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Topics, Issues, and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership
S T A N F O R D C L O S E R L O O K S E R I E S
stanford closer look series		 1
Fixed or Contingent: How Should
“Governance Monitors” Be Paid?
the compensation of governance monitors
The primary purpose of a corporate governance
system is to reduce agency costs within an organi-
zation. Agency costs occur when the individuals
managing or working in an organization take self-
interested actions to make themselves better off,
with the cost of these actions borne by sharehold-
ers. Agency costs can manifest themselves in count-
less ways. Examples include the inappropriate use
of corporate assets for personal purposes (such as
a corporate expense account, automobile, or air-
craft), the bribery of a purchasing agent to facilitate
a product sale, the manipulation of financial results
to boost the size of a bonus, trading on the basis of
material non-public information, the acquisition of
a non-strategic asset to increase managerial domain,
or the failure to train a successor to increase the per-
ception of one’s value to the organization. Time
has shown individuals to be extremely creative in
devising new ways to profit from the abuse of their
organizational position.
	 To reduce agency costs, companies—because
of both regulation and prudence—hire monitors
to oversee various activities. Monitors include the
board of directors, the general counsel, and an in-
ternal and external auditor. These monitors are
paid by the organization, but their responsibilities
are (largely) non-managerial. They are not expect-
ed to develop or implement the corporate strategy,
they do not have direct responsibility for profit
generation, nor do they control or allocate com-
pany assets. Rather, their job is to safeguard assets,
monitor for illicit activity, and discourage manage-
ment from excessive risk taking. Though difficult
to measure, the success of these efforts will mani-
fest itself through an improvement in operating
By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan
October 1, 2012
performance, corporate value, and risk levels when
agency costs are reduced in the system.
	 What is the appropriate compensation struc-
ture for these individuals? As with all employees,
the design of the compensation plan (i.e., its mix
of fixed and variable components) is driven by the
incentives that the company wishes to impose on
its workers. In the case of managerial workers, the
company selects appropriate investment and risk
taking incentives through a blend of fixed and vari-
able pay elements and a blend of short- and long-
term incentives that, in aggregate, encourage man-
agement to pursue a corporate strategy that creates
shareholder value. Compensation design for corpo-
rate monitors is (perhaps) more complicated. On
the one hand, the objectives of a corporate monitor
are to detect and mitigate agency problems. Suc-
cess is defined as the prevention of errors, while
failure is defined as the allowance of errors. This
suggests that monitors should be paid largely on a
fixed-salary basis, with failure to detect malfeasance
punishable by a substantial decrease in salary or
outright termination from the firm. A fixed salary
discourages variations in outcomes and encourages
risk minimization (see Exhibit 1).1
From this view-
point, corporate monitors should receive little to no
incentive compensation.
	 On the other hand, an entirely fixed compensa-
tion system might not provide sufficient incentive
for vigilant monitoring. With little incentive to
“perform,” monitors might grow lax in their over-
sight. A corporation might also not be able to at-
tract the best monitors. From this viewpoint, the
corporation should include variable compensation
elements to encourage effective oversight, or to at-
tract highly qualified individuals. The company
stanford closer look series		 2
Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid?
might do so by offering cash bonuses or long-term
equity incentives to align the interest of monitors
with shareholders. Note that this approach explic-
itly imposes risk (compensation risk) on the moni-
tor, and is diametrically opposed to the fixed-salary
approach above. The potential downside from im-
posing compensation risk on monitors is that they
might be co-opted by the very executives and em-
ployees they are expected to oversee. With their
compensation tied to corporate performance, they
have an incentive to turn a blind eye when manage-
ment operates in grey areas (such as questionable
sales practices, earnings management, insider stock
sales, etc.), the detection of which would threaten
their own bonus. Furthermore, the question arises
as to what form the variable compensation should
take (cash or equity) and what performance targets
should be used (stock price, operating, or other fi-
nancial and nonfinancial metrics).
	 There is little research to guide firms on this
important choice. One body of literature exam-
ines the impact of variable compensation in board
of director compensation contracts. Kumar and
Sivaramakrishnan (2002) find that incentives en-
courage directors to expend greater effort to acquire
information about the firm, thereby improving
their monitoring.2
Other studies find a positive as-
sociation between firm performance and incentives
provided to directors.3
Still, these results might
have more to do with the dual responsibilities of
the board, which include both monitoring and ad-
vising management. Furthermore, the monitoring
responsibilities of the board are high-level. Direc-
tors are not involved in day-to-day oversight of ex-
ecutive and employee behavior.
	 In a recent study, Armstrong, Jagolizner, and
Larcker (2012) examine the compensation packages
offered to general counsel and chief internal audi-
tors. They find that these monitors receive a higher
portion of incentive compensation when they are
more highly ranked within the organization. They
also find a lower frequency of adverse outcomes
(class action filings, financial restatements, SEC en-
forcement actions, and material weaknesses) among
firms that offer higher incentive payments. They
conclude that “performance-based incentives en-
hance the internal monitoring function, perhaps by
providing incentives for better monitoring efforts
or by facilitating the selection of more talented or
reputable monitors.”4
	 General observation supports the notion that
many companies elect to award variable compen-
sation to corporate monitors. For example, one
medical device company offers cash incentives to
divisional-level compliance officers. Payments are
calculated as a combination of corporate perfor-
mance (measured by earnings per share), divisional
performance (measured by sales and operating mar-
gin), and divisional milestones (measured as pipe-
line development and product launch targets), with
a target annual bonus equal to 20 percent of salary.
The general counsel of this same company receives
a compensation mix that is more heavily weighted
to variable compensation: 15 percent salary, 35 per-
cent stock awards, 10 percent option awards, 20
percent long-term performance plan, and 20 per-
cent deferred compensation and other.5
	 Research by Equilar also indicates that general
counsel receive compensation with a considerable
emphasis on performance incentives. General
counsel within Fortune 1000 companies receive
compensation that is 43 percent salary, 27 percent
annual bonus, and 30 percent cash and equity long-
term incentives, on average (see Exhibit 2).6
When
they pay out, performance-related incentives can be
highly lucrative, in some cases exceeding $10 mil-
lion per year (see Exhibit 3). It is quite rare to find
examples where the general counsel is paid solely in
terms of fixed salary.
Why This Matters
1.	The decision of how to pay corporate monitors
can have a significant impact on the motivation
these individuals will have to detect and mini-
mize corporate malfeasance. Should corporate
monitors be paid strictly on a fixed-salary basis,
or should some form of incentive compensation
be offered? If so, what form should the incentive
component take (cash or equity)? What propor-
tion of total pay should be offered as incentive?
What performance targets should be used to cal-
culate their value?
2.	Research shows that employees respond to in-
centives. Do performance incentives enhance
stanford closer look series		 3
Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid?
or impede the effectiveness of monitors? Should
monitors be paid lower bonuses (or have previ-
ous bonuses clawed back) when their companies
have governance problems such as earnings re-
statements, foreign corrupt payment problems,
or regulatory violations? 
1
	 In this way, monitors can be thought of as “guardians” under the
classifications created by Baron and Kreps (1999). “Guardians” are
employees whose success creates minimal upside for the organiza-
tion but whose failure leads to large costs. Corporate monitors can
be thought of as guardian employees because their focus is on cost
prevention and not value creation. The opposite of a guardian is a
“star,” whose success leads to considerable upside for the organiza-
tion but whose failure leads to only minimal costs. An example of a
“star” employee is a sales representative whose success generates large
incremental profit for the firm but whose failure generates minimal
incremental cost. See: James N. Baron and David M. Kreps, Strate-
gic Human Resources, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999).
2
	Praveen Kumar and Shiva Sivaramakrishnan, “Optimal incentive
structures for the board of directors: a hierarchical agency frame-
work.” University of Houston working paper (2002).
3
	 See: David A. Becher, Terry L. Campbell, and Melissa B. Frye,
“Incentive compensation for bank directors: the impact of deregu-
lation,” Journal of Business (2005); Zhilan Feng, Chinmoy Ghosh,
and C.F. Sirmans, “Director compensation and CEO bargaining
power in REITs.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
(2007); and James J. Cordeiro, Rajaram Veliyath, and Jane B. Ro-
mal, “Moderators of the relationship between director stock-based
compensation and firm performance.” Corporate Governance: An
International Review (2007).
4	
Chris S. Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and David F. Larcker,
“Performance-Based Incentives for Internal Monitors,” Rock Cen-
ter for Corporate Governance at Stanford University working paper
(2012).
5
	 Proprietary interviews with the authors and SEC filings (2011).
6
	 Equilar, “Top General Counsel Compensation Report,” (2009).
David Larcker is the Morgan Stanley Director of the Center
for Leadership Development and Research at the Stanford
Graduate School of Business and senior faculty member
at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford
University. Brian Tayan is a researcher with Stanford’s Cen-
ter for Leadership Development and Research. They are
coauthors of the books A Real Look at Real World Cor-
porate Governance and Corporate Governance Matters.
The authors would like to thank Michelle E. Gutman for
research assistance in the preparation of these materials.
The Stanford Closer Look Series is a collection of short
case studies that explore topics, issues, and controversies
in corporate governance and leadership. The Closer Look
Series is published by the Center for Leadership Devel-
opment and Research at the Stanford Graduate School
of Business and the Rock Center for Corporate Gover-
nance at Stanford University. For more information, visit:
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cldr.
Copyright © 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
stanford closer look series		 4
Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid?
Exhibit 1 — Distribution of Outcomes by Employee Type: Guardians v. Stars
Note: Star employees are those whose success creates considerable upside for the organization but whose failure creates
minimal loss. Most stars produce performance around the average, while only a few create considerable upside. Sales
representatives are an example of star employees because their focus is on value creation rather than cost prevention. By
contrast, guardian employees are those whose failure creates considerable downside but whose success creates minimal
upside. Most guardians produce average results, while a few fail and allow considerable loss. Corporate monitors can
be thought of as guardian employees because their focus is on loss prevention rather than value creation. Compensation
systems for each employee type must encourage the “right” behavior: risk-taking in the case of stars and risk-minimization
in the case of guardians. The responsibilities of senior executives combine “star” and “guardian” elements, and there-
fore their compensation structure will balance risk-taking and risk-reduction (i.e., prudent but not excessive risk-seeking
behavior).
Source: James N. Baron and David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999).
stanford closer look series		 5
Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid?
Exhibit 2 — Composition of Pay among General Counsel: Descriptive Statistics (2009)
components of pay
percentage of general counsel receiving each award type
stanford closer look series		 6
Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid?
Exhibit 2 — Continued
Note: Sample includes 275 companies among the Fortune 1000. Options and stock awards listed above have time-based
vesting. Performance awards include performance based options, performance based stock awards, and performance
based cash.
Source: Adapted from Equilar, Top General Counsel Compensation Report. 2009.
most common performance metrics
stanford closer look series		 7
Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid?
Exhibit 3 — Ten Most Highly Paid General Counsel: Realized Pay (2011)
Note: Sample includes general counsel of Fortune 500 companies that are “named executive officers” in the annual proxy.
Totals based on realized pay. Totals do not include other compensation, such as the fair value of perquisites and benefits.
Source: Source: Corporate Counsel. 2011 General Counsel Compensation Survey. Available at: http://www.law.com/jsp/
cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202499548177.
Name Company Salary
Bonus/ Non-
Equity Incentive
Realized Value
Equity Awards
Total
Donald
de Brier
Occidental
Petroleum
495,900 5,472,000 28,560,879 34,528,779
Richard
Baer
Qwest
Communications
690,000 1,738,800 19,974,888 22,403,688
Kenneth
Siegel
Starwood Hotels
& Resorts
634,582 766,188 12,662,928 14,063,698
Charles
Tanabe
Liberty
Media
875,500 1,332,073 9,740,432 11,948,005
J. Michael
Hemmer
Union
Pacific
455,000 1,100,000 7,530,493 9,085,493
Bruce
Sewell
Apple 650,012 700,000 7,094,250 8,444,262
David
Sorkin
KKR & Co. 300,000 2,045,000 5,939,892 8,284,892
Laureen
Seeger
McKesson
Corp.
615,000 2,028,000 4,377,866 7,020,866
Denise
Keane
Altria
Group
731,817 5,724,700 552,416 7,008,933
Alan
Schnitzer
The Travelers
Companies
687,500 2,200,000 4,080,450 6,967,950

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Fixed or Contingent: How Should “Governance Monitors” Be Paid?

  • 1. Topics, Issues, and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership S T A N F O R D C L O S E R L O O K S E R I E S stanford closer look series 1 Fixed or Contingent: How Should “Governance Monitors” Be Paid? the compensation of governance monitors The primary purpose of a corporate governance system is to reduce agency costs within an organi- zation. Agency costs occur when the individuals managing or working in an organization take self- interested actions to make themselves better off, with the cost of these actions borne by sharehold- ers. Agency costs can manifest themselves in count- less ways. Examples include the inappropriate use of corporate assets for personal purposes (such as a corporate expense account, automobile, or air- craft), the bribery of a purchasing agent to facilitate a product sale, the manipulation of financial results to boost the size of a bonus, trading on the basis of material non-public information, the acquisition of a non-strategic asset to increase managerial domain, or the failure to train a successor to increase the per- ception of one’s value to the organization. Time has shown individuals to be extremely creative in devising new ways to profit from the abuse of their organizational position. To reduce agency costs, companies—because of both regulation and prudence—hire monitors to oversee various activities. Monitors include the board of directors, the general counsel, and an in- ternal and external auditor. These monitors are paid by the organization, but their responsibilities are (largely) non-managerial. They are not expect- ed to develop or implement the corporate strategy, they do not have direct responsibility for profit generation, nor do they control or allocate com- pany assets. Rather, their job is to safeguard assets, monitor for illicit activity, and discourage manage- ment from excessive risk taking. Though difficult to measure, the success of these efforts will mani- fest itself through an improvement in operating By David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan October 1, 2012 performance, corporate value, and risk levels when agency costs are reduced in the system. What is the appropriate compensation struc- ture for these individuals? As with all employees, the design of the compensation plan (i.e., its mix of fixed and variable components) is driven by the incentives that the company wishes to impose on its workers. In the case of managerial workers, the company selects appropriate investment and risk taking incentives through a blend of fixed and vari- able pay elements and a blend of short- and long- term incentives that, in aggregate, encourage man- agement to pursue a corporate strategy that creates shareholder value. Compensation design for corpo- rate monitors is (perhaps) more complicated. On the one hand, the objectives of a corporate monitor are to detect and mitigate agency problems. Suc- cess is defined as the prevention of errors, while failure is defined as the allowance of errors. This suggests that monitors should be paid largely on a fixed-salary basis, with failure to detect malfeasance punishable by a substantial decrease in salary or outright termination from the firm. A fixed salary discourages variations in outcomes and encourages risk minimization (see Exhibit 1).1 From this view- point, corporate monitors should receive little to no incentive compensation. On the other hand, an entirely fixed compensa- tion system might not provide sufficient incentive for vigilant monitoring. With little incentive to “perform,” monitors might grow lax in their over- sight. A corporation might also not be able to at- tract the best monitors. From this viewpoint, the corporation should include variable compensation elements to encourage effective oversight, or to at- tract highly qualified individuals. The company
  • 2. stanford closer look series 2 Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid? might do so by offering cash bonuses or long-term equity incentives to align the interest of monitors with shareholders. Note that this approach explic- itly imposes risk (compensation risk) on the moni- tor, and is diametrically opposed to the fixed-salary approach above. The potential downside from im- posing compensation risk on monitors is that they might be co-opted by the very executives and em- ployees they are expected to oversee. With their compensation tied to corporate performance, they have an incentive to turn a blind eye when manage- ment operates in grey areas (such as questionable sales practices, earnings management, insider stock sales, etc.), the detection of which would threaten their own bonus. Furthermore, the question arises as to what form the variable compensation should take (cash or equity) and what performance targets should be used (stock price, operating, or other fi- nancial and nonfinancial metrics). There is little research to guide firms on this important choice. One body of literature exam- ines the impact of variable compensation in board of director compensation contracts. Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2002) find that incentives en- courage directors to expend greater effort to acquire information about the firm, thereby improving their monitoring.2 Other studies find a positive as- sociation between firm performance and incentives provided to directors.3 Still, these results might have more to do with the dual responsibilities of the board, which include both monitoring and ad- vising management. Furthermore, the monitoring responsibilities of the board are high-level. Direc- tors are not involved in day-to-day oversight of ex- ecutive and employee behavior. In a recent study, Armstrong, Jagolizner, and Larcker (2012) examine the compensation packages offered to general counsel and chief internal audi- tors. They find that these monitors receive a higher portion of incentive compensation when they are more highly ranked within the organization. They also find a lower frequency of adverse outcomes (class action filings, financial restatements, SEC en- forcement actions, and material weaknesses) among firms that offer higher incentive payments. They conclude that “performance-based incentives en- hance the internal monitoring function, perhaps by providing incentives for better monitoring efforts or by facilitating the selection of more talented or reputable monitors.”4 General observation supports the notion that many companies elect to award variable compen- sation to corporate monitors. For example, one medical device company offers cash incentives to divisional-level compliance officers. Payments are calculated as a combination of corporate perfor- mance (measured by earnings per share), divisional performance (measured by sales and operating mar- gin), and divisional milestones (measured as pipe- line development and product launch targets), with a target annual bonus equal to 20 percent of salary. The general counsel of this same company receives a compensation mix that is more heavily weighted to variable compensation: 15 percent salary, 35 per- cent stock awards, 10 percent option awards, 20 percent long-term performance plan, and 20 per- cent deferred compensation and other.5 Research by Equilar also indicates that general counsel receive compensation with a considerable emphasis on performance incentives. General counsel within Fortune 1000 companies receive compensation that is 43 percent salary, 27 percent annual bonus, and 30 percent cash and equity long- term incentives, on average (see Exhibit 2).6 When they pay out, performance-related incentives can be highly lucrative, in some cases exceeding $10 mil- lion per year (see Exhibit 3). It is quite rare to find examples where the general counsel is paid solely in terms of fixed salary. Why This Matters 1. The decision of how to pay corporate monitors can have a significant impact on the motivation these individuals will have to detect and mini- mize corporate malfeasance. Should corporate monitors be paid strictly on a fixed-salary basis, or should some form of incentive compensation be offered? If so, what form should the incentive component take (cash or equity)? What propor- tion of total pay should be offered as incentive? What performance targets should be used to cal- culate their value? 2. Research shows that employees respond to in- centives. Do performance incentives enhance
  • 3. stanford closer look series 3 Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid? or impede the effectiveness of monitors? Should monitors be paid lower bonuses (or have previ- ous bonuses clawed back) when their companies have governance problems such as earnings re- statements, foreign corrupt payment problems, or regulatory violations?  1 In this way, monitors can be thought of as “guardians” under the classifications created by Baron and Kreps (1999). “Guardians” are employees whose success creates minimal upside for the organiza- tion but whose failure leads to large costs. Corporate monitors can be thought of as guardian employees because their focus is on cost prevention and not value creation. The opposite of a guardian is a “star,” whose success leads to considerable upside for the organiza- tion but whose failure leads to only minimal costs. An example of a “star” employee is a sales representative whose success generates large incremental profit for the firm but whose failure generates minimal incremental cost. See: James N. Baron and David M. Kreps, Strate- gic Human Resources, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999). 2 Praveen Kumar and Shiva Sivaramakrishnan, “Optimal incentive structures for the board of directors: a hierarchical agency frame- work.” University of Houston working paper (2002). 3 See: David A. Becher, Terry L. Campbell, and Melissa B. Frye, “Incentive compensation for bank directors: the impact of deregu- lation,” Journal of Business (2005); Zhilan Feng, Chinmoy Ghosh, and C.F. Sirmans, “Director compensation and CEO bargaining power in REITs.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics (2007); and James J. Cordeiro, Rajaram Veliyath, and Jane B. Ro- mal, “Moderators of the relationship between director stock-based compensation and firm performance.” Corporate Governance: An International Review (2007). 4 Chris S. Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer, and David F. Larcker, “Performance-Based Incentives for Internal Monitors,” Rock Cen- ter for Corporate Governance at Stanford University working paper (2012). 5 Proprietary interviews with the authors and SEC filings (2011). 6 Equilar, “Top General Counsel Compensation Report,” (2009). David Larcker is the Morgan Stanley Director of the Center for Leadership Development and Research at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and senior faculty member at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University. Brian Tayan is a researcher with Stanford’s Cen- ter for Leadership Development and Research. They are coauthors of the books A Real Look at Real World Cor- porate Governance and Corporate Governance Matters. The authors would like to thank Michelle E. Gutman for research assistance in the preparation of these materials. The Stanford Closer Look Series is a collection of short case studies that explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance and leadership. The Closer Look Series is published by the Center for Leadership Devel- opment and Research at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and the Rock Center for Corporate Gover- nance at Stanford University. For more information, visit: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cldr. Copyright © 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
  • 4. stanford closer look series 4 Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid? Exhibit 1 — Distribution of Outcomes by Employee Type: Guardians v. Stars Note: Star employees are those whose success creates considerable upside for the organization but whose failure creates minimal loss. Most stars produce performance around the average, while only a few create considerable upside. Sales representatives are an example of star employees because their focus is on value creation rather than cost prevention. By contrast, guardian employees are those whose failure creates considerable downside but whose success creates minimal upside. Most guardians produce average results, while a few fail and allow considerable loss. Corporate monitors can be thought of as guardian employees because their focus is on loss prevention rather than value creation. Compensation systems for each employee type must encourage the “right” behavior: risk-taking in the case of stars and risk-minimization in the case of guardians. The responsibilities of senior executives combine “star” and “guardian” elements, and there- fore their compensation structure will balance risk-taking and risk-reduction (i.e., prudent but not excessive risk-seeking behavior). Source: James N. Baron and David M. Kreps, Strategic Human Resources, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999).
  • 5. stanford closer look series 5 Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid? Exhibit 2 — Composition of Pay among General Counsel: Descriptive Statistics (2009) components of pay percentage of general counsel receiving each award type
  • 6. stanford closer look series 6 Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid? Exhibit 2 — Continued Note: Sample includes 275 companies among the Fortune 1000. Options and stock awards listed above have time-based vesting. Performance awards include performance based options, performance based stock awards, and performance based cash. Source: Adapted from Equilar, Top General Counsel Compensation Report. 2009. most common performance metrics
  • 7. stanford closer look series 7 Fixed or contingent: how Should “governance monitors” be Paid? Exhibit 3 — Ten Most Highly Paid General Counsel: Realized Pay (2011) Note: Sample includes general counsel of Fortune 500 companies that are “named executive officers” in the annual proxy. Totals based on realized pay. Totals do not include other compensation, such as the fair value of perquisites and benefits. Source: Source: Corporate Counsel. 2011 General Counsel Compensation Survey. Available at: http://www.law.com/jsp/ cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202499548177. Name Company Salary Bonus/ Non- Equity Incentive Realized Value Equity Awards Total Donald de Brier Occidental Petroleum 495,900 5,472,000 28,560,879 34,528,779 Richard Baer Qwest Communications 690,000 1,738,800 19,974,888 22,403,688 Kenneth Siegel Starwood Hotels & Resorts 634,582 766,188 12,662,928 14,063,698 Charles Tanabe Liberty Media 875,500 1,332,073 9,740,432 11,948,005 J. Michael Hemmer Union Pacific 455,000 1,100,000 7,530,493 9,085,493 Bruce Sewell Apple 650,012 700,000 7,094,250 8,444,262 David Sorkin KKR & Co. 300,000 2,045,000 5,939,892 8,284,892 Laureen Seeger McKesson Corp. 615,000 2,028,000 4,377,866 7,020,866 Denise Keane Altria Group 731,817 5,724,700 552,416 7,008,933 Alan Schnitzer The Travelers Companies 687,500 2,200,000 4,080,450 6,967,950