1. 1
The EU crisis: something more than Euro crisis
Limits of the intergovernmental constitution and political standstills in
the current EU
Eleonora Salluzzi
salluzzieleonora@gmail.com
Abstract
During the past years the EU has been experiencing serious challenges for its survival. The
severe crisis that has hit the common currency in Europe from 2009 on has been the apex of
a generalized declining tendency within the Union. The intergovernmental constitution, set
up to deal with financial issues, has seized the central stage. However, the measures
undertaken in order to manage the crisis and prevent it from destabilizing the whole area
have been unsatisfactory and have exacerbated asymmetrical relations between peripheral
member-States and central member-States. The discontentment arisen from the absent
legitimacy of these austere actions, nonetheless, has to be framed in a more general context
of political standstill. Since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the supranational
constitution has been put aside, thus generating a complaint of democratic deficit. The
recent proposals to make the EU more accountable, however, incur in some problems.
Keywords: intergovernmental constitution, Euro crisis, democratic deficit, supranational
constitution, peripheral and central member-States, legitimacy, parliamentarization

2. 2
Introduction
The recent European crisis has profoundly shaken the ground which the European Union
(EU) has been settling on. In fact, during the past years the process of European integration
launched in 1952 with the Treaty of Paris has undergone a major halt due to several shocks
and standstills of different natures. The stability of the European continent has been
severely called into question, and especially the institutions of EU have suffered from
unsuitableness and ambiguousness while trying to handle serious challenges. However, it is
mistakenly commonplace to identify the EU crisis with the crisis of the common currency
adopted by eighteen member-States, the Euro, and to argue that this critical situation has
been brought about by exogenous factors. In particular, the international financial and real
crises originated in the sub-prime market of United States of America in 2007 have been
depicted as the Pandora’s box of all evils which spread out in Europe and in the world.
Although the international crunch has played a decisive role in the worsening of the
European scenario and has sharpened the EU fragilities, nevertheless it is fundamental to
make clear that the Euro crisis is only a component of the more general crisis that has
knocked the EU. In fact, the EU has been facing a sharp democratic deficit due to the lack
of accountability and legitimacy, as proved in the management of the crisis too. Moreover,
it is equally important to investigate the endogenous circumstances that have led to the
deepening of the crisis, and to examine the very structure of the Union in order to better
understand its real vulnerability. This paper is divided into three paragraphs. The first one is
dedicated to the analysis of the measures undertaken by some specific EU institutions in
order to deal with the Euro crisis, and it aims to highlight the limits of such a response. The
second paragraph will aim to examine the structural causes of the EU stagnation as a whole,
which has occurred since before the forthcoming of the international crisis and that has
more to do with politics rather than economics. Finally, the third paragraph will try to
critically analyze the suggestions advanced in order to let the EU be perceived in a more
democratic way by European citizens.
The Euro crisis and the EU response – An intergovernmental fiasco
When the Euro started to circulate in 2002 it was meant to bring diffused prosperity, to
boost growth and jobs, and to obtain macroeconomic stability in all member-States of the
EU. But most importantly, the common currency should have represented a stepping-stone
to a more interdependent regional integration (Posen, 2005). However, the unfolding of

3. 3
events has showed how the premises, which the Euro was founded on, were actually hiding
intrinsic drawbacks and huge disparities between member-States. Therefore, it is important
to clarify that the European economic crisis cannot be simply identified with the
international crisis, although they eventually came to be intertwined. Undoubtedly the
financial and real crises broken out in USA during 2007 can be considered as the
immediate cause of the plausible breakdown of the Euro zone. Given the irreversible
interconnectedness of global financial markets, when in the USA the financial speculative
bubble surrounding the mortgage lending burst in 2007, the international banking sectors
mingled with the American one started to face severe illiquidity and insolvency problems.
Nonetheless in order to assess why the Euro crisis is a distinct and further step in the
critical international juncture one must look at the structural conditions that the Economic
and Monetary Union1
(EMU) of the EU has exacerbated (Lapavitsas, 2012). In particular
one must acknowledge that even before the European economic crisis the latent
contradictions between the fiscal performance of peripheral member-States and central
member-States were a potential force of disruption. In fact, peripheral member-States were
burdened by domestic problems: Greece had a severe deficit in the current account of its
public balance sheet hidden by misleading data; Ireland was facing a collapse of the
banking sector and a bubble of the real estate sector; Portugal had a deficit in the exchanges
of services and goods on the international market and also imbalances in the current
account of its public balance sheet.
When the international crisis of 2007-2009 hit the Old Continent, the structural
vulnerability of the monetary union came to the surface taking the form of a sovereign debt
crisis in the peripheral member-States. The intrinsic limit of a monetary union lacking of an
economic union led to the so-called “flight to quality”2
during the sovereign debt crisis: the
perceived default possibility of peripheral member-States (among which also Italy and
Spain are present) led the investors to move their investments from these countries to the
safer central ones (Garcìa; Gimeno, 2013). The severe deterioration of the public balance
sheets of EMU’s peripheral member-States prompted an intervention by the side of the EU.
However, the institutions embodying the most the willingness to aspire to a more
supranational polity were left inactive: the European Parliament and the European Court of
Justice were put aside, with little space for the European Commission. The
intergovernmental constitution (which will better analyzed in the next paragraph) as
resulted from the Maastricht compromise (Fabbrini, 2013, a) and as formalized in the

4. 4
Lisbon Treaty, was the expected option to manage the crisis, and to implement preventive
and corrective tools. In this frame the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the
European Central Bank (ECB) were in charge of the crisis management. In tandem with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), these institutions set up a new economic governance
and put in place various financial assistance programs. After the EU member-States agreed
upon bilateral loans on a multilateral coordination scale in order to help the European
countries facing a sovereign debt crisis, the intergovernmental bodies approved two
additional sources of financial aid in May 2010: the European Financial Stabilization
Mechanism (EFSM), available to all the EU member-States, which was an
intergovernmental agreement able to raise €60 billions on the market; and the European
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSF), a special vehicle purpose created by the EMU’s
member-States, endowed with €440 billions and guaranteed on a proportional basis by
those countries of the EMU not receiving aid. However, both these instruments were
temporary and a posteriori; furthermore they asked for too severe consolidation
adjustments in those countries receiving aid.
The first set of interventions, thus, highlighted the imperfect nature of the
intergovernmental policy-making. Besides a number of preventive and corrective tools,
among which the European Semester3
is numbered, a new attempt to re-launch aid
programs in a more coherent way saw the birth, within the EMU perimeter, of an
intergovernmental permanent organization, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
devoted to the safeguard of financial stability of Euro area. At the same time, in order to
grant liquidity to the banking sector in 2011 ECB decided to play unusual moves of
quantitative easing, buying public bonds of peripheral member-States on the secondary
market and accepting the same bonds as collaterals in open market operations. Despite all
these measures, the situation worsened due to the speculation on the market and to the
outcomes of austerity policies asked by the IMF as a conditionality to receive aid. In 2012
another fiscal innovation, the so-called Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance4
(known as the Fiscal Compact) was signed by all the EU member-States, except for UK and
Czech Republic, and provided for a reinforcement of macroeconomic surveillance and
fiscal consolidation. Nevertheless, even the Fiscal Compact was flawed for several reasons:
firstly the stringent critical thresholds to respect did not allow for case-by-case evaluation,
even though European countries considerably differed in terms of indebtedness and crisis
affectedness; secondly the rule of debt reduction was ostensibly vague, leaving too much

5. 5
room for interpretation. Despite these interventions the economic performance of peripheral
member-States further worsened and the EMU experienced a very long recession lasted six
quarters. Therefore the European Council held in June 2012 asserted the need for positive
growth, unemployment reduction, banking union and democratic accountability. In this
intergovernmental framework a report called “Towards A Genuine Economic and
Monetary Union” (TGEMU) gathered the hopes of integrity, stability and political
commitment to implement these suggestions. Moreover, in the European Council of
December 2012 the call for economic growth within a more solid economic union was
formalized in a road map, which at last gave a glimpse of the importance of the social
dimension of the EMU in order to boost its declining legitimacy (Fernandes; Maslauskaite,
2013). However, to this day none of these remarkable proposals has been fully achieved.
The intergovernmental constitution continues to raise questions about its sustainability and
effectiveness in so far the delayed short-time actions produced within its perimeter did not
succeeded in halting the speculation on the markets and did not manage to successfully fuel
the economic growth.
The structural political asymmetries of the European Union
An extensive understanding of the European Union current standstill
The intergovernmental constitution has to be analyzed within its structural institutional
container in order to assess its failures. The intergovernmental institutional pattern was
rationalized in the Treaty of Maastricht5
in 1992 alongside the supranational constitution,
each one ruling over one or more pillars, as it was envisaged with regard to the division of
policy domains by the European Council held in 1991 in the Dutch town of Maastricht.
This treaty went down in history as the Maastricht compromise: in fact, it was enlivened by
a controversial bargaining between a greater supranational arrangement and the need to
protect the member-States’ interests (Gilbert, 2012). Within this legal structure, the Gaullist
approach met the supranational federalist vision of Europe (Gilbert in Fabbrini, 2005). The
incongruous appeal to the principle of subsidiarity and intergovernmental on one hand and
to the vision of a strengthened union, on the other, produced a sort of win-win situation:
European national governments agreed to shift some policies at the European level on the
condition that these policy domains, traditionally belonged to the States, would have been
controlled by national governments and coordinated through various methods. Moreover,
the intergovernmental constitution was specifically set up to handle financial problems: it is

6. 6
clear how a definite outline of policies allocation was already working in the Nineties and
ready to be tested.
However, in 2005 the failure of the project aimed at approving a Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe (CT)6
signed the standstill of the supranational driving forces. The
constitutional text, which was deemed too audacious and sovereignty-losing, was rejected
by the French and Dutch referendums. As some scholars have pointed out, the
constitutional text was too long and detailed; it was not preceded by a true constitutional
momentum and was trapped in a double appearance (Podolnjak, 2007) (Albi, 2005).
Despite the intention to yield a European constitution, the constitutional text resembled
more an international treaty in so far as it had to be approved by each member-State
according to the State international treaty procedure of ratification rather than by means of
pouvoir constituant europeèn (Albi, op. cit.). Furthermore, the Convention7
entitled to draw
a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe never specified which kind of polity the
constitutional project was referring to nor which democratic standards to apply: those who
took part in the drafting process only kept remarking the exceptional and unprecedented
nature of the EU evolution. In such a blurred context, especially in the oldest member-
States the national discussions about the constitutional draft led the way to demagogic
exploitations aimed at contesting the EU enlargement towards Eastern European countries.
The final rejection of the constitutional proposal by no means empowered the
intergovernmental mode of governance and might be depicted as the first serious symptom
of the EU crisis.
Although the Lisbon Treaty approved in 2009 formally re-asserted the double institutional
patters (supranational and intergovernmental) getting rid of the pillar division as conceived
in Maastricht, the intergovernmental constitution gained its favorable momentum and
proved to be the most feasible way of integration. The formalization of the European
Council as a new European Union institution, the establishment of the full-time President
of such intergovernmental body and the creation of new functions, such as the European
External Action Service, enhanced the intergovernmental side of the EU at the expenses of
a genuine democratic accountability and legitimacy. In fact, the progressive consolidation
of the double-layered indirect legitimacy of the EU intergovernmental institutions,
composed by the national governments, has seriously started to hamper the democratic
bonding of European citizens. And exactly the flawed intergovernmental management of
the economic crisis has contributed to inflate the sails of euro-skepticism already deployed

7. 7
with the dismissal of the Constitutional Treaty. Obfuscated by the crisis management
scheme, the most eminent supranational democratic institution, the European Parliament,
has not been able to trigger a straightforward European political discourse: the European
Parliament seemed to resemble more a mosaic of the various national political debates
while the positive role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), representing the most
genuine supranational preferences, has been replaced by the new political centre constituted
by the European Council. Whereas in long periods of stagnation throughout the integration
process the ECJ has been the juridical detonator of the regional advancements towards a
more supranational polity8
, the new institutional configuration consolidated from the
Constitutional Treaty rejection onwards has entrusted the decision-making role to the
European Council according to a mere logic of policy coordination rather than legislative
labor. This new form of deliberative intergovernmentalism has increasingly gained
prominence in Brussels and has changed the agenda composition of EU activities.
Unfortunately the intergovernmental constitution has proved to be highly inefficient during
the economic crisis and subsequent recession. Not only has it sharpened the perception of
democratic deficit due to the involvement of an external technical body, the International
Monetary Fund, which prescribed rigorous economic receipts to those member-States
facing a collapse, but it has also seen the rise of asymmetrical power relations within the
bargaining process of the intergovernmental side and asymmetrical goals. On one side there
were member-States that were seeing the EU as essentially a means to establish economic
coordination and nothing more, on the other side there were those States belonging to a
monetary union that were willing to or forced to pursue an even closer union. Moreover, it
must be stressed that the attitude of central member-States towards the peripheral ones has
created a narrative of racism and neo-colonialism. Firstly, the inhabitants of peripheral
member-States have been blamed on the basis of cultural habits, such as laziness,
corruption, non-productivity and wasteful spending (Vossole, 2012). In second instance,
during the Euro crisis the central member-States found themselves in a favorable position
from which to offer their conditional help. By means of EFSF and other tools the aid
offered to peripheral member-States, the so-called PIGS, allowed Germany and France to
indirectly bail out their own banking sector. Moreover, the harsh conditionality annexed to
the aid programs resembled the modus operandi of the former colonialist relations. The
PIGS countries were forces to realize consistent cut in wages and public spending, plus a
severe reduction of sovereign discretionary powers. Such disequilibrium between the core

8. 8
and the periphery of the EU endorsed a situation of disparity and hierarchy within the
intergovernmental Union. The more economically solid core countries, such as France and
Germany, through their influential power have sought to heavily shape the
intergovernmental decision-making at the expenses of democratic legitimacy.
In order to hide such logic of power, however, the intergovernmental union has ended up
creating an ingenious technocratic system for handling financial issues that has took the
distance from citizens’ preferences and interests. In particular, the opaque management of
the Euro crisis, as it has been driven, has been especially vitiated by the lack of legitimacy
from the recipients of the emergency measures. It is the European legitimacy crisis that has
been inciting the criticisms of those who acknowledge a severe democratic deficit in the EU
nowadays. From a democratic perspective, the current disequilibria between a fully
supranational monetary union and a purely intergovernmental economic coordination is
characterized by the dominance of the executive to the detriment of EP, which is the only
directly elected body of the EU institutional set. However even the direct election of
European Members of the Parliament arouse uncertainty and disaffection. Although the
Lisbon Treaty has granted the EP more powers in a wider array of policy areas and in the
overall decision-making process9
, nevertheless there are no proper European elections: in
fact, the elections of the EP are still being perceived as second-order national contests run
by national politicians. Exactly the lack of transnational candidates grouped in transnational
political parties prevents any political competition at the European level. Therefore, the
outcome of this electoral mechanism is that the existing political parties participating in
European elections do not run transnational electoral campaigns and, thus, do not come
forward with projects and ideas for Europe as such (Sementilli, 2012).
Towards a more accountable EU?
Suggestions advanced to strengthen the democratic nature of the EU and its
legitimacy
The failure to tackle the EU’s democratic challenge has posed questions about the long-
term vision of stability of the Union. For such a reason, as a response to the Franco-German
scheme centered on an executive-supervised intergovernmentalism as the most efficient
way to foster economic coordination, a number of suggestions have been put forward in
order to revitalize the dormant institutions of the EU, and confer them accountability,
credibility and efficacy. In particular, the European parliamentary elections due in May

9. 9
2014 represent an important test. It is largely presupposed that these elections will manage
to “Europeanize” the debate around issues of fundamental importance, such as the
economic crisis and the need for re-launching employment. However, the true novelty of
the 2014 parliamentary elections resides in the opportunity for the European political
groups to indicate their own candidate for the Presidency of the Commission. Already in
2012 in the report towards a genuine economic and monetary the European Commission
has been the mouthpiece affirming the need to enhance the rise of an autonomous political
sphere at the supranational level. The same EP has repeatedly solicited the European
political groupings within the Parliament to choose their respective candidates for the
Presidency of the Commission: the reason was to ensure that these candidates could have a
key-role in the electoral campaign by having a direct contact with European citizens and
submitting their programs to public discussion. The attempt to parliamentarize the EU is
meant to unite the political legitimacy of both the EP and the Commission by linking their
respective elections to the direct vote of the citizens. Hereafter, on the basis of the
outcomes of the elections the candidate for the Presidency of the Commission representing
the winning group could be appointed relying on a sort of parliamentary majority within the
EP. In this way the European parliamentary elections would acquire credibility and would
catalyze the attention over an enthusiastic political debate in so far as the Parliament would
be crucial in determining the political leadership of the Commission. In this perspective the
tendency to politicize the European elections would have a spill-over effect since the quest
for politicization would seemingly spread to other less legitimized institutions.
Nevertheless, the transformation of the European Commission into a sort of government
supported by a parliamentary majority would be problematic. In fact, the EU has a twofold
nature of representation: it represents citizens, on one hand, and member-States on the
other. Such a compound polity (Fabbrini, 2007) is born out of intrinsic asymmetrical
relations between member-States of different power and size and has to continuously try to
keep the institutional equilibrium that ties together the double source of representation. A
politicized Commission would jeopardize this balance in so far as it would possibly
marginalize those members of the EP who belong to minority parties, especially in the case
in which they represent small-medium sized member-States disadvantaged by their limited
authority (Fabbrini, 2013, b).

10. 10
Conclusion
The recent Euro crisis has called into question the basic tenets which have enabled the EU
to flourish in its short-lived history: prosperity, union, deeper integration. The
intergovernmental constitution, which has been specifically set up to handle this sort of
problems, has proved to be inadequate. The measures adopted to face the crisis, coordinated
by the most intergovernmental bodies (the European Council and the Council of the EU)
with the participation of the IMF, were too little and arrived too late. Moreover, the
perceived illegitimacy of such actions has deteriorated the already unbearable situation due
to the forced implementation of austerity measures in countries near the collapse. Despite
its magnitude, however, the Euro crisis cannot be understood as the EU crisis per se. In
fact, the EU crisis has deeper roots and has to do more with the institutional structure of the
Union. The uneasy tension between the intergovernmental and the supranational
constitution rooted within the Lisbon Treaty and already present in Maastricht has seen the
rise of the former, especially after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. On the
one hand the pre-eminence of the intergovernmental side of the Union has exacerbated
asymmetrical relations within the Union, thus generating disparity and hierarchy, on the
other hand it has triggered serious questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability:
the occurrence of a democratic deficit has become a leitmotiv in the European political
narrative. Despite the suggestions advanced in order to politicize the EU and make it closer
to the heart of European citizens, the process of integrations seems stuck and the overall
equilibrium at stake. Although every proposal seems to call into question structural and
institutional strains, it is necessary to vigorously re-launch the process of positive
integration. In order to re-shape the negative asymmetries between member-States, fiscal
and banking union should be the first objectives to be pursued. Secondly, the powers of the
EP should be enhanced in such a discredited supranational union. As things stand, without
a positive and massive involvement of citizens, the EU would remain trapped in the current
political gridlock.

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Notes
1 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a pillar enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992.
This pillar represents a clear step towards a further integration of the European economies, envisaging the
creation of a common currency, the Euro, a common monetary policy and the coordination of economic and
fiscal policies of the member-States.
2
Before the European crisis occurred, investments were mostly located in the peripheral member-States of
the EMU due to the high interest rates that these countries offered on financial assets. Once the sovereign debt
crisis exploded, investors preferred to transfer their money from peripheral member-States to safer assets in
central member-States (Germany, France).
3 The European Semester is a new governance institution in force since January 2011. It was adopted in order
to strengthen the fiscal discipline as well as the structural policies of the EU member-States. The basic idea
was to prevent excessive public deficit and enhance macro-economic coordination.
4 The Fiscal Compact does not substantially anything more than the Six Pack, a previous set of measures
which entered into force in December 2011. The Six Pack introduced greater macroeconomic surveillance and
introduced some novelties to the Stability and Growth Pact.
5 The Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) was signed in February 1992 in the Dutch town of
Maastricht. It shaped the institutional architecture of the European Community by providing three pillars,
each gathering some specific policies and ruled by a specific decision-making method.
6 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was the result of different stages of a clear political
project. In December 2001 the European Council held in Laeken adopted a Declaration of the Future of the
EU that asked for a more democratic, transparent and efficient EU.
7 After the European Council of Laeken a Convention was summoned in Brussels in 2002 with the task of
drafting a constitutional text for the EU. Its work lasted two years and yielded a constitution thought as an
solemn guide for the future development of the EU.
8 During the Sixties and the Seventies the process of European integration underwent a block. No relevant
institutional change was proposed and the attempt to further the supranational development was vetoed
several times (e. g. the episode of De Gaulle’s “empty chair”). In this framework of deadlock the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has been able to carry out a plan of positive integration through the jurisprudence. With
its paramount rulings the ECJ succeeded in pushing forward the supranational design and, above all, declared
the supremacy of the Community Law over the national law in the Costa-ENEL case in 1964.
9 The Lisbon Treaty formalizes the so-called co-decision procedure as the ordinary legislative procedure. This
procedure gives the EP the power to adopt laws jointly with the Council of the European Union. Therefore the
EP becomes a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council, except for some cases specified by the
Treaty.

12. 12
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