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Closing Mainframe Integrity Gaps
1.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Ray Overby Key Resources, Inc. Closing the Integrity Gap in Your Mainframe Ray.Overby@KRIsecurity.com www.KRIsecurity.com
2.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Introduction: Is the Mainframe Secure? Enterprise Quadrant Architecture IBM’s z/OS System Integrity Statement Mainframe Security Methods Configuration-based Security Code-based Security The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities Summary Questions AGENDA 2
3.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Enterprise Quadrant Architecture 3 Network EndUser Operating System Layer Systems Programs Systems Memory Application Layer User Programs User Memory DASD Printers RESOURCES
4.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. The Mainframe is Only as Secure as the TIME and EFFORT You Spend on Maintaining the Integrity of the Environment IBM’s z/OS Authorized Assembler Services Guide states that you are responsible for making sure that anything you install on each z/OS system you maintain meets the criteria of the Integrity Statement. The Integrity of the Environment is Based on the INABILITY of any program, not authorized by a mechanism under your control to: Disable or circumvent the store or fetch protection encoded in z/OS, Access an operating system resource that is password protected or protected by a mainframe security product, also called an External Security Manager (ESM), Obtain control in an authorized state such as APF-authorized, supervisor state, or with a protection key less than eight exploitable to illicitly and invisibly browse, corrupt, or steal data associated with an application Is the Mainframe Secure? 4
5.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. All installation-supplied authorized code (for example, an installation SVC) must perform the same or an equivalent type of validity checking and control that the system uses to maintain its integrity. Modifications and additions (3rd Party Software) to the system do not introduce any integrity exposures. The IBM z/OS Statement of Integrity only applies to IBM software. It does not apply to any ISV code or installation written code. You, the z/OS system owner, are responsible for continually verifying the integrity of any configuration based modifications and code you add to your mainframe. Is the Mainframe Secure? 5
6.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Configuration-Based Security • Configuration-based Security is built around a Security Policy, the Procedures enacted to maintain the Security Policy, and a correctly configured ESM and Operating System. An Installation has Responsibility for Securing the following: IPL (boot) Parameters, Subsystem Startup Parameters, Adoption of security procedures (for example, the password protection of appropriate system data sets) that are a necessary complement to the integrity support within the operating system itself, Setup and management of External Security Managers like IBM RACF®, CA ACF2™ or CA Top Secret®. What are the Security Methods Under My Control? 6
7.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Code-Based Security • IBM’s Statement of Integrity is the basis for Operating System Integrity Testing™ (OSIT) • Code-based Security is built around a strong Vulnerability Management program as outlined in your Security Policy. • Vulnerability Management across all platforms is now a component of PCI, SOX, etc. • Vulnerability Management on the Mainframe is no different than on any other Platform or Technology A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should include the operating system layer and the application layer A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should encompass all aspects of the Vulnerability Lifecycle What are the Security Methods Under My Control? 7
8.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle 8 • REPORT THE RESULTS TO THE VENDOR • APPLY VENDOR SUPPLIED FIXES • SCAN AND ASSESS THE RESULTS • RESCAN TO VALIDATE THE VIABILITY OF THE FIX VERIFY DISCOVER REPORTREMEDIATE
9.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • Configuration-based vulnerabilities are caused by improper configuration settings. • Configuration-based vulnerabilities are remediated by changing configuration parameters. • How to Protect Yourself • Configure all security mechanisms based on your security policy, • Turn off all unused services, • Continually monitor roles, permissions, and accounts, • Disabling all default accounts and/or change their passwords, • Set up and monitor logs and alerts. Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities 9
10.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • KRI classifies z/OS integrity vulnerabilities as Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities™ (SSCV). • Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities™ (SSCV’s) are caused by poor design or coding errors in products that reside in the operating system layer on your mainframe. • SSCV’s have the following characteristics IN ALL CASES: • Exploitable • Violates the IBM Statement of Integrity • If exploited, can compromise all data on the system and the system itself • A single SSCV would allow someone with access to z/OS to bypass its controls without forensic evidence of a breach. They can: • Dynamically elevate External Security Manager (ESM) authorities • Dynamically elevate z/OS authorities • Alter operating systems processing: • To suppress forensic evidence • To collect information such as userids and passwords Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities 10
11.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • Common to all of the below is that the vulnerability can be triggered or exploited by a non-authorized user with no special privileges. • Exploitations of this code vulnerability leaves no forensic evidence or audit trails of what was accessed, copied, and/or modified. • Types of Vulnerabilities: • System Instability - System instability occurs when the authorized program is invoked other than as designed and the program does not protect itself against improper invocation. This improper invocation can cause z/OS service issues including crashing the system. • Denial of Service; crashing or slowing the system down. • Identity Spoofing - Identify Spoofing vulnerabilities allow the non-authorized user to create alternate security credentials. Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities 11
12.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • Types of Vulnerabilities: • Trap Door -Trap Door vulnerabilities provide the non-authorized user the ability to call a user provided routine in an authorized state. (Either system key (0-7) or supervisor state.) This enables the user to directly make any changes to the active environment, including: • Direct invocation of any authorized z/OS interface • Changing user’s state (authorized) • Making changes to the operating system • Making changes to system or application data • Impersonating other users • Disabling logging auditing (SMF) • Disrupt z/OS operation (crash or failure) • Least Privilege - Least Privilege vulnerabilities occur when a privilege or authority is assigned where a lessor privilege is appropriate. • Example: An SVC routine or system exit is improperly linked as AC(1). • As SVC routines and system exits are directly invoked by the system already authorized, they do not need to be link edited as AC(1); it has no effect on their normal use. However, the AC(1) attribute allows these routines to be improperly directly invoked via PGM= in JCL, where they were not designed to be invoked. Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities 12
13.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. In Summary 13 What’s Out There
14.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • External, independent code validation is essential for both software development “best practices” and controlling enterprise security risk associated with the deployment of third-party applications. • z/OS Clients believe that their External Security Managers (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) are adequately protecting mission-critical platforms, third-party applications and information. • SSCVs allow security (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) to be bypassed – data is compromised. • In general Code-based Vulnerabilities are remediated by: - Reporting the problem to the code owner and the code owner provides a PTF that is applied by the user, - Removing the software from the system – this is very rare. In Summary 14
15.
© 2010-2016 Key
Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. IBM, RACF, and z/OS are registered trademarks of IBM in the US CA and ACF2 are trademarks of Computer Associates Technologies, Inc. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. TRADEMARKS
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