The whole Apollo 1 fire disaster.

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EAST DELTA UNIVERSITY
COURSE TITLE: Professional Ethics
COURSE CODE: HUM 233/HUM 302/PEC 203
SUBMITTED BY:
Hanan M.Kamal Syed (151003912)
Nishargo Nigar (142000212)
Motaher Kibriah (133001110)
Riadul Moula (133000810)
Jubaer Uddin Baker (142000312)
ASSIGNMENT NAME: Apollo 1:
Disaster on the road to the Moon
FACULTY: Samina Afrin

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Apollo 1: Disaster on the road to the Moon
Crew Spaceflight Histories
Virgil I. "Gus" Grissom
Mission Dates Role Notes
Mercury 4
"Liberty Bell 7"
July 21, 1961 2nd US citizen in space
Gemini 3 March 23, 1965 Commander First manned Gemini flight
Apollo 1 January 27, 1967 Died in Apollo 1 fire
Edward H. White, II
Mission Dates Role Notes
Gemini IV June 3-7, 1965 Pilot First US spacewalk
Apollo 1 January 27, 1967 Died in Apollo 1 fire

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Roger B. Chaffee
Mission Dates Role Notes
Apollo 1 January 27, 1967 Died in Apollo 1 fire
Apollo 1 Backup Crew:
Walter M. Schirra, Jr.
Donn F. Eisele
Walter Cunningham
Background
The Apollo 1 mission was scheduled to have been launched on February 21, 1967, with
astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee onboard. This would have
been the first manned Apollo mission; one in a series of missions designed to get an
American to the moon by the end of the 70's.
However, on January 27, 1967, during a preflight test on the launch pad, tragedy struck. A
fire swept through the Command Module (CM) which killed all three astronauts. What follows
is an account of the events that occurred before, during and after the fire.
Earlier that day
 The astronauts entered the Apollo 204 spacecraft, which was attached to the Saturn
rocket on launch pad 34 at 1:00 p.m.
 Grissom's spacesuit oxygen loop had a "sour smell". The crew stopped to take a
sample of the suit loop, and after discussion with Grissom decided to continue the
test.
 A high oxygen flow indication periodically triggered the master alarm. The matter was
discussed with environmental control system personnel, who believed the high flow
resulted from movement of the crew. The matter was not really resolved.
 Faulty communications existed between Grissom and the control room for most of
the test, even though the crew made adjustments. Later, the difficulty extended to
include communications between the operations and checkout building and the
blockhouse at complex 34. This failure in communications forced a hold of the
countdown at 5:40 p.m.

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 At 6:31 the count was about to restart when ground instruments showed an
unexplained rise in the oxygen flow into the spacesuits. One of the crew, presumably
Grissom, had moved slightly.
1. Electrical Components
Teflon, has an excellent fire resistance and was therefore chosen as the covering
for the wiring in the spacecraft. The specific type used for the craft was easily
damaged or penetrated by abrasion. If this wiring experiences penetration by a
metal structure, a short is created at the point of conductor contact. Tests
performed in highly pressurized atmosphere indicate that sparks blown from an
arc can ignite combustible materials that are a short distance away from that arc.
Electric power distribution malfunctions in the Apollo 204 module were also
related to the Environment Coolant System leakage. RS-89 was the coolant the

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leaked, which is a mixture of 62.5 percent ethylene glycol, 35.7 percent H20, and
1.8 percent stabilizer and corrosion inhibitor. This mixture is not highly
combustible, however leakage and spillage of this fluid does present a threat.
The water in this fluid evaporates much faster than the ethylene glycol. This
results in a salt formation that does not evaporate and which is highly
combustible. Furthermore, the residue from RS-89 is electrically conductive;
therefore contact with un-insulated wire would result in current exposure to the
internal atmosphere. It was proved in laboratory tests that this coolant provides a
mechanism to ignite a fire.
2. Spacecraft Atmosphere
The high pressure and concentration levels of oxygen gas largely contributed to
the dispersion of the fire. During the initial stages of the fire oxygen levels were
reported to be at saturated levels which may have prompted the spread of the
fire. The initial flow rate increase was probably due to crew movement which
normally results in increased leakage in cabin.
3. Combustible Materials
The fire moved rapidly from the point of ignition, traveling along the Ratchet net
debris traps which were installed in the Command Module (CM) to prevent items
from dropping into equipment areas during tests. These nets were made mainly
of nylon, and were thus highly combustible. Since these nets ran along large
sections of the CM they generated firebrands which scattered, igniting more
materials. NASA was aware of this undesirable property, but not anticipating a
fire in the test runs, allowed them to be used on the ground but not during space
flight.
4. Hatch Design
The main exit from the Command Module was through inner and outer hatches.
The hatch design for the Apollo 1 spacecraft was not a cause of the disaster, but
it had a large impact on the outcome. With this particular design three hatches
were installed. The outermost hatch (the Boost Protective Cover (BPC)) covers
the Command module during launch. The inner hatch or ablative hatch becomes
the outer hatch when the BPC is jettisoned after launch. The inner hatch closes
off the Command Module and is the first to be opened by the crew in the case of
the emergency. The crew had also been having problems evacuating in the 90
second benchmark time due to the complicated, multi-step nature of the hatch
design.

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The crew crossing the gantry to the Apollo 1 command module on Jan. 27, 1967 (NASA)
WHAT HAPPENED?
All three astronauts contributed to the success of NASA’s manned space activities
throughout the 1960s. It was with great tragedy, therefore, that they became the first
casualties of the American space programme. On 27 January 1967 Apollo 1 was sitting on
the launch pad atop a Saturn 1B rocket at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Launch
Complex 34, the precursor to the Saturn V. It was set to perform a “plugs-out” test, during
which both the launch vehicle and the spacecraft were not loaded with fuel and all
pyrotechnic systems were disabled. The task was merely to prepare Apollo 1 for its launch
on 21 February 1967 by running through various system procedures.
Suddenly, at 18:30:54 local time (23:30:54 GMT), an unidentified electrical arc ignited the
Command Module’s pure, high-pressure oxygen atmosphere that was being used to

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replicate conditions in orbit. The fire engulfed the interior capsule and the astronauts’ efforts
to open the hatch and escape were in vain. Less than a minute later all three had perished.
The Fire:
A few seconds later, an astronaut, probably Chaffee, announced almost casually over the
intercom: "Fire, I smell fire." Two seconds later, Astronaut White's voice was more insistent:
"Fire in the cockpit." The fire was visible in mission control via the video feed.
White began preparations to unlatch the hatch, the escape route from the module. This
involved moving the headrest out of the way, operating the ratchet-like equipment to open
the latch, and removing the latch.
The command module ruptured. Flame and thick black clouds of smoke billowed out, filling
the launch escape system atop of the spacecraft.

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Some of the men on the launch pad evacuated while others tried to rescue the astronauts.
They had difficulties getting close to the module because of the intense heat and dense
smoke.
When the hatch was finally opened, it was determined that all three astronauts were dead.
The primary cause of death was carbon monoxide posining, with thermal burns having
contributing effects. Firemen arrived within three minutes of the hatch opening, doctors soon
thereafter.
Investigation:
The fact that the disaster occurred on the ground rather than in space made a big difference
to those hoping to understand what went wrong, and do better next time. In this case, all the
evidence was sitting there waiting to be examined, which would have been impossible for an
accident after launch.
One of the most incriminating finds made by the investigation team was that the 100-percent
oxygen environment of the capsule, originally intended to reduce the weight of the vehicle,
made fire extremely easy to start.

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Fire safety:
Another major finding was that the prevalence of flammable materials inside the Apollo 1
cabin further increased the risk of fire.
After the accident, NASA reduced the amount of flammable Velcro in the crew cabin, and
tested many of the capsule's materials for flammability.
The hatch:
A particularly tragic aspect of the Apollo 1 fire was the fact that the astronauts inside the
capsule tried to open the hatch to escape, but couldn't.
The investigation later revealed that the hatch opening procedures were way too difficult and
took too long to be executed in an emergency. Furthermore, the inward-opening hatch was
impossible to open under any pressure higher than normal atmospheric pressure — and the
fire had boosted the cabin pressure significantly.
HOW COULD THEY AVOID IT?
Space exploration is a considered a highly dangerous job field and because of this safety is
considered very important. The Apollo 1 disaster was the first major disaster that NASA
encountered. It was reviewed in detail by a board of authorities who investigated the
problems that caused it. From the investigation the review board came up with
recommendations that would prevent future disasters. The following are some of the main
recommendations that were put forth by the review board.
1. Oxygen or any other material that is combustible should be restricted and
controlled
 That the location and amount of combustible materials should be strictly
controlled, both on missions and simulations.
 That combustible materials used should be replaced wherever possible with
non-flammable materials.
 That atmospheric condition of %100 oxygen is not permissible on tests.
Full-scale flammable mockups should be used to test spacecraft in future.

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2. Spacecraft should be designed with safety as a primary consideration
 Electrical wiring and insulation should be appropriate for the application.
 In future the time to escape be decreased through other escape routes and a
hatch that can easily open under extreme pressure difference.
 When the fire broke out in the module, bits and pieces of the conversation
between the module and command were heard. At times it left command
guessing as to what the astronaut was saying. The review board
recommended that a better communication system be set up.
3. Emergency personnel should be available
 It was recommended that all personnel should have proper training and
should practice for emergency procedures.
 The emergency equipment be reviewed for adequacy in dealing with this
incident, and that the launch facilities should be modified to facilitate
emergency egress situations.
 Inspectors should continually monitor the safety of all test operations and
assure that emergency procedures are in place to handle these types of
situations.
Issues overlooked
 The first problem occurred when Gus Grissom entered into the spacecraft and
hooked up to his oxygen supply from the spacecraft. He described a strange odor in
the spacesuit loop as a "sour smell". The crew stopped to take a sample of the suit
loop, and after discussion with Grissom decided to continue the test.
 The next problem was a high oxygen flow indication which periodically triggered the
master alarm. The men discussed this matter with environmental control system
personnel, who believed the high flow resulted from movement of the crew. The
matter was not really resolved.
 A third serious problem arose in communications. At first, faulty communications
seemed to exist solely between Command Pilot Grissom and the control room. The
crew made adjustments. Later, the difficulty extended to include communications
between the operations and checkout building and the blockhouse at complex 34.

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Procedures for emergency escape called for a minimum of 90 seconds. But in practice the
crew had never accomplished the routines in the minimum time. Grissom had to lower
White's headrest so White could reach above and behind his left shoulder to actuate a
ratchet-type device that would release the first of series of latches. According to one source,
White had actually made part of a full turn with the ratchet before he was overcome by
smoke.
Other changes included: substituting stainless steel for aluminum in high-pressure oxygen
tubing, armor plated water-glycol liquid line solder joints, protective covers over wiring
bundles, stowage boxes built of aluminum, replacement of materials to minimize
flammability, installation of fireproof storage containers for flammable materials, mechanical
fasteners substituted for gripper cloth patches, flameproof coating on wire connections,
replacement of plastic switches with metal ones, installation of an emergency oxygen system
to isolate the crew from toxic fumes, and the inclusion of a portable fire extinguisher and fire-
isolating panels in the cabin.

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AFTER THE TRAGEDY
After removal of the bodies, NASA impounded everything at launch complex 34. On 3
February, NASA Administrator Webb set up a review board to investigate the matter
thoroughly. Engineers at the Manned Spacecraft Center duplicated conditions of the Apollo
204 without the crewmen in the capsule. They reconstructed events and the investigation on
pad 34 showed that the fire started in or near one of the wire bundles to the left and just in
front of Grissom's seat on the left side of the cabin — a spot visible to Chaffee. The fire was
probably invisible for about five or six seconds until Chaffee sounded the alarm.
The exhaustive investigation of the fire and extensive reworking of the CMs postponed any
manned launch until NASA officials cleared the CM for manned flight. Saturn 1B schedules
were suspended for nearly a year, and the launch vehicle that finally bore the designation
AS-204 carried a Lunar Module (LM) as the payload, not the Apollo CM. The missions of AS-
201 and AS-202 with Apollo spacecraft aboard, unofficially known as Apollo 1 and Apollo 2
missions, carried only the aerodynamic nose cone.
In the spring of 1967, NASA's Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, Dr. George
E. Mueller, announced that the mission originally scheduled for Grissom, White and Chaffee
would be known as Apollo 1, and that the first Saturn V launch, scheduled for November
1967, would be known as Apollo 4. The eventual launch of AS-204 became known as the

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Apollo 5 mission (no missions or flights were ever designated Apollo 2 and 3). From NASA
SP-4204, Moonport, A History of Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations.
The tragedy was a big blow to NASA and subsequent investigations led to major changes in
the design of the lunar module. The hatch door was improved to be easily opened in an
emergency, flammables were removed and the pure oxygen atmosphere was replaced with
an oxygen-nitrogen mixture. The crew members who perished are remembered at several
memorials and a patch from their project was even left on the moon by the 1969 Apollo 11
spaceflight.
Ultimately, though, while spacecraft safety has improved leaps and bounds since Apollo 1,
the business of flying in space is still risky, and NASA aims to remember that. The Apollo 1
fire was not the last of NASA's deadly space accidents. Two fatal space shuttle accidents,
one in 1986 and the other in 2003, killed 14 astronauts in all, forcing NASA each time to
reexamine its spacecraft safety.
"In the face of our greatest accomplishments, it's easy to lose sight of the fact that each time
men and women board a spacecraft, their actions carry great risks, along with the
opportunity for great discoveries and the chance to push the envelope of our human
achievement," NASA administrator Charles Bolden said in a video message to
commemorate the Apollo 1 anniversary this week. "In memory of our colleagues I ask all of
you in the NASA family once again to always make your opinions known and be unafraid to
speak up to those in authority so that safety can always be our guiding principle and the
sacrifices of our friends and colleagues will not have been in vain."
The disaster prompted a comprehensive review from NASA, which resulted in a number of
design changes to the Apollo spacecraft to significantly improve its safety. The deaths of
these three talented astronauts provided an important reminder of the perils of manned
space exploration in an age where the desire to send mankind to the stars was second to
none. Amongst a number of memorials, geographical landmarks on the Moon and Mars bear
the names of the three Apollo 1 astronauts as part of their lasting legacy.

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Credit: NASA/Goddard/Arizona State University. Edit by Jason Major.
The flag-draped coffin of astronaut Virgil I. Grissom is being escorted atArlington National Cemetery by his fellow
astronauts (NASA/Ed Hengeveld)