Impacts on Security

1. Quantum Computing -
Impacts on Security and
Large-size Financial
Organizations
Miguel Antonio Rey
Cyber Risk Manager, Deloitte & Touch, LLC
June 1, 2019

2. Background
 The Post-Quantum Computing standardization process is the National Institute
of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) response to advances in the
development of quantum computers.
 These machines exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve
mathematical problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional
computers.
 If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break
the public-key cryptosystems currently standardized by NIST, which
consist of digital signatures and key-establishment schemes.
 Quantum computers will have an impact on symmetric-key cryptosystems,
however the impact will not be as drastic.
 The goal of post-quantum cryptography is to develop cryptographic systems
that are secure against both quantum and classical computers and can
interoperate with existing protocols and networks.

3. NIST Standardization Timeline
 • April 2-3, 2015 Workshop on Cybersecurity in a Post-Quantum World, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD
 • February 24, 2016 PQC Standardization: Announcement and outline of NIST’s Call for
Submissions presentation given at PQCrypto 2016
 • April 28, 2016 NISTIR 8105, Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography, released
 • August 2, 2016 Federal Register Notice - Proposed Requirements and Evaluation Criteria announced
for public comment
 • December 20, 2016 Federal Register Notice – Announcing Request for Nominations for Public-
Key Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms
 • November 30, 2017 Submission Deadline for NIST PQC Standardization Process
 • December 20, 2017 First-Round Candidates were announced. The public comment period on
the first-round candidates began.
 • April 11-13, 2018 First NIST PQC Standardization Conference, Ft. Lauderdale, FL
 • January 30, 2019 The First Round ended and the Second Round began. Second- Round
candidates announced. The public comment period on the second-round candidates began.
 • March 15, 2019 Deadline for updated submission packages for the Second Round
 • August 22-24, 2019 2nd NIST PQC Standardization Conference, Santa Barbara, CA

4. Goals, Evaluation Criteria & Steps Forward
 The goal of post-quantum cryptography is to develop cryptographic systems that are
secure against both quantum and classical computers and can interoperate with
existing protocols and networks.
 Identified three broad aspects of evaluation criteria that would be used to compare
candidate algorithms throughout the NIST PQC Standardization Process. The three
aspects are: 1) security, 2) cost and performance, and 3) algorithm and
implementation characteristics.
 When standards for quantum-resistant public key cryptography become available, NIST
will reassess the imminence of the threat of quantum computers to existing
standards, and may decide to deprecate or withdraw the affected standards
thereafter as a result.
 Agencies should therefore be prepared to transition away from these algorithms as
early as 10 years from now. As the replacements for currently standardized public
key algorithms are not yet ready, a focus on maintaining crypto agility is imperative.
Until new quantum-resistant algorithms are standardized, agencies should continue to
use the recommended algorithms currently specified in NIST standards.
 International communities emerge
- Through the European Union (EU), PQCrypto and SAFECrypto
- In Japan, CREST Crypto-Math

5. Overview of the main families for which post-
quantum primitives have been proposed
 Lattice-based cryptography - Exciting new applications (such as fully
homomorphic encryption, code obfuscation, and attribute-based encryption) have
been made possible using lattice-based cryptography. Most lattice-based key
establishment algorithms are relatively simple, efficient, and highly
parallelizable. Also, the security of some lattice-based systems are provably
secure under a worst-case hardness assumption, rather than on the average case.
On the other hand, it has proven difficult to give precise estimates of the security
of lattice schemes against even known cryptanalysis techniques.
 Code-based cryptography – In 1978, the McEliece cryptosystem was first
proposed, and has not been broken since. Since that time, other systems based
on error-correcting codes have been proposed. While quite fast, most code-
based primitives suffer from having very large key sizes. Newer variants have
introduced more structure into the codes in an attempt to reduce the key sizes,
however the added structure has also led to successful attacks on some proposals.
While there have been some proposals for code-based signatures, code-based
cryptography has seen more success with encryption schemes.

6. Cont’d
 Multivariate polynomial cryptography – These schemes are based on the
difficulty of solving systems of multivariate polynomials over finite fields.
Several multivariate cryptosystems have been proposed over the past few
decades, with many having been broken. While there have been some
proposals for multivariate encryption schemes, multivariate cryptography
has historically been more successful as an approach to signatures.
 Hash-based signatures – Hash-based signatures are digital signatures
constructed using hash functions. Their security, even against quantum
attacks, is well understood. Many of the more efficient hash-based signature
schemes have the drawback that the signer must keep a record of the exact
number of previously signed messages, and any error in this record will result
in insecurity. Another drawback is that they can produce only a limited
number of signatures. The number of signatures can be increased, even to
the point of being effectively unlimited, but this also increases the
signature size.

7. Selection of Second Round Candidates
 NIST selected 26 second-round candidates from the 69 first-round candidates
using the evaluation criteria specified in FRN-Dec16.
 In relative order of importance, NIST considered the security, cost and
performance, and algorithm and implementation characteristics of a
candidate in selecting the second-round candidates.
 For the security evaluation of an algorithm, NIST studied the security
arguments presented in the submission package, as well as external
cryptanalysis submitted to NIST or published elsewhere. NIST researchers also
conducted internal cryptanalysis.
 NIST considered both the key/ciphertext/signature sizes as well as the
computational estimates given by the submitters in their submission
documentation and in their presentations at the First NIST PQC
Standardization Conference.
 NIST also performed internal performance benchmarks using the code from
the submission packages. In addition, NIST considered the external feedback
and performance estimates provided by the cryptographic community.

8. Second Round Candidates
BIKE (PKI) - Lattice LEDAcrypt (PKI) - Code Rainbow (DigSig) - Multivariate
Classic McEliece (PKI) - Code LUOV (DigSig) - Multivariate ROLLO (PKI) - Lattice
CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM (DigSig) - Lattice MQDSS (DigSig) - Multivariate) Round5 (PKI) - Lattice
CRYSTALS-KYBER (PKI) - Variant NewHope (PKI) - Lattice RQC (PKI)
FALCON (DigSig) - Lattice NTRU (PKI) - Lattice SABER (PKI) - Lattice
FrodoKEM (PKI) - Lattice NTRU Prime (PKI) - Lattice SIKE (PKI)
GeMSS (DigSig) - Multivariate NTS-KEM (PKI) - Code SPHINCS+ (DigSig) - Hash
HQC (PKI) - Code Picnic (DigSig) - Hash Three Bears (PKI) - Multivariate
LAC (PKI) - Variant qTESLA (DigSig) - Lattice

9. Ramifications of Quantum Computing on
technology at large-size financial
organizations
 Infrastructure (Routers & Switches)
 Applications (PKI)
 Databases (Data At Rest)

10. Common quantum computing challenges
associated with legacy Infrastructure in a
large-size financial organization
 identification of cryptographic algorithms that are quantum-resistant and which
algorithms should be replaced - identify legacy ciphers that are at the threat of being
broken by advances in computing power of existing super- computers.
 Upgrades to legacy system creates challenges due to the fact that such integrated
services such as routers which are used at the edge of the network, in numerous
companies’ branch offices and other remote locations. Therefore, the company needs
to plan such upgrades not only from a technology perspective but also from the
resource perspective.
 Considerations to replacing legacy Cisco equipment with similar equipment from other
vendors as other vendors may offer cheaper equipment and support options. However,
Cisco as the market leader in routing and switching equipment, has issued and adopted
more than 13,000 patents for proprietary protocols and technologies ranging from their
core routing and switching to voice and wireless products. Some of these protocols are
used to integrate various network infrastructures with routing and switching
equipment, such as voice over IP phones and wireless access points.
 evaluated on whether it is used in company’s routing and switching environment and
whether these protocols can be replaced with industry’s open standard protocols, if the
company is using ISR routers as branch or remote site routers, there is a good chance
that the company is using Cisco’s proprietary routing protocol (Enhanced Interior
Gateway Routing Protocol or EIGRP) as per Cisco’s branch connectivity design guide [68]
. As no other networking company is using such routing protocol

11. Assessing the quantum-resistant cryptographic
of routing and switching infrastructure in a
large-size financial organization
 This research study was limited to top three datacenter routing and switching vendors
that hold 74% share in datacenter market globally.
 NIST is still in the process of standardizing quantum-resistant protocols, migrating the
infrastructure to NSA’s Suite B protocols will be a good start as it contains symmetric-
key protocols that are believed to be secure.
 Both Juniper Networks and Arista Networks do not seem to have a strategy or vision on
overcoming a threat of quantum computing. Out of three organizations researched,
Cisco has the strongest awareness and support of the development of quantum
resistant protocols.
 Cisco’s Next Generation Encryption project is tracking not only which protocols are
secure enough to be used in current cryptographic applications, but also if these
protocols are believed to be quantum-resistant and whether they are supported across
all Cisco’s platforms.

12. NSA’s Commercial National Security
Algorithm Suite
The Suite B algorithms have been replaced by Commercial National Security Algorithm
(CNSA) Suite algorithms:
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), per FIPS 197, using 256 bit keys to protect up to
TOP SECRET
 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Exchange, per FIPS SP 800-56A, using Curve P-
384 to protect up to TOP SECRET.
 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), per FIPS 186-4
 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), per FIPS 180-4, using SHA-384 to protect up to TOP
SECRET.
 Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange, per RFC 3526, minimum 3072-bit modulus to protect
up to TOP SECRET
 RSA for key establishment (NIST SP 800-56B rev 1) and digital signatures (FIPS 186-4),
minimum 3072-bit modulus to protect up to TOP SECRET

13. Transition algorithms
Algorithm Function Transition parameters Quantum
resistant
Advanced
Encryption
Standard (AES)
Symmetric block cipher
used for
information protection
Use 256-bit keys to protect up to
TOP
SECRET
YES
Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA)
Algorithm for message
authentication
and digital signature
Use SHA-384 to protect up to TOP
SECRET.
YES
Diffie–Hellman
(DH)
Asymmetric algorithm
used for key
establishment
Minimum 3072-bit modulus to
protect
up to TOP SECRET
NO
Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA)
Asymmetric algorithm
used for key
establishment
Minimum 3072-bit modulus to
protect
up to TOP SECRET
NO
Elliptic Curve
Diffie–Hellman
(ECDH) and
Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature
Algorithm
(ECDSA)
Asymmetric algorithm
used for key
establishment
Use Curve P-384 to protect up to
TOP
SECRET.
NO

14. Routing and switching cryptographic agility
Routing switching technology Compliance Description
Cisco
Catalyst 30 0 0 (running IOS
16.2), 40 0 0, 60 0 0 & Nexus
90 0 0 Series switches (running
NX-OS 7.0.3)
FIFPS 140–2 certified Support Diffie–Hellman with
2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-bit
keys for IPSec. Support RSA with
keys of 2048, 3072, and 4096
bits. AES with 256bit keys, and
SHA with message digests of 384
bits and 512 bits
ISR 1100 & ISR 4000 Series
Routers (running XE 16.9)
Cisco 7200 Series Routers
Cisco 7200 (VSA) & (VAM2 +
)Routers
Catalyst 3750-X and 3560-X
switch
FIFPS 140–2 certified
N/A
FIFPS 140–2 certified
802.1AE MACsec Encryption
Support IPSec DES, 3DES, and AES
Support ended Sep 30, 2017
IPsec tunneling that supports
DES, 3DES, AES (128-, 192-, 256-
bit) encryption
Support IPsec Algorithms: 3DES
(168-bits/AES (128/196/256-
bits), HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bits),RSA
(2048/3072 bits)
Cisco 6500 switches
Cisco 7600 Routers
Hardware Security Modules
Hardware Security Modules
No support for NGE
Support ends Feb 29, 2022

15. Routing and switching cryptographic agility
Routing switching technology Compliance Description
Arista networks
Arista 7500R 802.1AE MACsec Encryption 100 Gbps line card, No support
for 256-bit encryption
7500E Switches 802.1AE MACsec Encryption 100 Gbps line card, No support
for 256-bit encryption
Aritsa 7050x, 7250x, 73300x,
7500E, 5150 Switches
FIFPS 140–2 certified Supports SHA 512 (suite B
protocol), RSA 2048-bit

16. Routing and switching cryptographic agility
Routing switching technology Compliance Description
Juniper Networks
SRX340 0, SRX360 0, SRX560 0,
SRX580 0 gateways
Support for Suite B Protocols with Junos OS 12.1.X45-D30
release
EX420 0, 40 0 and 4550 Switch 802.1AE MACsec Encryption AES-128 and AES-256 bit
encryption, with Junos OS
12.1.X45-D30 release
QFX10016 and QFX10 0 08
switches
802.1AE MACsec Encryption AES-128 and AES-256 bit
encryption, with Jonus OS
Release 17.2R1
EX430 0, EX460 0, EX9204 and
EX9208 switches
FIFPS 140–2 certified Support for AES-CBC-256
encryption for SSH, SHA2-256,
SHA2-412

17. Summary of Impact of quantum computing on
modern routing and switching infrastructure
in a large-size financial organization
 all three vendors have NIAP FIPS 140–2 certificates for their data center equipment that
confirm compliance and security of equipment’s management plane and conforming to
NSA’s Suite B
 they are still vulnerable to an attack by quantum computer as they use management
protocols such as SSH or HTTPS that rely heavily on RSA public-key encryption.
 Cisco and Juniper offer IPSec VPN solution as part of their OS (software
implementation) or in the form of Hardware Security Modules that perform
acceleration of cryptographic functions. Both vendors provide information on which
software versions and hardware modules support NSA’s Suite B protocols.
 IPSec implementations support Suite B authentication algorithms, such as SHA2-384 and
SHA2-512 as in the case with Cisco and Juniper, they are still vulnerable to a threat
posed by the quantum computer as IPSec is using Diffie–Hellman protocol for key
exchange, which can be broken by quantum computers.

18. Impact of Quantum Computing on Common
Cryptographic Algorithms used in Applications
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Type Purpose Impact from large-scale
quantum computer
AES Symmetric key Encryption Larger key sizes needed
SHA-2, SHA-3 --------------- Hash functions Larger output needed
RSA Public key Signatures, key
establishment
No longer secure
ECDSA, ECDH
(Elliptic Curve
Cryptography)
Public key Signatures, key
exchange
No longer secure
DSA
(Finite Field
Cryptography)
Public key Signatures, key
exchange
No longer secure

19. Importance of PKI to modern Web
Browser communication
 A study conducted in 2015 (Proofing the TLS Handshake Secure) exposes the
vulnerabilities of TLS clients and servers offer many choices, and each run of the
handshake involves a negotiation of the best protocol version, cipher-suite, and
extensions available at both ends. Such a trade-o between flexibility and security
creates several problems:
1. It makes the security of TLS depend on its correct configuration, inasmuch as some
versions (e.g. SSL2) and algorithms (e.g. MD5 and RC4) are much weaker than others,
and may also suffer from different implementation flaws.
2. It complicates the protocol logic, as the integrity of the negotiation itself relies on
algorithms being negotiated; this is a persistent source of attacks, from protocol
regression in SSL2 to version fallback in current browsers.
3. It demands stronger security assumptions, to reflect the fact that honest parties may
use the same key materials with different algorithms, e.g. the same master secret may
be used to key different pseudo-random functions. Intuitively, TLS on its own enables a
range of chosen-protocol attacks whereby a weak algorithm (chosen by the attacker)
may compromise the security of stronger algorithms (chosen by honest parties).

20. Empirical Results on TLS Configurations
 Using an online analyzer (Qualys), we gathered extended information on server
configurations for 215 of the top 500 domains, including the TLS versions, cipher-suites,
certificates, and extensions they offer.
 For instance, the commonly-used cipher-suite TLS RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA indicates
an RSA handshake: the client sends a fresh premaster secret encrypted under the
server public key; both parties use it to extract a master secret, used in turn as the
seed of a SHA1-based PRF to derive 4 keys for SHA1-based MACs and AES encryption in
CBC mode.
 These servers accept 64 cipher-suites, with an average of 12 and standard deviation of
6. They accept on average more than 5 encryption algorithms and 2 hash methods.
They still widely deploy weak algorithms: 70% accept at least one cipher-suite with MD5
and 90% at least one with RC4.
 All servers but one offer several versions; 37% offer only SSL3 and TLS 1.0; 56% offer all
4 versions from SSL3 to TLS 1.2. Although now forbidden by the standard, 3% still
accept SSL2 with compatible cipher-suites. They all disable TLS-level compression. 86%
support the (mandatory) secure renegotiation extension, leaving the others vulnerable
to attacks. 60% support session tickets for resumption.
 tested 12 TLS clients, including major web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Internet
Explorer, Safari) and libraries (NSS, OpenSSL, SChannel, Secure Transport). These
clients similarly propose a large number of cipher-suites, ranging from 19 to 36; they
all propose weak hash (MD5) or encryption methods(RC4, or even no encryption). On
the other hand, clients tend to support more recent cipher-suites than servers, notably
those based on elliptic curves.

21. Cont’d
Supported Protocol Versions
SSL2 7 3.26%
SSL3 212 98.60%
TSL 1 214 99.53
TSL 1.1 129 60.00%
TSL 1.2 124 57.67%
Hash Algorithms
MD5 149 69.30%
SHA 215 100.00%
SHA256 103 47.91%
SHA384 74 34.42%
Signature algorithms
ECDSA 13 6.05%
RSA 215 100.00%
Top Encryption Algorithms
3DES EDE CBC 207 96.28%
AES 128 CBC 212 98.60%
AES 128 GCM 78 36.28%
AES 256 CBC 212 98.60%
RC4 128 195 90.70%
Agile Summary
Cipher-suites count 64
Avg. per host 11.88
Cipher-suites std.
dev
Agile Summary Cont’d
Avg. hash per host 2.52
Avg. encrypt per host 5.36
Avg. sig. per host 1.06
Avg. KEMs per host 1.73

22. Cryptographic Agility
Determination of whether common hardware and software
components, have enough flexibility and scalability to
accommodate the change of cryptographic algorithms to the
ones that do not exhibit vulnerability to quantum computing
and to the ones that are compliant with National Security
Agency (NSA) Suite B set of protocols. We pinpoint upstream
or downstream impacts of a change in the encryption
algorithms across various IT network infrastructure
components and applications in terms of effort required to
accomplish this transition.

23. Impact of Quantum Computing on
Databases
 Cryptographic agility is observed to work better with non-persisted transient
data than persisted data.
 Persisted (stored) data that is encrypted with an algorithm that is being
replaced may not be recoverable once the algorithm is replaced.
 This can also lead to Denial of Service(DoS) to legitimate users, when
authentication relies on comparative matching of computed hashes, and the
accounting credentials are stored after being computed using a hashing
function that has been replaced.
 It is important to plan for the storage size of the outputs as the algorithm
used to replace the insecure one can yield an output with a different size. For
example, the MD5 hash is always 128 bits in length, the SHA -2 function can
yield a 256 bit (SHA-256), 384 bit (SHA-384) or 512 bit (SHA-512) bit length
output and if storage is not planned for allocated in advance, the upgrade
may not even be a possibility.

24. SAFEcrypto
 SAFEcrypto will provide a new generation of practical, robust and physically secure
postquantum cryptographic solutions that ensure long-term security for future
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems, services and applications.
 The project will focus on the remarkably versatile field of Lattice-based
cryptography as the source of computational hardness, and will deliver optimized
public key security primitives for digital signatures and authentication, as well
identity based encryption (IBE) and attribute based encryption (ABE).
 As the NIST and Technology (NIST) prepares for the transition to a post-quantum
cryptographic suite B, urging organisations that build systems and infrastructures that
require long-term security to consider this transition in architectural designs; the
SAFEcrypto project will provide Proof-of-concept demonstrators of schemes for
three practical real-world case studies with long-term security requirements, in
the application areas of satellite communications, network security and cloud.
 The goal is to affirm Lattice-based cryptography as an effective replacement for
traditional number-theoretic public-key cryptography, by demonstrating that it can
address the needs of resource-constrained embedded applications, such as mobile
and battery-operated devices, and of real-time high performance applications for
cloud and network management infrastructures.

25. Blockchain & Crypto currencies
 quantum computing threatens all computer security systems that rely on
public key cryptography, not just blockchain. blockchain’s seemingly
immutable ledgers would be under threat.
 What makes quantum-resistant or “post-quantum” cryptography, quantum
resistant? When private keys are generated from public keys in ways that are
much more mathematically complex than traditional prime factorization.
 The Quantum Resistant Ledger team is working to implement hash-based
cryptography, a form of post-quantum cryptography. In hash-based
cryptography, private keys are generated from public keys using complex
hash-based cryptographic structures, rather than prime number factorization.
 The connection between the public and private key pair is therefore much
more complex than in traditional public key cryptography and would be much
less vulnerable to a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm.

26. Cont’d

27. Virtualized Containers with Serverless
platform
 By default, TLS client authentication is turned off when TLS is enabled on a peer
node. This means that the peer node will not verify the certificate of a client
(another peer node, application, or the CLI) during a TLS handshake. To enable TLS
client authentication on a peer node, set the peer configuration property
peer.tls.clientAuthRequired to true and set the peer.tls.clientRootCAs.files
property to the CA chain file(s) that contain(s) the CA certificate chain(s) that
issued TLS certificates for your organization’s clients.
 By default, a peer node will use the same certificate and private key pair when
acting as a TLS server and client. To use a different certificate and private key
pair for the client side, set the peer.tls.clientCert.file and peer.tls.clientKey.file
configuration properties to the fully qualified path of the client certificate and
key file, respectively.
 Containers adheres to Crypto Agile design and architecture principles of scalability
and extensibility (performance)
 Leverages Defense-In-Depth principle, it’s not Single Point of Failure as it exposes
services through API which can be monitored by signature-based tools.

28. Cont’d

29. Quantum Computing in Today’s Financial
Services Industry
 In November 2017, the same month it unveiled a 50-qubit computer, IBM put its 20-
qubit machine online and began working with key customers to get them quantum-
ready. The IBM Q Network currently has 12 members, including Barclays, JPMorgan,
Mizuho Financial Group and MUFG Bank.
 For Bob Stolte, managing director and head of post-trade technology at JPMorgan
Corporate & Investment Bank, quantum computing has reached a point where the
material science has caught up with the theoretical research. “This is where it starts to
get interesting,” he says. “We can run our problems on a quantum computer and
determine whether we can benefit from this technology in the future.”
 Madhav Thattai, chief operating officer at Rigetti Computing, a full-stack quantum
computing start-up expects some milestones to be passed in the next few years. First,
the industry will cross the ‘quantum supremacy’ threshold, which is when a quantum
computer can perform tasks that classical computers cannot. The next thing to happen
will be the first examples of ‘quantum advantage’ applications. “This is where a
quantum computer is used – most likely in a hybrid quantum-classical arrangement – in
a way that provides commercial value for a particular application,” says Mr. Thattai,
adding that these could be seen inside five years.
 According to Dr. Lee Braine, the investment bank's chief technology officer at Barclays,
the bank has an internal working group for quantum computing that includes
stakeholders, the CTO’s office, statistical modeling teams and others. Some, like
Braine, have Ph.D.s in mathematics. They’ve been writing short quantum programs,
uploading them to an IBM quantum computer running on IBM’s cloud, and getting
results back. Their programs have fallen mainly into two categories.

30. Conclusion and Next Steps
 The next twelve to eighteen months will consist of a public review on the remaining 26
second-round post-quantum candidates.
 With the number of candidates substantially reduced from the first round, we hope
that the combined efforts of the cryptographic community will evaluate the remaining
candidates and provide NIST with feedback that supports or refutes the security claims
of the submitters.
 NIST is interested in additional performance data on each of the candidates. This
includes optimized implementations written in assembly code or using instruction set
extensions, and analyses of implementation suitability of candidate algorithms in
constrained platforms, as well as performance data for hardware implementations.
 In 2020, NIST plans to either select finalists for a final round or select a small number
of candidates for standardization.

31. Questions

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