1. Blessing corruption: institutional reforms
By
Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez
Abstract
Despite the claimed economic benefit argued by the implementation of institutional
reforms, there are some structural inefficiencies that hamper the benefit of such re-
forms. We develop a political-economic model in which a government tries to set the
optimal institutional level taking into account the effect of this policy on FDI, the
benefit of two kind of people: honest and dishonest, and a political contribution given
by the dishonest people in order to get the lowest institutional level. The results sug-
gest that the optimal institutional level will depend on the degree of efficiency of the
legal structures against illegal structures.
JEL Classification: D4, D6, H2, Z0
Keywords: Institutional Reforms, Corruption, Structural Efficiency.
Department of Economics, University of Guadalajara, Mexico.
(rafaelsa@cucea.udg.mx)
——————————————————
Mailing address: Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez, Departamento de Economa, Centro Uni-
versitario de Ciencias Econmico Adinistrativas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Perifrico Norte
799, Modulo K302, Los Belenes, 45100 Zapopan, Jalisco, Mxico. TEL: +523-37703431, e-
mail: rafaelsa@cucea.udg.mx

2. Blessing corruption: institutional reforms
Abstract
Despite the claimed economic benefit argued by the implementation of institutional
reforms, there are some structural inefficiencies that hamper the benefit of such re-
forms. We develop a political-economic model in which a government tries to set the
optimal institutional level taking into account the effect of this policy on FDI, the
benefit of two kind of people: honest and dishonest, and a political contribution given
by the dishonest people in order to get the lowest institutional level. The results sug-
gest that the optimal institutional level will depend on the degree of efficiency of the
legal structures against illegal structures.
JEL Classification: D4, D6, H2, Z0
Keywords: Institutional Reforms, Corruption, Structural Efficiency.

3. 1 Introduction
In the last decade the growing of the institutional economics literature has been rather
amazing.1 It is an interdisciplinary enterprise covering a wide range of issues such that
anthropology, sociology, law, political science, organization theory, etc. linked by a
common economic language. Coase (1937), Williamson (1975) and North (1990) are
the best-known representatives of this branch in economics where its goal is to explain
what institutions are, how they arise, what propose they serve, how they change and
how -if at all- they should be reformed (Klein (1999) p. 456).
This impressive development has produced many refined opinions of many
scholars and policy makers on the need to set and implement institutional reforms
as a way to get a more substantial and solid economic growth and development. Nu-
merous papers have been written on the topic.2
All of these studies make a deep analysis and lead to solid findings. However, the
problem why these policies in developing countries just failed or simply are cancelled
out, to our knowledge, has not been investigated well3 . Moreover, the theoretical
studies of this issue is rather limited. The literature relating institutional reforms
and economic performance in a theoretical and empirical framework has been huge4 .
However, this literature seems to be focused on very specific types of countries and
in a very specific types of issues where a positive assessment for institutional reforms
not only for economic growth but also in welfare is presented5 . Supported in the last
evidence, many scholars provide burning recommendations for institutional reforms in
developing countries.
Despite all, many developing countries seem to delay (or even ignore) the nec-
essary institutional reforms. Unclear legal framework to run the process, structural
inefficiencies and poor results of the reforms are part of the reasons why developing
countries neglect institutional reforms (Espinosa, 2001).
Based on this fact we develop a partial equilibrium model in which a good is
produced by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and consumed in a country in which
two kinds of people live in: honest and dishonest people. FDI is crucial in terms of
considering the relevance of foreign investment on developing economies. Even when
literature on FDI is huge, in this paper I do not intend to analyze FDI but to consider
1
A good survey can be found in Klein (1999).
2
Some examples are the impressive and accurate articles written by Rodrik (2000), Williamson
(1996), and Bardhan (1989).
3
One valuable exception is given by Herath (2005)
4
A good colection of these works may be found in Mnard and Shirley (2005), and the works of
Joskow (1991), Shelanski and Klein (1995), Lyons (1996) and Crocker and Masten (1996)
5
Some examples are Alesina (2005), Dutta (2000), and Fung et al. (2005)
1

4. it to model a stylized fact6 . On the other hand, honest and dishonest people offer a
suitable parameter to consider corruption in our model.
The aim of this theoretical model is to offer an institutional explanation about
how corruption and FDI coexist to determine a proper institutional policy. In this
model, the foreign firms have two production costs: the traditional technical and
market cost and the Fiscal Cost (FC) which is a cost levied by the government in the
form of tax. However, when a firm tries to pay the tax, he faces a corrupted civil
service that intends to bribe the firm in order to get an extra income. We assume
that bribe is a common practice that the firms should consider in its production
decision. This bribe comes together with the legal payment of taxes and moreover it
is a compensatory option. That is, the firm has to pay its FC through two structures:
an illegal and a legal one.7
It is assumed in his paper that honest people work for the private sector and
dishonest work for the government as civil servants. It is a very strong but convenient
assumption for developing countries where the social perception about the civil service
is the one in which, independently of the existence of honest elements, the corruption
is considered a generalized fact. The opposite perception about the private sector
holds8 . In other words, we are considering the ”net” perceptions about the honestly
of the workers in the private and public sector.
Honest people working for the private sector receive a transfer from the govern-
ment equivalent to the amount of taxes paid by the firm through the legal structure.
Dishonest people receive an income from the bribe paid by the firm9 . The government
can set an institutional policy in order to control this flows affecting the corruption of
the civil service.
However, the dishonest lobby the government to influence negatively in the set-
ting of a strict institutional policy. This lobby would depend on the corruption of the
political process (the government’s willingness to accept contributions). Lobbying in
this paper takes place in a country which determines the institutional level. We model
lobbying by following the political contribution approach. That is, the lobbyists make
6
A good surveys can be considered in Caves (1982) and Cantwell (1994).
7
It is well known that bribe is widely used in developing countries in order to simplify or avoid
any legal and administrative procedure that can be significantly costly by the legal way.
8
For more details see Global Corruption Report 2003 in http://www.globalcorrutionreport.org
(october 2003).
9
In the case of the honest income received for working in the private sector we consider that
in the background there is a second commodity in a competitive market produced under constant
returns. This is taken as numeraire. Both goods require only a single factor of production, let say
labour, which is fixed supply under a perfect competitive market and full employment. On the other
hand the income of dishonest people working for the government it can be considered as a lump-sum
transfer from the government which for simplicity can be ignored
2

5. political contributions to the political party in power, and the amount they contribute
is contingent upon the policy that the government adopts. The political contributions
approach, derived from the common agency problem analysed by Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1986), was first introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994) in modeling the
political economy of trade protection with quasi-linear preferences.10 Dixit, Grossman
and Helpman (1997) have recently generalised the Bernheim-Whinston framework to
allow for general preferences and therefore variability in marginal utilities of income.
Given that our framework is a partial equilibrium one, we shall follow the original
Grossman-Helpman (1994) approach.
Our aim is to construct a model in which the reasons for a particular insti-
tutional level is found not only in the moral considerations, but also in the way the
domestic political equilibrium is determined taking into account we have two corrupted
scenarios highly related: Corruption of the political process of the government which
is exogenous, and corruption in the civil service which can be affected by the policy
decision. Both scenarios can coexist perfectly11 . We shall focus on the determination
of the optimal institutional level.
The optimal institutional level depend mainly on the cost between the legal
and illegal structures to pay the FC. In this sense, we have two cases of analysis: in
the first case we consider that the fiscal cost for using the illegal structure is larger
than the fiscal cost for using the legal structure. The second case is the opposite.
The model is spelled out in detail in the next section. In section 3 we will set
the optimal institutional level taking into account the level of government political
corruption, efficiency of the structures and the market size. In section 4 we conclude.
2 The Model
Our focus is on a country which hosts n identical foreign firms competing in a oligopolis-
tic industry. These firms produce a homogeneous good X which is consumed entirely
in the host country where there are not a domestic producers.12 The marginal cost of
10
The importance of political process in economic decision making in general and international
policy issues in particular is well recognised (see Dixit (1996)). The particular aspect of lobbying
by interest group has derived a lot of attention from international economists. The alternative ap-
proaches in modeling political equilibrium include the tariff-formation approach (Findlay and Wellisz
(1982)), the political support function approach (Hilman (1989)), median voter approach (Mayer
(1984)), the campaign contribution approach (Magee et al (1989)), and the political contribution
approach (Grossman and Helpman, (1994)).
11
If we consider a link between both scenarios or if we assume the corruption of political process
as endogenous, we will obtain similar results as obtained in this paper.
12
The assumption that there are only foreign firms is made for two reasons: first, it models better
a developing feature, and second it is made for simplification. In the case of domestic production the
3

6. each firm is C which is taken to be constant, and therefore equal the average variable
cost.13
In order to make the analysis at a tractable level, we assume a linear demand
function of the form
P = a − bQ
where a and b are positive parameters, Q = nX is the total demand and P is the price
of the good X.14 The profit function of each n foreign firm is
π f = (P − C)X, (1)
Each firm has a Cournot perception: it takes the output of other firms as given while
maximising its profits. Under Cournot-Nash assumptions from (1) profit maximisation
yields the following result
a−C
X= , (2)
2b
where the benefit of each oligpolistic firm is given by (2) in (1) as
π f = (P − C)X = bX 2 . (3)
To produce, firms incurs two kinds of costs: the usual technological and market con-
ditions cost and the legal fiscal cost. That is,
C =c+∆ (4)
where c is the technological and market conditions cost (which is constant), and ∆
is the Fiscal Cost (FC) which is a levied tax firm should pay to the government for
fiscal reasons. It will be characterized as being a per-output tax that allows the firm
continuing operations regularly.
The FC tax have two components: a legal and an illegal one. The legal com-
ponent of this tax will be paid through the government’s legal structure (legal option)
and the illegal component will be paid through an alternative illegal structure (illegal
option).
results are similar to those found in this paper.
13
As we mention before there is a numeraire good in the background which is produced under
competitive conditions and a factor of production whose price is determined in the competitive
sector.
14
The utility can be approximated from U = u(X) + m where X is the good under consideration
and m is the expenditure on the numeraire good. The use of this approximation removes a number
of theoretical difficulties, including income effects.
4

7. The amount of tax paid through the legal and illegal options would depend on
the efficiency of the government institutional framework. The institutional framework
is understood as the legal environment set by the government in order to regulate
the political and economical activities properly. In this sense, an efficient institutional
framework strengthens the control against illegal activities. An inefficient institutional
frameworks means a weak control over illegal activities15 .
The institutional framework is set by the government through a credible politi-
cal reform of the legal system. For simplicity we consider that this reform is the result
of a political-legal process where no direct ex-ante economic cost is attached to this
reform. This process will produce a parameter α which measure the efficiency of the
institutional framework and it will be determined by the government. This parameter
will be set between 0 and 1 and will be called institutional level.
Therefore the two parts of the FC can be written as
∆ = γ(1 − α) + βα (5)
where γ(1 − α) is the illegal component and βα is the legal one. γ and β are the
per-unit structural illegal and legal costs respectively. These two per-unit costs can be
defined as the degree of efficiency in both structures. Therefore, γ(1 − α) gets smaller
as the institutional level increases while βα becomes larger. When the institutional
level α, the policy instrument of the government, is close to one the institutional
framework is more efficient, when α is closer to zero the institutional framework is
more inefficient16 .
In order to pay this tax, the firms should face a civil service body in charge of
collecting taxes. This civil service is formed by dishonest individuals (labeled ς) who
benefit from and support the illegal structure through which the firm pay taxes. On
the other hand, there are honest people (labeled σ) working for the private sector.
They are homogeneous within their own type.
Dishonest people work and obtain an income from illegal activities, specifically
through the bribe they charge from the producer once the latter faces tax obligation.
On the other hand, the honest people receive an income through the (legal) tax levied
on the producer. It can be seen as a transfer from the government to the honest
people.
Taking into account the considerations mentioned above, we shall specify the
utility function of the honest people, dishonest people and the government: we will
use these functions to determine the optimal institutional level. Assuming quasi-linear
15
Institutions is understood as the rules of the game which all the economic agents agree to play.
16
Although the FC depend on β, γ and α, when α get the extreme values 0 and 1 the institutional
framework will be clearly inefficient and efficient independently of the values of β and γ.
5

8. preferences the utility of the honest people can be defined as
I σ = αβnX + CS, (6)
In expression (6), the first term is the legal payment of tax obligations made by the
firm. This payment, which will be the income of the honest people, is transferred in
a lump-sum fashion from the government. The second term is the consumers surplus
which satisfies:
dCS = −QdP,
where Q is the total consumption of X, and P is its price.
The income of the dishonest people is given by
I ς = γ(1 − α)nX, (7)
Clearly, the source of the income is the bribes taken from the firm17 .
The institutional parameter α is a policy instrument for the government and
is determined by a political equilibrium. We shall follow closely Dixit et al (1997)
in specifying this equilibrium. The honest people do not lobby the government, but
the dishonest make political contributions to influence the government’s decisions.
The political contribution schedule for the dishonest is denoted by c(α). The host
government’s objective function is given by
G = ρc + (I σ + I ς + nπ f ), (8)
where ρ > 1 is a constant parameter. Equation (8) states that the government con-
siders the total welfare of its nationals (the terms in parenthesis), as well as the total
amount of political contribution that it receives (the first term on the right hand side
of (8)).
The political equilibrium is the outcome of a two-stage game. In stage one of
the game, the dishonest people choose their contribution schedule. The government
then sets its institutional policy in the second stage. A political equilibrium is given by
(i) a political contribution function c∗ (α), such that it maximizes the welfare of all the
dishonest people given the anticipated political optimisation by the government, and
(ii) a policy variable, α∗ , that maximises the government’s objective function given
by (8), taking the contribution schedule as given.
17
This is not the only income the dishonest could have received. We can consider that the dishonest
people receive a fix wage w as a lump-sum transfer from a lump-sum tax levied on the monopolist.
In this case, given the lump-sum characteristic of this income, it does not affect the result of the
model and, for simplicity, we can ignore it.
6

9. Dixit et al (1997) develop a refinement known as truthful equilibria that im-
plement Pareto efficient outcomes. Stated formally, let (c◦ (α◦ , I ς ◦ ), α◦ ) be a truthful
equilibrium in which I ς ◦ is the equilibrium per-capita utility level of the dishonest
people. Then (c◦ (α◦ , I ς ◦ ), α◦ , I ς ◦ ) is characterised by
c(α, I ς ◦ ) = M ax(0, ), (9)
α◦ = Argmaxα {ρc(α, I ς ◦ ) + (I σ (α) + I ς ◦ )} , (10)
I σ (α1 ) + I ς ◦ = ρc(α◦ , I ς ◦ ) + (I σ (α◦ ) + I ς ◦ ), (11)
where is defined in
Iς◦ = Iς − , (12)
and
α1 = Argmaxα (I σ (α) + I ς ◦ ). (13)
Equation (9) (together with (12)) state that the truthful contribution schedule
is set to the level of compensating variation relative to the equilibrium utility level of
the dishonest. The definition of is the basic concept of the compensating variations.
Under a truthful equilibrium payment function, for any change in α, the change in
the contribution received by the government will exactly equal the change in the
dishonest welfare, provided that the payment both before and after the change is
strictly positive. Equation (10) is self explanatory: the government takes the utility
level of the dishonest as given and chooses the institutional level so as to maximize its
objective function. Equation (11) (together with (13)) complete the characterization
of the truthful equilibrium and tie down the equilibrium utility level of the dishonest
people, which is derived from the premise that the dishonest would pay the lowest
possible contribution to induce the government to pursue the equilibrium policy given
in (10). For this to be the case, the government must be indifferent between (i)
implementing the equilibrium policy and receiving contributions from the dishonest,
and (ii) implementing a policy by accepting no contribution. Equation (11) states
precisely that.18
According to Grossman and Helpman (1994, pp. 845-846), in the case of one
lobby group there is no opposition from competing interests, and the lobby group
captures all of the surplus from its political relationship with the government. In this
political equilibrium, the government derive exactly the same utility as they would
have achieved by allowing no contribution. An interesting example with one lobby
group can be found in Rama and Tabellini (1998, p. 1311).
18
See Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), pp. 756-759.
7

10. Finally, the government can affect the number of foreign firms by changing
the fiscal policy. It is assumed that the host country is small in the market for FDI.
Foreign firm moves into (out of) the host country if the profit it makes in the host
country, π f , is larger (smaller) than the reservation profit, π , it can make in the rest
¯
of the world. Therefore, the FDI equilibrium provides
πf = π.
¯ (14)
From (3), (4), (5) y (14), we have the defined solutions
X = π /b
¯ (15)
a − c − γ(1 − α) − βα
n = − 1 ≥ 1. (16)
b π /b
¯
Now we have established the backbone of our analysis.
3 Optimal Institutional Level
Having described the properties of the political equilibrium, in this section we shall
analyse the optimal institutional level and its effect on welfare. From (2) we have
dn γ−β
= . (17)
dα bX
An increase in the institutional level α will increase the number of foreign firms
if the per-unit structural illegal cost is larger than the per-unit structural legal cost. In
other words, when the illegal option is more inefficient than the legal one, an increase
in the institutional level, α, will reduce the cost of the firms because the tax payment
is made in a cheaper way inside the legal structure. In the opposite way when β is
larger than γ, the illegal option is cheaper and an increase in α will reduce the number
of incoming foreign firms. The increase in the institutional control will increase the
firm’s costs.
On the other hand, the effect of a change in the institutional level on the optimal
output is null because the FDI adjusts to any output modification. From (15) we have
dX
=0 (18)
dα
The first step to determine the optimal α is to obtain the first order condition
for the optimisation problem given in (10). From (6), (7), (8), (17) and (18) we obtain
implicitly the following result
γ−β
Gα = nX(β − ρ) + (ρ + α(β − ρ)) + X(n + 1)(γ − β) = 0, (19)
b
8

11. where from this equation we get
ρ(γ − β) bX
α∗ = + [(n + 1)(γ − ρ) − β], (20)
∆ ∆
where ∆ = (γ − β)(ρ − β). On the other hand the second order condition is given by
(γ − β)
Gαα = [(β + γ) − 2ρ],
b
where concavity holds under the following conditions to consider in the analysis
β+γ
if (γ − β) > 0 then ρ > ,
2
β+γ
if (γ − β) < 0 then ρ < . (21)
2
Under this conditions we can conclude that ∆ > 0.
From (20) we can see that the value of α∗ is pretty ambiguous. This value will
depend on the corruption parameter, the efficiency of the legal and illegal options and
the market size. In order to get cut clear results we consider two possible scenarios:
first, we assume that the illegal option is more expensive than the legal option. Second,
the illegal option is cheaper than the legal option.
In the first case, the firms face a efficient legal structure to pay taxes. It
probably means legal and technical facilities implemented by the government to all
tax payers. Simplicity in the fiscal structure is argued by most economist in emerging
economies in order to solve the fiscal evasion and corruption. I this case we consider
that the illegal structure is economically and legally more expensive.
In the second case, the firms face a inefficient government structure to pay taxes
and the illegal option becomes a better option to pay taxes. Probably a complicated
fiscal system and/or technical barriers are some of the main reasons why firms may
prefer the illegal way.
3.1 Case 1: illegal cost option larger than the legal cost op-
tion (γ > β)
When the illegal option is more expensive than the legal one, by (21) can see that
(ρ > β). The optimal α is ambiguous and would depend on the corruption level and
market size which is defined as SX = (a − C)/b and, without loss of generality, it could
be measured by a according to (15) and (16).19
In the case in which the cost of bribe is larger than the cost of using the legal
structure, an increase in the institutional level will increase the cost of the illegal
19
See Martin (1983, p. 15)
9

12. option since the firms will be averse to use a costly and risky option. Under these
conditions, there are two specific effects on government objective function: an indirect
effect on FDI given by an increase in the number of entry firms, and a direct effect
given by the change in the institutional level itself.
In the first one, an increase in the institutional level will increase the income
of honest and dishonest people, the consumer surplus, the producer surplus and the
contribution offered by the dishonest people due to the increase in the number of
incoming firms. This is an indirect effect produced by the positive externality of new
firms in the market. However, there is a direct effect produced by the increase in the
institutional level which reduces the income of dishonest people and consequently the
bribe paid by them to the civil service. This reduction in the bribe is produced by the
reduction in the income of the dishonest people.
The net effect is going to depend on the weight attached to the dishonest
payment on the government objective function. From (20) we can see that the level of
corruption and the market size are the determinant variables. Despite the illegal option
is more expensive than the legal one, a large corruption and market size parameters
may produce the lowest institutional level. When the corruption parameter is small,
the government may choose the highest institutional level. Formally we can say
Proposition 1 When the illegal fiscal option is more expensive than the legal one,
the optimal institutional level set by the government will be
α∗ = 0 if ρ > γ and a 0
α∗ > 0 if ρ ≤ γ
Intuitively the weight attached to the political contribution made by the dis-
honest people is determined by two parameters: the corruption parameter, ρ, which
measures the governments sensibility of the contribution in the political process20 ;
and the market size which determines the magnitude of the contribution taking into
account the amount of production.
With a large corruption level, the contribution is a valuable objective for the
government. There are incentives to set a lower institutional level in order to receive
a increasing flows of contributions from the dishonest people. However it may not be
enough because the amount of the contribution is going to depend on the amount of
income received by the dishonest people. When the market size is large enough, the
income from bribes is large too. Therefore, with a large corruption parameter and
market size, the government will be willing to set the lowest institutional level despite
the efficient legal structure21 .
20
This sensibility may change according to many factors like election times and political scandals.
21
In this case the government magnifies the benefit of the political contribution. According to
Magee et. al. (1989) this fact can be presented at the end of the political cycles, at election or
re-election times, or under any political event which requires economic contributions.
10

13. On the other hand, when the level of corruption is small (or the market is
reduced), the weight of the political contribution is limited and the government is
willing to maximize the benefit of the society in terms of consumer and producer
surplus promoting the entry of firms and the benefit of the honest people. The gov-
ernment consider significantly the benefit of setting a high institutional level in order
to increase the number of incoming firms. The efficiency of the legal structure will
promote the foreign investment and the government is willing to eradicate any cor-
ruption in the civil service. The government will be more efficient as less corrupted
civil service he has, and the way in which he eliminates the corrupted civil service is
setting the highest institutional level.
3.2 Case 2: illegal cost option shorter than the legal cost
option (γ < β)
When the illegal option is cheaper than the legal one, from (21) we can see that ρ < β.
The optimum α will be again ambiguous. The value of the institutional level would
depend again not on corruption level and market size.
The fact that the illegal structure is more efficient (or cheaper) than the legal
structure is the more common case in developing economies. Actually the existence
of these illegal structures depend on their ability of being a better option to over-
come efficiently administrative and legal process rather than the legal option which is
sometimes a pain in the way.
The firms take the illegal way in order to avoid all the administrative stuff. They
prefer an efficient bribe rather than an inefficient administrative procedure. According
to Klein (1999), with a social acceptance the illegal structure becomes an institution.
The bribe is then a valuable institution which reduces the social uncertainty produced
by an inefficient legal administrative structure.
Implicitly we are here considering that the origin of the illegal structure comes
from the inefficiency of the legal one. In the previous case, in which the illegal structure
was more inefficient than the legal one, it is implicitly assumed that the origin of the
illegal structure is independent of the legal one. The former is seen as externally
imposed22 .
From (20) when the level of corruption ρ is relatively large, the institutional
level set by the government will be the lowest possible. However, when the level of
corruption is realitively small, and the market size is sufficiently large, the government
will adopt the strictest institutional level. Formally we an say
Proposition 2 When the legal fiscal option is more expensive than the illegal one,
22
Some cases like terrorism and drug trafficking can be considered here.
11

14. the optimal institutional level set by the government will be
α∗ = 0 if ρ ≥ γ
α∗ > 0 if ρ < γ and a 0
Intuitively we suspect that a cheaper illegal option may incentive to the firms
to play against the legal way. In this sense a reduction in the institutional level will
reduce the cost of the firms promoting the increase in the incoming number of firms.
A reduction in the institutional level will produce again two effects on welfare: a direct
effect given by the reduction in the income of the honest people (and the increase in
he income of dishonest people); and an indirect effect given by the increase in FDI
and its effect on the income of honest, dishonest, consumer and producer surplus.
When the corruption parameter, ρ, is sufficiently large, the incentives of the
firms to play the illegal way is magnified. A large corruption level and the efficient
illegal structure produce an institutional policy oriented to the most corrupted envi-
ronment. The government is willing to set the lowest institutional level because the
value attached to the political contribution and the benefit of the foreign firms is sig-
nificantly larger than any reduction in the income of the honest people. In this case,
the optimal policy will maximize the income of the government, the dishonest people
and the benefit of the incoming firms. A lax institutional policy incentives the entry
on new firms and the increase in consumer surplus.
In this sense, the government consider that the loss produced by the inefficiency
of the legal structure could be widely compensated with the use of the illegal structure
in benefit of FDI, consumer surplus and the political contribution.
On the other hand, when the corruption level is relatively small, the effect of
the political contribution on welfare is rather limited. In this case the optimal decision
of the government will depend on the market size. An increase in the institutional
level will reduce FDI and consequently the contribution given by the dishonest people.
However, since the weight of the political contribution is relatively small, the
government consider significantly the benefit of the honest people through a direct
effect of an increase in the institutional level. In this sense, when the market size is
sufficiently large, the benefit of the honest people is larger than the loss in contribution
offered by the dishonest people. The government set a positive institutional policy,
α > 0 despite the inefficiency of the legal option.
4 Conclusions
In spite of the effort to set a proper institutional reform, the result has been disappoint-
ing. Misunderstanding the action of the corrupted civil service, political corruption
12

15. and the inefficiency of the legal structures on the society’s interests may lead to unsuc-
cessful institutional policies. The illegal structures may substitute inefficiencies in the
legal structures and the producers can take advantage of that. In terms of economic
efficiency the illegal way can be more profitable and suitable than the legal options.
On the other hand, corruption is more complicated. Historically in many de-
veloping countries bribery for example has not only been a way to compensate the low
wage rates, but also has been inherent to their culture, idiosyncrasies and sometimes
religion. Nowadays corruption is a survival strategy which represent a source of in-
come for people and government of these countries. For the government it may seem
easier to help the people through maintaining this illegal structures.
On the other hand, the same government may have a political interest in sup-
porting the illegal structures since these structures provide monetary resources. The
political competition between political parties imply the need to get contributions to
secure the continuity in the power. These contributions come from corrupted lobbies
and dishonest people who try to influence the political decision.
This paper attempted to explain why some institutional reforms have failed
and why some others simply have been just cancelled despite the apparent economic
and social benefit. The corruption in the government and the benefit obtained by
dishonest people can inhibit any action led by the honest governors to set a clear and
healthy institutional environment. Bribes are the origin and the result of corruption,
the dishonest people make payments to the party in the power to guarantee the insti-
tutional level according to their needs. Likewise the governments have to consider the
benefits of its citizens and a part of the benefits come from bribes in the illegal struc-
tures. The dishonest people lobby the government taking into account their interests,
and the government takes into account both the interest of the honest and dishonest
nationals.
We model lobbying following the common agency problem as developed by
Grossman and Helpman (1994). In this framework the government accepts political
contributions from the lobbyists and the level of contribution depends on the policy
that the government pursues.
We analyze two cases: in the first case, the cost for using the legal structure to
pay taxes is smaller than the cost for using the illegal structure. In this case the gov-
ernment will set a positive institutional level when the level of corruption is sufficiently
small. However, when the level of corruption and the market size are sufficiently large,
the government will overweight the contribution paid by the dishonest people and will
set the minimum possible institutional level.
In the second case, when the cost for using the legal structure is larger than the
cost of using the illegal one, the government will tend to set the lowest institutional
13

16. level. This effect is reinforced when the corruption level is large. However, when the
corruption level is small, and we have a relatively large market size, the government
will consider very valuable the benefit obtained by the honest people and even above
the level of the contribution paid by the dishonest one. The government will choose a
positive institutional level in order to magnified the benefit of the honest people.
14

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