FinalEpagoge draft5

S. E. Strader, Epagoge
Introduction
What is induction for Aristotle? Throughout the corpus, I understand Aristotle to
be employing three distinct senses of induction (in Greek, epagoge). [1] A root sense,
which I define as the mental act by which one leads oneself or another from one or more
propositions to others, either through inductive or deductive means. [2] A qualified form
of sense [1]: this sense of epagoge is the mental act by which one moves from one or
more particular or general propositions to another of greater generality. This is
Aristotle’s usual sense of the term, and what I will refer to as Intellection. [3] A
qualified form of sense [2]: what I will call absolute epagoge is the mental act by which
one moves from one or more particular or general contingent truths or beliefs to another
contingent truth or belief of greater generality. Sense [3] is to be contrasted with
absolute noesis, defined as the act through which from one or more particular or general
truths one grasps a necessary, universal truth.
As I will show, the energeia of nous, insofar as it is a dunamis for thinking and
judging, is noesis, i.e., noetic activity broadly construed. If we couple this general notion
of noesis with the root sense of epagoge that Aristotle employs in the Analytics, what
emerges is a dunamis of nous consisting of two operations: epagoge and noesis, which
stand to each other as potency to act. As I will explain, in order to see that all forms of
epagoge (but, in particular, absolute epagoge) are incomplete realizations of nous, one
must keep in mind the teloi corresponding to Aristotle’s proper – or absolute – sense of
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each of these notions. However, the initial distinction of the operations of nous is into
the two operations of epagoge and noesis, both of which are understood as a movement
of the intellect from one truth or concept to another. At this early stage of the analysis of
nous and its operations, no distinction needs to be made according to whether the
movement is from universal to particular or particular to universal, or even from whole to
part or part to whole. These generic senses of epagoge and nous are ones with which
Aristotle commences his preliminary inquiry in the Analytics: a vague sense which
includes both induction and deduction as modes of teaching and learning. Although this
sense of epagoge is included with noesis under the operations of the faculty of nous
broadly construed, in fact, noesis and epagoge are distinct names for the same operation.
Noesis is only distinguished from epagoge by their proper teloi: absolute noesis stands to
absolute epagoge as knowledge to belief; that is, as certain knowledge of essences to
justified true belief about contingent generalities.
As I will show, the sense of epagoge I call Intellection is the sense used
predominantly by Aristotle. Intellection is a movement of the mind from part to whole;
i.e., from the specific or general to the more general or universal. In other words,
Intellection includes both absolute epagoge and absolute noesis.
To attain the precise, technical senses of absolute epagoge and absolute noesis,
Aristotle defines these two notions according to their respective teloi: absolute epagoge
is a movement of the intellect from the particular or specific to the general which results
in doxa or contingent truth. Just insofar as doxa can be an incomplete grasp of an object
which may be grasped through absolute noesis, doxa stands as potency to the act of nous;
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the movement of the intellect which yields necessary truth is noesis in Aristotle’s most
technical and proper sense, what I am calling absolute noesis.
Aristotle often begins with a received or nominal definition of a concept and proceeds
to develop the notion, by analyzing it into its various senses, until he isolates the notion’s
proper or technical sense. Although the development of the notion of epagoge is not as
obvious as it is with kinesis in the Physics or eudaimonia in the Ethics, there is indeed a
development of the notion of epagoge throughout the Organon and the Nichomachean
Ethics. The notion of epagoge is then further developed in the De Anima and the
Metaphysics. Nevertheless, no complete account of epagoge is possible without
understanding its relation to nous.
In the first part of this paper I will develop the three senses of epagoge outlined above
by examining the passages in which Aristotle discusses the notion of epagoge.
Throughout this exegetical process, I will invoke the commentary of Ross and Barnes
among others, and compare and contrast such commentary with my own exegesis of
these same texts. My analysis will reveal the simple logical relation between the various
senses of epagoge; a relation that I think accurately reflects Aristotle’s intent. I will
examine passages from the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics and the
Nicomachean Ethics, passages that shed light on the nature of epagoge. This exegesis
will reveal the need to look more closely at the nature of nous and its operations in order
to complete my interpretation of the notion of epagoge. For this subsequent analysis of
nous, in the second part of my paper I will show how Aristotle’s metaphysical principles
of potency and act as developed in the De Anima and Metaphysics serve to relate the
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notions of nous and epagoge, and how these notions determine the relation of each to the
other.
The Epagoge Problem
Aristotle’s account of epagoge, and its relation to nous and noesis has long been
considered problematic. In the account of epagoge in II.19 of the Posterior Analytics,
and in a number of other passages, Aristotle states that it is by epagoge that we acquire
knowledge of the primary premises.1
But in the following paragraph he says that it is
nous that apprehends the first principles.2
When attempts are made to isolate the accurate
and precise notions of epagoge and nous, and to understand the exact relation that exists
between these two notions, such seemingly conflicting accounts cause significant
difficulties.
We meet with further difficulties when attempting to determine the proper sense of
epagoge and nous respectively among the various senses of each that Aristotle employs.
In the passage noted above from Posterior Analytics II.19, Aristotle gives an account of
nous that furnishes us with the immediate, indemonstrable first principles of scientific
demonstration.3
However, in the psychological treatises, we find a different account. In
the De Anima Aristotle employs a much broader sense of nous which means “that by
which the soul thinks and judges.”4
Here, nous is identified with the intellective part of
the human soul; i.e., the intellective dunamis, or power, which underlies all mental
operations of thinking and judging. Then, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle employs
1
Post. An. II.19, 100b3.
2
Post. An. II.19, 100b12.
3
Ibid.
4
De An. III.4, 429a23.
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yet another sense of nous which means a developed habit, or hexis; i.e., one of the
intellectual virtues along with art, scientific knowledge, prudence, and wisdom.5
As a
result, there appear to be at least three distinct senses of nous employed by Aristotle: a
mental operation, or energeia, a dunamis, and a hexis.
Regarding the dunamis of nous (identified above as “that by which the soul thinks and
judges”), since induction is a mode of thought, one of the operations of nous so
understood is epagoge. But like nous, epagoge is also used in various ways by Aristotle.
Aristotle’s claim that it is by epagoge that we grasp first principles (prota) caused W. D.
Ross (1949) to wonder what exactly the ‘first things’ are which Aristotle claims are
known by epagoge. Are they general concepts or universal propositions?6
In his
attempt to determine Aristotle’s meaning in this regard, Ross suggested that Aristotle
employs a sense of epagoge meaning “intuitive reason,” i.e., nous, and this sense is
distinct from both “perfect induction,” and “imperfect induction.”7
But it does not appear
that Ross regarded this to be a satisfactory solution to this problem. This dissatisfaction
is evident in his later commentary on Posterior Analytics (1980), in which Ross
continued to question whether the process of the formation of general concepts is distinct
from the process of the formation of universal propositions.8
Ross’ question of the relation of epagoge to nous was taken up more recently and
most notably by Lesher (1973), Kosman (1973), Engberg-Pederson (1979), and Kahn
(1981). Modrak (1987) accurately and concisely summarizes their respective positions,
and rightly characterizes the whole as a positive development of the notions of nous and
5
N.E. VI.3, 1139b15-17. See also N.E. VI.2, 1139a17,
6
Ross 1949, 55.
7
Ibid., 217.
8
Ross 1980, 675, In his commentary on Posterior Analytics II.19.
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epagoge; but she does not regard the issue as settled.9
She shows that the issue of the
relation of epagoge to nous cannot be settled by confining our search to the passages in
the Analytics, particularly to Post. An. II.19, as these commentators did. Instead, the
search must be widened to include Aristotle’s psychological works. Modrak makes great
strides toward resolution of the issue, but I will show that she does not go quite far
enough. The tripartite division of the senses of epagoge developed here will determine
the senses of epagoge and their relation to nous.
Lexical Preliminaries
Before launching his investigation in earnest, Aristotle typically reviews the
various received notions, beginning with what is commonly held about the subject in
question. This method furnishes Aristotle with an indistinct notion which serves as a
starting point for the subsequent analysis. Liddell and Scott10
provide us with such a
starting point. L&S define epagoge as a bringing in, supplying; a bringing in to one’s
aid, introduction; a drawing on, alluring. The unabridged version includes a much
narrower sense taken from Aristotle’s Prior Analytics: in logic, the bringing a number of
particular examples, so as to lead to an universal conclusion, the argument from
induction. Epagoge is a cognate of the verb epago, epagein,11
which L&S define as 1. to
bring on; 2. to set on; urge on; b. to lead on an army against the enemy; 3. to lead on
by persuasion, influence; to induce; 4. to bring in, invite. 5. to bring to a place, bring
9
Modrak 1987, 185.
10
An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, 7th
ed., Oxford University Press (Oxford:
2001). Hereafter, L&S.
11
Epi, to or towards + ago, lead, carry or bring.
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in; to bring in, supply; 6. to lay on or apply to one; 7. to bring forward, propose; 8. to
bring in over and above, to add.12
Of these various senses, sense (3), with its notions of
persuasion and influence, appears best suited for use and development in a logical
treatise. Further, most of the other senses can be viewed as aspects of persuading and
influencing.
That sense (3) above is the best candidate for a starting point of an investigation into
the nature of epagoge is a view that is corroborated by Jonathan Barnes. According to
Barnes (1969), the aim of the Analytics as stated in the opening line of the Posterior
Analytics is to present a theory of demonstration that is a formal account of how an
achieved body of knowledge should be presented and taught, as opposed to showing how
scientific knowledge is discovered. If this claim is correct and the aim of the Analytics is
to elucidate how scientific knowledge is taught or learned, and not how it is discovered,
then L&S’s sense (3) of epagein, (i.e., to lead on by persuasion, influence; to induce) best
aligns with what I referred to above as the preliminary, root sense of epagoge employed
in the Analytics. Barnes’ claim is justified since, with the introduction of apodeixis,
Aristotle’s intent in the Analytics is to unveil the most accurate mode of persuasion.13
Further, the concepts of “persuasion,” “influence,” and “inducement” imply at least two
people, where one is attempting to effect a change in another by such means.
Bearing all this in mind, this sense (3) of epagein is the logical starting point for a
preliminary definition. Or, more precisely, this aspect of epagein, and its corresponding
cognate, epagoge, appear to be, at first blush, the particular concern of the Analytics.
12
L&S
13
I.e., scientific demonstration is more accurate in itself, not to us.
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CHAPTER ONE: The Root Sense of Epagoge
As mentioned above in the introduction, I understand Aristotle to be employing
three distinct senses of epagoge. The first sense of epagoge I will discuss is what I will
refer to as the root sense. It is the mental act by which one leads oneself or another from
one or more propositions to others, either through inductive or deductive means. In the
introduction to his translation and commentary on the Prior and Posterior Analytics,
Ross states the following regarding epagoge:
The root idea involved in Aristotle’s usage of the words epagein and epagoge is
not that of adducing instances, but that of leading some one from one truth to
another. So far as this goes, ordinary syllogism might equally be described as
epagoge, and epagein is occasionally used of ordinary syllogism. And in general
Aristotle clearly means by epagoge not the adducing of instances but the passage
from them to a universal conclusion.14
In this passage Ross isolates what he calls the root idea of epagoge as “that of leading
some one from one truth to another.” However, as I will show, there is convincing
evidence that Aristotle’s root idea of epagein and epagoge is significantly more general,
encompassing both truth and opinion; as such, Aristotle’s root idea includes both
14
Ross 1980, 47.
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induction as well as ordinary syllogism. In short, Aristotle’s root sense of epagoge
encompasses any means of leading oneself or another from one proposition to another.
Epagoge and epagogei
There are two passages in the Analytics which reveal Aristotle’s root sense of
epagoge meaning to be led from one proposition to another, or to lead oneself or another
from one proposition to another. Both passages use a form of the passive verb
epagesthai instead of a form of the noun epagoge. The first is An. Pr. II.21, 67a23, the
passage in which Aristotle’s introduces his solution to the problem of Plato’s Meno; i.e.,
how we can both know a general truth such as, ‘all triangles have interior angles equal to
two right angles,’ and yet fail to recognize a particular manifestation of this truth. He
explains that
We do not know the particular fact beforehand (proepistasthai); we acquire the
knowledge (epistemen) at the same moment as we are led on (epagogei) to the
conclusion, and this is like an act of recognition (anagnorizontas).15
Ross points out that epagogei here and at An. Post. I.1, 71a21 are forms of the passive
verb epagesthai, meaning “led on.” Smith, however, chooses to translate epagogei not as
a form of epagesthai, but as a form of the noun epagoge.16
But it appears that Ross’s
translation using the passive verb is correct.
Smith translates “hama tei epagogei” as ‘induction’ likened to an act of recognition:17
like when we recognize that the figure in the semi-circle is a triangle, and at the same
15
Ross 1980, 471. Bold here and hereafter are mine and denote Aristotle’s use of either the passive form of
the verb epagein (67a23 and 71a20) or the noun epagoge.
16
Smith’s translation of the same passage: “. . . they get the knowledge of the particulars at the same time,
by means of induction, like those who recognize something” (Smith 1989, 96).
17
Ibid. 96.
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moment that it thus has angles equal to two right angles, i.e. recognition that this figure is
a triangle; therefore, etc. However, simple recognition of a particular qua particular of a
certain kind, while epagogic insofar as it is a movement of the mind from one truth or
concept to another, is not epagoge in any of Aristotle’s more determinate senses. Insofar
as this example reveals any analogy, it is that induction is a process through which we
acquire the ability to “recognize” the universal in the particular like when we recognize
the particular as a particular of a certain kind: just insofar as both forms of recognition
involve a non-discursive flash of insight. The emphasis in this analogy is on
synchronism. Just as one recognizes the figure as a triangle and at the same time knows
it has angles equal to two right angles, similarly Aristotle holds that one can abstract the
essence from this individual, and at the same time know that the essence can be
predicated of this. But this analogy does not involve likening epagoge itself to anything.
Ross, on the other hand, translates “hama tei epagogei” as ‘simultaneously with our
being led on to the conclusion.’ He argues that translating ‘epagogei’ with ‘induction’ is
incorrect here because Aristotle is not describing induction, but deduction. Since the
universal ‘All triangles have angles equal to two right angles’ (major premise) is already
known by the one who will discover the triangle in the semi-circle, one is merely
discovering the fact that this semi-circle contains such a figure, and this figure is a
triangle (minor premise).
Engberg-Pedersen18
develops six distinct senses of epagoge, and argues that the use of
epagoge here is in accordance with his sense (1). According to E-P, sense (1) means
“leading another person towards something with the aim and consequence that he
18
Engberg-Pedersen 1979; hereafter, E-P.
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acquires insight into it.”19
I will address E-P’s six-fold analysis of epagoge in a later
section, but note that E-P’s sense (1) is broad, and can be understood as embracing any
movement of the intellect from a particular, general or katholou idea to another
particular, general, or katholou idea. This sense squares with the root sense of epagoge I
have identified.
The second passage that contains the root sense of epagoge is An. Post. I.1, 71a21,
and it also employs a form of the passive verb epagesthai. Aristotle states that
Thus you already knew that every triangle has angles equal to two right angles;
but you got to know that this figure in the semicircle is a triangle at the same time
as you were being led to the conclusion. In some cases learning occurs in this
way, and the last term does not become known through the middle term – this
occurs when the items are in fact particulars and are not said of any underlying
subject.20
Because the context is describing a deduction instead of an induction, I agree with both
Barnes and Ross that epagomenos is not used here in any technical sense of induction but
is describing a form of the passive verb epagein in the sense of “led on.” This is the same
sense as that seen above in 67a23. Further, as Ross points out, “led on” can describe
either an inductive or a deductive mode of teaching or learning.21
As such, I think this
passage clearly indicates that Aristotle has in mind a broad notion of epagoge which
includes both induction and deduction, and this broad notion is the root sense from which
he proceeds to develop more strict senses of epagoge.
The first line of the Posterior Analytics states that “All teaching and all learning of an
intellectual kind proceed from pre-existent knowledge.”22
The emphasis on teaching and
19
Ibid., 301.
20
Ibid. (71a20-24).
21
Ross 1980, 47.
22
Barnes 1994, 1.
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learning corroborates the above claim, namely, that the focus of the Analytics is to lay out
the way in which episteme is to be taught or learned, as opposed to describing the process
of scientific discovery. Because of this, we should expect that the account of epagoge
developed throughout the Analytics may not be the complete account.
As the opening line of the Posterior Analytics shows, Aristotle’s primary focus in the
Analytics is to determine how existing sciences are to be taught and learned, and only
secondarily with how they are discovered.23
As my analysis of the texts above shows, the
root sense of epagoge in the Analytics is a process of leading or drawing a student to see
or be persuaded of a proposition. This process may be understood from the point of
view of the teacher or from that of the student. When viewed from the point of view of
the teacher, this root sense of epagoge describes an active process, i.e. leading or
drawing a student to the grasp of some proposition. When understood from the point of
view of the student, the root sense of epagoge describes a passive process: here the
student is led or is drawn to the grasp of some proposition. Further, as suggested above,
this root sense of epagoge is general in yet another way: from either the active or passive
point of view, the proposition in question the student is led to see may be particular or
general, contingent or necessary.
23
Cf. Barnes, 1969, who argues this same point.
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CHAPTER TWO: Intellection
The usual sense of epagoge
Having made explicit the root sense of epagoge, and revealed its etymological
ties to the verb epagein as it was commonly understood, I will now develop Aristotle’s
most common sense of epagoge, what I am calling Intellection. In this section, I will
show that Intellection includes the grasping of necessary and universal truths, as well as
the more modest and ordinary function of induction as that which grasps general truths
and concepts. In other words, Intellection is the movement from part to whole.
There are many passages which show that epagoge can yield the universal. At Topics
I.12, Aristotle presents what appears to be a formal definition of epagoge; that is, it is the
closest we have of a formal definition of epagoge. This passage serves as the clearest
proof that Aristotle has a determinate sense of epagoge which I have termed Intellection,
and which is a generic term for any mental act which moves from part to whole. So, at
105a13, Aristotle states:
Having made these distinctions, we must distinguish how many species there are
of dialectical arguments. There are induction and deduction. Now what
deduction is has been said before: induction is a passage from particulars to
universals, e.g. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective,
and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at
his particular task. Induction is more convincing and clear: it is more readily
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learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men; but
deduction is more forcible and more effective against contradictious people
(Revised Oxford).24
Smith (1997) translates the same passage as follows:
With these things defined, then, we need to distinguish how many kinds of
dialectical argument there are. One kind is induction, another is deduction. Now,
what a deduction is was explained earlier. Induction, however, is proceeding
from particulars up to a universal. For instance, if the pilot who has knowledge is
the best pilot, and so with a charioteer, then generally the person who has
knowledge about anything is the best. Induction is more persuasive, clearer,
more intelligible in the way perception is, and commonly used by the public;
deduction is more coercive and more effective with those skilled in
contradicting.25
In the first of the two translations above, induction “is a passage from particulars to
universals.”26
This description of Intellection as “a passage from particulars to
universals” captures the essence of epagoge as Intellection, and precludes the opposite
notion from the account, namely, the movement from universal to particular which
belonged to the root sense of epagoge. It clearly states that induction proceeds from the
particular to the universal.27
Nevertheless, as I will show, this account lacks precision.
Finally, it should be evident that Intellection is logically related to the root sense as a
species to its genus.
Regarding the phrase, ‘more intelligible in the way perception is,’ Smith draws
attention to the common Aristotelian distinction between that which is more intelligible
in itself and that which is more intelligible to us. What we know through sense
perception is more intelligible to us but less intelligible in itself. And further, since
24
Ibid., 175. Italics mine.
25
Smith 1997, 11. Italics mine.
26
This account of epagoge can also be predicated of noesis, the operation of nous (See 88b30-89a2 and
100b5-17). These passages and the account given here at 105a13 form corroborating evidence for the view
that I will defend in the next chapter that absolute noesis is a kind – that is, a qualified sort – of epagoge.
27
This passage describes induction from the point of view of the student. Below, at Topics VIII.1, 156b14,
the same account is given but from the point of view of the universal.
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induction is closely tied to sense perception, inductive arguments are also more
intelligible to us, though they are incapable of providing the understanding of causes
which is required for science. This harmonizes with the remainder of the passage, which
emphasizes the ordinary and common-sense character of inductive argument.28
At An. Post. II.19 Aristotle develops his historical account of the grasp of first
principles: perceptions inform the memory, and memories in turn provide the matter for
experience. Epagoge is the process which marshals experience in some way in order to
facilitate a grasp of a general concept. The often problematic passage in An. Post. II.19 is
perhaps the clearest proof that epagoge yields first principles, i.e., universal and
necessary truths:
Clearly, then, it is by induction (epagogei) that we come to know (gnorizein) the
first principles (prota); for that is how perception (aesthesis), also, implants
(empoiei) the universal in us.”29
There are several points to be made here. First, Hamlyn (1976) showed that the word
‘that’ in the phrase “for that is how perception. . . ” refers to the role of epagoge in the
genetic account which immediately preceded the passage above.30
The genetic account
describes the grasp of universal categories as rooted in sense perception. Starting with
the particular sensible, we form increasingly general concepts such as ‘man’ and ‘animal’
until we reach the universal categories of substance, quantity, quality, etc. Since the aim
of the chapter is to identify the source of the first principles of scientific demonstration,
the account of the formation of universal concepts serves as a bridge to the discussion of
the formation of first principles.31
28
Smith, 87.
29
Ross 1980, 674 (100b3).
30
Hamlyn, 1976, 181.
31
This is clear in the Treddenick translation: “Clearly then it must be by induction that we acquire
knowledge of the primary premises, because this is also the way in which general concepts are conveyed to
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Finally, in the passage above, Aristotle claims that aisthesis implants the universal.
Aisthesis is not to be understood as a distinct dunamis or energeia which grasps the
universal. Instead, this passage emphasizes how fundamental sense perception is to the
process of coming to know. This is evident if we consider what Aristotle says in Physics
I.1. There Aristotle explains that we first come to know things as confused wholes
presented to us in sense perception; “for it is a whole that is best known to sense
perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it,
like parts.”32
In other words, the universal is present in the particular, and is implanted in
us in sense perception, but the universal is known in a vague, indistinct way.
In sum, the first principles of scientific demonstration established by induction
through sense perception are universal, necessary truths.
We see the same thing at Topics VIII.1, 156b14:
Moreover, try to secure admissions by means of likeness; for such admissions are
plausible, and the universal involved is less patent; e.g. that as knowledge and
ignorance of contraries is the same, so too perception of contraries is the same; or
vice versa, that since the perception is the same, so is the knowledge also. This
argument resembles induction, but is not the same thing; for in induction it is the
universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, whereas in arguments
from likeness, what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases
fall.33
The account given here is the same as that found above in Pr. An. I.12, 105a13, but from
the point of view of the universal.34
us by sense perception” (Treddenick 1960, 100b3).
32
Phys. I.1, 184a22-b1. See also Meta. A.1 which describes the advance from sensation through memory,
experience, and art, to theoretical knowledge.
33
34
Other usages of epagoge in the Topics Bks I and VIII include: 105b28; 155b22, 34, 36; 156a2, 5;
156b14; 157a7, 20; 160a38; 164a12. In his Rhetoric, I.2, at 1356b14, Aristotle discusses epagoge in its
relation to the art of rhetoric: “. . . just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and deduction or
apparent deduction on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a
deduction. . .” (Roberts, 1984, p.2156). I will not discuss the texts listed in this note since they add nothing
significant to the discussion of the nature of epagoge.
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At An. Post. I.18, 81a38-b9, Aristotle provides more evidence that it is through
epagoge that we grasp the universal.
If a man lacks any of the senses, he must lack some knowledge, which he cannot
get, since we learn either by induction or by demonstration. Demonstration
[apodeixis] is from universals, induction [epagoge] from particulars; but it is
impossible to grasp [theoresai] universals [ta katholou] except through [me di]
induction (for even abstract truths can be made known [gnorisma] through
induction, viz. that certain attributes belong to the given class as such – even if
their subjects cannot exist separately in fact), and it is impossible to be led on
inductively [epachthenai] to the universals if one has not perception. For it is
perception that grasps individual facts; you cannot get scientific knowledge of
them; you can neither deduce them from universal facts without previous
induction, nor learn them by induction without perception.35
Aristotle states here that “we learn either by induction or by demonstration,” and
proceeds to discuss the grasp of universals through induction. But, as we have seen,
Aristotle also asserts that it is nous which grasps the universal. Thus, it is odd to find that
there is no mention at all of nous in this passage which describes how we acquire
knowledge. This creates a problem for the interpretation for which epagoge establishes
contingent truths and opinions, leaving the grasp of universal truths to nous, for how do
you reconcile the passages in this section with the fact that induction grasps universal
abstract truths?
The passage “. . . it is impossible to grasp universals except through induction. . .” has
caused Ross36
to surmise that Aristotle means that nous is a type of epagoge. According
to this view, since it is impossible to grasp universals except through induction, but
elsewhere Aristotle argues that nous is of universal first principles, then perhaps nous is a
species of epagoge which yields only those universals which are also first principles.
However, nous is a faculty, and epagoge is one of its operations; thus, because they are
35
Ross 1980, 564-5 (81a38-b9).
36
See Ross 1980.
17

generically different, nous cannot be a species of epagoge. However, in a way, noesis,
qua operation of nous, is a species of epagoge.
In summary, what I am proposing in this section of the chapter is that Aristotle is
employing a general sense of epagoge, which I am calling Intellection to distinguish this
sense from the other senses of epagoge, and that Intellection includes both epagoge
understood as a mental operation which yields contingent truths and opinions, and the
traditionally understood sense of noesis which grasps universal truths. This way of
understanding epagoge makes sense of its use in passages above and others in which
epagoge is used in this sense.
Further, based on this understanding of epagoge as Intellection, I think that the
account given above which describes epagoge as a passage from particular to universal is
accurate, but not precise. It is accurate because Intellection does include the grasping of
the universal, but, as I have shown, it need not. As such, the account is somewhat
imprecise.
Epagoge and Apodeixis
Another reference to epagoge meaning Intellection is found at An. Pr. I.25, 42a3. Here
Aristotle states that epagoge can establish the necessary, universals premises for use in
scientific demonstration (apodeixis). Regarding apodeixis, Aristotle says:
. . .each of the premises may be established by a prior syllogism, or one by
induction (epagoge), the other by syllogism.37
37
Ross 1980, 376.
18

In this passage epagoge is distinguished from sullogismoi, translated above by Ross as
syllogism,38
at least as far as both syllogism and induction relate to scientific
demonstration. Also, Aristotle states here that epagoge can establish at least one of the
premises of a demonstrative syllogism.39
And if this is the case, Aristotle evidently
intends the sense of epagoge meaning Intellection, which is a movement from the
particular or specific to the universal, with emphasis on Intellection’s ability to establish
universals, since apodeixis establishes universal truths.
Conversely, at An. Pr. I.25, 42a23, when discussing the relation of premises to each
other and to the demonstration, Aristotle distinguishes between sullogismos and epagoge.
In particular, he emphasizes the aspect of Intellection which lacks the characteristics
proper to the premises of syllogism.
. . .If C and D are not so related as to form a syllogism, they have been assumed to
no purpose, unless it be for the purpose of induction or of obscuring the issue,
etc.40
where C and D are premises of some conclusion E. Here again epagoge is shown in
opposition to syllogism since syllogism requires the terms to be arranged according to the
figures, whereas induction does not.41
Simply put, in 42a23 above, Aristotle distinguishes
between induction and syllogism by emphasizing that premises C and D may be the
grounds for a conclusion E, so that C, D and E form an inductive argument, but not a
38
Ibid., 377. Smith (1989) translates sullogismoi as deduction.
39
Although there would seem to be nothing to prevent both the major and minor premises from being
established by induction.
40
Ross 1980, 377.
41
In his commentary on this passage, Smith observes that “Aristotle regularly distinguishes epagoge and
deduction (cf. Topics I.12), which allows him to ignore such arguments for his present purposes. . .” (Smith,
146). Looking ahead, the passage from Topics I.12 is the clearest account of what Aristotle means by
epagoge, which is defined there as “a passage from particulars to universals” (Oxford translation).
However, more on that when we look at the passages from the Topics.
19

syllogism. Again, Aristotle’s sense of epagoge in this passage is Intellection, a
movement from the particular or specific to the general or universal.
Epagoge and perfect induction
Aristotle’s account of perfect induction further corroborates my Intellection thesis.
Perfect induction reasons from all the particulars, but the grasp which it affords may or
may not be of an essential, universal characteristic of a thing. In 67a15-30, Aristotle
states that
Induction, i.e. the syllogism arising from induction, consists of proving the major
term of the middle term by means of the minor. Let A be ‘long-lived’, B ‘gall-
less’, C the particular long-lived animals (e.g. man, the horse, the mule). Then all
C is A, and all C is B, therefore if C is convertible with B, all B must be A, as we
have proved before. C must be the sum of all the particulars; for induction
requires that.42
The “syllogism arising from induction” is a demonstrative syllogism – which has a
premise arrived at by induction. For such an argument to be a proper demonstration, and
thus perfectly convincing, would seem to require the induction to be a perfect induction.
However, mere conviction, i.e. persuasion, can be produced through rhetorical or
dialectical syllogism, which does not require a perfect induction. Perfect induction
requires a complete exhaustion of the species under the genus in question, or the
particulars within a species in cases where that is possible: it requires that the premise
All C is B be truly convertible, so that in the example above ‘all the different kinds of
long-lived animals are gall-less’ is convertible to ‘all gall-less things are long-lived.’43
42
Ross 1980, 481.
43
Further, it should be noted that this induction is Intellection, but Intellection understood as a movement
from species to genus, not particular to species, which is here assumed to have already been established.
20

Starting at 67a30, Aristotle concludes his account of perfect induction by
contrasting it with syllogism:
Such a syllogism establishes the unmediable premise; for where there is a middle
term between two terms, syllogism connects them by means of the middle term;
where there is not, it connects them by induction. Induction is in a sense
opposed to syllogism; the latter connects major with minor by means of the
middle term, the former connects the major with middle by means of the minor.
Syllogism by way of the middle term is prior and more intelligible by nature,
syllogism by induction is more obvious to us.44
I.e., Induction: Demonstrative syllogism:
S1aP, S2aP, S3aP. . .SnaP > SaP MaP
SaM = MaS SaM
MaP SaP
where S1. . .Sn are all the various kinds of long-lived animals, so that all S are P. But if
observation teaches us that all the long-lived animals happen to be gall-less, and further,
that all gall-less things are long-lived animals; then all gall-less things are long-lived.
Induction here supplies the major premise in a way that is more obvious and intelligible
to us, and which allows us to draw the major premise of a syllogism as a conclusion; so
that if the minor premise is convertible, we can then draw the conclusion SaP in a way
that is more intelligible by nature. This is not a scientific demonstration, but it’s not
intended to be.45
If induction were to establish a premise of a scientific demonstration, the clearest
example would be one taken from geometry: let S1 be all three-sided obtuse-angled plane
figures, S2 all three-sided acute-angled plane figures, and S3 all three-sided right-angled
44
Ross 1980, 481.
45
But can induction establish a premise for use in a scientific demonstration? Scientific Demonstration
proper would not include contingent or ‘for the most part’ premises. Such inductive premises can only be
deemed scientific in a broader sense of science.
21

plane figures. Further, let P = triangles, and M = plane figures having angles equal to
two right angles. Then, by an induction,46
since
P1 – All S (three-sided plane figures) are P (triangles)47
;
and further, if it is shown that Every kind of three-sided plane figure has angles equal to
two right angles (All S are M), and convertibly that no other kind of plane figure has
angles equal to two right angles, then
P2 – All M (plane figures having angles equal to two right angles) are S (three-
sided plane figures),
And therefore,
C/P1 – All M (plane figures having angles equal to two right angles) are P
(triangles).
We can then take this conclusion as the major premise in a demonstrative syllogism, add
the minor premise,
(P2) All S are M (plane figures having angles equal to two right angles); therefore
(C) All S are P (have angles equal to two right angles).
And this is the proof in the order of nature. So, the deduction through induction
concludes or proves what the resulting demonstrative syllogism takes as the major
premise. In this way also epagoge is opposed to apodeixis.48
Aristotle provides an example of perfect induction at I.8, 103b3.49
Aristotle states
that
46
Or, more properly, several inductions: SaP presupposes three inductions establishing S1aP, S2aP, and
S3aP.
47
Is this an example of a postulated nominal definition of a genus?
48
Hintikka calls this sense of induction, i.e. that “opposed to syllogism,” Aristotle’s “official account.”
(Niiniluoto, 50).
49
Revised Oxford, Vol. I., Pickard-Cambridge, 1994, 172.
22

Of sameness then, as has been said, three types [numeric, specific and generic
sameness, each of which can be said essentially, properly, or accidentally] are to
be distinguished. Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are
those out of which and through which and to which arguments proceed, is by
induction; for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one, it
would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something or
from its property or from its genus or from its accident. Another way to confirm
it is through deduction. For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be
either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible, it would be its
definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the definition; if not, it is
a property – for this is what a property is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but
does not signify the essence.50
In this passage Aristotle provides us with an example of perfect induction. This is
evident because he says “. . .for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one
by one, it would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something or
from its property or from its genus or from its accident.” Since the four stated types of
propositions exhaust all the possibilities, Aristotle clearly means this to be a perfect
induction.
Depending on its object, perfect induction may either lead to a grasp of a necessary
truth or to a contingent truth. Consequently, in order to account for both acts, the sense
of epagoge in the passages in this section should be understood as Intellection.
Epagoge and example
Perhaps the best way to see that Intellection includes an ordinary, inferior mode of
induction is to look at the passages in which Aristotle compares and contrasts example
and induction. In An. Pr. II.23, 69a15, Aristotle distinguishes between induction and
example:
50
Ibid.
23

Example, then, is inference from part to part, when both fall under the same class
and one is well known. Induction reasons from all the particulars and does not
apply the conclusion to a new particular; example does so apply it and does not
reason from all the particulars.51
Here we are to understand that example has a particular for a conclusion (e.g., This war
with the Thebans is bad); whereas induction has a generalization or universal for a
conclusion (e.g., All war with one’s neighbors is bad). Also, we see that example does
not reason from all the particulars, whereas induction may, i.e., in the case of perfect
induction. Particulars here must mean particular species since the number of particulars
under the lowest species is potentially infinite, so that it is not possible to “reason from
all the particulars.” And since Aristotle is ruling out any movement from whole to part,
he means Intellection as the sense of epagoge here.
At An. Post. I.1, 71a10, Aristotle appears to contradict himself. At 69a15 he
distinguished example and epagoge, but in the following passage he asserts that example
is a kind of epagoge. However, this confusion on the part of Aristotle is only apparent.
Insofar as example reasons from particular to particular, it is to be distinguished from
Intellection, but not the root sense of epagoge; but insofar as example is employed in
order to draw a general conclusion, this use of example is Intellection. Keeping this in
mind, Aristotle’s account is as follows:
Similarly with arguments, both deductive and inductive: they effect their
teaching through what we already know, the former assuming items which we are
presumed to grasp, the latter proving something universal by way of the fact that
the particular cases are plain (delon). (Rhetorical arguments too persuade in the
same way – either through examples, which is induction, or through
enthymemes, which is deduction).52
51
Ross 1980, 488.
52
Ibid. (71a4-10).
24

Besides the distinction between the kinds of example, there are several properties of
epagoge that can be seen in this passage. First, Aristotle shows that induction proceeds
from facts already known, i.e. from the particulars known through perception or general
notions drawn from experience.
Secondly, Barnes translates “oi de deiknuntes to katholou dia tou delon einai to kath’
hekaston” as “the latter [i.e. epagoge] proving something universal by way of the fact that
the particular cases are plain.” It is unclear why Ross omits this phrase altogether from
his translation. It does not appear to state anything problematic or state something which
flags this phrase as spurious. By this point, Aristotle has made clear that epagoge is a
process through which one moves from particular to universal. Moreover, Barnes’
translation aligns with the meaning of the text above (68b36), in which Aristotle shows
that the deduction from induction proves something universal from particular cases, i.e. it
establishes the major premise of the corresponding demonstrative syllogism.
Thirdly, we see that examples are the clearly imperfect rhetorical analogues to
induction, since examples are employed merely to persuade, not to establish apodictic
certainty.
And finally, Barnes points out that, for Aristotle, “particular” translates “to kath’
hekaston,” but can mean either an individual this or a lowest species. For this reason
Barnes thinks that Aristotle “muffs the distinction between universal/singular and
general/specific.” However, since it is clear that Aristotle has both a singular this and the
lowest species in mind, what he says regarding to kath’ hekaston is accurate, and further
precision is unnecessary for his purposes. From these four points it is evident that
Aristotle is developing the sense of epagoge which I am calling Intellection.
25

By way of introduction to a few passages in the Topics that reveal the relation between
epagoge and example, in his commentary on this work, Robin Smith observes that the
focus of the Topics is the question: “under what circumstances am I entitled to infer a
general conclusion when my respondent has conceded a number of instances?”53
This
observation highlights the point that the treatment of epagoge in the Topics is confined
only to that found in argumentative exchanges, and thus is not likely to shed much light
on the nature of epagoge. The references to epagoge in the Topics serve to reinforce or
complete the notion of epagoge that Aristotle develops in the Analytics.
At Topics I.18, 108b12, Aristotle highlights the importance of similarities for the
persuasive success of inductive arguments. This effort can be seen as further
corroboration for the claim that example is a kind of induction:
The study of what is similar is useful for inductive arguments, for deductions
from an assumption, and for giving definitions. It is useful for inductive
arguments because it is by means of bringing in particular <premises> about
similar cases that we claim a right to bring in the universal <premise> (for it is not
easy to perform an induction if we do not know what the similar cases are).54
For Smith, “the general point here is that an inductive argument must rest on a
collection of similar cases about each of which the same thing is true. If these similar
cases were (perceptible) individuals, then the relevant criterion of similarity would be a
perceived likeness, something not likely to be advanced by the kind of study Aristotle has
in mind. Therefore, induction here must rather be the generalization from many similar
species to a genus containing them all.”55
I disagree. Aristotle does mean to include
induction from particulars to species as well as from species to genera, particularly since
a generalization from species to genus presupposes one from particulars to species. E.g.,
53
Smith 1997, 86.
54
Ibid., 19.
55
Ibid., 102.
26

X war with one’s neighbor was bad, Y war with neighbor was bad, Z war with neighbor
was bad; therefore, all war with one’s neighbors are bad.
On the translation ‘bringing in’, Smith points out that “epagein commonly means
‘lead in’, ‘bring in’, and can be used of introducing witnesses in a legal case. Although
Aristotle often uses it to mean ‘perform an induction’, some indication of the root sense
makes this passage clearer.”56
I agree that the sense of epagein here aligns better with the
root sense of the word, but instead of invoking the legal sense of epagein – which appears
to be a later extension of the term – to explain Aristotle’s usage here, I think it makes
more sense to tie this sense of epagein closer to its etymological roots, epi + ago.
Moreover, this sense of epagein more closely aligns with L&S’ senses (4) through (8) of
epagein cited in the opening above.
Epagoge and pistis
The preceding section focused on the relation between epagoge and example. Since
the Topics is mainly concerned with their rhetorical uses, it is worthwhile reviewing what
Aristotle has to say about conviction as it relates to epagoge, since conviction is what
rhetoric aims at. In An. Pr. II.23, 68b9-15, Aristotle states that
We next proceed to show that not only dialectical and demonstrative arguments
proceed by way of the three figures, but also rhetorical arguments and indeed any
attempt to produce conviction (pistis). For all conviction is produced either by
syllogism or by induction (epagoges).57
56
Ibid., 102.
57
Ross 1980, 481.
27

What is notable here is the claim that arguments from induction can produce conviction.
“Conviction” here translates pistis, meaning trust in others, faith; persuasion of a thing,
confidence, assurance.58
But conviction may be too strong of a definition of pistis. Ross
has in mind a weaker sense of the term: “The object of dialectic and of rhetoric alike is
to produce conviction (pistis); and therefore (a) their premises need not be true; it is
enough if they are endoxoi, likely to win acceptance; and (b) their method need not be
the strict syllogistic one.” For this reason, it seems clear that conviction does not
necessarily involve certainty.59
As such, perhaps “persuasion” is a more accurate
translation of pistis, since rhetorical arguments can persuade while not producing
certainty. The sense of epagoge in this passage is that of Intellection since the context
implies a contrast of epagoge with syllogism, i.e. epagoge as a movement from part of
whole, with syllogism as a movement from whole to part.
CHAPTER THREE: Absolute Epagoge
58
Middle L&S.
59
Ross identifies senses 4a and 5a from the Big Liddell that are not found in the Middle Liddell.
28

Aisthesis, Epagoge, and Apodeixis
Sense [3] of epagoge is a qualified form of Intellection. What I am calling
absolute epagoge is the mental act by which one moves from one or more particular or
general contingent truths or beliefs to another contingent truth or belief of greater
generality. To see this, it is first necessary to see that, strictly speaking, it is only through
absolute noesis that we grasp the necessary first principles and other necessary, universal
truths. But first, I will review Aristotle’s account of universals, i.e., “what is always and
everywhere,”60
as it relates to the other modes of knowledge such as apodeixis, aisthesis
and epagoge. Contrasting the roles of these processes to that of absolute noesis will
serve to stabilize the account of the latter.
In An. Post. I.18, Aristotle distinguishes the roles of apodeixis and epagoge as each
relates to universals. He then develops in greater detail the role of aisthesis in the
formation of universals, arguing that although the grasp of the universal is impossible
without perception (aisthesis), aithesis is incapable of itself to establish universals.
If a man lacks any of the senses, he must lack some knowledge, which he cannot
get, since we learn either by induction or by demonstration. Demonstration
[apodeixis] is from universals, induction [epagoge] from particulars; but it is
impossible to grasp [theoresai] universals [ta katholou] except through [me di]
induction (for even abstract truths can be made known [gnorisma] through
induction, viz. that certain attributes belong to the given class as such – even if
their subjects cannot exist separately in fact), and it is impossible to be led on
inductively [epachthenai] to the universals if one has not perception. For it is
perception that grasps individual facts; you cannot get scientific knowledge of
them; you can neither deduce them from universal facts without previous
induction, nor learn them by induction without perception.61
60
87b33
61
Ross 1980, 564-5 (81a38-b9).
29

The passage “. . . it is impossible to grasp universals except through induction. . .” caused
Ross to surmise that Aristotle means that nous is a type of epagoge. According to this
view, if it is impossible to grasp universals except through induction, but elsewhere
Aristotle argues that nous is of universal first principles, then perhaps nous is a species of
epagoge which yields only those universals which are also first principles. However,
Ross needs to render explicit the sense of nous he means to make a type of epagoge,
because if he means the dunamis or hexis of nous, and epagoge is an energeia, then
epagoge and nous are generically distinct and nous cannot be a species of epagoge.
A variation on the former view which avoids the problem above makes clear that it is
the noetic energeia that is meant, not the faculty of nous. According to this view, and the
one I will defend, epagoge names a general process of coming to know (a ‘leading up
to’), while absolute noesis names a specific operation which can only result in universal,
necessary truths. Thus, just insofar as absolute noesis is a type of epagoge, noesis falls
under epagoge as a species under a genus.
This way of understanding the two processes suggests a preliminary definition of each
in terms of genus and specific difference. The genus of these operations seems to be a
non-discursive mental process which establishes general notions or propositions, i.e.,
Intellection. The differentiae distinguish absolute noesis and absolute epagoge according
to their distinct products, i.e. general notions or propositions can be resolved into 1.)
those which are universal and necessary (products of an absolute noetic act); and 2.)
those which are merely contingent or imperfectly known (products of an absolute
epagogic act). However, in 81a38-b9 quoted above, Aristotle is employing Intellection,
the more general sense of epagoge which implies both of the above acts.
30

Epagoge and Aisthesis
Turning now to the relation of aisthesis to the grasp of universals, following
Aristotle’s common theme that perception is of the particular, Barnes is surely right in his
observation that “perception cannot constitute knowledge since if P truly reports a
perception it must contain singular terms (references to particular individuals, times and
places) and hence cannot be universal in the fashion required for understanding.”62
By
knowledge here, Barnes means unqualified knowledge, which, by definition, is of the
universal. Further, according to Barnes, the act of understanding implies a universal
which is understood. With these claims in mind, at 81b5, in the passage beginning with
“For it is perception (aesthesis) that grasps individual facts. . ,” Aristotle situates epagoge
as a sort of mean between apodeixis and aisthesis, where all three terms are defined
generally as processes of the intellect. Apodeixis is more properly a mode of teaching. It
involves “demonstrating” that one in fact has knowledge of the universal through its
cause. This knowledge is derived from the process of epagoge, which is the process that
leads one to the universal, but requires aisthesis to present the object to the intellect.
With simple perception and the phantasm, Aristotle presents us with modes of
perception through which one apprehends a particular, while at the same time affording a
62
Ibid., 193. He goes on to say that “. . .we see individuals incidentally; i.e. to see a is to see an F (where
F is some sensible quality) which in fact is a. Thus perception is, in a sense, ‘of the universal’; and so (one
might infer) reports of perception may encapsulate knowledge. Aristotle rejects this final inference, but his
rejection relies on a tenuous distinction between having perception of X and perceiving X. His answer
should be something like this: ‘Although a strictly correct reply to the question “What are you
perceiving?” must be of the form “an F” or perhaps, “That F” and cannot be of the form “a” (where “a” is a
proper name), nevertheless any proposition reporting the contents of your perception must contain or imply
some reference to individual objects, times, or places; and this must be so because the act of perception is
necessarily tied to some individual time and place.’ (193).
31

grasp the universal; nevertheless, strictly speaking, perception is a passive act which is
incapable of establishing the universal.
Much of the previous discussion is encapsulated in the discussion in An. Post. I.31. In
this passage Aristotle establishes that perception cannot establish the universal because
perception is limited to apprehending the particular.
Nor can one understand (epistasthai) through perception (aistheseos). For even if
perception is of what is such and such, and not of individuals, still one necessarily
perceives an individual and at a place and at a time, and it is impossible to
perceive what is universal and holds in every case; for that is not an individual at
a time; for then it would not be universal – for it is what is always and everywhere
that we call universal.63
Here we find the nominal definition of ‘universal’ referred to above: “. . .for it is what is
always and everywhere that we call universal.” The proper definition is given in Post.
An. I.4. There Aristotle defines a universal attribute as what is predicated of all instances
of a kind of thing and belongs per se and qua itself. Further, since such attributes belong
to their subjects per se, such things belong to their subject of necessity.64
The universal
in itself and the universal products of apodeixis (and epagoge) are here contrasted with
what is given in aisthesis, which by definition are only of the particular sensible (this
white, this oblong) or a particular phantasm, which clearly cannot be always and
everywhere or predicated per se of its subject.
Having established that perception cannot establish the universal, Aristotle argues that
for the same reasons that one cannot grasp the universal, perception cannot establish
understanding either:
So, since demonstrations are universal, and it is not possible to perceive these, it
is evident that it is not possible to understand through perception either; but it is
63
Barnes 1994, 87b29-33.
64
Post. An. I.4, 73b26-30.
32

clear that even if one could perceive of the triangle that it has its angles equal to
two right angles, we would seek a demonstration and would not, as some say,
understand it; for one necessarily perceives particulars, whereas understanding
(episteme) comes by becoming familiar (gnorizein) with the universal.65
Perception is of the particular perceptible, whereas understanding is of the universal, not
the particular.
Further on, Aristotle establishes that since perception is only of a fact, and not of the
reason for the fact, it cannot yield understanding.
That is also why if we were on the moon and saw the earth screening it we would
not know the explanation of the eclipse. For we would perceive that it is eclipsed
and not why at all; for there turned out to be no perception of the universal.
Nevertheless, if, from considering this often happening, we hunted the universal,
we would have a demonstration; for from several particulars the universal is
clear.”66
Ross observes that the passage 88a2-4 (‘ou men all. . .eichomen’) means that “the
knowledge of the universal principle which supervenes on perception of particular facts is
not itself deduction but intuitive knowledge, won by induction (a16-17); but the
principles thus grasped may become premises from which the particular facts may be
deduced.”67
It should be clear from the foregoing that Aristotle denies the possibility that
perception can yield the universal. But at 88a9-17, Aristotle admits the possibility of
grasping a universal after a single perception:
65
Barnes 1994, 87b34-38. Barnes suspects here that “universal” vacillates between “universally quantified
proposition” and “universal property.” However, it appears that Aristotle sees no need to distinguish the
two. The intellect grasps a universal property, but in speech the property is in the form of a universally
quantified proposition.
66
Ibid., 87b39-88a4.
67
Ibid., 87b39: “Since perception cannot yield universal propositions it cannot yield explanations (cf. Met
A 1, 981b10-13); for to explain (Aristotle implies) is to subsume under some universal law. For the
example see B 2, 90a26” (194).
33

So it is evident that it is impossible by perceiving to understand anything
demonstrable – unless someone calls this perceiving: having understanding
through demonstration.
Yet some of our problems are referred to want of perception; for in some cases
if we saw we should not seek – not on grounds that we knew by seeing, but that
we grasped the universal from seeing. E.g. if we saw the glass to be perforated
and the light coming through it, it would also be clear why it does, even if seeing
occurs separately for each piece of glass while comprehending (noesai) grasps at
one time that it is thus in every case.”68
While it is not clear what the role of experience is in this and how experience relates to
perception,69
it is nevertheless clear that it is not by perception but by a noetic act that one
grasps the cause or middle term of a demonstration.
Again, in An. Post. II.2:
That the search is for the middle term (meson) is made clear by the cases in which
the middle is perceptible. For if we have not perceived it, we seek, e.g. for the
eclipse, if there is one or not. But if we were on the moon we would seek neither
if it comes about nor why, but it would be clear at the same time. For from
perceiving, it would come about that we knew the universal too. For perception
tells us that it is now screening it (for it is clear that it is now eclipsed); and from
this the universal would come about.”70
In his commentary on this passage, Ross makes the observation that “in all such cases the
what and the why are the same. . . epagoge furnishes us with the meson for facts that
have one as a cause (aition), and furnishes us with the principles that have no meson.”71,72
68
Ibid., 88a9-17.
69
Ibid., 88a16: “even if seeing. . .”: i.e. ‘If we could see the internal structure we should be able to grasp
the explanation – even though we see each particular case separately and yet must grasp them all together
in comprehending a universal fact.’ (The commentators take hama, “at a single time”, to mean “at the
same time <sc. As the seeing>”. But sense, syntax, and the contrast with “separately”, choris, favor my
interpretation.) (Barnes, 194).
70
Barnes(?), 90a24-31.
71
Ross 1980, 90a14.
72
For Barnes: ‘If observing that X is Y, we actually perceive the middle term Z, we do not cast around for
an answer to the question “Why is X Y?” Hence in this case having Z is knowing the explanation; and so
in general the middle term is the explanation.’ But a single glance cannot give us the explanation (A 31,
87b39-40). And although from perception (i.e. from a series of perceptions) “the universal would come
about”, this does not distinguish the lunar from the mundane cases; for all universal knowledge comes
about from perception (A 18), and thus all middle terms, if they can be known at all, are in this weak sense
‘perceptible’. What Aristotle should say is that in some cases we do not have to cast around for a middle
term: for moon dwellers, observation of the eclipse involves observation of the interposition of the earth;
34

These arguments sufficiently establish that perception cannot yield the universal or
understanding. In the next section I will briefly review the role of apodeixis and its
relation to the grasp of universals.
Epagoge and demonstration proper
Demonstration proper reasons from universal, necessary causes to their effects, that is,
from what is prior in itself to what is prior to us. Conversely, Aristotle describes epagoge
as a movement from what is prior to us to what is prior in itself. As I showed in the
previous chapter, Intellection may establish the principles of scientific demonstration.
But not all acts of Intellection do so. Some merely establish general concepts or
contingent truths. The efforts in this section aim at establishing absolute epagoge and
distinguishing absolute epagoge from absolute noesis. To this end, it may prove
illuminating to see Aristotle’s account of the distinction between scientific premises in
themselves as causes of the conclusion, and those same premises as derived from an act
of Intellection. At An. Post. I.3, 72b29, Aristotle argues
That proof in the proper sense cannot be circular is clear, if knowledge must
proceed from propositions prior to the conclusion; for the same things cannot be
both prior and posterior to the same things, except in the sense that some things
may be prior for us and others prior without qualification – a distinction with
which induction familiarizes us. If induction be admitted as giving knowledge,
our definition of unqualified knowledge will have been too narrow, there being
two kinds of it; or rather the second kind is not demonstration proper, since it
proceeds only from what is more familiar to us.73
and having observed several eclipses, they will at the same time have come by knowledge of the middle
term (Barnes, 206).
73
Ross 1980, 512-3.
35

First, there is the point that the premises of scientific demonstration are prior in
themselves and are established is established by means of what is prior to us. This is a
common theme in Aristotle and warrants no further comment.
But, in the passage “. . .or rather the second kind is not demonstration proper. . .”,
Aristotle appears to be engaged in dialectics: either demonstration proper is the only way
we get unqualified knowledge or not; and if not, induction may or may not also give us
such knowledge. Clearly, induction proceeds from effects, and effects are prior to us and
more familiar than their causes. But two properties of unqualified knowledge as defined
by Aristotle preclude the inclusion of induction: (1) unqualified knowledge is knowledge
of an effect established through its proper cause, and (2) unqualified knowledge is
necessary truth.74
Thus, if it turns out that induction should be included with
demonstration proper as a kind of unqualified knowledge, then Aristotle suggests that his
definition of it in Post. An. I.2 is too narrow. The issue that needs to be addressed and
which is implied in Aristotle’s dialectic posed above amounts to this: for epagoge to give
us unqualified knowledge, it must be knowledge of what is necessary and not merely
contingent. As the previous chapter showed, epagoge as Intellection establishes the
necessary first principles of scientific demonstration, but it also establishes our general
concepts and contingent truths. This distinction within epagoge understood as
Intellection points to its distinct objects, such that absolute noesis is the realization within
the knower of a certain kind of knowable, i.e., of the necessary and universal; and,
generally speaking, absolute epagoge is the realization within the knower of what is
contingent.
74
Post. An. I.2, 71b9-13: “We consider that we have unqualified knowledge of anything (as contrasted with
the accidental knowledge of the sophist) when we believe that we know (i) that the cause from which the
fact results is the cause of that fact, and (ii) that the fact cannot be otherwise.”
36

Along these same lines, in An. Post. I.13, 78a34, Aristotle explains that the
syllogism with the effect as the middle term instead of the cause cannot be demonstration
proper. This constraint lessens the likelihood that epagoge can sufficiently establish a
distinct kind of unqualified knowledge unless a distinction is made according to the
objects of knowledge.
For sometimes the term which is not the ground of the other is the more familiar,
e.g. when we infer the nearness of the planets from their not twinkling (having
grasped (eilephtho) by perception (aistheseos) or induction (epagoges) that that
which does not twinkle is near). We have then proved that the planets are near,
but have proved this not from its cause but from its effect.75
I briefly explained above what I think the role of aisthesis is in the formation of
universals. That explanation is also applicable here. The passage “. . .having grasped by
perception or induction. . .” means, on the one hand, that induction presupposes
perception, and on the other hand that, in fact, one can, in a way, perceive the universal in
a particular.76
More importantly, ‘All planets are near’ is the conclusion of a deduction from
induction77
which employs an effect (not twinkling) as a middle term instead of the cause
(nearness), and the major premise of a syllogism with the conclusion ‘All planets are
near.’ The major premise, P1 is supplied by an induction: (P1) ‘All non-twinkling
[heavenly bodies] are near’; (P2) ‘All non-twinkling [heavenly bodies] are planets’
75
Ibid., 551 (78a26-38).
76
See the discussion in the previous section and regarding 100b3, pp. 15-17 above. A more complete
analysis of aisthesis, and its relation to epagoge and nous is needed to fully address this concern, but such
an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
77
I.e., a deduction in which the major premise is established by means of an induction which happens to
have a subject and predicate of equal extension. Upon conversion this proposition renders the syllogism
valid as the planetary example makes clear.
37

(which converts to ‘All planets are non-twinkling [heavenly bodies]’); establishing the
conclusion of a Barbara syllogism, (C) ‘All planets are near.’78
This example shows the need to determine the proper cause for a given effect, but
since the proper cause of what is necessary is itself necessary, this idea can be extended
to include cases in which one seeks the cause for what is necessary and universal. And
this is the province of absolute noesis. In sum, the telos of absolute epagoge is distinct
from that of absolute noesis. The telos of the latter includes the grasp of the proper,
universal and necessary cause.
In these last three sections I have shown the role aisthesis and apodeixis play in the
grasp of the universal. The relation of aisthesis to epagoge showed the impossibility of
aisthesis to grasp the universal. Apodeixis, however, employs the universal in syllogism
to derive a universal conclusion, but relies on epagoge to establish those universals.
Nous, Absolute noesis and Absolute epagoge
I will now look at some passages involving nous in order to render more precise the
relation of the noetic act to epagoge, and to give greater precision to the notions of
absolute noesis and absolute epagoge.
78
According to Barnes, “both of Aristotle’s planetary syllogisms would count as explanatory on the
orthodox modern account of scientific explanation; both infer a fact from a set of observationally
significant general laws and boundary conditions. Thus if Aristotle is correct to distinguish between the
two syllogisms, and to hold the one explanatory and the other not, then the orthodox account of scientific
explanation is wrong.” Barnes continues: “Moreover, the Humean notion of causation, which is a
presupposition of that account, goes too: as far as Hume is concerned, the major premises of both
syllogisms are equally causal. . . If Aristotle’s view is to be upheld, then he must tell us how we can judge
that non-scintillation is explained by, and does not explain, proximity; any such account is obliged to wait
upon the discussion of essence in Book B: it is finally offered at B 16, 98b21-4” (Barnes 1994, 156).
38

Turning briefly to a few passages in which Aristotle addresses nous and its role in
establishing the universal, in Post. An. I.31, 88a5-8, Aristotle says that
The universal is valuable because it makes clear the explanation; hence universal
demonstration is more valuable than perception and comprehension [nous] – with
regard to those things whose explanation is something different; but for the
primitives there is a different account.”79
Perception and comprehension yield knowledge of the fact; that is, perception yields
knowledge of the particular fact, and comprehension of the universal. But demonstration
makes evident the fact and its cause. Understanding implies the possession of
demonstrative knowledge with regard to those facts which have a distinct cause, and in
such situations demonstration proves its value. But demonstration is of no help when it
comes to the grasp of primitives. For the grasp of primitives, we require nous, and in
particular its noetic act, absolute noesis.
In De An. III.4, Aristotle describes nous as “that by which the soul thinks and judges.”
Fundamentally, this is to consider nous as a faculty, i.e., as a potency for thought. The
faculty, or dunamis, is the potency for action. And the act of thinking is exactly that: an
act of nous, an energeia. The energeia of nous insofar as it is a judging and thinking
dunamis, is noesis, or noetic activity broadly construed. This activity includes all modes
of thinking and judging. If we couple this general notion of noesis with the root sense of
epagoge that Aristotle employs in the Analytics, what emerges is a dunamis of nous
which has two nearly identical operations: epagoge and noesis, where the only
distinction between the two acts is that epagoge stands to noesis as potency to act. This
is not a relation of potency to act seen above as a relation of a faculty to its operation, but
as an incomplete or imperfect act is related to the perfect; or in this case, as opinion or
79
Ibid., 88a5-8.
39

belief is related to knowledge. In order to see that epagoge is the realization of nous to
some extent, one must keep in mind the teloi (belief for absolute epagoge and knowledge
for absolute noesis) corresponding to the absolute sense of each of these notions.
However, in this initial division of nous into its two operations, both epagoge and noesis
are equally a movement of the intellect from one truth or concept to another, making no
distinction according to whether the movement is from universal to particular or
particular to universal.
Moreover, the root idea of epagoge that Aristotle identifies in the Analytics is an
aspect of this broader operation of epagoge. As it was pointed out during the preliminary
treatment of epagoge in the Analytics, this root sense includes both induction and
deduction as modes of teaching and learning. The broad operations of nous in the above
De Anima passage include this sense of epagoge. In fact, noesis and epagoge are distinct
names for the same operation. Noesis is only distinguished from epagoge, and epagoge
from noesis, by their proper teloi: absolute noesis stands to absolute epagoge as
knowledge to belief.
These broad operations of epagoge and noesis can be further distinguished into
inductive and deductive processes. The inductive processes involve a movement of the
intellect from the particular or specific to the general or universal, whereas the deductive
processes are a movement from the general or universal to the specific or particular.
Both types of processes are either epagogic or noetic just insofar as their proper teloi are
contingent or necessary respectively. Here again, epagoge stands to noesis as potency to
act.
40

To attain the precise, technical senses of absolute epagoge and absolute noesis, a
further distinction is required. Deductive operations are epagogic or noetic just insofar as
they can be distinguished into mere syllogism on the one hand, or scientific
demonstration on the other. The dialectical or rhetorical syllogism proves general
conclusions lacking the qualities of those of demonstration proper. Similarly, on the
inductive side, absolute epagoge and absolute noesis can also be distinguished according
to their proper teloi. Aristotle’s most technical and proper sense of epagoge is defined
according to its telos: a movement of the intellect from the particular or specific to the
general which results in doxa or contingent truth. Doxa stands as potency to the act of
nous; when such a movement yields necessary truth, it is noesis in Aristotle’s most
technical and proper sense: what I am calling absolute noesis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Developing a notion of Epagoge
Developing a notion of epagoge
Up to this point in my investigation into the nature of epagoge, the analysis has
focused mainly on the development of epagoge throughout the Analytics and Topics.
Although Aristotle makes liberal use of epagoge in various contexts beyond the Analytics
and Topics, he does not develop the notion further than the three senses identified in the
foregoing.80
As I have shown, Aristotle uses the passive form of the verb epagein in a
quite general sense meaning to lead another to a conclusion utilizing either inductive or
deductive forms of argument.81
The remainder of the passages from the Analytics and the
Topics reviewed above reveal more specific properties of epagoge from which we can
elicit Aristotle’s more technical senses, but, for the most part, Aristotle limits application
of the term ‘induction’ to arguments which proceed from part to whole.
Extracting the substantive claims regarding epagoge from the collected passages in the
Analytics and Topics, there emerges a list of properties of epagoge containing its essential
attributes. In particular, a review of the passages in chapters 1 – 3 above reveals the
following properties of epagoge. First, the characteristics that epagoge shares with
demonstration include:
80
I will not review each use or mention of epagoge in Aristotle’s corpus due to the sheer number of such.
Aristotle frequently flags his use of inductive reasoning with an explicit mention of the fact that the
conclusion in question was derived by means of an inductive process. To review each of these cases would
inflate the current project to an unreasonable length. Instead, I limit my focus to the substantive claims that
Aristotle makes regarding epagoge.
81
See An. Pr. II 21, 67a23 and An. Post. I 1, 71a21which both employ the passive verb in this sense and are
identified as such by both Ross and Barnes.
42

(1.) The capacity to establish the premises used in the sullogismoi;82
(2.) The capacity to produce pistis, i.e. persuasion or conviction;83
(3.) The necessity to proceed from facts that are already held to others;84
(4.) The capacity to be employed in dialectical or rhetorical arguments;85
(5.) The capacity to be employed as a mode of teaching and learning.86
Epagoge’s unique characteristics include:
(6.) Freedom from the strict formal requirements demanded of the sullogismoi;87
(7.) The capacity to proceed from the particular or specific to the general or universal;88
(8.) The capacity to connect the major term with the middle term by means of the minor
term, unlike syllogism which connects the major term to the minor term by means of the
middle term;89
(9.) More obvious or familiar to us than syllogism, and posterior and less intelligible in
the order of nature to syllogism;90
(10.) The capacity to proceed from effect to cause, whereas demonstration is always from
cause to effect;91
(11.) The capacity to grasp the universal, and in fact, the only way to grasp the
universal;92
and lastly,
(12.) The capacity to grasp the first principles of science.93
82
An. Pr. I 25, 42a3; II 23, 68b15
83
An. Pr. II 23, 68b11
84
An. Post. I 1, 71a5
85
An. Post. I 1, 71a10
86
An. Post. I 18, 81b1
87
An. Pr. I 25, 42a23
88
An. Pr. II 23, 68b19, 69a15; An. Post. I 1, 71a8; I 18, 81b1
89
An. Pr. II 23, 68b33
90
An. Pr. II 23, 68b37; An. Post. I 3, 72b29; I 13, 78a26
91
An. Post. I 13, 78a34
92
93
An. Post. II 19, 100b3
43

Assuming the above characteristics include all the propriae of epagoge, it is evident that
the essential attributes will come from the list of unique characteristics, and the remainder
will be non-essential.
According to the root sense of epagoge, all reasoning or intellection is epagogic just
insofar as one person leads another or is led on by some process of reasoning from
certain facts or opinions to others. This definition has property (3) above as its essential
characteristic. As we saw in the discussion above (Pr. An. II.21 and Post. An. I.1), the
passive verb epagomenos is often used instead of epagoge or epagein. The failure to
appreciate this passive sense has led some to mistakenly think and claim that Aristotle’s
technical sense of epagoge includes reasoning from universal to particular as well as
from particular to universal.94
However, as I argued above, it is clear that in An. Pr. II.21
and An. Post. I.1, the reasoning described is not inductive, but deductive. Since the root
sense of epagoge (i.e., leading another or being led on by some process of reasoning from
certain facts or opinions to others) includes deductive reasoning, this root sense of
epagoge is able to incorporate reasoning from particular to universal as well as reasoning
from universal to particular. Finally, this root sense of epagoge makes the most sense of
the use of the passive form of epagein in An. Pr. II.21 and An. Post. I.1.
In addition to the root sense, Aristotle usually employs the narrower, more specific
notion of epagoge which does not include deduction. This is evident in the passages in
which Aristotle states that epagoge is the only way to grasp the universal,95
or that
epagoge provides us with first principles;96
both of these characteristics were traditionally
reserved for the operation of nous. To see this, it should be kept in mind that in Posterior
94
See the section on Engberg-Pederson 1979 below regarding epagoge and the adducing of particulars.
95
96
44

Analytics II.19, nous is determined to be that faculty which grasps the universal first
principles of science, where these are necessary truths. But if epagoge can provide us
with the first principles of science, then epagoge can provide us with necessary truths.97
In light of the foregoing, I argue that in addition to Aristotle’s root sense of epagoge
outlined above, he employs a more specific sense of epagoge, what I have called
Intellection, which includes both absolute noesis and absolute epagoge. Taking our cue
from Aristotle’s language in Post. An. I.4, 73a21, in which scientific knowledge of the
necessary is called episteme haplos, I call the operation by which one grasps necessary
truths be called noesis haplos – or, absolute noesis. Contingent objects, on the other
hand, only admit of contingent truths, and since absolute noesis is only of the necessary,
the operation by which one grasps contingent truths is epagoge haplos, or absolute
epagoge.
The Nicomachean Ethics
To recap before moving on to examine the passages from the Nichomachean
Ethics: I have identified three senses of epagoge: 1) the root sense meaning to lead
another or to be led on through some process of reasoning from certain facts or opinions
to others. Then, since Aristotle refers to epagoge as a passage from the particular to the
universal,98
which grasps universal first principles,99
the more precise sense of epagoge, or
97
Parenthetically, although Aristotle has a notion of perfect induction, such a notion is only a special case
of induction, and there is no necessity that these special cases of perfect induction will yield truths that
cannot be otherwise, i.e. Aristotle generally uses epagoge as yielding mere doxa or contingent truths.
98
Topics, I 12, 105a13
99
45

Intellection, can be defined as 2) a movement of the intellect from the particular or
specific to a grasp of the general or universal. Absolute epagoge, further qualifies the
above account: in this sense epagoge involves 3) a movement toward and grasp of the
contingent (or, as I will show below, an imperfect grasp of the necessary). This latter
sense of epagoge allows for a clear distinction between absolute epagoge and absolute
noesis, since the latter involves the grasp of necessary truths.
The treatment of epagoge in the Analytics is focused on its role in teaching or learning
science, and the Topics and Rhetoric treat of epagoge primarily as a mode of persuasion.
The concern with epagoge in the Topics is limited to its role in dialectic. There,
epagoge, as a form of dialectical argumentation, is shown to be more persuasive, clearer,
and more intelligible to an audience than deduction, the other form of dialectical
argumentation.100
In the Ethics, the treatment of epagoge is on its role as a contributor to
understanding and the good life for man. That is, epagoge is necessary for
understanding, and understanding and wisdom are necessary for happiness.
Nevertheless, the brief treatment of epagoge in the Nicomachean Ethics reinforces what
was laid out in the Analytics. In particular, Aristotle merely re-states there what was
established in the Analytics and Topics, namely, that epagoge “is of first principles and of
the universal.”101
A brief review of these passages from the Nicomachean Ethics should
serve to corroborate my claim that the Analytics and Topics contain all of Aristotle’s
substantive claims regarding epagoge, and to allow me to shift my focus to addressing
objections.
First, In Nichomachean Ethics I.7, 1098b3:
100
Topics, I 12, 105a13
101
N.E. VI 3, 1139b28
46

Nor must we demand the cause in all matters alike; it is enough in some cases that
the fact be well established, as in the case of the first principles; the fact is a
primary thing (proton) or first principle (arche). Now of first principles (archon)
we see some by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation,
and others too in other ways.102
If this passage is a discussion of the way we come to grasp universal first principles, it is
odd to find no mention of nous or noesis here. If noesis is to be understood as a process
of mind distinct from epagoge, the absence of nous and noesis is conspicuous indeed.
Yet in Post. An. II.19 Aristotle is clear that nous plays an essential role in the grasp of
first principles. So, since nous is not explicitly mentioned here in 1098b3, it seems that
Aristotle means that noesis is somehow implied in the notion of epagoge. This makes
sense if Aristotle is taking epagoge here as meaning Intellection, because Intellection has
its two species, absolute epagoge and absolute noesis. And ultimately, it is through
absolute noesis that the necessary first principles are grasped; however, it is by a process
of epagoge that the principles are introduced.
However, in this passage, by “first principles” Aristotle means the particular facts
which serve as the principles for action, not the universal first principles of science.
Although the definitions of happiness, courage, temperance, etc. serve as universal first
principles insofar as they are the end for man (in the case of happiness) or the formal
cause of action (in the case of the virtues), the particular facts serve as the first principles
qua material cause. As such, just as the wood serves is the first principle of the chair, the
particular fact is the first principle of action. This is evident because the subject matter is
right action which has to do with determining the right thing to do in a given situation,
i.e., the given facts of the matter under deliberation.
102
Revised Oxford, Vol. II, trans. Ross, W. D., 1736.
47

In the phrase “Now of first principles we see some by induction, some by perception,
some by a certain habituation. . .” Aristotle is considering first principles qua particular
facts. These facts directly bear upon the choice about which one deliberates, whether
those facts be generalizations arrived at through induction (such as, ‘Callias is always at
the agora on Saturday afternoons’), through perception (‘I see Callias’), or through
habituation (I am generous with my friends). These facts may serve as the matter for the
deliberative process aimed at determining how I might best demonstrate generosity and
magnanimity toward Callias. Should I merely invite Callias to dinner, or honor his
request to speak on his behalf before the Assembly?
Nevertheless, if eudaimonia, for example, is a necessary first principle of Ethics, then
epagoge remains the only way that we grasp the universal first principles of Ethics. And
this is the sense of epagoge developed in the Analytics and Topics. Lastly, the idea to
take away from the passage at 1098b3 is that epagoge may supply us with the general
facts used in deliberation, and this sense of epagoge was described in the Analytics and
Topics.
This same theme is found in the following passage. In VI.3, 1139b28, Aristotle re-
establishes the role of epagoge with regard to the first principles of science:
Now what knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere
similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not
capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know,
when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not.
Therefore the object of knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for
things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that
are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable. Again, every science is thought to
be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts
from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics also; for it proceeds
sometimes through induction and sometimes by deduction. Now induction is of
first principles and of the universal and deduction proceeds from universals.
There are therefore principles from which deduction proceeds, which are not
48

reached by deduction; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired.
Knowledge, then, is a state of capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting
characteristics which we specify in the Analytics; for it is when a man believes in
a certain way and the principles are known to him that he has knowledge, since if
they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his knowledge
only incidentally.103
Much of this is a recap of the Analytics and the role of epagoge in science. The
comments to the passage preceding the one above apply here also. Again, no mention is
made of nous or noesis in a context in which one would expect to find it.
Further, it is said here that “all teaching starts from what is already known, as we
maintain in the Analytics also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and
sometimes by deduction.” This passage emphasizes the aspect of knowledge discussed in
the Analytics, i.e. knowledge as taught and learned, not as discovered knowledge. It is
unlikely that Aristotle omits any mention of nous here because there is no discovery at
work; it is more likely that Aristotle is employing the sense of epagoge I call Intellection,
under which noesis is a species. Thus, it would be accurate, but too precise for the
purposes here to say that noesis is at work if the object of knowledge is of necessity.
In sum, in this chapter I showed that the substantive claims made in the Analytics and
Topics about epagoge provide us with its various characteristics and essential properties.
Further, a review of the passages in the Nicomachean Ethics corroborates my thesis. I
will now shift my focus to addressing objections to my thesis.
103
N.E. VI.3, 1139b19-35. Italics mine.
49

CHAPTER FIVE: Other analyses of epagoge
Ross on epagoge
In his translation and commentary on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, Ross
(1949) identifies and defines several senses of epagoge, and the relation of each sense to
the others and to nous. While Ross sheds significant insight on this issue, he ultimately
fails to establish a coherent understanding.
Ross recognizes that Aristotle, “uses [epagoge] to mean a variety of mental processes,
having only this in common, that in all there is an advance from one or more particular
judgments to a general one.”104
There is a sense in which Ross is correct, but this
observation misses the mark. From the foregoing, it should be evident that epagoge does
indeed involve various mental processes as Ross claims, but what is in common to all
three senses is not an advance from one or more particular judgments to a general one,
but simply an advance from one or more judgments to another – without any restriction
with regard to the number: it does not matter whether the propositions are particular or
general. What Ross is describing here is accurate of the still general but more qualified,
intellective sense of epagoge which Aristotle employs, that which includes both absolute
noesis and absolute epagoge.
Ross proceeds to say that “the knowledge of the principle [in science] is not produced
by reasoning but achieved by direct insight – nous an ein ton archon [An. Post. 100b12].
104
Ross 1949, 48.
51

This is in fact what modern logicians call intuitive induction. And this is far the most
important of the types of induction which Aristotle considers.”105
This passage makes it
clear that Ross does in fact identify nous as a type of epagoge.
Ultimately, Ross explicitly identifies three senses of epagoge:
To sum up, then, Aristotle uses ‘induction’ in three ways. He most often means
by it [1] a mode of argument from particulars which merely tends to produce
belief in a general principle, without proving it. Sometimes he means by it [2] a
flash of insight by which we pass from knowledge of a particular fact to direct
knowledge of the corresponding general principle. In one passage he means by it
[3] a valid argument by which we pass from seeing that certain species of a genus
have a certain attribute, and that these are all the species of the genus, to seeing
that the whole genus has it.106
This explication is confusing in light of the senses of epagoge Ross identified in the
previous passages. There he identified a root sense meaning ‘to lead someone from one
truth to another;’ and a general sense meaning ‘an advance from one or more particular
statements to a general one;’ and finally a sense which corresponds to absolute noesis.
Only the latter sense is identifiable above as sense [2]. With senses [1] – [3], Ross must
have in mind three technical senses of Aristotelian epagoge. In which case, even though
he does not state it with any precision, Ross seems to share my understanding of what I
am calling absolute noesis and absolute epagoge, and their relation to Intellection;
however, I do not think there is a need to break out his sense [3] as a distinct type of
epagoge and for two reasons. First, Aristotle describes Ross’ sense [3] as a syllogism
arising out of induction, i.e. the induction merely serves as a premise in the syllogism, but
is not a syllogism in its own right. Second, sense [3] will fall under sense [1] if it
produces a contingent truth or mere belief, or sense [2] if it produces a necessary truth.
105
106
Ibid., 50. Bold mine.
52

In the commentary to Prior Analytics II.23, Ross identifies a sense (5) of the middle
voice of epagein, or epagesthai, “which has often been thought to be the origin of the
technical meaning of epagoge, viz. its usage in the sense of citing, adducing. . .”107
And
further on: “In most passages epagoge clearly means not the citation of individual
instances but the advance from them to a universal . . . but occasionally epagoge seems to
mean ‘adducing of instances’ (corresponding to sense (5) of epagein).”108
Ross identifies
three passages which attest to this interpretation,109
but in each of the passages cited,
particulars are brought forward with the intention that one grasps the general or universal
claim; as such, the sense of egagoge is either absolute epagoge or absolute noesis,
respectively. Thus, I see no need to break out a distinct sense of epagoge meaning
‘adducing of instances,’ absolute epagoge is a mental process which leads one from one
or more particular judgments to a general one, and absolute noesis is a mental process
which leads one to a necessary truth.
Ross’ analysis of epagoge is accurate for the most part, but is somewhat confused. He
fails to recognize the full generality of Aristotle’s root sense of epagoge, or to define the
more technical senses of epagoge. These failures result in an overall confusion and
imprecision of senses.
Engberg-Pedersen
107
Ibid., 482.
108
Ibid., 483.
109
Ibid., 483, Top. 108b10, Soph. El. 174a36, Cat. 13b37, Met. 1048a35.
53

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