VUZF Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022)

ISSN 2534-9228 (online)
Journal of Scientific Papers
VUZF REVIEW
Volume 7, Issue 1, March 2022
https://papersvuzf.net/index.php/VUZF/
Public
organization:
VUZF
University
of
Finance,
Business
and
Entrepreneurship

VUZF Review, № 7(1) – 2022 ISSN 2534-9228
Vol. 7, №1
March, 2022
Founded in 2016 by the VUZF University
The editorial board
Editor of the publication
Ivan TKACH Prof, Dr. of Sciences, Ukraine;
Deputy Editor-in-Chief
Julia Dobreva Prof., PhD, Bulgaria;
Igor Britchenko Prof., Dr. of Sciences, Poland;
Members of the editorial board
Mitko Atanasov
Dimitrov
Prof., PhD, Chairman of the Academic Council of the Institute for Economic Research of the
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria;
Igor Britchenko Prof., Dr. of Sciences, VUZF, Bulgaria;
Daniela Bobeva Prof. Dr., Professor at the VUZF, Bulgaria;
Mariana M. Petrova Assoc. Prof. PhD, St. Cyril and St. Methodius University of Veliko Turnovo, Bulgaria;
Stanislav Dimitrov Assoc. Prof. PhD, VUZF, Bulgaria;
Radostin Vazov Assoc. Prof. PhD, VUZF, Bulgaria;
Ali Veysel Assoc. Prof. PhD, VUZF, Bulgaria;
Desislava Josifova Assoc. Prof. PhD, VUZF, Bulgaria;
Manyu Moravenov Assoc. Prof. PhD, VUZF, Bulgaria;
Marián Mesároš Prof., DrSc, Rector, University of Security Management in Košice, Slovakia;
Peter Lošonczi PhD., Vice-rector for scientific work and educational process, University of Security
Management in Košice, Slovakia;
Jozefína Drotárová PhD., Vice-rector for Science and Research (Department of Science and Research), University
of Security Management in Košice, Slovakia;
Marcin Jurgilewicz PhD, DrSc in social sciences in the field of security science, professor at the Rzeszów
University of Technology, Poland;
Bartosz Mickiewicz Dr. of Sciences, Professor, Dean of Faculty of Economics, West Pomeranian University of
Technology, Poland;
Petro Gudz Dr. of Science in Economics, Professor, Kujawy and Pomorze University in Bydgoszcz, Poland;
Tomasz Wnuk-Pel Dr. of Sciences, Professor, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management, University of
Lodz, Poland;
Marcin Kęsy PhD, Senior Lecturer, University of Economy in Bydgoszcz, Poland;
Costas Siriopoulos Ph.D., Professor of Finance, College of Business, Zayed University, United Arab Emirates;
Prem Lal Joshi Professor, Dr., Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Social Sciences Research (ICSSR), India;
Mir Abdul Sofique Dr., Associate Professor Department of Tourism Management University of Burdwan, India;
Dio Caisar Darma Assist. Prof., Department of Management, Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi, Indonesia;
Omar Durrah Dr., Associate Professor of Management in Dhofar University, Sultanate of Oman;
Ahmar Uddin
Mohammed
Dr., Assistant Professor (Accounting and Finance), Dhofar University, Department of Finance
and Economics, Salalah, Oman;
Iryna Yepifanova Dr. of Science in Economics, Professor of Department of Finances and Innovative
Management, Vinnytsia National Technical University, Ukraine;

VUZF Review, № 7(1) – 2022 ISSN 2534-9228
Nataliya Tanklevska Dr. of Sciences, Prof., State Higher Educational Institution "Kherson State Agrarian
University", Ukraine;
Vitaliy Shapran Professor, Ph.D. in Economics, Member of the National bank of Ukraine Council, Ukraine;
Dr Richard Tomlins Associate Head of School, Faculty of Business and Law, Enterprise and Innovation, School of
Marketing and Management, United Kingdom; Visiting Professor at the Early Childhood
Department, Muhammadiyah University of Ponorogo, Indonesia;
Dr Vladimir Danykiv Ph.D. in Economics, Credit Risk Manager, Fly Now Pay Later, United Kingdom;
Maksym
Bezpartochnyi
Dr. of Sciences, Prof. at the Department of Economics, Marketing and International
Economic Relations Faculty of Soft Engineering and Business National Aerospace University
named after N. Zhukovsky “Kharkiv Aviation Institute”, Ukraine;
Olena Chukurna Dr. of Sciences, Professor of State University «Odessa Polytechnic», Ukraine;
Viktor Trynchuk Ph.D., Assoc. Prof. of Department of Banking and Insurance National University of Life and
Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraine;
Yaroslava (Iaroslava)
Levchenko
Doctor of Economics, Professor of Kharkiv National Automobile and Highway University,
Ukraine;
Jurgita Sekliuckiene Professor of International Business, Kaunas University of Technology, Litva;
Sudhanshu Rai Associate Professor, Phd, Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark;
Panagiotis Kontakos Assistant Professor in International Business & Entrepreneurship, UCLan Cyprus University,
Cyprus;
Sahure Gonca Telli Prof. Dr., Dean Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Dogus University, Turkey;
Mustafa Erdogdu Professor of Department of Public Finance, Marmara University Faculty of Economics,
Turkey;
Radmila Pidlypna Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, chair of the Department of Finance UTEI Kyiv
National University of Trade and Economics, Ukraine;
Andrii Nikitin PhD in Economics, Associate Professor, Professor Kyiv National Economic University named
after Vadym Hetman, Ukraine;
Yasheva Galina Doctor of Economics, Professor, Vitebsk State Technological University, Belarus;
Liudmila Bagdonienė Professor at Kaunas University of Technology, Litva;
Hans van Meerten Professor, Utrecht University - Utrecht Centre for Shared Regulation and Enforcement in
Europe – RENFORCE, The Netherlands;
Reinhard Magenreuter Dr., Private investor MG GbR, Germany.
e-mail: vuzfreview@gmail.com; tkachivan9@gmail.com https://papersvuzf.net/index.php/VUZF/index, тел. +38(093) 752-81-56
The authors of articles are responsible for the authenticity of facts, quotes, their own names, geographical names, names of enterprises,
organizations, institutions and other information. Opinions expressed in these articles may not coincide with the point of view of the
editorial board and do not impose any obligations on it.

VUZF Review, № 7(1) – 2022 ISSN 2534-9228
CONTENT
1 Central Banks policy under sanctions: critical assessment of the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation experience
Vitaliy Shapran, Igor Britchenko …..……………..………………….……………………….. 6
2 Credit economy of banks during SARS-CoV-2
Irena Brukwicka, Iwona Dudzik …………….….……………………..………………….………. 14
3 Formation conditions and theoretical and methodological aspects of
assessment of the economy digital transformation level
Bartosz Mickiewicz, Yekaterina Volkova.…………..………………….…………………….. 22
4 Limitations of the framework to address value for money risk in the
European unit-linked market
Stanislav Dimitrov …………….….………………………………………………………………. 32
5 Identification of risks of the bank business model
Krasnova Іryna, Lavreniuk Vladislav, Nikitin Andrii …………………………………………………………….. 43
6 Sustainability reporting by companies: reasons and financial benefits
Georgi Momchilov..……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 55
7 The impact of behavioral aspects on the social capital of the tax service of
Ukraine
Viktoriya Hurochkina, Rіabinina Natalia………………………......................................................... 69
8 Sources of Financing Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Areas in the EU in
the Financial Perspective of 2021-2027
Alina Walenia........................................................................................................................... 80
9 The theoretical aspects of mathematical modeling in the banking on the ex
ample of compound interest
Anna Małgorzata Jatczak …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 88
10 Comparative analysis of innovative and socio-economic development of
enterprises and other purposeful systems
Horiashchenko Yuliia …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 97
11 Economic analysis based on indicators in the company
Maciej Ślusarczyk ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 108
12 Social insurance schemes: foreign experience in the realities of Ukraine
Radmila Pidlypna, Oksana Makara, Boris Shevchuk …………………………………………………………… 115
13 Values of the managers within their environments
Emanuela Esmerova, Ivana Stojcevska ……………………………………………………………………………….. 129
14 Theoretical and methodological aspects of keeping record of goods
exchange operations at transfer prices
Igor Kononov ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 142

VUZF Review, № 7(1) – 2022 ISSN 2534-9228
15 The phenomenon of succession in a family business
Izabella Kęsy, Marcin Kęsy …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 152
16 Digital economy: essence, approaches, elements, transformation
Yekaterina Volkova ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 161
17 Potential benefits and risks from Poland’s accession to the euro area
Iwona Dudzik, Irena Brukwicka …………………………………………………………………………………………… 169
18
Fourth industrial revolution as a driver of the digitalization of production
and urbanization
Kateryna Kraus, Nataliia Kraus, Kateryna Buzhdyhan …………………………………………………………. 177
19
Transparency in public life with particular emphasis on local government
finance
Marek Wolanin ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 192

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
Central Banks policy under sanctions: critical assessment of the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation experience
Vitaliy Shapran * А
; Igor Britchenko B
A
National Bank of Ukraine, Instytutska St, 9, Kyiv, 01601, Ukraine
B VUZF University, 1, Gusla str., Sofia, 1618, Bulgaria
Received: March 25, 2022 | Revised: March 26, 2022 | Accepted: March 28, 2022
JEL Classification: E.31, E.32, E.52, E.58.
DOI: 10.38188/2534-9228.22.1.01
Abstract
The article provides a critical assessment of The Central Bank of the Russian Federation policy in
response to the sanctions of the US, the EU, the UK, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea and a number
of other countries. The effect of sanctions on the Russian economy and its financial market is viewed
through the prism of credit, interest rate, and currency risk, and the risk of a decline in business
activity. Special attention is paid to the inflationary component and inflationary expectations of the
Russian Federation, as well as to the forecasts for a decline in business activity in Russia. A critical
assessment is given to the actions of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the economic
bloc of the government of the Russian Federation as a whole in response to the sanctions of the
civilized world, which disable the normal existence of the economy and the main purpose of which
is not to destroy the economy of the Russian Federation but to ensure the end of hostilities on the
European continent. The results of our study will be useful to everyone who studies the problems of
the effect of economic sanctions on the resource-based economy and the processes of stimulating
political decisions by economic methods.
Keywords: credit markets, development markets, inflation, inflation target, monetary policy,
monetary regime, monetary transmission, prime rates, sanctions.
Introduction
The start of the full-scale military aggression
of the Russian Federation against Ukraine was a
stroke not only for the economy of the European
region, but also for the world economy as a
whole. The war between the two countries,
which remain prominent producers of
agricultural raw materials (cereals, oilseeds, and
other agricultural crops), was instantly reflected
in the dynamics of prices on the world market. It
is also important to consider the reaction of the
aggressor country to the sanctions of civilized
countries. The sanctions were intended not to
destroy the Russian Federation economy but
only to create additional incentives to start
effective peace negotiations.
* Corresponding author:
A Professor, Ph.D. in Economics, Member of the National bank of Ukraine Council, e-mail: shapranv@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-1540-6834
B
Dr. of Sciences, Professor Higher School of Insurance and Finance, e-mail: ibritchenko@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-9196-8740
The economic interpretation of the sanctions
and the analysis of their consequences for the
Russian economy are very important for the
correct interpretation of the goals of these
sanctions and the restoration of the economic
and agricultural balance in the region. The
reaction of the Russian economy to sanctions
and the effectiveness of countering these
sanctions by the Russian authorities have not
been studied yet, making this research pioneer.
Moreover, in the course of the study, we came
to rather non-standard conclusions that
economic protection against sanctions does not
work as such, and sanctions themselves, like
military actions, are force majeure
6

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
circumstances that cannot be stopped by
economic methods. These conclusions were
made on the basis of studying the first reaction
of the Russian authorities to the economic
sanctions of civilized countries, as well as
studying further scenarios for the development
of the situation and a possible change in the
intensity of sanctions pressure.
Material and methods
In our study, we relied primarily on official
statistics and reports from The Central Bank of
the Russian Federation (CBRF), as well as on
news reports from leading news agencies, the
quality of which has been repeatedly tested by
time: Reuters, Bloomberg, Interfax. We admit
possible data inaccuracies since the primary
sources are the state authorities that are
currently in a war state, placed under conditions
of violation of the basic principles of freedom of
speech and democracy. Also, in the study, we
used such methods as analysis, synthesis, and
historical comparison.
Results and discussion
The economic sanctions imposed by the US,
the UK, the EU, Japan, and other countries had a
multidirectional character. These sanctions can
be divided into several classes:
1. Freezing of gold and foreign exchange
reserves of CBRF and The National Welfare Fund
of the Russian Federation.
2. Freezing of assets of a number of banks on
correspondent accounts outside the Russian
Federation.
3. Prohibition on direct or indirect purchase
and import of US dollar and Euro cash banknotes
into the territory of the Russian Federation.
4. Sanctions against individual banks that
were disconnected from the SWIFT
international transfer system.
5. Sanctions against insurance and
reinsurance companies, a ban on the presence
of European ratings for insurance or reinsurance
companies.
6. Personal sanctions against officials of the
Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus
who were involved in the aggression.
7. Sanctions against big businessmen
(oligarchs) who have earned their fortune due to
warm relations with the Russian authorities.
8. A ban on the export to the Russian
Federation of high-tech products, as well as
products and services that are important for the
development of the oil and gas industry and
other key sectors of the Russian Federation.
9. Ban on the export of transportation and
traffic-related services, such as aircraft
certification.
10. Trade sanctions that provide for a
complete or partial ban on the export of goods
and services to the territory of the Russian
Federation, as well as a complete or partial ban
on the import of energy resources from the
Russian Federation.
In total, all 10 groups of sanctions produce
the following types of risks: currency risk, risk of
the decline of business activity, credit risk, and
interest rate risk. Each of the risks will be
considered now in its practical aspect.
1. Currency risk. The main reason for the
manifestation of currency risk in the Russian
Federation was both a bunch of sanctions in
general and the freezing of reserves of The
Central Bank of the Russian Federation in the
US, EU, UK, Japan, and South Korea. These
countries have frozen approximately $400
billion of CBRF and The National Welfare Fund
(NWF) reserves in total. And although the
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
underestimates this amount by about $100
billion, comparative statistics from the US and
the EU show that the amount of frozen assets of
the CBRF and the NWF is closer to $400 billion.
Only gold (approximately $135 billion worth)
and several tens of billions of Chinese yuan
remained in the management of the CBRF from
the gold and foreign exchange reserves.
In the second decade of March 2022, it
became clear that the CBRF did not expect a
freeze on reserves and kept a very small part of
7

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
them in cash dollars and euros. The situation
was so critical that on March 9, the CBRF banned
the sale of cash to the public. In response, the
US and the EU banned the sale and import into
the territory of the Russian Federation (directly
or indirectly) of cash dollars or euros. With its
ban on the sale of cash, the CBRF effectively
admitted that it was unable to cope with
maintaining the exchange rate, as it had lost its
supply of reserve currencies, and the yuan is a
very unpopular savings currency among
Russians and Russian companies. Therefore, it
was decided not only to ban the sale of cash
currency but also a number of restrictions on
imports, as well as a decision to force exporters
to sell 80% of foreign exchange earnings for
January and February 2022 (this decision was
actually made retroactively).
As a result, it should be understood that by
segmenting the foreign exchange market, CBRF
introduced a plurality of ruble exchange rates:
non-cash (for official transactions and critical
imports), gray non-cash and black-market cash
rates. The active information policy of CBRF and
the habit of the main stakeholders to believe
that the exchange rate of the ruble reflects the
real rate made it possible to slightly calm the
market. However, a deeper study of the
situation leads to the discovery that from March
15 to March 20, 2022, they gave from 135 to 225
rubles for one US dollar on the black market of
the Russian Federation, while the exchange rate
on the exchange was 107-120 rubles per dollar.
Also, the study of the cash market showed that
even with a quote of 135 rubles, the black dealer
did not always have cash currency for sale. In
addition, surprising cases with additional
commissions of banks were recorded. For
example, when trying to withdraw cash in euros
in one of the banks in the EU, the bank
demanded an additional commission of 12.5%
of the withdrawal amount. Thus, with the
exchange rate, for example, 150 rubles per euro
and the rate of the international payment
system 155 rubles per euro, the real rate could
be 175 rubles per euro.
The multiplicity of exchange rates in the
Russian Federation became more pronounced
when it emerged that citizens were allowed to
withdraw no more than 10,000 US dollars from
foreign currency deposits but with banks
intensifying the situation with burdening these
amounts with additional commissions that
reached 15%. Later, the CBRF ordered the return
of these commissions, but it appeared that the
cash desks of banks receive cash at very high
costs, which they are not able to cover.
By March 23, 2022, CBRF brought down the
exchange rate to below 100 rubles per dollar,
however, in the Moscow cash market, the
maximum quotes for 1 cash dollar were at the
level of 170-225 rubles per 1 US dollar.
Temporarily, CBRF used the multi-rate
technique to enable "elite" currency buyers to
conduct more or less normal business activity
and not affect inflation in the retail sails.
However, this did not slow down the pace of
devaluation, and the real selling rate of the cash
dollar for the period from February 23 to March
23 increased from 80 to 170 rubles (with some
effort, it was possible to buy a small amount
from 135 rubles per dollar). As a result, the
growth rate of the dollar against the ruble for
the month amounted to at least 70%.
The effect of currency risk on the economy of
the Russian Federation has a classic character of
manifestation:
• the transfer of a rapid devaluation to
inflationary processes in the consumer market;
• mass withdrawal of deposits from banks in
rubles and conversion of rubles into US dollars
or euros, with an outflow of resources from the
banking sector;
• the maximum impact on inflation in the
segment of unofficial supply, the formation of
the maximum trade margin on goods that can
only be smuggled into the territory of the
Russian Federation at the black-market rate,
including for sub-sanctioned goods;
• formation of a pool of problem loans from
among foreign currency loans, the borrowers of
which have lost all or the part of their foreign
8

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
exchange earnings (for example, Russian
airlines).
In our opinion, in March 2022, the CBRF was
unable to block any of the manifestations of the
currency risk, perhaps only reducing the impact
of devaluation on consumer inflation in the
segment of bulk and official supply. In all other
cases, the multiplicity of exchange rates only
slightly delayed the manifestation of this risk but
did not eradicate it.
2. Interest rate risk. In the first days after the
invasion, the CBRF reacted with a sharp increase
in the key rate: from 9.5% to 20%. With this
decision, the Central Bank of Russia tried to stop
the outflow of capital from the country, and
most importantly, to reduce the outflow of
deposits from banks. A few days after the
change in the interest rate, Sberbank, which
accounts for more than 50% of the deposits of
the population of the Russian Federation, set
the interest rate on short-term deposits at 18%,
and some state-owned banks raised it to 22%. In
the third decade of March 2022, many banks
lowered deposit rates, believing that the
outflow of resources from the banking system in
the amount of 1.2 trillion rubles was overcome.
However, interest rate risk did only begin to
destroy the Russian banking sector.
First, there was no victory in the return of 1.2
trillion rubles to the banking system of the
Russian Federation. Money only described the
circle: part of the population's deposits was
withdrawn from banks ahead of time and spent
on the consumption of goods and services, after
which the money again went to banks, but no
longer to current accounts of companies; part of
the resources was replaced by CBRF through
ruble refinancing. It turns out that in March
2022, the structure of the resource base of
Russian banks changed towards an increase in
more expensive and less urgent refinancing
from CBRF instead of cheaper time deposits
from the population. On the whole, the share of
time deposits in the resources attracted by
banks decreased.
Secondly, it turned out that about 40% of the
volume of loans of the Russian banking system
were issued at a floating rate, which was pegged
to the CBRF key rate. Usually, the contracts fixed
the coefficient by which the “market rate” was
calculated. For banks, on average, this
coefficient ranged from 1.2 to 1.5. But with the
growth of the key rate to 20%, interest rates on
loans soared from 24% to 30% per annum.
Commercial companies, which previously paid
12-18% per annum, faced with the need for a
sharp increase in interest costs. Some of the
agro-industrial complex enterprises applied to
the government to be included in preferential
support programs. The federal government
generously promised support not only to the
agro-industrial complex, but also to other
industries, the performance of which the
population of the Russian Federation is very
sensitive to. Such promises of the Russian
government will become a budgetary burden
already in the second half of the year and will
require sequestration of the 2022 federal
budget. But an almost twofold increase in the
interest burden on borrowers in the Russian
Federation will almost inevitably lead to a
deterioration in the quality of bank loans and to
the bankruptcy of small banks. The process of
transformation of interest rate risk into credit
risk in the Russian Federation may take 6-9
months, but the wave of the first defaults may
begin in 3 months. It turns out that the desire of
the CBRF to regulate the impact of currency risk
on the financial system through a sharp increase
in interest rates launched the flywheel of
interest rate risk. And the desire of the
government to issue more preferential loans will
be a burden on the budget, the revenue plan of
which will not be fulfilled.
3. Credit risk. While the currency and interest
rate risk has just begun the transformation of
Russian borrowers from good to bad quality of
risk, a number of industries that have fallen
under the sanctions of civilized countries have
already become the epicenters of credit risks.
For example, almost all Russian airlines whose
aircraft are leased from foreign leasing
companies are already in a default mode. After
the imposition of sanctions, insurance
9

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
companies providing aviation insurance and
lessors demanded that the aircraft leave the
territory of the Russian Federation. In response,
the Russian Federation blocked the return of the
planes by stealing planes worth approximately
13 billion US dollars from the world market. The
refusal of Boeing and Airbus to certify aircraft in
the Russian Federation did not confuse the
authorities, and they started internal
certification. But now this means that imported
Boeing and Airbus cannot fly abroad even to
those countries whose skies are still open for the
Russian Federation. For such flights, Russian
airlines need to return old IL-76 or TU-134
aircraft or accelerate the production of the new
ones. In practice, this led to a drop in airline
revenue by several times. Not a single borrower
can withstand such pressure. Defaults of Russian
airlines towards banks will begin in the next 3
months, and for credit analysts, this is a credit
risk that has already taken place.
The second point is the stock section of the
Moscow Exchange, which has been closed since
February 25. For a month now, banks, insurers,
and other non-banking financial companies
have been accounting for shares and bonds of
Russian issuers in their portfolios at the rates
that were formed in February at the start of the
war between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation. The opening of the stock exchange
will lead to the fact that credit institutions and
insurers will be forced to re-evaluate their
securities portfolios upon completion of trading,
which may lose up to 50% of their value. In this
situation, 10-15 small banks that previously
actively worked on the bond and stock market
may leave the market. This will also be a direct
implementation of credit risk in practice. So far,
the CBRF has done nothing to combat the
manifestation of credit risks in the banking or
insurance sector. The Central Bank of Russia is
only postponing the opening of the Moscow
Exchange, and it cannot counteract the decline
in business activity due to sanctions since it does
not have the tools to do so.
4. The risk of a sharp decline in business
activity remains the main sanction risk of the
Russian Federation, which, although being
outside the CBRF perimeter, directly or
indirectly affects the structure of the sectoral
markets of the Russian economy. Also, this risk
is pushing the CBRF into an emergency fight
against currency, interest rate and credit risks.
In our opinion, the key factors for the decline in
business activity in the Russian Federation
under the influence of sanctions are:
• the oil embargo and the desire of the EU
countries and the UK to reduce energy
dependence on the Russian Federation;
• mass withdrawal of foreign companies
from the Russian Federation (the number is
already about 200 companies), which
announced either a complete curtailment of
activities or the cancellation of previously
announced projects;
• mass withdrawal of banks with foreign
capital from the banking system of the Russian
Federation.
The direct share of the oil and gas sector of
the Russian Federation amounted to about 16%
of the country's GDP but it was very dynamic
due to changes in the external environment and
price dynamics. However, there were a lot of
related industries related to the oil and gas
industry, and many joint projects with
foreigners. Together with subcontractors and
dependent industries, part of the oil and gas
sector accounted for up to a third of the Russian
economy.
A reduction in oil and gas purchases from the
Russian Federation could cause the Russian
economy to fall by up to 15-20% in 2022. The
Russian Federation has no alternative routes
along which the Russian Federation will be able
to quickly reorient gas and oil flows. Today, the
Russian Federation cannot even quickly organize
the sale of oil to China through Kazakhstan due
to the small diameters of pipelines. The
construction of gas pipelines may take 5-7 years,
and their cost may exceed Nord Stream 2. Given
the shortage of foreign currency in the Russian
Federation, it is impossible to implement such
projects in an accelerated mode without the
help of China. In addition, it should be taken into
10

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
account that URALS brand oil will not suit most
oil refineries in the world, so its export range is
limited to some countries of the former USSR,
Africa and some Asian countries.
The mass exodus of foreign companies from
the Russian Federation is dangerous by itself, as
it produces a whole bunch of risks: currency
(capital outflow), credit (destruction of industry
ties), and the risk of mass unemployment in
certain regions or cities.
Companies from the EU, the US, Japan, and
other countries have stated that they do not
want to work with and invest in the Russian
Federation. Most of these companies, according
to Russian laws, will begin to lay off personnel
only a month after such a statement, i.е. the
peak of unemployment from the departed
companies will be visible only in April-May 2022.
The impact on Russia's GDP will be noticeable
according to the statistics of the third quarter of
2022. Because of the departure of foreigners,
Moscow and St. Petersburg, the main
consumers of imported products, may suffer
primarily. The total number of unemployed only
in Moscow and St. Petersburg by May 1 may
reach 1 million people. And this is only direct
unemployment associated with the departure of
foreigners.
5. Mutual migration of risks and results for
the Russian economy. As we saw from the
previous 4 points, the risks awakened by
sanctions tend to produce each other and
strengthen their effect in practice. These
processes can be cyclical or continuous. The
chain, when the manifestation of currency risk
leads to the monetary authorities increasing
interest rate risk, which, together with currency
risk, supplies bad borrowers to the bank loan
market, leading to the flow of bad borrowers
amplified by sanctions due to a fall in business
activity in the country, always works. The
authorities need to make a lot of efforts in order
to break the cyclical transfer of risks from one to
another, as well as their support of negative
trends in the economy.
Today, we see attempts to stop the actions of
the entire set of risks only from the government
through preferential loans and preferential
rates. This tool would be effective if it could
make a surplus of the Russian Federation's
federal budget. However, these programmes
seem inefficient in fighting the sanctions, and
the Russian budget is expected to undergo
sequestration in the summer of 2022.
Russian Central Bank did not manage to
break the chain of mutual risk support: currency,
credit, interest rate. A high inflation rate could
weaken the connections between the risks and
formally decrease interest rate pressure on the
borrowers, yet it would not make a difference in
business activity decline. Inflation is a poor tool
for tackling the risk correlation, as a high
inflation rate does not imply a proportionate
income increase between actors in the market.
For instance, the boost of incomes in the food
industry enterprises could outpace the income
growth of importers of household appliances,
which could be sold less in case of devaluation.
In turn, there are no signs that CBRF would
use policy elements to suppress the functioning
cyclicality of interest rate, credit and currency
risks in the financial sector. There are only
attempts to decrease the implications of these
risks. This policy would lead to an increase in
inflation and the unemployment rate in 2022.
Consequently, by the end of 2022, the
Russian Federation will have experienced a 10-
15% unemployment rate and increased inflation
(according to the most modest ratings, up to
20%). Currently, the expectations on the
inflation rate estimate up to 19%, but in some
food industry sectors, it reached 45%. Sanctions
do have a direct effect both on the inflationary
spiral and unemployment rate. Therefore, it is
impossible to suppress these negative
phenomena with the CBRF's high-interest-rate
policy. The Central Bank of Russia directors team
is well-aware of it, which is evident from their
public statements.
Nevertheless, instead of conveying the
viewpoint of high-class professionals to the
Russian political leadership and clarifying the
consequences of imposing more severe
sanctions, CBRF took the position of the formal
11

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
perpetrator when anti-sanctions measures are
taken with negative deliberative results for the
economy. CBRF's position of "consent" with the
functioning of the security structures mark its
low independency level from the executive
power vertical in Russia. It also indicates the
collaboration of CBRF's board of directors (as
management body) in financing the war in
Ukraine. The degree of such involvement
expanded and became tangible when in mid-
March, CBRF issued a regulation that allowed
insurers and lenders not to share details of their
owners. CBRF interpreted this initiative as a
desire to oppose sanctions. This way, CBRF in
mid-March 2022 acted in a way that allowed
civilized states to include the entire CBRF board
of directors into the sanctions list, which would
make its work with the external risks even more
complicated.
It is also crucial to note the global economic
consequences of war in Ukraine – the food
shortage and the rise in the cost of food raw
materials in some market segments. According
to the government of Cameroon, the bread
prices there increased up to 40% because of the
disruptions in the grain supply from Ukraine.
Nevertheless, there are reverted tendencies as
well. In Ecuador, riots broke out among farmers.
The sanctions imposed on the Russian seaports
caused Ecuadorians not to be able to send
20000 tons of bananas to the consumers, which
may cause a drop in banana prices on the global
market soon. The banana market is a primary
export market for Ecuador, and the longevity of
such a situation may lead to a financial crisis
there.
The countries of Eurasian Economic
Communities do experience these problems
too, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia.
For instance, the majority of anti-Russian
sanctions were duplicated upon Belarus. The
National Bank of Kazakhstan was forced to
introduce currency restrictions on the export of
foreign currency, as its chronic deficit from
Russia spilled over Kazakhstan, formally not
engaged in the war with Ukraine. Rising energy
prices for Germany and France may accelerate
inflation in the euro area, and the same trends
may be observed in the UK. Thus, the
responsibility for the global economic problems
caused by military operations in Ukraine also lies
with the authorities of the Russian Federation.
Conclusions
1. A set of sanctions from civilized countries
evoked a number of the classic risks for the
Russian economy: currency, interest rate and
credit risks have already launched migration and
vice versa. The CBRF and the economic bloc of
the Russian government do not have sufficient
tools and resources to counter the practical
realization of these risks.
2. The catalyst for the work of currency,
interest rate and credit risks in the Russian
economy is the risk of a decrease in business
activity under the influence of sanctions. CBRF
does not have adequate tools to counter such a
risk, which by itself can reduce the scale of the
Russian economy, raise the unemployment rate
to 15%, and inflation from 20% already in 2022.
3. All efforts by the CBRF to mitigate the
consequences of sanctions delay the practical
implementation of risks in time but do not solve
the problem in essence. CBRF formed a currency
reserve, forcing Russian exporters to sell 80% of
foreign exchange earnings for January and
February 2022, and did not cancel this norm in
March. Such stock may run out already in April-
May, and then the classic set of risks will make
itself felt again.
4. CBRF's active anti-sanctions policy and
CBRF's assistance to sanctioned persons in
circumventing sanctions indicate that the CBRF
Board of Directors was directly involved in
financing the war in Ukraine and, therefore,
should also be included in the sanctions list. We
should also acknowledge the deficient level of
independence of the CBRF from the vertical of
the executive power of the Russian Federation
and the inability of The Central Bank of Russia to
pursue an independent policy, which certainly
undermines confidence in the ruble and the
12

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
Russian banking system, which most foreign
banks are abandoning. This trend is a problem
for all the central banks of the countries of the
Eurasian Economic Community, which are
forced to work in current conditions not only
with an unreliable partner but also with a source
of additional risks.
5. The Russian economy and the war in
Ukraine have become a problem not only for the
European region. The economic echoes of the
conflict are already being heard in Africa, Latin
America, and the Eurasian Economic
Community countries. If the Russian crisis is not
localized, then even the prosperous countries of
Europe will feel its consequences in the next
month or two.
References
News database of the agency Interfax.
News database of the agency Reuters.
News database of the agency Bloomberg.
Official Web-Site of the Central Bank of Russian
Federation.
13

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
Credit economy of banks during SARS-CoV-2
Irena Brukwicka * А
; Iwona DudzikB
A, B Bronisław Markiewicz State Higher School of Technology and Economics in Jarosław, Czarnieckiego str. 16, Jarosław, 37-500 Poland
Received: January 09, 2022 | Revised: January 18, 2022 | Accepted: March 28, 2022
JEL Classification: G14, G17, G21, G32.
DOI: 10.38188/2534-9228.22.1.02
Abstract
Each pandemic is the greatest potential, negative and global risk, especially when it is connected
with high morbidity and mortality. There are also negative social and economic effects
associated with a pandemic. The world is fighting nowadays against the COVID-19 pandemic,
which is caused by SARS-CoV-2. Thus, there is high concern about the global economy. In the
opinion of some analysts, COVID-19 will contribute to the global recession.
It is worth emphasizing that the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, the Financial Stability
Committee, as well as the National Bank of Poland undertake actions focused on introduction of
measures aimed at maintaining the availability of credit for entrepreneurs. At the same time,
the Polish Bank Association (ZBP) initiated some facilitations for bank customers with regard to
paying off liabilities, as well as extending the period of the loan itself (A. Sieroń, 2021).
For those involved in observation of central banks activities, it is obvious that the monetary
policy reaction to the situation resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic is dictated by many
reasons, and thus, is considered to be exceptional. The purpose of this analysis is to examine in
a systematic manner some of the aspects of the above unique situation and to make some
comments. The observations described in the paper result only from information relating to the
initial reactions of banks to the situation connected with the COVID-19 pandemic. It would be
wrong to say that banks can be considered completely safe today. New economic and social
events could contribute to the inefficiency of this sector. One of such event is the COVID-19
pandemic. In the long run, there may be more risks of this kind.
Keywords: credit economy, market, consumer, interest rates.
Introduction
As a result of the spread of the COVID-19
pandemic all over the world, significant
changes in the economy and financial liquidity
of enterprises in Poland are observed. It may
also affect the financial capacity of the
enterprises themselves to settle their
liabilities with regard to financial institutions
in a timely manner, thus limiting the
availability of debt financing and the ability of
banks to finance the economy. (A. Sieroń,
2021). The aim of this article is to show the
way the credit market responds to the COVID-
А PhD, adjunct, The Bronisław Markiewicz State Higher School of Technology and Economics in Jarosław, e-mail: brukwicka.irena@op.pl, ORCID: 0000-0002-
2213-702X
B PhD, adjunct, The Bronisław Markiewicz State Higher School of Technology and Economics in Jarosław, e-mail: iwona.dudzik@op.pl, ORCID: 0000-0001-
6434-9699
19 pandemic. The subject of the paper is the
credit economy of banks during the SARS-CoV-
2.
The coronavirus pandemic is definitely a
humanitarian crisis, but it should be
emphasized, at the same time, that it also has
fundamental social and economic
implications. The main consequences include
the increased likelihood of a recession in 2021.
It is highly probable that the economic growth
will return after the end of the COVID-19
pandemic. In the Republic of Poland, it is
14

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
indicated that the probability of a deep
recession is lower than in other European
countries, however, a slowdown in economic
growth is probable and real. (A. Sieroń, 2021).
The Polish Bank Association (ZBP) is
working quite intensively on introduction of
measures to maintain the availability of credit
for entrepreneurs. Moreover, it initiated some
facilitations for bank customers with regard to
paying off liabilities, as well as extending the
period of the loan itself. (A. Sieroń, 2021). All
the proposed solutions, however, should be
considered in the light of applicable legal
regulations, and their application may require
prior legislative actions (A. Sieroń, 2021).
When analyzing the credit economy of
banks during the COVID-19 pandemic, it
should be noted that cash loans are drawn
less frequently in comparison to the previous
year. However, the number of processed loan
applications has not been reduced to zero,
and borrowers are willing to incur much
lower loan obligations than before. The
number of installment purchases has also
increased (https://www.
Obserwatorfinansowy.pl, 2021).
Thus, it is worth pointing out that many
institutions have decided to limit their
activities in connection with the coronavirus
pandemic. Banks were also among such
institutions. Despite the fact that the vast
majority of banks indicate that they are still
operating, some of them limited themselves
only to the remote mode (A. Sieroń, 2021).
It is also possible to apply for a cash loan.
Banking institutions implement solutions that
would enable them to incur this obligation,
apart from the necessity to personal contact
with the bank (A. Sieroń, 2021).
Taking into account the above mentioned,
there is a question if the COVID-19 pandemic
has adversely affected banks' credit decision-
making. At the same time, the main lending
conditions are changing, especially those
relating to the amount of credit interest
itself. (A. Sieroń, 2021).
In March 2020, banks changed the way of
their employees work in order to guarantee
them the greatest possible safety related to
the COVID-19 pandemic. Numerous sanitary
restrictions, as well as safety rules, have been
introduced not only in Poland, but also in
other countries, which have contributed,
inter alia, to changes in the activities of
banking establishments. Restrictions have
been implemented, for example, with regard
to the number of the customers being
present at a banking establishment at the
same time. The restrictions related to the
need to maintain an appropriate distance
between bank employees and its customers
have also changed (A. Sieroń, 2021).
In addition, during the COVID-19
pandemic, the banks had to prepare the
appropriate offers and introduce the
appropriate procedures in the context of
suspending repayments of mortgage loans,
cash loans and other liabilities (A. Sieroń,
2021).
It is also worth noting that despite the fact
that a small number of people are currently
making efforts to incur liabilities in the bank,
the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic
contributed to the deterioration of the
economic situation in a large part of
households, thus reducing automatically
creditworthiness (https: //www.
Obserwatorfinansowy.pl, 2021).
Significant effects also occurred during the
second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.
COVID-19 has also contributed to the
negative changes in the state economy. In
order to stimulate consumer demand and to
support various industries in Poland, the
Monetary Policy Council decided to lower
fundamental interest rates several times.
However, the demand for business loans
has changed, it can be seen on the basis of the
data in the chart below.
15

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
Chart 1. Criteria for granting loans and
demand for business loans
Source: Lending criteria and demand for business
loans,
https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/rynki-
finansowe/bankowosc/banki- zaostrzaja-wymogi-
udzielania-kredytow-w-obliczu-pandemii/#fullimg0
[Access: 23.03.2021]
It is predicted that low interest rates will
continue to function the following 2-3 years.
Thus, favorable loan offers will be recorded
during this period. At the same time, however,
it should be noted that there is connection
between the loan itself and COVID-19 in the
form of an increase in commission for granting
a loan, but this does not refer to every bank (K.
Spurgiasz, 2021).
According to the forecasts for 2021, the
number of loans during the COVID-19
pandemic will gradually increase, although it
undoubtedly depends on the development of
the situation and subsequent waves of the
pandemic. Banks continue to grant loans. It is
still possible to submit on-line loan
applications. Nevertheless, borrowers must
take into account the necessity to take out
loan insurance. Despite the fact that a
significant part of Polish citizens should not
have difficulties with obtaining a cash loan, it
is still necessary to have proper
creditworthiness (K. Spurgiasz, 2021).
The figures of the Credit Information
Bureau for 2020 clearly indicate that Polish
citizens were more cautious about taking
loans last year. It can be seen in Chart 2.
Chart 2. The amount of new credits and loans
granted in 2020, in total PLN 141 billion
Source: Totalmoney.pl on the basis of BIK
The sales of cash loans and loans that Poles
willingly took out for the purchase of a vehicle,
renovation or furnishing of an apartment, as well
as the purchase of RTV equipment and household
appliances, dropped sharply. It seems intriguing
that 13% of respondents took a loan to repay the
previously taken out loan (A. Serafin, 2021). And
what is more interesting, Poles took out
installment loans more enthusiastically. It should
be supposed that they decided to implement the
plans that they could not afford and used an
alternative form by making purchases in
installments. It is the only loan product to record
growth and lending value from year to year (+
0.8% compared to 2019) (A. Serafin, 2021). On the
other hand, when it goes about cash loans, the
situation is presented in Figure 3.
Chart 3. Dynamics of cash loans sales
Source: https://media.bik.pl/informacje-
prasowe/att/1723738
16

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
The above chart, prepared by BIK, at the turn
of 03/04 2020 shows that the demand for cash
loans decreased by almost 70%. The above
situation was caused by the beginning of the
first wave of the pandemic and the introduced
restrictions. The following months brought the
situation improvement, which resulted in a
renewed demand for cash loans, and the banks
were extremely eager to grant them.
In the above situation, it is far from the
former popularity of this type of liabilities, and
the dynamics of loan sales is still more than 20%
away from at least a year ago. The situation will
therefore depend on the “bloom” of the
pandemic, the reaction of the government or
specific monetary institutions, and it is not easy
at that time to presume anything about the
credit policy of banks (Https://media.bik.pl,
2021).
In the case of the impact of the pandemic on
the conditions for receiving a cash loan (positive
decision), it turned out to be more difficult even
when the customer previously had low
creditworthiness or negative entries in the
credit history. In case of health and economic
crisis, banks are trying to minimize the risk
associated with granting loans. Many of them
decided to make verification of customers in
order to decide the amount and people for
granting a loan. In order to meet customers’
expectations, banks initiated loans granted on-
line, especially in case of loans up to several
dozen thousand zlotys and for a short period of
time (https://media.bik.pl, 2020).
The pandemic had also a negative impact on
the sale of mortgage loans that are relatively
more complex or difficult to obtain, even under
normal conditions. This situation is presented in
Chart 4. The chart below shows a significant
decrease in interest in this type of loans,
especially in March and April, 2020. In this case,
as with cash loans, the demand for mortgage
loans began to grow again. Moreover, the BIK
Index Value - Demand for Housing Loans
communicates about the annual dynamics of
the value of applied housing loans. The index
was + 8.1%, which means that in October 2020,
according to the number of working days,
monetary institutions in the form of banks sent
to BIK inquiries about mortgage loans for an
amount higher by 8.1% in relation to October
2019 (https://media.bik.pl, 2020).
Chart 4. Demand for housing loans
Source: https://media.bik.pl/informacje-
prasowe/591695/bik-indeks-popytu-na-kredyty-
mieszkaniowe-wyniosl-w-pazdzierniku-2020-r-8-1
Taking into account the above trends in the
behavior of borrowers, pandemic realities, or
getting used to them, the forecast is made for
2021, it is shown in Chart 5.
Chart 5. Forecast of loan sales in 2021 (PLN billion)
Source: Totalmoney.pl on the basis of BIK
Figure 5 illustrates the growing interest in
housing and installment loans in 2021 with
moderate optimism. BIK predicts that the sale of
cash loans will amount to PLN 60 billion in 2021,
therefore it will increase by 16.1%. The demand
17

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
for housing loans will amount to PLN 72 billion, it
will increase by 13.9%, and BIK expects an increase
ininstallmentloansby4.8%,that is,PLN15.3billion
for new loans (D. Sudoł, 2021).
It goes without saying that the COVID-19
pandemic has affected various industries, and thus
changed the everyday life of the entire world,
including Polish citizens. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the COVID-19 pandemic also
contributed to the method and manner of verifying
bankcustomerswhengrantingloans.Currently,the
banks are aware that maintaining the workplace at
the current level is a highly questionable situation.
They are also aware of the possibility of a sharp
increase in the unemployment rate and the
exclusionofmanyPolesfromthegroupofpotential
borrowers (K. Spurgiasz, 2021).
Therefore, it shouldn’t be a surprise that banks
take cautious actions in making credit decisions, as
they are not inclined to incur an additional
increased risk. For this reason, they exercise due
diligence in assessing the creditworthiness of
potential customers (K. Spurgiasz, 2021).
In connection with the above, banks undertake
activities that would more closely verify the
situation of personsapplyingfor a credit obligation.
There is no doubt that more advanced
creditworthiness in times of the COVID-19
pandemic will be required for mortgage loans (K.
Spurgiasz, 2021).
Therefore, it seems unjustified to presume that
they refrain from granting loans during the
coronavirus pandemic. Banks, surely, conduct their
activitiesfocusedonearnings. Thus,fortheirown
safety, they are required to verify properly
potential borrowers. Despite the fact that the
assessment of creditworthiness does not
guarantee the repayment of the contracted
liability, it can undoubtedly contribute to the risk
reduction. However, if banksdo not have adequate
capacity to properly assess the creditworthiness of
a given entity, they resign from granting loans (K.
Spurgiasz, 2021).
Bankshave always been associated with the risk
of granting loans and the creditworthiness of
potential borrowers. At the same time, however, it
should be emphasized that this riskhas not been as
significant for many years as during the COVID-19
pandemic. This pandemic has caused a crisis in
manysectors,andstateassistancehasprovedtobe
insufficient in many of them. Uncertainty is also
growingallthetime,asitisdifficulttoevenforecast
the date of the pandemic end. Even if the potential
borrower did not lose his job, his remuneration
could be significantly reduced during the above
period. Despite the fact that borrowers have
indefiniteemploymentcontract,itisnotpossibleto
have full certainty as to their financial situation (K.
Spurgiasz, 2021).
When analyzing the credit economy during
the COVID-19 pandemic, it is also worth noting
that banks received nearly 600,000 applications
for a deferral of loan installments at the
beginning of the pandemic. The majority of
them have been granted by banks. The sum of
the deferred installments amounted to nearly
several billion zlotys. According to the European
Banking Authority, this credit moratorium
should only apply to the bank customers who
were not in arrears with payment at the time of
the pandemic. In this way, the Polish Bank
Association also commented the issue, referred
by the Human Rights Defender, concerning help
for borrowers directly affected by the pandemic.
(https://www.parkiet.com/Finanse, 2021).
This is the way the banks make decisions.
They don’t give loans to borrowers who have
experienced delays in repayment of their
liabilities in the past. Considering the ethical
issues, they remain unresolved, because such
banking practices may contribute to the fact
that borrowers will be at risk of falling in a debt
spiral, incurring further debts in order to pay off
the previous charges (Https://www.rpo.gov.pl) ,
2021).
The Polish Bank Association also makes
efforts to collect information on the total
number and reasons for complaints that
consumers submit to the banks. The Polish Bank
Association also emphasizes that the positive
assessment of bank’s offer is also evidenced by
18

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF review, 7(1)
the relatively small number of complaints
submitted by consumers (https:
//www.rpo.gov.pl, 2021).
It is worth noting that, in the opinion of the
Polish Bank Association, development and
implementation of the bank assistance program
depend on compliance with Polish and EU legal
regulations referring to creditworthiness. There
are the restrictions on the implementation of
the banking program introduced, for example,
by the European Banking Authority, according to
which the assistance should be addressed only
to those clients whose financial situation was
assessed as satisfactory until the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore no arrears in
the repayment of previous liabilities were
observed. It is worth noting that, in the opinion
of the Polish Bank Association, it is currently
difficult to forecast the economic effects of the
pandemic and its impact in the context of the
Polish economy, including the finances of Polish
consumers and entrepreneurs
(https://www.rpo.gov.pl, 2021).
When analyzing the credit economy during
the COVID-19 pandemic, it is worth noting that
in the third quarter of 2020 the lending trend
changed and the criteria for borrowers, who
showed interest in financing the purchase of real
estate, were simplified. Almost 40% of banks
decided to take such measures. Despite the fact
that many of these banks have increased their
margins in this respect, every fifth bank decided
to lower the requirements for the minimum own
contribution. A situation where the borrower by
means of credit covers nearly 90% of the entire
property has become a real one (https:
//www.rpo.gov.pl, 2021).
On the other hand, with regard to contracting
consumer loans, a visible wave of banking
institutions liberalization was not observed. It
should be noted however that the very scale of
the unfavorable changes, from the point of view
of the borrower himself, was assessed as
considerably smaller. Despite the fact that
among nearly 40% of the banks, a continuation
of the increase in expectations towards the
borrowers themselves was observed, in nearly
30% of the banks, despite the fact that it slightly
facilitated the access of borrowers to their
services. Thus, in some banking establishments
an increase in expectations with regard to such
issues as, for example, increase in credit
guarantee was observed. In most cases, the
maximum loan repayment period has also been
extended (W. V. Eseoghene, 2020).
The author of this article considers the issue
of taking out mortgage loans during the
coronavirus pandemic to be quite interesting. It
is one of the largest obligations incurred by
consumers (M. Żukowski, 2020). They are,
nowadays, permanently related to the price of
real estate on the market, despite the fact that
economists and analysts showed different
expectations in this regard. Real estate prices
did not decline in 2020. According to the above
mentioned, the total value of debt due to
mortgage loans increased by approx. 7.5% in
2020, compared to the previous year, and
amounted to PLN 476.267 billion. There has
been also noted a faster increase in the prices of
the real estate itself. In 2020, for example, a real
estate in Warsaw amounted to about PLN
10,000 per square meter in comparison to the
previous year, it represented an increase by
nearly 11.75% (M. Żukowski, 2020).
Conclusions
1. Summarizing the considerations
undertaken in this paper, it should be noted that
the market situation in connection with the
COVID-19 pandemic is changing very
dynamically. As a result, a person interested in
taking a loan may have a perception of
insecurity. At the same time, however,
borrowers should be rational and cautious in
their actions, and thus not strive to use their
creditworthiness to the maximum extent. At the
same time, it is necessary for the borrower to be
protected, when the financial situation changes
dramatically (M. Żukowski, 2020).
2. There is great hope that the COVID-19
19

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF review, 7(1)
pandemic will also have positive, long-term
effects, and thus increase in awareness of the
entire society. Apart from taking into account
the fundamental role of public health hygiene, it
can contribute to the awareness of state failure.
3. The risks that may lead to a banking
crisis are defined as adequately identified in the
theory of economics itself. It would be wrong to
say that banks can be considered completely
safe today. New economic and social events
could contribute to the inefficiency of this
sector. One of such event is the COVID-19
pandemic. In the long run, there may be more
risks of this kind, which will contribute to the
perception of this sector with a certain degree
of uncertainty (P. Łasak, 2021).
4. The activities of the NBP and lending
policy should focus on provision of support to
the economy and the population, thus
mitigating, at least partially, the effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic. The long-term
effectiveness of the above activities will depend
on the factors that appear in the global economy
and domestic economic policy, as well as in the
changes and their dynamics, which enable the
stabilization of the banking sector (P. Łasak,
2021).
5. Significant negative changes took place
in the creditworthiness of a considerable
number of Poles. They are associated with job
loss, reduction of working hours, evolution of
the form of employment. In addition, one can
also add gratification decrease and freezing
some of its forms (bonuses, awards), as well as
forced or unpaid leave (P. Łasak, 2021).
6. The destructive impact of the
coronavirus on individual sectors of the
economy was initiated by a change in the
behavior of the population. The decline in
interest rates carried out by FED or other central
banks (for example, the National Bank of
Poland) is considered by analysts as an
unnecessary one, and is not able to help the
economy affected by the pandemic. And what is
worse, it can intensify some negative effects of
unconventional monetary tactics, such as over-
indebtedness or “zombie companies” (A. Sieroń,
2021).
References
Serafin, A. (2021). Poles massively fall into a
debt spiral. This is the new fashion: living on
credit. Money.pl.
https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/polacy-
masowo-wpadaja-w-spirale-zadluzenia-to-
nowa-moda-zycie-na-kredyt-
6612688120859584a.html [Access:
27.02.2021 12:57].
Sudoł, D. (2021). Are we facing a post-pandemic
life on credit? Credit outlook after COVID-19
https://www.money.pl/banki/czy-po-
pandemii-czeka-nas-zycie-na-kredyt-
prognozy-kredytowe-po-covid-19-
6630493591571232a.html [Access: 2021-01-
28]
Eseoghene, W. V. (2020). The political economy
of covid-19 and its effects on global econom,
International Journal of New Economics and
Social Sciences", nr 11. pp. 11-24.
https://media.bik.pl/informacje-
prasowe/591695/bik-indeks-popytu-na-
kredyty-mieszkaniowe-wyniosl-w-
pazdzierniku-2020-r-8-1 [Access: 05.11.2020]
https://media.bik.pl/informacje-
prasowe/att/1723738 [Access: 05.11.2020]
Coronavirus. Banks have postponed repayment
of over a dozen billion zlotys to borrowers -
informs the Polish Bank Association,
https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/korona
wirus-info-dla-rpo-banki-odroczyly-splate-
kilkunastu-mld-zl-kredytobiorcom [Access:
27.03.2021]
Credit in the age of coronavirus and a 91%
chance of a positive decision - is it possible?,
https://www.parkiet.com/Finanse/2012199
98-Kredyt-w-dobie-koronawirusa-i-91-szans-
na-pozytywna-decyzje--czy-to-mozliwe.html
[Access: 26.03.2021]
Lending criteria and demand for business loans,
https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/temat
yka/rynkifinansowe/bankowosc/banki-
zaostrzaja-wymogi-udzielania-kredytow-w-
20

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF review, 7(1)
obliczu-pandemii/#fullimg0 [Access:
23.03.2021]
Łasak, P. (2020). Challenges for the Polish banking
sector as a consequence of the COVID-19
pandemic in Kaleta M., Laska M., Żuchowska D.
/red./ Economic policy in an unstable
environment: dilemmas and challenges.
Publishing House of the Academy of Social and
Media Culture, Toruń. pp. 80-93.
Sieroń, A. (2021). Will the covid-19 pandemic
cause the global economy to collapse?
https://uni.wroc.pl/czy-pandemia-covid-19-
spowoduje-zapasc-globalnej-gospodarki/
[Access: 26.03.2021]
Spurgiasz, K. Cash credit and coronavirus - has
the pandemic affected banks' lending
decisions.
https://www.totalmoney.pl/artykuly/kredyt-
gotowkowy-a-koronawirus-czy-pandemia-
wplynela-na-decyzje-kredytowe-bankow
Żukowski, M. (2020). Turbulence of the banking
system in Russia under conditions of the
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. "Legal and Economic
Review". nr 4.
21

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
Formation conditions and theoretical and methodological aspects
of assessment of the economy digital transformation level
Bartosz Mickiewicz * А
; Yekaterina VolkovaB
A
West Pomeranian University of Technology, 17, Piastow Ave., Szczecin, 70-310, Poland
В Belarusian State University of Food and Chemical Technologies, 4, Nezavisimosti Ave., Minsk, 220030, Belarus
Received: February 18, 2022 | Revised: February 22, 2022 | Accepted: March 28, 2022
JEL Classification: Q17, Q18.
DOI: 10.38188/2534-9228.22.1.03
Abstract
The development of digital technologies in the economy requires the transformation of business
processes at the level of organizations focused on a strategic perspective. In the digital economy,
obtainingstrategic competitive advantages is associated withthe formation and development of the
potential of organizations. The use of digital technologies leads to the introduction of new methods,
toolsandservicesthatrequireinfrastructuralchanges inorganizations andcontribute tothecreation
of new products (works, services) that increase the competitiveness and financial stability of
organizations. The process of digital transformation of the economy is multi-stage, and each stage
has goals, objectives and evaluation criteria. The first step towards the economy digital
transformation is to assess the digital potential, digital maturity and readiness of organizations.
The originality lies in the development of theoretical and methodological foundations for assessing
the level of the economy digital transformation and in the development of promising areas.
The author's definition of the digital potential of an organization is given as the ability to perform
activities tocreate, introduce,developandimplement informationandcommunicationtechnologies
in the context of the transformation of business processes, business models in order to ensure
strategic competitive advantages in the markets, financial stability and performance.
The assessment methodology is proposed and the following groups of estimated private indicators
have been identified: digital transformation of the organization, intellectual capital, customer
interaction: service quality and customer satisfaction, online sales, business environment.
Determined that digital transformation, as the technical and technological core of the digital
economy, through the introduction of digital technologies,
transforms the structure of the added value of the product by including the digital and intellectual
component in the chain of its creation.
Keywords: digital economy, conditions, Republic of Belarus, Poland, digital transformation,
digital potential, digital maturity, organization, assessment, strategy, development directions.
Introduction
The goal is to study the formation conditions,
deepen the theoretical and methodological
foundations for assessing the level of digital
transformation of the economy of various
countries and develop promising areas for its
development.
А Doctor of Economics, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Department of European and Regional Studies, e-mail: bmickiewicz@zut.edu.pl ,
ORCID: 0000-0002-4787-2477
B Ph.D. in Economics, Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Department of Management of Enterprises, e-mail: kate_ag@mail.ru,
ORCID: 0000-0003-0735-5018
The basis of the study is a systematic
approach to the formation conditions and
assessment of the level of digital
transformation, digital potential, digital
readiness and digital maturity of economic
systems. For studying the readiness for
22

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
the digital transformation of the economy,
general scientific methods of theoretical
knowledge were used: statistical and logical
analysis, synthesis, comparison, deduction and
generalization, expert surveys.
Implementation of the economy digital
transformation modifies traditional business
processes, business models, increasing the
prestige of the state, business and
organizations. In modern conditions, digital
transformation reflects the competitiveness of
organizations and is a determining factor in
developing a strategy for their sustainable
development. The expediency of applying a
systematic approach to the analysis of the
conditions for the formation, assessment of the
level and main directions of development of the
digital transformation of the economy is
substantiated.
Digital transformation of the economy can be
studied: as a historical stage in the development
of the national economy, providing for access to
a qualitatively different, higher level of modern
technological development; as a large-scale
national project that provides for the
implementation of a set of long-term developed
measures. Considering the first approach, it
should be noted that large-scale
transformations (industrialization,
electrification, complex mechanization and
automation of production) corresponded to
each stage of the technical and economic
development of Europe and the USA countries.
The achieved level of the productive forces
development and the existing scientific,
technical and human capital in Belarus create
conditions for the digital transformation of the
economy. Applying the second approach, it
should be noted that the development of the
information and communication technology
sector in economically developed countries
demonstrates a certain sequence: first, the
appropriate infrastructure, conditions,
prerequisites for the digitalization of the service
sector are created, then starts the introduction
and application of ICT in the real sector of
economy.
Formation of a high-tech sector of the
national industry and an increase in its
knowledge intensity, as the achievement of key
goals, is reflected in the National Strategy for
Sustainable Socio-Economic Development of the
Republic of Belarus until 2030 (National strategy
for sustainable socio-economic development of
the Republic of Belarus for the period up to
2030). Digital transformation of an industrial
enterprise is the basis for the formation of the
sector of intelligent industrial production
through the development and implementation
of modern information technologies and
industrial integrated systems, this is the digital
transformation of processes into intelligent
management of production, quality and sales of
products.
Policy paper of the informatization and
communications field is the Strategy for the
Development of Informatization in the Republic
of Belarus for 2016–2022 (Strategy of
Development of Informatization in Republic of
Belarus for 2016–2022). Digital transformation
strategies should be comprehensive in
addressing interconnected policies, ensuring its
coherency and coordination across all areas and
sectors, shaping digital transformation, and
engaging relevant stakeholders in its design and
implementation. Implementation of the
digitalization strategy requires administrative
capacity, a clear division of labor and
relationships between different levels of
government. It is necessary to formulate a
strategic vision of the country’s digital
transformation in order to develop a coherent
policy for the digitalization of the economy. It is
important to justify how digital transformation
contributes to the achievement of such goals as
sustainable development, innovative
development, and growth in the welfare of the
population? This approach contributes to the
formation of strategic priorities and the
consistency of the goals of the development of
society, the inclusion of the country in global
23

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
world processes.
The Republic of Belarus has developed the
State Program “Digital Development of Belarus”
for 2021–2025, one of the key tasks of which is
the development of digital economy tools in
various sectors of the national economy,
providing for the use of advanced production
technologies in production and processes of
foreign economic activity, the formation of the
necessary conditions to maintain and improve
the competitiveness of Belarusian enterprises in
the world market (State Program "Digital
Development of Belarus" for 2021-2025).
14. The main task of developing the
infrastructure of the Polish economy is its
modernization, associated with the
development of access to digital technologies,
to the dominant information and
communication technologies. It is the latter that
have a significant impact both on changing
consumption patterns and social ties, and on
increasing the economic efficiency of
production. Achieving this goal is associated
with an increase in the number of “innovation
platforms” as a means of supporting an effective
technological complex. The proposed tools and
solutions are contained in the programs “Digital
Poland”, “Comprehensive Program of
Informatization of Poland”, in the Law “On the
Unified State Information and Communication
Infrastructure” (Innovative Development of the
Food Sector in the Republic of Belarus and
Poland, 2021, Ayupov, A.N., 2020).
The main reason for the complexity of the
transition to digital innovations in industrial
enterprises is the lack of professional skills
among employees (digital thinking, self-
learning, working with data, flexibility and the
ability to make decisions in the face of constant
market changes). To analyze and activate the
digital literacy of employees, it is necessary to
test them in the following areas: information
security, knowledge of Microsoft Excel and
other programs, analytical data processing,
modern communication methods and digital
trends. The most significant factor is availability
and development of a digital strategy (at the
same time, the goals of the enterprise are
planned: achieving an excellent customer
experience, leadership in reducing costs,
implementing new digital opportunities,
developing digital competencies in a team, etc.),
the underdevelopment of the appropriate
infrastructure to ensure cybersecurity and
development of direct sales channels.
Numerous economic literature works are
devoted to the study of the problems of
economic systems digitalization and processes.
However, insufficient attention has been paid to
the concept of the digital potential of an
organization, assessment methods, quantitative
and qualitative measurement. The term “digital
potential” in relation to an industrial enterprise
appeared in the scientific literature in 2010. The
most common approach is to define the concept
of “digital potential” as a characteristic of the
capabilities of economic systems to use digital
technologies. The concept of “digital potential
of an enterprise” is a relatively new concept,
both for foreign and domestic science. Explore
the digital potential as the ability of an
enterprise to carry out activities to create,
implement and apply information technologies,
ensure information security in order to meet the
current or future needs of the enterprise
(Gorodnova, N.V., Peshkova, A.A., 2018). Digital
potential is a set of data itself, software and
hardware for their storage and processing, and
personnel using this data for management
(Popov, E.V., Semyachkov, K.A., Moskalenko
Y.A., 2019).
In general, when exploring digital potential,
the following aspects should be taken into
account: “potential” comes from the Latin
“potentia” – strength, power, internal
capabilities that exist in a hidden form and can
manifest themselves under certain conditions;
the concept of “digital” is used to denote a sign
(quality, property) of an object associated with
digital (information) technologies that have a
certain life cycle and scope in an enterprise.
Digital industrial organization means an
integrated set of digital models, methods and
tools interconnected on the basis of a data
management system. The main objective of the
activities of organizations is the integrated
24

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
planning, evaluation and continuous
improvement of the main and auxiliary
structures, production processes and resources.
The concept of digital transformation of an
industrial enterprise is defined as a change in
intra-production components, parameters and
proportions, connections of the economic
system of an industrial enterprise, which
determine the gradual transition of an industrial
enterprise to a new qualitative digital state
(Danilchenko, A.V., Zubritskaya, I.A.,
Yakushenko, K.V., 2019).
The leaders in the formation of competitive
advantages with the implementation of the
digital transformation of the industry are the
following concerns: Siemens, ThyssenKrup,
Robert Bosch, BASF, Embedded Systems, Smart
Factory, Robuste Netze, Cloud Computing и IT-
Security, NV, Materialise NV, Limacorporate
SPA, Medical Modeling, Inc.
The problem of the digital potential integral
assessment, which allows assessing the ability of
organizations to implement information
technologies and transform business processes,
is relevant and in demand. Such an assessment
can be carried out in two ways: by forming a
balanced scorecard system (BSC), taking into
account the level of digitalization, allowing a
systematic analysis of the performance of
enterprises and based on an integral
assessment. An integral indicator – “digital
potential of the enterprise” – is proposed,
reflecting the actual level and opportunities for
the future, taking into account the factors and
conditions of the external environment (this is
the readiness of the industry for the formation
of a digital environment, the readiness of
specific key stakeholders of the enterprise to
interact, the level of consumer friendliness, the
degree of state support for digitalization
processes. The proposed approach makes it
possible to analyze both the current level of
digitalization of individual processes in an
organization and the opportunities for
increasing digital potential. The readiness of
industrial organizations to accept new
transformational changes requires, along with
the introduction of new information
technologies in the processes of organizing their
activities, a change in the business model
(Kozlov, A.V., Teslya, A.B., 2019).
To assess the potential for business
digitalization, the Industry Digitisation Index
(IDI) proposed by McKinsey&Company is used,
which includes 23 indicators grouped into three
groups: assets, use and labor.
Digital potential is one of the elements of the
enterprise economic potential and a distinctive
feature of its assessment methodology is a
modular structure that allows assessing the
potential of enterprises of both full and
incomplete cycles in the formation of flexible
value chains in the digital economy. The
methodology takes into account the basic
principles and elements of the Industry 4.0
concept and the Technet roadmap (Frolov, V.G.,
Sidorenko, Y.A., 2020).
The growth rate of the enterprise digital
potential is determined by the presence of both
hardware and software, and taking into account
the financial component (financial resource
availability, liquidity indicators and financial
stability ratios), which makes it possible to
justify the possibility of implementing a digital
strategy (Cherkashnev, R.Y., 2016).
The results of the studies have shown that
estimation of the digital potential of food
organizations requires creation of a hierarchy of
private indicators,that makesthebasisfor integral
indicator formation. The following groups of
estimated private indicators have been identified:
1) digital transformation of the organization:
the level of business processes automation,
scientific and information resources, return on
investment in digitalization, income from new
digital services;
2) intellectual capital: the presence of digital
competencies and personnel capable of using
digital technologies, the attitude of the team to
digital innovations;
3) customer interaction: service quality and
25

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
customer satisfaction, online sales;
4) business environment: level of competition,
financial stability of the business, innovative
products.
Since the listed indicators are of a different
nature and can be estimated both by its quantity
and quality, their formalization is proposed, which
take values from 0 (at the lowest value of the
indicator) to 1 (in the ideal case).
Figure 1 shows a diagram for assessing the
digital potential of organizations in the food
sector.
Figure 1. Estimation of the digital potential of
food organizations
Source: suggested by the author
Data shown in Figure 1 demonstrates a low
level of assessment indicators (business
environment, customers interaction) for the food
sector which requires the development of
appropriate measures to activate and grow them.
Thus, the organization digital potential is its
ability to perform activities to create, introduce,
develop and implement information and
communication technologies in the context of the
transformation of business processes, business
models in order to ensure strategic competitive
advantages in the markets, financial stability and
performance.
In the economic literature, most of the
methods are based on the analysis of statistical
data related to the assessment of the level of
informatization, automation and digital maturity
of organizations (readiness of organizations to
internal and external changes associated with
digitalization).
Digital maturity is a key indicator of the degree
of readiness of the state and organizations to
implement digital solutions in their processes.
Digital maturity of the business is an assessment
of its position relative to the leaders in the field of
digitalization in accordance with given criteria,
which determines their ability to offer the best
value proposition to customers. Digital maturity is
the ability of the organization to respond to
technological developments, taking into account
the realization of competitive advantages. There
are two approaches:
the first is the assessment of the enterprise
level of readiness for digital transformation;
the second is the assessment of the
introduction of digital technologies and their
impact on the formation of the business model of
the enterprise and its competitiveness.
The general indicators of digital maturity
assessment should be the following: strategy and
business model, organizational culture and
personnel, consumers and their experience,
operational processes and digital technologies,
value for the client (products and services of the
company). At the same time, the digital maturity
assessment provides for:
1) determination of the current level of
maturity in the functional areas of the
organization (structure, key resources, key
processes, technologies);
2) identifying development priorities and
setting goals in accordance with the digital
strategy;
3) identification of priority areas, development
of an action plan for the strategy implementation
(Medvedeva, L.F., Arkhipova, L.I., 2021).
At the moment, large global consulting
companies are analyzing the level of digital
maturityandassessingthepotentialand dynamics
ofchangesin organizationsintheprocessofdigital
transformation. To assess the dynamics and
effectiveness of implementation, the following
digital maturity assessment methods are used:
1. Digital maturity model analyses digital
0,68
0,55
0,44
0,31 0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
digital
transformati
on of the
organization
intellectual
capital
interaction
with clients
business
environment
26

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
capabilities across six key dimensions (customers,
business strategy, technology, production,
structure and culture of the organization), which
are divided into 28 subsections, including 179
indicators.
2. Digitization piano evaluates the most
important elements of the value chain: business
model, organizational structure, people,
processes, IT capabilities, offers and interaction
modelagainst specificquestionsdesignedforeach
category. The model is aimed at identifying
differences between the actual and forecast levels
of each transformational category of
organizations.
3. Acatech Industry Maturity Index 4.0
developed by the German National Academy of
Sciences and Technology assesses digital maturity
in four areas (resources, information systems,
culture and organizational structure) taking into
account stages of development and corporate
processes.
4. Digital Transformation Index (analytical
agency Arthur D. Little) is formed based on seven
indicators: (strategy and leadership, products and
services, customer management, operations and
supply chains, corporate services and control,
information technology, workplace and culture)
(Barulin, E., 2021).
The methodology for calculating the level of
digital maturity of the Russian Federation in key
sectors of the economy and in the social sphere is
based on three indicators:
1) number of specialists intensively using
information and communication technologies;
2) expenses of organizations for the
implementation and use of modern digital
solutions;
3) level of digital maturity depending on the
achievement of the target value of 2030 in ten
sectors of the economy and the social sphere (in
industry, agriculture, construction, urban
development, transport and logistics, energy
infrastructure, financial services, healthcare,
education and science and public management).
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
Russia distinguishes four levels of “digital
maturity” of organizations: low (digital
transformation carries risks), basic
(transformation is possible, but requires clear
planning of resources and tasks), advanced (the
company has ongoing digitalization initiatives),
high (digitalization integrated into the operating
and production activities of the company).
Organizations can get the status of a digital
transformation leader (manage the growth of
business value through innovation) or a digital
transformation driver (create a digital
environment for the integration of partners,
suppliers, customers). Assessment is carried out in
five areas: “goal setting, strategy, business
model”, “organizational structure and processes”,
“people”, “product”, “resources”. An alternative
modelof “digital maturity” is proposed byDeloitte
analysts, which, along with the strategy and
organizational structure of the organization,
provides for the assessment of the application of
technologies, work with clients and operational
activities of the organization (Galiyeva, D., 2021).
The main technical and organizational
conditions that allow organizations to increase
their digital maturity are analyzed. These include:
interconnected data, automation and technology
integration, application of analytical findings in
practice, strategic partnerships, specialist skills,
flexible teams and a culture of Fail-Fast (trial and
error method) (Field, D., Patel, S., Leon, G., 2021).
Methodology for assessing the level of
digitalization has been developed by questioning
top managers on 31 business processes. The
pyramid of the digitalization process includes five
levels: primary local, partial, complex, “smart”
organization and digital ecosystem. Furthermore,
in accordance with the digital transformation
strategy, the target level of digital maturity of the
organization, which is necessary for its
implementation, is determined. To overcome the
discrepancy between the current and target levels
of the organization digital maturity, a digital
transformation roadmap is being developed, in
accordance with which a portfolio of projects is
formed that ensures a balance of innovation and
the achievement of the company strategic goals
(Merzlov, I.Y., Shilova, E.V., Sannikova, E.A.,
Sedinin, M.A., 2020).
27

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
Digital transformation is a way of doing
business that involves information and digital
technologies, as well as the readiness of
companies for internal and external changes, that
is, digital maturity. The formation of the digital
level in organizations is certainly related to the
possibility of its financing (Derizemlya, V.E., Ter-
Grigoryants, A.A., 2021).
Digital transformation is a large-scale
adaptation of a business to the new conditions of
the digital economy, which is being studied from
different perspectives as:
- transformation of society – value systems,
culture, relationships, institutions, etc.;
- transformation of technologies and their
impact on economic processes;
- business transformation – markets,
industries, competition, business processes,
business models, etc.
Thanks to modern methods of project
management and analytics, innovation centers
and digital transformation centers are being
formed in organizations, the essence of which isto
actively search for and test new areas of business
development, products and solutions. The digital
maturity model is a tool that can be used to
estimate the level of skills and competencies of an
organization and develop measures to improve
them (Kuzin, D.V., 2019).
A comprehensive assessment of the conditions
and analysis is the first stage of the digital
transformation of an industrial enterprise. Based
on SWOT, PEST and strategic analysis, it is
necessary to determine the goals that are the
basis for the formation of the concept of digital
transformation of an industrial enterprise. In
addition to the main goal, i.e. to provide
conditions for increasing the economic efficiency
of production activities, the digital transformation
of the industry is aimed at obtaining a synergistic
effect from the implementation of ongoing
activities (Danilchenko, A.V., Zubritskaya, I.A.,
Yakushenko, K.V., 2019).
To assess the speed of adaptation of
enterprises to digital transformation, the BDI
(Business Digitalization Index) is used. The
calculation of this index is based on data on the
organization’s use of: information transmission
and storage channels (cloud technologies,
corporate mail, instant messengers, automation
systems, etc.); digital technologies of artificial
intelligence, the Internet of things, 3D printing,
electronic document management, etc.; Internet
tools for promotion and development of the
enterprise; digital information protection
programs and the use of specialized anti-virus
programs; assessment of the degree of
involvement of management in self-development
and development of personnel in the field of
digital competencies (Veselovsky, M.Y.,
Khoroshavina N.S., 2021).
Figure 2 shows the business digitalization index
of various countries in 2018 (Indicators of the
digital economy: statistical collection, 2020).
Figure 2. Business digitalization index of various
countries
Source: Indicators of the digital economy: statistical
collection, 2020
The data shown in Figure 2 shows that the level
of business digitalization is most developed in
countries such as Finland, Belgium, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway, Austria, Spain, Germany,
Slovenia, Italy, Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Latvia, Russia, etc.
It is advisable to evaluate the effectiveness of
digital transformation of enterprises in high-tech
industries by stages of the digital transformation
strategy. When evaluating the effectiveness, it is
necessary to take into account the costs of
implementing investment projects for the
digitalization of economic processes within the
considered stages of the product life cycle and the
cumulative effect received by the organization as a
50 49 47 46
43
40 40 39 39 37 37 37 36
32 31 31 31 29
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Finland
Belgium
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Austria
Spain
Germany
Slovenia
Italy
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Slovakia
Latvia
Russia
Greece
Poland
Bulgaria
28

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
whole (Kokuytseva,T.V.,Ovchinnikova,O.P.,2021).
Digital transformation, as the technical and
technological core of the digitaleconomy,through
the introduction of digital technologies,
transforms the structure of the added value of the
product by including the digital and intellectual
component in the chain of its creation.
Figure 3 shows the share of the ICT sector in
gross value added in 2019 for various countries
(Indicators of the digital economy: statistical
collection, 2020).
Figure 3. The share of the ICT sector in the
gross value added of various countries
Source: Indicators of the digital economy: statistical
collection, 2020
The data shown in Figure 3 shows that in
2019 the highest share of the ICT sector in
gross value added in the following countries:
Hungary (6.1%), Czech Republic (5.9%),
Sweden (5.6%), Germany (5.0%), Slovakia
(4.8%), France (4.7%), Croatia (4.4%),
Denmark (4.1%), Belgium (4.0%), Austria
(4.0%), Poland (3.7%), Italy (3.6%), Greece
(3.2%), etc.
The key areas of digital transformation
include changing organizational culture,
transforming business models and products,
and ensuring the growth of enterprise
flexibility (Trushkina, N., Rynkevich, N., 2020).
At the same time, the need for highly qualified
employees is increasing, especially for
specialists in digital technologies, data
analytics and graduates in the field of science,
technology, engineering and mathematics.
Modern methods of personnel search and
training programs, formed taking into account
the goals and objectives of Industry 4.0, are of
decisive importance at the present stage and
in the future.
Conclusions
Modern digital organization is one that
actively integrates technology into products and
services, uses IT solutions to actively interact
with customers, technologies to make decisions
and improve business processes. In general,
digitalization is a continuous process aimed at
improving the efficiency of functioning and
sustainable business development. For business
development, it is necessary to constantly
introduce advanced technologies, improve the
quality of service, the level of automation, as
well as use modern tools for analyzing and
evaluating the effectiveness of both individual
investment projects and digital potential.
Demanded direction is the development of an
algorithm for intellectual analysis of business
processes, which ensures a gradual transition
from a questionnaire, reports to intelligent
systems in order to make a profit and economic
growth.
The main directions for the development of
the economy digital transformation are as
follows:
1) increase of expenses on digital
transformation and innovations and more than
half of the costs of ICT will be directed to these
purposes. Organizations must develop a digital
transformation strategy to increase
competitiveness;
2) integrated application of software
training, automation tools for efficient
operation. Heads of organizations will invest in
the development of sectoral strategies for its
implementation;
3) a distributed cloud, that is, the distribution
of public cloud services to different locations
that operate in an accessible place and around
the clock. Approximately 70% of organizations
will implement unified technologies, tools and
processes for hybrid management, define key
6,1 5,9 5,6
5,0 4,8 4,7 4,4 4,1 4,0 4,0 3,7 3,6
3,2
2,8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Hungary
Czech
Republic
Sweden
Germany
Slovakia
France
Croatia
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
Poland
Italy
Greece
Russia
29

ISSN 2534-9228 (2022) VUZF Review, 7(1)
business performance indicators and improve IT
infrastructure;
4) blockchain, which is able to transform the
relationship in the implementation of activities,
providing transparency and secure data
exchange in business ecosystems;
5) providing users with access to technical
knowledge (or business knowledge) through a
simplified experience that enables the use of
specialized tools and systems in professional
activities.
References
National strategy for sustainable socio-
economic development of the Republic of
Belarus for the period up to 2030 [Electronic
resource]: approved by the Presidium of the
Council of Ministers of the Republic of
Belarus, May 2, 2017, No. 10 // Ministry of
Economy of the Republic of Belarus. – Access
mode: http://economy.gov.by. – Access
date: 19/01/2022.
Strategy of Development of Informatization in
Republic of Belarus for 2016–2022 [Electronic
resource]. – Access mode:
http://economy.gov.by. – Access date:
25/03/2020.
State Program "Digital Development of Belarus"
for 2021-2025 // Resolution of the Council of
Ministers of the Republic of Belarus dated
02.02.2021. - No. 66.
Gorodnova, N.V., Peshkova, A.A. (2018).
Development of theoretical foundations for
assessing the digital potential of an industrial
enterprise // Discussion. - No. 5 (90). - pp. 74-
84.
Popov, E.V., Semyachkov, K.A., Moskalenko Y.A.
(2019). Digital potential of the enterprise //
Economic analysis: theory and practice. - T.
18, No. 12. - pp. 2223 - 2236.
Cherkashnev, R.Y. (2016). Development and
improvement of the mechanism for
obtaining competitive advantages by an
enterprise when using information
technologies // Socio-economic phenomena
and processes. - V.11, No. 2. – pp. 65–72.
Medvedeva, L.F., Arkhipova, L.I. (2021). Digital
maturity as a factor of competitive advantage
in business // BIG DATA and Advanced
Analytics. BIG DATA and high-level analysis;
VII Intern. scientific-practical. Conf., Minsk. –
pp. 86–98.
Barulin, E. (2021). Diqital is not just diqital: how
to analyze the implementation of innovations
correctly [Electronic resource]. – Access
mode: https://rb.ru/opinion/proanalizirovat-
vnedrenie-innovacij. – Date of access: 25.02.
2021.
Galiyeva, D. (2021)."Digits" are looking for the
threshold of maturity [Electronic resource]. -
Access mode:
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4602997.
– Date of access: 25.02. 2021.
Field, D., Patel, S., Leon, G. (2021). How to
achieve digital maturity [Electronic resource].
Accessmode:ru_AdWords_Marketing_Sales_
891609_Mastering_Digital_Marketing_Matu
rity%20(2).pdf. – Date of access: 26.02. 2021.
Kozlov, A.V., Teslya, A.B. (2019). Digital potential
of industrial enterprises: essence, definition
and methods of calculation // Bulletin of
ZabGU. - V.25, No. 6. - pp. 101-110.
Frolov, V.G., Sidorenko, Y.A. (2020). Assessment
of the economic potential of industrial
structures in a digital economy // Economics,
Entrepreneurship and Law. - 2020. - Volume
10. - No. 10. - pp. 2505-2516.
Merzlov, I.Y., Shilova, E.V., Sannikova, E.A.,
Sedinin, M.A. (2020). Comprehensive
methodology for assessing the level of
digitalization of organizations // Economics,
entrepreneurship and law. - 2020. - T. 10. -
No. 9. - pp. 2379-2396.
Kokuytseva, T.V., Ovchinnikova, O.P. (2021).
Methodological approaches to performance
evaluation of enterprises digital
transformation in high-tech industries.
Kreativnaya ekonomika, 15(6), pp. 2413-
2430.
Veselovsky, M.Y., Khoroshavina N.S. (2021).
Digital transformation of industrial
30

VUZF Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022)

VUZF Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022)

Recomendados

Recomendados

Más contenido relacionado

Similar a VUZF Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022)

Similar a VUZF Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022) (20)

Último

Último (20)

VUZF Review, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022)