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Air Force Institute of Technology
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

PLC Code Protection
Center for Cyberspace Research
Stephen Dunlap
Jonathan Butts, PhD

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
What’s the Story?
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Tactical Questions
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Resources
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Requirements

•  Helpful:

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Static Analysis
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

Device? We don’t need no stinkin
device…

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Hardware Analysis
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

But I’ll take it if I can get it…

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Dynamic Analysis
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

I don’t always do dynamic
analysis, but when I do, I use
JTAG…

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Let’s Do This
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

Attacks Need:
Triggers

Payloads
Deployment
CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Time Bomb
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Hook regularly executed function
•  Count executions
Jump Instruction
before modification

After modification

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Time Bomb Cont.
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

Store a counter in memory

Load counter
and subtract
Test for zero
Continue operation
if greater

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Logic Bomb
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Hook jump table for CPU mode change
•  Keep track of changes for specific sequence

RUN
REM PROG

PROG

REM RUN
CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Remote Commands
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Hook CIP command handler jump table

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Remote Commands Cont.
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Check for custom service and instance

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Soft DoS
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Endless loop causes recoverable fault
•  Fault shutdown routine

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Persistent DoS
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Write value to flash
•  Fault if value exists
•  Exploit Flash Writing Function
•  R0 – Destination address
•  R1 – Source Address
•  R1 – Data Length

Flash end address

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Where to From Here?
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Traffic Modification
•  Modify CIP values
•  Propagation

•  Persistence
•  Implant in bootloader
•  Ignore firmware updates
•  Modify version number

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Pivoting Through Firewall
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Pivoting Through Router
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Pivoting Through Router
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Implications
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

• 
• 
• 
• 

Vendor agnostic
Expensive devices not needed
Supply chain
Cost of entry
•  Team composition: Two guys
•  Time: Approx 3 months
•  Money: $3,500

NATION STATE NOT REQUIRED

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Protection Mechanisms
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

•  Vendor
•  Digital Signatures
•  Trusted Platform Module

•  Integrator
•  Source Verification
•  Access Control
•  Configuration Management

•  Asset Owner
•  Deep Packet Inspection
•  Data Diodes
•  Configuration Management
CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
Thank You
The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow.

CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research

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PLC Code Protection

  • 1. Air Force Institute of Technology The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. PLC Code Protection Center for Cyberspace Research Stephen Dunlap Jonathan Butts, PhD CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 2. What’s the Story? The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 3. Tactical Questions The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 4. Resources The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Requirements •  Helpful: CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 5. Static Analysis The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. Device? We don’t need no stinkin device… CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 6. Hardware Analysis The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. But I’ll take it if I can get it… CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 7. Dynamic Analysis The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. I don’t always do dynamic analysis, but when I do, I use JTAG… CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 8. Let’s Do This The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. Attacks Need: Triggers Payloads Deployment CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 9. The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 10. Time Bomb The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Hook regularly executed function •  Count executions Jump Instruction before modification After modification CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 11. Time Bomb Cont. The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. Store a counter in memory Load counter and subtract Test for zero Continue operation if greater CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 12. Logic Bomb The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Hook jump table for CPU mode change •  Keep track of changes for specific sequence RUN REM PROG PROG REM RUN CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 13. Remote Commands The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Hook CIP command handler jump table CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 14. Remote Commands Cont. The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Check for custom service and instance CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 15. The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 16. Soft DoS The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Endless loop causes recoverable fault •  Fault shutdown routine CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 17. Persistent DoS The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Write value to flash •  Fault if value exists •  Exploit Flash Writing Function •  R0 – Destination address •  R1 – Source Address •  R1 – Data Length Flash end address CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 18. Where to From Here? The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Traffic Modification •  Modify CIP values •  Propagation •  Persistence •  Implant in bootloader •  Ignore firmware updates •  Modify version number CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 19. The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 20. Pivoting Through Firewall The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 21. Pivoting Through Router The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 22. Pivoting Through Router The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 23. Implications The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  •  •  •  Vendor agnostic Expensive devices not needed Supply chain Cost of entry •  Team composition: Two guys •  Time: Approx 3 months •  Money: $3,500 NATION STATE NOT REQUIRED CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 24. Protection Mechanisms The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. •  Vendor •  Digital Signatures •  Trusted Platform Module •  Integrator •  Source Verification •  Access Control •  Configuration Management •  Asset Owner •  Deep Packet Inspection •  Data Diodes •  Configuration Management CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research
  • 25. Thank You The AFIT of Today is the Air Force of Tomorrow. CCR - The Center for Cyberspace Research