of open data portals,
which are online platforms that allow users to freely use, reuse and distribute government
data, as well as ‘stat programmes,’ which are external oriented performance management
programmes with measurable goals, data-driven analysis, regular meetings and/or
assessments, and follow-up (Drees, 2014). In total, 39 states and 46 cities and counties in the
US have open data portals, and some examples include Colorado’s OpenColorado, Alameda
County Data Sharing Initiative (in California), and Dallas Open Data portal (White House,
2015). Stat programmes are far fewer with approximately 8 across different levels of
government, including LouisStat in Louisville (Kentucky), Alaska’s Stat Programme in the
Governor's Office of Management and Budget, and Align Arapahoe in Arapahoe County,
Colorado (Maryland StateStat, 2014). Further, adopting a Stat programme does not
necessitate the adoption of an open data portal, but many do, as San Mateo County California
did. Other governments may adopt an open portal and at the very least provide a performance
measurement dashboard or a monthly ‘report card’ as Chicago’s Performance Metrics does.
While others more closely resemble the delivery unit model. Results Washington (in
Washington state) has both an open data portal and a Stat programme, but is closer to a
delivery unit with standardized output focused targets, a clear feedback loop to the political
principal, and a strategic framework to give value to data driven performance measurement
(Results Washington, 2014). As evidenced, these different data driven governance initiatives
come in many forms, but all have an aim toward a more open and transparent government.
Source: authors’ own elaboration.

32. 24
c. Identify the common functions, characteristics and tools used by delivery units
around the world, highlighting deviations from the original PMDU
Functions
In order to understand the characteristics and tools used, it is important to understand the
functions delivery units undertake. While monitoring and improving performance to ensure
progress against goals remains the core function, the tasks of delivery units have broadened
significantly (see table 2).
Table 2: Evolution of functions of delivery units
Source: authors’ own elaboration based on Harris and Rutter (2014), Alessandro et al.
(2014: 7) and James and Ben Gera (2004).
Type of function Examples
Common core function
Monitoring and improving
performance to ensure
progress against goals
All countries
Additional functions
Long-term policy
development and strategic
management
Sierra Leone, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Malaysia,
Pakistan, UK II, UK III,
Ontario
Short-term policy advice and
support
Australia, Ontario
Co-ordination and managing
the politics of delivery
Australia, Maryland, Brazil –
Minas Gerais, Ontario and
Pernambuco, UK II
Gathering input and
communicating results to
increase accountability
Rwanda, Malaysia,
Maryland, Los Angeles,
Indonesia, Netherlands

33. 25
In the ‘archetype’ of a delivery unit, heads of government had specific issues or areas of
improvement, often derived from their platforms or currently salient issues, which they would
turn into priorities together with the delivery unit. However, more recently, delivery units
also have a broader stake in long-term policy development and strategic management. For
example, the Rwandan Government Action Coordination Unit is directly involved in the
National Leadership Retreat and the National Dialogue Council meetings, where the
country’s senior leadership sets the targets for the next year. Sierra Leone’s Strategy and
Policy Unit stands as a good example, responsible not only for implementing and monitoring
progress of President Koroma’s ‘Agenda for Prosperity’, but also for providing strategic
policy advice as well as continuous support21
.
Short-term policy advice and support concerns the planning as well as the implementation of
best practice examples of policy making. The Australian CIU, for instance, provides
ministries with implementation guidelines and toolkits highlighting best practices to assist
them in improving their implementation strategies22
. Other units, such as the US
Performance Improvement Council, also use internal capability building as a way to
holistically improve on delivery and implementation issues across the government23
.
Delivery units are also increasingly coordinating efforts and managing the politics of delivery
across departments. Due to their position at the centre of government, along with their
growing focus on national level priorities, they are well suited for the role. For example, in
Liberia, the President’s Delivery Unit fosters coordination of priorities by securing
compliance of ministers, improving internal policy cohesion, and resolving disputes24
.
In the various cases, delivery units are more actively soliciting input at stakeholder meetings
as a way to increase legitimacy when enacting reforms. This increased focus on
communication can be internally driven to promote coordination across stakeholders, or for
external purposes to connect government to citizens. Such efforts are aided by the rise of ‘big
data’ and tools to collect and analyse large amounts of it. This allows units to more broadly
identify systemic gaps or problems and direct priorities toward addressing them. For
example, both the Maryland Unit and the Unidad Presidencial de Gestión de Cumplimiento in
21
Interview 22
22
Interview 1 & 15
23
Interview 12
24
Interview 22

34. 26
Chile specifically aim to align external communication with outward accountability by
publishing and maintaining information on progress (e.g. performance dashboards) online25
.
Whereas, those units with a more internally focused communication function, such as the
Welsh Delivery Unit and the CIU in Australia, use communication to strengthen intra-
government transparency and inward accountability26
.
Characteristics
As detailed in the beginning of this section, a certain set of characteristics was identified as
being necessary for the delineation of the term ‘delivery unit’. This list was determined by
identifying characteristics present in the first PMDU that have persisted and are common
across all subsequent delivery units. Necessary for meeting a unit’s functions, these
characteristics describe the focus of the units (mission, priorities, targets, and tools) as well as
their physical attributes (size and location). The following figure displays a broader set of
characteristics based on the original PMDU and subsequent adaptations as well their
prevalence across the units researched:
25
Interview 9
26
Interview 1

35. 27
Figure 4: Shared characteristics of delivery units
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
At its core, as given by its very name, a delivery unit must aim to improve the delivery and
performance of government services. A delivery unit’s commitment to improving service
outcomes is demonstrated through the priorities it sets and the functions it undertakes to meet
them. In the PMDU model, heads of government specify a narrow set of performance
improvement areas based on their administrative platform. These translate into the priorities
that delivery units will advance with departments to meet pre-determined targets.
Priorities set in the original PMDU were fairly narrow and department-specific27
. While some
units today continue this tradition, such as the Maryland unit, an increasing number of
delivery units (for example the UK, Australia, Malaysia, and many of the African delivery
units) use much broader priorities that are standardised across departments to reflect national
27
Interview 19
0
5
10
15
20
25
Involvement of
Executive Office
Periodic performance
report routines
Targets - Output
Separate from
Treasury
Strong participation of
head of Government
Small size < 50Delivery plans
Priorities -
Department specific
Dichotomized
variables
Priorities -
Standardized
Targets - Input
Yes No Information not available

36. 28
priorities28
. For instance, macroeconomic and socioeconomic issues of focus might include
promoting economic growth, improving infrastructure, or lowering poverty.
Further, in addition to expanding upon the scope, priorities are no longer exclusively set by
the head of government. For example, in Malaysia problems and possible solutions are
identified through ‘Cabinet Workshops’ (Gold, 2014). Regardless of whether or not the head
of government personally sets the priorities directly, an essential characteristic of a delivery
unit is that the head of government be directly linked through a feedback loop. This feedback
loop provides the head of government with highly accessible information and constant
assessment of the progress being made on executive priorities, allowing him or her to give
input or course correct when necessary. For the unit, the feedback loop provides ‘the ear of
the executive,’ bestowing an air of authority for the work the unit is conducting29
.
Being located at the centre of government is an additional characteristic that provides a
delivery unit with a high degree of leverage in monitoring those departments with which it
works. Taken in conjunction with its close relationship with the executive, these two
characteristics are the primary sources from which delivery units derive their power,
legitimacy, and authority.
Equally, the institutional location of the delivery unit within government is imperative, in
which it is crucial that the unit be seen as separate from the treasury. As most delivery units
are output-focused and rely on trust and department buy-in, it would be detrimental to be
perceived as a sanctioning or policing unit (Barber, 2008). This underpins why delivery units
are almost always not associated with ‘input decisions’, or those decisions that determine
departmental resources. This is because if departments believe that their performance in
meeting targets will determine funding decisions, they may be less cooperative in working
with delivery units. In other words, this can create an adversarial dynamic where departments
then behave secretively, or even engage in gaming behaviour, both of which activities will
greatly hinder or undermine the work of the delivery unit.
An equally important characteristic that affects a delivery unit’s effectiveness is the staff size.
Delivery units often employ a small and highly skilled staff, taken from both the public and
private sectors. ‘Small’, however, is a relative concept, in that the staff size should be small
28
Interviews 8, 1, 4 and 22
29
Interview 17

37. 29
proportional to the size and scope of the priorities, and functions being performed by the unit.
For example, while Malaysia’s staff of approximately 130 could be seen as large30
, especially
when compared to the under 50-person staff size of the first PMDU, the staff size is
proportional to their responsibilities. The Malaysia unit is responsible for advancing a large
number of nation-wide priorities whereas the PMDU was only responsible for 14 department-
specific priorities. Nonetheless, more delivery units deploy a smaller staff as a way to
maintain flat hierarchies and efficient processes. It fosters a ‘SWAT mentality’ and mitigates
the threat of ‘mission creep’, wherein an overload of responsibilities or work that is too broad
can undermine the capabilities of a unit, rendering them ineffective31
. Such was the case in
the Netherlands, which was staffed by only four individuals working part-time on 74
priorities32
.
Tools
Beyond the tools discussed on page thirteen, particularly in the earlier description of the
original PMDU, a number of tools have been adapted and even created since the first PMDU.
The following figure displays these various tools and the prevalence of their use across
investigated units:
30
Interview 2
31
Interview 17
32
Interview 14

38. 30
Figure 5: Shared tools of delivery units
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
The use of graphs indicating the current progress against the pre-agreed timetable for
achieving performance targets, known as policy delivery trajectories, witnessed an adaptation
when implemented in some countries. While being exclusively used for internal purposes in
the original model, various countries have opened up this tool in different forms to the public
in an attempt to increase external transparency. The StateStat dashboard used by the
Maryland delivery unit is an illustrative example. The dashboard allows citizens to track
progress against the targets (almost in real time) and check whether indicators are ‘on track’,
‘progressing’ or have ‘insufficient progress’33
. Similar mechanisms can be found in Malaysia
as well as in Chile.
As previously discussed, recent years saw the rising use of digital technologies and open data
with media platforms used by government as an interaction space with the public. This has
resulted in the new and innovative use of public and social media platforms by delivery units,
33
Interview 9
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Executive regular (monthly,
bi-yearly, ...) notes
Priority reviews
Policy delivery trajectories
Open data in outside
communication
Delivery chains
Deep dive reports
League tables
Policy labs
Yes No Information not available

39. 31
most commonly providing a stage for citizens to voice public service delivery concerns. For
instance, citizens can share pictures of issues with public works or problems with the
infrastructure, providing a mechanism for “on the ground” monitoring to crosscheck the
information provided by the ministries, as evidenced in Indonesia34
. While not all units have
such outward orientation, this real time reporting of issues increases responsibility of
government to citizens, which, if done properly, enhances trust and credibility between
citizens and the unit 35
.
Another relatively recent tool are deep dive reviews, which are typically one or two months
long projects with the relevant departments aimed at tackling particularly difficult bottlenecks
in high-priority goals (Mullin, 2014). Gold (2014: 18) notes this “(…) involves intensive
fieldwork, discussing findings with stakeholders, and generating an action plan that is
monitored”. Found in the UK Implementation Unit, Australia and Brazil, this tool involves an
intensive research with line staff while engaging stakeholders on the process and delivery
plans36
.
Finally, the several delivery units have established policy labs, which are sessions that last six
to eight weeks and “(…) bring together delivery experts (including frontline practitioners) to
solve program and service delivery problems (…)” (Gold, 2014: 18). These also include the
development of Open Days, and international seminars, and have been adopted in Malaysia,
Tanzania, and the UK.
34
Interview 13
35
Interview 21
36
Interview 6

40. 32
6. Objective II: Evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in
producing real improvements
a. Challenges establishing effectiveness
Providing substantiated evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real
improvements has consistently been a challenge for public servants and academics alike. The
empirical research conducted highlights a structural and a methodological challenge. The
structural challenge consists of two dimensions: internally delivery units often do not keep a
‘success record’ and externally leave the credit of improvements to the relevant departments.
Internally, as units are often so closely tied to the political principal and have a constrained
staff, there is limited time or necessity to outline clearly (by establishing a counterfactual)
that the unit led to a success. As an interviewee explained37
:
These people work such hectic days; they are under a lot of pressure. They
have very long days. They try to make things happen, so any resource they
have they devote to doing that. (…) I haven’t seen many cases were they
actually devote people and time to document what they did or started
documenting it from the beginning. In most cases they tried to build a legacy
of their unit once they are leaving office.
Externally, delivery units cannot or should not claim responsibility for successes because
they formally or informally agreed to not take credit for the results they help to deliver
(Barber, 2008). As institutions that support and help departments to improve their work, these
units are supposed to have a backstage role and allow the departments they liaise with to take
credit on any progress achieved38
. This arrangement is critical for “buy-in” from departments
working with delivery units. As a current member of the UK Implementation Unit39
points
out: “Demonstrating success is a very difficult thing to do, not because there is no success to
point out, there is lots. It is because there is either an explicit or implicit contract between you
37
Interview 21
38
Interview 17
39
Interview 7

41. 33
and the departments you work with, implying that any success is their success not your
success (…)”. While this arrangement is necessary for the successful functioning of a
delivery unit, at the same time, it paradoxically places the delivery unit at a disadvantage
when asked to provide evidence of their effectiveness. This is a key challenge inherent in the
deliverology model.
The methodological challenge refers to the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship
between deliverology and improvements in public service outcomes. As deliverology is often
adopted as part of broader public management reforms, outcomes are likely to be influenced
by them, making it difficult to see real effects of the adoption of a delivery unit. Moreover,
“[b]ecause it is ‘hard to see the benefits of a problem avoided’, it will always be difficult to
quantify the precise value add that agencies and units at the centre of government offer
departments” (Gold, 2014: 34). Units working on public service delivery improvement and
performance management will struggle to establish a counterfactual for outcomes produced
in the absence of their unit40
. A White House Office of Management and Budget (2011: 91)
report points to this dilemma: “(…) performance measurement is a critical tool managers use
to improve performance, but often cannot conclusively answer questions about how outcomes
would differ in the absence of a program or if a program had been administered in a different
way”.
While attempts at quantitative assessments have been made, they do not isolate the effect of
the delivery unit and cannot be extrapolated to other contexts, as the results lack external
validity. In this respect, a former member of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit41
stated:
(…) it is important to be clear that a lot of conversations in government
about demonstrating impact do not mean to show the attribution to the unit.
You can look at the numbers and see if they are going in the right direction,
but that is not evaluation; there is no counterfactual. And in any event, how
do you show that it was the effect of the delivery unit, the effect of the work
of the leading departments, or the effect of external factors? In the world of
policy making nobody has yet been able to do an experiment (…).
40
Interview 18
41
Interview 5

42. 34
Indeed, without a counterfactual to serve as a way to disentangle conflating results, delivery
units cannot account for potential confounding factors that may lead to a spurious
relationship between a delivery unit’s effectiveness and improvements in outcomes. An
illuminating example of this problem comes from the Governor’s Delivery Unit and their
StateStat counterpart in Maryland, US. The unit asserts as evidence of their effectiveness that,
despite the great recession, they recovered 144,000 jobs since February 2010 and fulfilled
97.3% of their goals (StateStat, 2014). As Hayward (2013) contends: “However, there is no
way to know the true correlation between StateStat42
activity and jobs recovered and it’s
conceivable the state’s other actions including last year’s [2012] tax hikes on the wealthy
actually impaired job growth”.
b. Empirical evidence of improvements in areas under scrutiny of delivery units
Due to the challenges outlined, there are no quantitative assessments of the effectiveness of
delivery units. However, there is some research on policy areas under the scrutiny of delivery
units. Bevan and Wilson (2013) compare education and health43
outcomes in England and
Wales, in a difference-in-differences approach before and after the 2001 reform (until 2005).
While in the case of education the authors evaluate the effect of the abolition of school league
tables in Wales, in health they examine the effect of the introduction of the Star rating
system44
for hospitals in England. The authors conclude that the Welsh model45
led to worse
reported outcomes in education (examination performance at age 16) and health (reduction of
hospital waiting times).
Despite the robustness of the results46
, the research assessed the effect of differences in
policies for schools and hospitals and not the direct effect of the PMDU itself. Even though
the unit was a main factor in elaborating new approaches to health and education, it is
impossible to disentangle the effects of the unit and of the policy changes at that time.
42
For the relationship between Maryland’s Delivery Unit and StateStat, please see Annex A.
43
As a result of the devolution, Wales and England had similar policy objectives but created very different
models of governance, especially in education and health (Bevan and Wilson, 2013).
44
The Star rating system gave NHS trusts a score from zero to three stars based on performance.
45
For the trust and altruism model see Le Grand (2003).
46
According to Bevan and Wilson (2013) the parallel-trends assumption is strong, given the countries’
proximity in models of governance, funding and organisation before the change.

43. 35
Bevan (2014) and Bevan et al. (2014: 115) assess health outcomes in the four countries of the
UK from 2001 to 2010 by examining the different policies implemented as a result of the
devolution and conclude:
Within the limitations of the performance information available across the
four countries over time before and after devolution, it does not appear that
the increasing divergence of policies since devolution has been associated
with a matching divergence of performance. (…) Where we do have
comparable data, there are no material differences in performance (…).
Where there were material differences in the past, improvements over time
have narrowed differences so these are now relatively small.
Aside from the aforementioned studies, some units (or third parties assessing the work of
these units) merely compare pre- and post-intervention outcomes without establishing
counterfactuals or causality. The three UK units provide a good example of this assessment.
As mentioned, the initial PMDU had a very limited and clear scope. Each one of the targets
had precise measures and improvements in each of these areas were tracked continuously47
.
By 2005, 80% of the targets were met, while the rest showed increases (Regan, 2014).
Measurement of outcomes has been a consistent part of the UK PMDU. Although after 2007
the number of priorities increased and a more sophisticated approach to target setting was
taken, not all of the priorities had specific targets. In that sense, under the second iteration of
the PMDU, a more ‘fit for purpose’ approach to motivating and engaging delivery systems
was adopted48
. This set of metrics and trajectories was used to monitor whether progress was
on track and to ensure early intervention. The unit performed an analysis to understand what
interventions accelerated progress49
.
The Implementation Unit50
measures effectiveness in a three step process: “The basic
measurement, step one, is if whatever you have done has positively influenced the thinking of
what we call centre of government (…). We should be reaching level one 100% of the time,
and we do. Level two is that we can demonstrate impact; that we can show that our
inspections change the work of the leading department or the lead delivery agency of that
47
Interview 19
48
Interview 4
49
Interview 4
50
Interview 7

44. 36
issue (…). Level 3 is the real world impact (…).” However, this information is not publicly
available.
Another example for this type of assessment was conducted in Pakistan and Tanzania51
.
Barber (2013) reports that after having implemented the ‘deliverology’ methodology in
Pakistan between 2011 and 2013, 1.5 million more children were enrolled in schools, their
attendance was at over 90% and 81,000 new teachers were hired. However, Todd et al.
(2014) highlight that these effects cannot be interpreted causally. Similarly, with Tanzania
they (ibid: 8) stress that despite it being too early to attribute the increases in educational
attainment in 2013 to the BRN52
, “it is clear that BRN has created a window for change in the
Tanzanian education system”.
While this is only a selected sample of evidence, it is important to keep in mind that these are
self-reported differences in outcomes provided by units themselves, so they are subject to
potential misreporting and time-variant heterogeneity. Furthermore, while the quantitative
evidence provided has a high degree of internal validity, its external validity is small,
rendering the approach inappropriate for our attempt to conduct a universal assessment of the
effectiveness of deliverology.
c. Indicators of effectiveness of delivery units
While there is strong, albeit not robust, evidence from delivery units, few and largely
inconclusive empirical evidence from academia exists on the effectiveness of delivery units
in improving outcomes. Interviewed experts and public servants, instead, point to qualitative
indications of the success of deliverology in producing improvements in outcomes. As such,
this report has identified ‘common sense’ as well as ‘good governance’ indicators.
Common sense indicators: proliferation, replication, and longevity
Common sense indicators of effectiveness and success include proliferation, replication, and
longevity. This stems from the idea that it is unlikely delivery units would have persisted and
51
In both cases, third parties assessed the effect of deliverology as an approach, as at that point these countries
did not have fully institutionalised delivery units.
52
The link between deliverology and the BRN (Big Results Now!) can be found in Todd et al. (2014).

45. 37
inspired replications elsewhere if they were not seen as value adding by those who have
implemented them (see table 3). As the White House Office of Management and Budget
(2011: 73) reports: “Outcome-focused performance management can transform the way
government works, but its success is by no means assured. The ultimate test of an effective
performance management system is whether it is used, not the number of goals and measures
produced”.
As shown in figure 1, delivery units have spread over five continents and more than 20
countries, suggesting a growing consensus and support for an institution that monitors the
internal performance of government entities and ensures the efficient and effective delivery
of priorities. As stated by an interviewee53
: “With the increasing acceptance of the unit and its
work, there seems to be a greater understanding on the need of the unit and this can be seen
as an assessment of how the unit improves outcomes”. This is not restricted to the top-level
of government with departments and ministries replicating the model. For example, “a few
departments have set up project management or similar units to improve and monitor their
own implementation activities and we [the CIU] do quite a lot of work with those counterpart
units to improve the implementation of new and existing measures” (Hamburger, 2007: 219).
Indonesia has also established performance management branches at the ministry level to
monitor more frequently performance54
. The adoption of these smaller units can therefore be
seen as further proof of the necessity and usefulness of delivery units.
Some adaptations to the political, economic and social environment were so successful, that
their structure and approach has been replicated elsewhere. Malaysia’s model, defined by a
strong citizen participation as well as its cooperative use of new and innovative ways to
define targets and push for results (e.g. policy labs, Open Days Initiative), has itself served as
a unit worth replicating by Tanzania, Pakistan and Rwanda (Puttick et al., 2014: 79). Similar
considerations apply to Maryland’s Unit. Following earlier innovations such as CompStat,
the unit spearheaded a push for data-driven governance that has been adopted by other cities
and states in the US (see box in Objective I).
53
Interview 13
54
Interview 13

46. 38
Longevity, particularly ‘surviving’ administration changes, especially when an opposition
party gains control of government is an indicator of effectiveness. The Australian CIU, for
example, has persisted over twelve years despite four prime ministerial changes55
. Moreover,
these administrational changes involved prime ministers from both the liberal and the labour
party56
. As outlined before, the UK PMDU after having undergone changes in the Brown
administration was eventually abolished in 2010. However, the coalition government, after
having given autonomy back to the departments, realised the importance of having a unit in
the executive overseeing the implementation of certain government priorities and introduced
the Implementation Unit in 201157
. This unit follows a slightly different philosophy but has a
similar set-up as well as functions and methodologies used by the PMDU58
.
‘Good governance’ indicators: transparency, accountability, and capacity-building
In terms of efficiency, the value added by deliverology results from the impacts its adoption
has on the workings of governance: it can increase transparency, strengthen the
accountability of public officials, and build necessary capacities for cross-departmental
coordination.
Deliverology cannot be thought of as a panacea to the ills of government, but rather as a
mechanism for more responsive governance that allows for “catalysing opportunities for
public sector culture change” (Todd et. al, 2014: 8). Publicising performance information,
delivery and implementation units provide opportunities for more transparent and
accountable governance. As an interviewee59
explained: “When releasing information or
making it publicly available, delivery units tend to do so in an attempt to increase
transparency and to build credibility of what they do as well as raise their accountability”.
The White House Office of Management and Budget (2011: 74) further explains:
Transparent, coherent performance information contributes to more
effective, efficient, fair, and responsive government (…) promotes
55
Interview 15
56
Interview 15
57
Interview 7
58
Interview 5
59
Interview 9

47. 39
public understanding about the actions that government is working to
accomplish, but also supports learning across government agencies,
stimulates idea flow, enlists assistance, and motivates performance
gain. In addition, transparency can strengthen public confidence in
government, especially when government does more than simply
herald its successes but also provides candid assessments of
problems encountered, their likely causes, and actions being taken to
address problems.
Likewise, publicising information with the aim of increasing transparency induces an upward
spiral and leads to lock-in effects. Thereby, binding government to keep or increase the level
of responsiveness, and establishing a cultural change within the public administration.
Equally, delivery units necessitate inter-governmental coordination, which builds government
capacity to detect and respond to issues and gaps early on. As governments “do not work in
isolation to improve outcomes,” units create formal settings for communication and
coordination between inter-governmental entities (ibid: 75). An interviewee60
explained that
inter-agency coordination is often necessary for goals to be reached, as targets may require
the attention of more than one agency. For instance, ending childhood hunger by 2015, one of
the sixteen Strategic Goals of the Maryland Delivery Unit requires the collaboration of
multiple departments, including the Department of Education, Department of Human
Resources, and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, as well as private and non-profit
partners. Without coordination and open communication facilitated by the bi-weekly
meetings and follow up on the part of the unit, reaching the goal would be more challenging,
particularly given the isolated nature of government bureaucracies. This built-in collaboration
inherent in deliverology transforms government’s ability to tap into reservoirs of capacity
beyond one bureaucratic office. It builds agency capability to answer questions and address
problems on their own, and even help sister agencies solve problems in the future61
.
60
Interview 17
61
Interview 12

48. 40
Table 3 below provides a survey of the indicators detailed that have had an impact to date.
However, this is only a snapshot of the units. For a more detailed description of
functionalities of these examples, please see the annex.
Table 3: Indicators of unit’s impact to date
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
d. Overview of the main critiques presented against deliverology
Despite self-reported improvements in outcomes and ‘common sense’ as well as ‘good
governance’ indicators of effectiveness, various questions remain as to the nature and extent
of such improvements. In particular, the PMDU’s target-focused approach to monitoring
performance has led to various concerns about potential gaming behaviours in reporting
improvements.
Indicators of
impact to date
United
Kingdom
Maryland,
United States
Australia Malaysia
Empirical
evidence and
self-
assessment
Bevan (2013,
2014) and Bevan
et al. (2014) and
unit’s self-
assessment
Unit’s self-
assessment
Unit’s self-
assessment
Unit’s self-
assessment
Common
sense
indicators
Longevity
(albeit rebranded
after
administration
change);
proliferation of
model in other
contexts
Proliferation and
replication of
model
Longevity
(endured three
administration
changes)
Proliferation and
replication of
model
Good
governance
indicators
Accountability,
and capacity
building
Accountability,
transparency,
and capacity
building
Accountability,
and capacity
building
Accountability,
transparency, and
capacity building

49. 41
In the case of the PMDU, there were three potential gaming effects identified: the ratchet
effect, the threshold effect and the distortion or manipulation of reported results (Hood,
2006). The first refers to the expected tendency to restrict performance to below ones
capability in order to avoid receiving higher targets in the following year (Hood, 2006: 156).
The threshold effect, on the other hand, relates to the use of uniform targets that lead to a
lower incentive for ministries to excel, which may “encourage top performers to reduce the
quality or quantity of their performance to just what the target requires” (ibid.). The third type
of gaming behaviour represents the manipulation of reported results (ibid.). This was
particularly visible in the UK National Health System, where the focus on meeting waiting
time targets for emergency room patients resulted in an increased waiting time for patients
with minor injuries as well as of patients waiting in ambulance cars just outside the hospital.
Furthermore, according to Hood (2006: 517), performance data has been inconsistent with
reports produced by public audit bodies. For example, “two studies found a gap of some 30%
between the levels of performance over waits in hospital emergency rooms in England as
reported by providers and independent surveys of patients” (U.K. Commission for Health
Improvement, 2004; Healthcare Commission, 2005).
The use of target-based mechanisms to monitor performance can therefore lead to unwanted
side-effects by providing incentives to those scrutinized to engage in strategic behaviours.
The English experience with gaming incentives in the health and education sector, and
critiques of performance targets in US education62
context have led the model away from a
purely target-driven system to milestones or mixed approaches such as in the Australian
CIU63
and the Malaysian PEMANDU64
respectively.
62
See Russo, 2010
63
Interview 1 & 15
64
Interview 2

50. 42
7. Objective III: Conditions facilitating the adoption of deliverology
Delivery units have been adopted under an array of economic, political, institutional and
cultural circumstances. However, the implementation of these units has been met with
various challenges that point to the requirement of certain preconditions for successful
adoption. Taking into consideration the experience of units that have sustained, as well as
those that have been abolished, this section will highlight the main conditions that may better
facilitate the adoption of a delivery unit in a given country. While these conditions facilitate
the adoption of deliverology, and subsequently delivery units, they are still highly context-
specific as there is no ‘one-size fits all’ approach to adopt this philosophy.
Figure 6: Key enablers for the adoption of deliverology
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
a. Involvement of the head of government
As delivery units are situated at the very centre of the government, they are closely tied to the
head of government (e.g. executive or political principal). For this reason, certain institutional

51. 43
and political arrangements of the public administration, predominantly of the executive
office, may be decisive enablers for the successful adoption of a delivery unit. As units work
in close collaboration with and for the political principal while also serving as a bridge to
other governmental entities, the role of the head of government is a critical feature. Strong
political power as well as the involvement and support of the political principal are factors to
take into account when adopting a delivery unit. These factors are also essential for the unit’s
success upon implementation.
Strong political power from the head of government is of high importance for the adoption of
a delivery unit. In particular, the ability to exert leverage over ministries is essential for
increasing accountability and committing the ministries to the delivery unit’s work. As such,
institutional and political arrangements that limit the amount of political power of the
executive make it more challenging, if not largely impossible, for a delivery unit to be
adopted successfully. The rather weak political power of the head of government was one of
the main obstacles faced by the now dissolved Dutch Delivery Unit. As reported by a former
member of the unit65
, “the Prime Minister in the Netherlands is not as powerful as in other
countries. He cannot sack ministers, for instance. He is described as primus inter pares [first
among equals]; he is the chairman of the meetings but he cannot force ministers to do
anything (…) he is the boss in name, but he has no power to enforce decisions”. According to
the interviewee66
, a main takeaway point from the Dutch experience is that delivery units
need to be “centralised, have independent staff and have a lot of political power behind it,
because otherwise it is not going to work”.
In addition to a strong head of government, it is equally important that the leader is actively
involved and fully supports the work of the unit. This form of commitment not only includes
the formal endorsement of the unit’s work but also a real pledge to increase transparency, the
use of data and measurements to inform policymaking, and a focus placed on
implementation. The involvement of Tony Blair was essential for the initial implementation
of the PMDU, and his personal patronage and involvement of the delivery unit were vital for
sustaining the unit (Barber, 2008). The unit not only reported directly to Blair but he was also
65
Interview 14
66
Interview 14

52. 44
present in the majority of meetings held with ministry leaders67
. This strong presence was a
key factor in ensuring the accountability and full involvement of departments in the
commitment to achieve their set out targets68
. Similarly, the role of the executive in the
Indonesian, Malaysian and Maryland units was equally critical in their establishment and
development of the necessary “buy-in” across departments. As expressed by an interviewee69
,
such close association with the Indonesian head of government elicited a sense of ‘reputation
at stake’ across ministries, creating a greater degree of collaboration and support of the units
work.
b. Compatible management styles
Another enabler for the successful adoption of a delivery unit deals with the managerial style
of the political principal. A delivery unit imposes a rather different style ‘to doing business’
within public administrations. As such, it is easier for a unit to be adopted when the political
principal has a managerial style that is compatible with the delivery unit being implemented.
In particular, a political principal should have a results-driven mind-set and value the use of
targets. While the managerial style is important for the relationship with a delivery unit, it
also assists in the dissemination of such values throughout the broader public administration.
With a wider support of the managerial values evoked by delivery units, the adoption of such
units will be met with less resistance and thus be more successful. As an interviewee
detailed70
, the managerial style of President Sebastian Piñera was vital to the implementation
of the later dissolved Chilean delivery unit. From the onset, Piñera managed with a clear
results-based vocation, emphasizing efficiency and diligence in order to improve public
service (Dumas et al., 2013).
Equally important, the style of management is a condition that also facilitates the
sustainability of a unit, which is particularly crucial following a change in government. The
managerial transformation of the PMDU under Gordon Brown provides an illustrative
example. Under Prime Minister Brown, cultural change, capability building and increased
intra-governmental work became an added focus of the delivery unit leading to a less strong
67
Interview 3
68
Interview 19
69
Interview 13
70
Interview 21

53. 45
top-down approach than under the original PMDU 71
. As an interviewee72
asserts, there was a
change in the scale and focus from the first to the second iteration of the PMDU, with a new
framework created in 2007 including 30 cross-departmental PSAs. In light of such
government changes, for delivery units to persist through them, they must remain flexible in
their design to adapt to managerial changes under different leaders.
c. Culture of performance management
An additional key condition that facilitates the implementation of a delivery unit is a
regulatory architecture of results-based goals and performance indicators. As highlighted
earlier, the UK PSAs framework provided a necessary architecture for measuring and
monitoring performance. Likewise, Australia prior to the adoption of its CIU had
noneconomic, central coordination units, as well as utilized results-based goals and
performance indicators that eased the delivery unit’s adoption (Dumas et al., 2013).
Similarly, the Maryland Unit had grown out of a performance metric monitoring programme,
StateStat, which is a data-driven management approach. Evidence from developing countries
underscores the necessity of a results-based architecture; as demonstrated by ‘ground work’
initiatives such as the Roadmap in Pakistan, the 150 Day Plan in Liberia and the BRN in
Tanzania and Malaysia (see Annex B).
d. Pre-existing data infrastructure
The pre-existence of a data culture and infrastructure including the continuous collection of
statistics and other measurement tools is an important first step for laying the groundwork for
delivery units. Due to their size and scope of work, however, delivery units usually do not
collect or produce data themselves, instead they rely on other sources of information for data,
such as independent government agencies or monitored departments. The availability of such
information is essential for the unit to be able to do its work, as it is necessary for tracking
progress. When adopting a delivery unit, having a reliable data infrastructure already in place
is a major advantage73
. As the interviewee74
detailed, this has been a challenge for delivery
71
Interview 4
72
Interview 6
73
Interview 7
74
Interview 7

54. 46
unit adoption in developing countries, as illustrated with Kenya’s Accountability and
Delivery Unit. In particular, priority identification becomes difficult without a clear sense of
progress and the areas falling behind. Correspondingly, the credibility of the data available is
crucial for defining measurable outcomes and monitoring progress as weak or falsified data
will distort results or make progress monitoring a daunting task.
e. Institutional setting
De-Centralization
The more recent evolution of deliverology, particularly in the United States, has shown that
delivery units may be more easily implemented at the state or city level. This seems to be
particularly relevant for large countries or those in which local government has a strong
presence and role in the provision of public services to their constituencies, such as those
under federal systems like the United States, Australia, and Canada. In these cases, regional
and municipal governments may be better equipped to improve service delivery and
implementation issues; as, “buy in” for a delivery unit may be greater, making it easier to
adopt75
. Especially in policy areas with shared responsibilities at the Federal and the State
level, delivery units will struggle to increase effectiveness, as the implementation is
dependent on multiple departments usually at varying jurisdiction levels76
. This makes
delivery chains less clear and holding agency leaders accountable significantly more difficult.
Majoritarian - Representative system
In addition, from an institutional perspective it may be easier to implement delivery units
under majoritarian representation systems rather than under proportional ones. As the latter
tend to result in the formation of coalition governments thereby limiting the power of an
elected political principal, the implementation of a delivery unit will be more difficult, as
previously discussed with the case of the Netherlands (Duverger, 1959)77
. Therefore,
75
Interview 12
76
Interview 12
77
Shepsle (2010: 217) explains that political conflict is more muted in majoritarian systems, stating, and “(…)
there is typically a single majority party [that] can get on with the business of implementing its agenda.
Legislatures elected by PR reflect rather than resolve political conflict in advance, depending upon post-
election parliamentary politics – coalition for example – to discover the means for resolution.”

55. 47
countries with institutional contexts that lend themselves to the weakening of the head of
government and the sharing of power may not be well suited for delivery units and the
adoption thereof.
f. Credibility and subsidiary role
The principal asset of delivery units lays with information gathering and collaborative
relations with other members of the government involved in the delivery chains. The
ministries involved including their ministers and the treasury need to support and trust in the
work carried out by the delivery unit in order to make its adoption successful. In other words,
there must be a general consensus within government for a deliverology approach and agency
like the delivery unit. As demonstrated in Australia, the CIU was created through the general
backing of the cabinet, not just the Prime Minster. In fact, in this case, the Prime Minister at
the time had to be convinced of the unit’s benefits by the cabinet78
. Such wide support creates
an environment conducive for the adoption of a delivery unit and promotes cooperation of
ministries once the unit is implemented. If this condition is not fulfilled however, ministers
will not cooperate and the impact of a delivery unit will be insignificant. Similarly, one of the
interviewees highlighted the importance of there being collective commitment to the
government priorities and the importance of investing in the setting of priorities at both
political and official levels79
.
g. Definition of specific and manageable priorities and targets
Two conditions that undermine the sustainability of a delivery unit are having an excessive
number of priorities and defining priorities that are difficult to monitor and measure. Even
though the scope of the unit varies considerably among the different countries, a delivery unit
that aims to oversee all areas of government will face difficulties in adopting and sustaining
the model. There has to, instead, be a balance between the size of the delivery unit and the
scope and number of priorities considered.
78
Interview 1 & 15
79
Interview 4