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© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
Ray Overby
Key Resources, Inc.
Closing the Integrity Gap in Your Mainframe
Ray.Overby@KRIsecurity.com
www.KRIsecurity.com
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
 Introduction: Is the Mainframe Secure?
 Enterprise Quadrant Architecture
 IBM’s z/OS System Integrity Statement
 Mainframe Security Methods
 Configuration-based Security
 Code-based Security
 The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle
 Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities
 Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities
 Summary
 Questions
AGENDA
2
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
Enterprise Quadrant Architecture
3
Network
EndUser
Operating System Layer
Systems
Programs
Systems
Memory
Application Layer
User
Programs
User
Memory
DASD
Printers
RESOURCES
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
 The Mainframe is Only as Secure as the TIME and EFFORT You Spend on
Maintaining the Integrity of the Environment
 IBM’s z/OS Authorized Assembler Services Guide states that you are
responsible for making sure that anything you install on each z/OS system
you maintain meets the criteria of the Integrity Statement.
 The Integrity of the Environment is Based on the INABILITY of any program,
not authorized by a mechanism under your control to:
 Disable or circumvent the store or fetch protection encoded in z/OS,
 Access an operating system resource that is password protected or protected by a
mainframe security product, also called an External Security Manager (ESM),
 Obtain control in an authorized state such as APF-authorized, supervisor state, or
with a protection key less than eight exploitable to illicitly and invisibly browse,
corrupt, or steal data associated with an application
Is the Mainframe Secure?
4
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
 All installation-supplied authorized code (for example, an
installation SVC) must perform the same or an equivalent type of
validity checking and control that the system uses to maintain its
integrity.
 Modifications and additions (3rd Party Software) to the system do
not introduce any integrity exposures.
 The IBM z/OS Statement of Integrity only applies to IBM software.
It does not apply to any ISV code or installation written code. You,
the z/OS system owner, are responsible for continually verifying
the integrity of any configuration based modifications and code
you add to your mainframe.
Is the Mainframe Secure?
5
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
 Configuration-Based Security
• Configuration-based Security is built around a Security Policy, the
Procedures enacted to maintain the Security Policy, and a correctly
configured ESM and Operating System.
 An Installation has Responsibility for Securing the following:
 IPL (boot) Parameters,
 Subsystem Startup Parameters,
 Adoption of security procedures (for example, the password
protection of appropriate system data sets) that are a necessary
complement to the integrity support within the operating system
itself,
 Setup and management of External Security Managers like IBM
RACF®, CA ACF2™ or CA Top Secret®.
What are the Security Methods Under My Control?
6
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
 Code-Based Security
• IBM’s Statement of Integrity is the basis for Operating System Integrity
Testing™ (OSIT)
• Code-based Security is built around a strong Vulnerability Management
program as outlined in your Security Policy.
• Vulnerability Management across all platforms is now a component of
PCI, SOX, etc.
• Vulnerability Management on the Mainframe is no different than on
any other Platform or Technology
 A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should include the
operating system layer and the application layer
 A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should encompass all
aspects of the Vulnerability Lifecycle
What are the Security Methods Under My Control?
7
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle
8
• REPORT THE
RESULTS TO
THE
VENDOR
• APPLY
VENDOR
SUPPLIED
FIXES
• SCAN AND
ASSESS THE
RESULTS
• RESCAN TO
VALIDATE
THE
VIABILITY OF
THE FIX
VERIFY DISCOVER
REPORTREMEDIATE
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
• Configuration-based vulnerabilities are caused by improper
configuration settings.
• Configuration-based vulnerabilities are remediated by changing
configuration parameters.
• How to Protect Yourself
• Configure all security mechanisms based on your security policy,
• Turn off all unused services,
• Continually monitor roles, permissions, and accounts,
• Disabling all default accounts and/or change their passwords,
• Set up and monitor logs and alerts.
Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities
9
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
• KRI classifies z/OS integrity vulnerabilities as Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities™ (SSCV).
• Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities™ (SSCV’s) are caused by poor design or coding errors in
products that reside in the operating system layer on your mainframe.
• SSCV’s have the following characteristics IN ALL CASES:
• Exploitable
• Violates the IBM Statement of Integrity
• If exploited, can compromise all data on the system and the system itself
• A single SSCV would allow someone with access to z/OS to bypass its controls without
forensic evidence of a breach. They can:
• Dynamically elevate External Security Manager (ESM) authorities
• Dynamically elevate z/OS authorities
• Alter operating systems processing:
• To suppress forensic evidence
• To collect information such as userids and passwords
Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities
10
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
• Common to all of the below is that the vulnerability can be triggered or
exploited by a non-authorized user with no special privileges.
• Exploitations of this code vulnerability leaves no forensic evidence or
audit trails of what was accessed, copied, and/or modified.
• Types of Vulnerabilities:
• System Instability - System instability occurs when the authorized program is invoked
other than as designed and the program does not protect itself against improper
invocation. This improper invocation can cause z/OS service issues including crashing the
system.
• Denial of Service; crashing or slowing the system down.
• Identity Spoofing - Identify Spoofing vulnerabilities allow the non-authorized user to
create alternate security credentials.
Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities
11
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
• Types of Vulnerabilities:
• Trap Door -Trap Door vulnerabilities provide the non-authorized user the ability to call a
user provided routine in an authorized state. (Either system key (0-7) or supervisor state.)
This enables the user to directly make any changes to the active environment, including:
• Direct invocation of any authorized z/OS interface
• Changing user’s state (authorized)
• Making changes to the operating system
• Making changes to system or application data
• Impersonating other users
• Disabling logging auditing (SMF)
• Disrupt z/OS operation (crash or failure)
• Least Privilege - Least Privilege vulnerabilities occur when a privilege or authority is
assigned where a lessor privilege is appropriate.
• Example: An SVC routine or system exit is improperly linked as AC(1).
• As SVC routines and system exits are directly invoked by the system already authorized, they do
not need to be link edited as AC(1); it has no effect on their normal use. However, the AC(1)
attribute allows these routines to be improperly directly invoked via PGM= in JCL, where they were
not designed to be invoked.
Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities
12
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
In Summary
13
What’s Out There
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
• External, independent code validation is essential for both software
development “best practices” and controlling enterprise security risk
associated with the deployment of third-party applications.
• z/OS Clients believe that their External Security Managers (RACF, CA ACF2,
and CA Top Secret) are adequately protecting mission-critical platforms,
third-party applications and information.
• SSCVs allow security (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) to be bypassed –
data is compromised.
• In general Code-based Vulnerabilities are remediated by:
- Reporting the problem to the code owner and the code owner provides a PTF
that is applied by the user,
- Removing the software from the system – this is very rare.
In Summary
14
© 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.
IBM, RACF, and z/OS are registered trademarks of IBM in the US
CA and ACF2 are trademarks of Computer Associates Technologies, Inc.
Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
TRADEMARKS

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Closing Mainframe Integrity Gaps

  • 1. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Ray Overby Key Resources, Inc. Closing the Integrity Gap in Your Mainframe Ray.Overby@KRIsecurity.com www.KRIsecurity.com
  • 2. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.  Introduction: Is the Mainframe Secure?  Enterprise Quadrant Architecture  IBM’s z/OS System Integrity Statement  Mainframe Security Methods  Configuration-based Security  Code-based Security  The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle  Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities  Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities  Summary  Questions AGENDA 2
  • 3. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. Enterprise Quadrant Architecture 3 Network EndUser Operating System Layer Systems Programs Systems Memory Application Layer User Programs User Memory DASD Printers RESOURCES
  • 4. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.  The Mainframe is Only as Secure as the TIME and EFFORT You Spend on Maintaining the Integrity of the Environment  IBM’s z/OS Authorized Assembler Services Guide states that you are responsible for making sure that anything you install on each z/OS system you maintain meets the criteria of the Integrity Statement.  The Integrity of the Environment is Based on the INABILITY of any program, not authorized by a mechanism under your control to:  Disable or circumvent the store or fetch protection encoded in z/OS,  Access an operating system resource that is password protected or protected by a mainframe security product, also called an External Security Manager (ESM),  Obtain control in an authorized state such as APF-authorized, supervisor state, or with a protection key less than eight exploitable to illicitly and invisibly browse, corrupt, or steal data associated with an application Is the Mainframe Secure? 4
  • 5. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.  All installation-supplied authorized code (for example, an installation SVC) must perform the same or an equivalent type of validity checking and control that the system uses to maintain its integrity.  Modifications and additions (3rd Party Software) to the system do not introduce any integrity exposures.  The IBM z/OS Statement of Integrity only applies to IBM software. It does not apply to any ISV code or installation written code. You, the z/OS system owner, are responsible for continually verifying the integrity of any configuration based modifications and code you add to your mainframe. Is the Mainframe Secure? 5
  • 6. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.  Configuration-Based Security • Configuration-based Security is built around a Security Policy, the Procedures enacted to maintain the Security Policy, and a correctly configured ESM and Operating System.  An Installation has Responsibility for Securing the following:  IPL (boot) Parameters,  Subsystem Startup Parameters,  Adoption of security procedures (for example, the password protection of appropriate system data sets) that are a necessary complement to the integrity support within the operating system itself,  Setup and management of External Security Managers like IBM RACF®, CA ACF2™ or CA Top Secret®. What are the Security Methods Under My Control? 6
  • 7. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc.  Code-Based Security • IBM’s Statement of Integrity is the basis for Operating System Integrity Testing™ (OSIT) • Code-based Security is built around a strong Vulnerability Management program as outlined in your Security Policy. • Vulnerability Management across all platforms is now a component of PCI, SOX, etc. • Vulnerability Management on the Mainframe is no different than on any other Platform or Technology  A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should include the operating system layer and the application layer  A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should encompass all aspects of the Vulnerability Lifecycle What are the Security Methods Under My Control? 7
  • 8. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle 8 • REPORT THE RESULTS TO THE VENDOR • APPLY VENDOR SUPPLIED FIXES • SCAN AND ASSESS THE RESULTS • RESCAN TO VALIDATE THE VIABILITY OF THE FIX VERIFY DISCOVER REPORTREMEDIATE
  • 9. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • Configuration-based vulnerabilities are caused by improper configuration settings. • Configuration-based vulnerabilities are remediated by changing configuration parameters. • How to Protect Yourself • Configure all security mechanisms based on your security policy, • Turn off all unused services, • Continually monitor roles, permissions, and accounts, • Disabling all default accounts and/or change their passwords, • Set up and monitor logs and alerts. Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities 9
  • 10. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • KRI classifies z/OS integrity vulnerabilities as Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities™ (SSCV). • Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities™ (SSCV’s) are caused by poor design or coding errors in products that reside in the operating system layer on your mainframe. • SSCV’s have the following characteristics IN ALL CASES: • Exploitable • Violates the IBM Statement of Integrity • If exploited, can compromise all data on the system and the system itself • A single SSCV would allow someone with access to z/OS to bypass its controls without forensic evidence of a breach. They can: • Dynamically elevate External Security Manager (ESM) authorities • Dynamically elevate z/OS authorities • Alter operating systems processing: • To suppress forensic evidence • To collect information such as userids and passwords Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities 10
  • 11. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • Common to all of the below is that the vulnerability can be triggered or exploited by a non-authorized user with no special privileges. • Exploitations of this code vulnerability leaves no forensic evidence or audit trails of what was accessed, copied, and/or modified. • Types of Vulnerabilities: • System Instability - System instability occurs when the authorized program is invoked other than as designed and the program does not protect itself against improper invocation. This improper invocation can cause z/OS service issues including crashing the system. • Denial of Service; crashing or slowing the system down. • Identity Spoofing - Identify Spoofing vulnerabilities allow the non-authorized user to create alternate security credentials. Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities 11
  • 12. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • Types of Vulnerabilities: • Trap Door -Trap Door vulnerabilities provide the non-authorized user the ability to call a user provided routine in an authorized state. (Either system key (0-7) or supervisor state.) This enables the user to directly make any changes to the active environment, including: • Direct invocation of any authorized z/OS interface • Changing user’s state (authorized) • Making changes to the operating system • Making changes to system or application data • Impersonating other users • Disabling logging auditing (SMF) • Disrupt z/OS operation (crash or failure) • Least Privilege - Least Privilege vulnerabilities occur when a privilege or authority is assigned where a lessor privilege is appropriate. • Example: An SVC routine or system exit is improperly linked as AC(1). • As SVC routines and system exits are directly invoked by the system already authorized, they do not need to be link edited as AC(1); it has no effect on their normal use. However, the AC(1) attribute allows these routines to be improperly directly invoked via PGM= in JCL, where they were not designed to be invoked. Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities 12
  • 13. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. In Summary 13 What’s Out There
  • 14. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. • External, independent code validation is essential for both software development “best practices” and controlling enterprise security risk associated with the deployment of third-party applications. • z/OS Clients believe that their External Security Managers (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) are adequately protecting mission-critical platforms, third-party applications and information. • SSCVs allow security (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) to be bypassed – data is compromised. • In general Code-based Vulnerabilities are remediated by: - Reporting the problem to the code owner and the code owner provides a PTF that is applied by the user, - Removing the software from the system – this is very rare. In Summary 14
  • 15. © 2010-2016 Key Resources, Inc. All rights reserved. z/Assure is a registered trademark of Key Resources, Inc. IBM, RACF, and z/OS are registered trademarks of IBM in the US CA and ACF2 are trademarks of Computer Associates Technologies, Inc. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. TRADEMARKS