1. Frederic Bleses Domestic Politics in International Relations Konstanz 16.01.2016
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
James D.Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, Alastair Smith (1999)
1. The Democratic Peace – Theory: Immanuel Kant (1795)
1.1 Assumption:
- Separation of Powers, Representative Systems and Rule of Law
→ Foundations for Peace
- Democracies fulfill these requirements the best
→ No War in a Democratic World
1.2 Empirical Findings:
1. There is (usually) no war between Democracies
2. Democracies fight (almost) as often as Autocracies
→ Democracies are not less hostile in general
1.3 Empirical Regularities:
1. Democracies are nearly immune from wars with one another (Maoz/Russet)
2. Democracies are not all immune from fighting wars with nondemocracies (Maoz, Abdoliali)
3. Democracies win a bigger share of the wars they fight (Lake/Raiter, Stam)
4. Democratic dyads chose more peaceful processes of dispute settlement then other pairings of
states (Brecher, Wilkenfeld/Dixon/Mousseau/Raymond)
5. Democracies are more likely to initiate wars against autocracies than are autocracies against
democracies (Bennett, Stam)
6. Democratic states pay fewer costs in terms of human life and fight shorter than nondemocratic
states (Bennett, Stam/ Siverson)
7. Transitional Democracies are more likely to fight than stable regimes (Mansfiels, Snyder)
8. Larger Democracies seem more constrained to avoid wars than smaller ones (Morgan, Campbell)

2. Frederic Bleses Domestic Politics in International Relations Konstanz 16.01.2016
2. The Debate: How to explain those regularities?
Normative Explanations: Common value system + role of citizens
→ What about covert operations?
→ Democracies fight imperialistic wars against weaker opponents
Institutional Constraints-Argument: Separation of powers + public opinion
→ What about the „Rally around the flag effect?“
→ Democracies do not seem to be constrained against autocracies
→ Neither approach is able to explain all 8 regularities
3. The Game Theoretical Approach: Mesquita's Game
3.1 The Game:
Actors: - Leader (Democratic or Autocratic)
- Population (P) → Selectorate (S) → Winning Coalition (W)
Resources (R): - Public Goods (Defense spending)
- Private Goods (Reward for Winning Coalition)
Strategies: - Leader: Has limited resources, seeks reelection
- Winning Coalition: Decides over reelection, seeks resources
Decisions: -Leader: How to spend resources?
→ Public or Private Goods?
- Winning Coalition: Reelect Leader or Incumbent?
→ Evaluation of Leaders Policy by how many resources they get.
3.2 The Institutional Setting:
Democracy:
- Large W
→ R/W (share of resources for each member of the winning coalition) = small
→ Public Goods / Public Policy success is more important
Autocracy:
- Small W
→ R/W = large
→ Public Goods / Public Policy success is less important

3. Frederic Bleses Domestic Politics in International Relations Konstanz 16.01.2016
3.2 Strategies to stay in office:
Democracy Autocracy
Winning Coalition Large Small
Public Goods Large Impact Marginal Impact
Private Goods Marginal Impact Large Impact
→ The larger W, the more important is success in Public Policy (War)
→ Democratic leaders usually do not „survive“ military defeat because they can not buy their
Winning Coalition off (like autocrats)
→ Democratic leaders spend more into the war effort in two ways
3.3 Conclusion:
Democratic leaders require large winning coalitions
→ they spend more on public goods
→ they try harder in wars → use of all available resources
Democratic leaders can’t buy their winning coalition off
→ they have to succeed in public policy (war)
→ they only fight if they anticipate victory
→ Democracies chose their wars (and opponents) carefully and try everything to win
→ War between democracies is not impossible
→ The conditions under which a democrat will attack another democrat are more restrictive than
the conditions under which a democrat will attack an autocrat
→ Autocrats always are the more attractive targets
→ If a democratic leader has a unsuccessful domestic policy, he is likely to wage war, also against
another democrat („Gambling for Resurrection“)

4. Frederic Bleses Domestic Politics in International Relations Konstanz 16.01.2016
4. Critique
4.1 Categorization:
Democracy Peace
Structural-Institutional Explanation:
Self-interest of:
-Population Selection of opponent
-Leader → Selection of duration
-Institutions Selection of warfare
Normativ-Cultural Explanation:
-Values
-Institutionalization Different Conflict-Behavior
of conflict-mechanisms → Establishment of Inside-
-Mediation and Outside-groups
4.2 How successful is Mesquita in explaining the empirical phenomenon?
- no assumption of superior motives or greater civic mindedness of one kind of leader over
another
- the explanation is driven purely by self-interested leaders who seek to retain in office and face
alternative institutional arrangements
- 8 regularities:
4.3 Discussion: Which of the 8 empirical regularities can be explained by the model?
1. Democracies are nearly immune from wars with one another
2. Democracies are not all immune from fighting wars with non-democracies
3. Democracies win a bigger share of the wars they fight
4. Democratic dyads chose more peaceful processes of dispute settlement then other pairings of
states
5. Democracies are more likely to initiate wars against autocracies than are autocracies against
democracies
6. Democratic states pay fewer costs in terms of human life and fight shorter than non-democratic
states
7. Transitional Democracies are more likely to fight than stable regimes
8. Larger Democracies seem more constrained to avoid wars than smaller ones