1. Author: Ece DINCASLAN
The European Union and Morocco Relations
After a decade of reforms through modernization, liberalization and relative
democratization, the European Union (EU) granted Morocco “advanced status” on October
2008. However, what does advanced status suggest is not clear. Does the EU give Morocco a full
membership status? Answer to this question is a direct no, but other questions are harder to
respond. Is the status of Morocco actually advanced for the EU, or is it just a gesture of the EU to
applause the reforms of Morocco? In addition to vagueness of the current situation, the future is
not clear either. To what extend advanced status will bring further integration of Morocco to the
EU? Will this lead to a full membership, or at least accession to the common market? Or does
advanced status not suggest any significant meaning for further integration? In order to answer
these questions, the paper analyzes the history of Morocco – EU relations, reviews the current
literature in order to formulate the present developments, and tries to conceptualize the nature of
the relations to predict the possible outcomes for the future. Special emphasis is given to
Moroccan internal political structure since it plays a key role for EU – Morocco relations. In
addition, the attitude of the EU towards Morocco is also essential. A strong comprehension of
the Moroccan political structure and the responses of the EU is necessary to understand the
integration of Morocco to Europe. However, the paper first addresses the importance of the
issue, and why and how the integration process develops, in order to build a strong informational
background.
The relationship of the EU and Morocco is particularly important for the European
studies because geographically Morocco is a very close neighbor of the EU and a Mediterranean
state, which make it a part of both the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the European-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Baracani, 2005). Furthermore, the case of Morocco provides
a significant example for the EU, since promotion of democracy and human rights are important
aspects of the foreign policy of the EU (Haddadi, 2003, p. 74). After a series of political reforms
initiated by the King Mohammed VI and directly supported by the EU, Morocco‟s progress on
democracy and human rights surpassed the regional standards (Kausch, 2009). Thus, Morocco
eventually became “a pioneer in the ENP” and the advanced status is granted in October 2008
(Akgul, 2010). Therefore, Morocco is a test for the EU to examine its influential strength and

2. strategies, as well as a platform to illustrate its democratizing effect. Every step of Morocco
towards democracy and human rights is a credit for the EU since the EU directly backs up the
Moroccan reforms. In short, Morocco can be a success story of the EU, and a showcase to
demonstrate its “transformative power” (Behr, 2010).
The major factor which leads to the further integration of Morocco to the EU is, as stated
above, Morocco‟s geographical location. In addition to the short distance between Morocco and
Spain -Spain shores can be seen from the coasts of Morocco (Kausch, 2009), Spain holds two
small territories, Ceuta and Melilla on the south of the Gibraltar Strait (Migdalovitz, 2010). Thus
this geographical intimacy causes crucial issues such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking
(Migdalovitz, 2010), security and terrorism (Haddadi, 2003), free trade, fisheries, transportation
and energy transition (Kausch, 2009). Because of these important issues, Morocco and the EU
found themselves obligated to cooperate and to develop a strong relationship. Moreover, both the
EU and Morocco have further incentives. The EU is the Morocco‟s major trading partner; almost
60% of Morocco‟s total trade is with the EU (European Commission, 2010). In 2007, the EU
exported €15.1 billion worth products and services to Morocco (European Commission, 2010).
This close trade relations consequently lead to further integration of Morocco to the EU.
Although the integration process has taken a major course after the inauguration of King
Mohammed VI, his predecessor Hassan II applied to the European Communities (preceding
institution) for accession decades earlier, in 1987. However, the application was turned down on
the basis that Morocco is not considered European (Akgul, 2010). King Hassan II initiated a
political reform process in 1992 but major reforms took place under his successor King
Mohammed VI. Consequently, relationship between the EU and Morocco escalated
tremendously due to liberalization of Morocco through reforms (Kausch, 2009). Moreover, the
EU launched the ENP in 2003 in order to enhance “stability, security and well being” and
prevent “the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged Union and its neighbors”
(Baracani, 2005, p. 6). The ENP targets to develop strong ties with the states who are not offered
full membership incentives. (Baracani, 2005). In this respect, European Commission President
Romano Prodi promised “sharing everything but institutions” to the ENP states (Prodi, 2002). As
Chilosi states; “the promise refers to the possibility for neighbours to have the same treatment
and economic advantages of EU membership, except the participation in EU institutions”

3. (Chilosi, 2006, p. 2). Thus, the ENP brought Moroccan – EU relations to a new dimension. The
position of Morocco was enhanced as an ENP country. Morocco is the first country in the region
to conclude the Action Plan with the EU on 2005 (Kausch, 2009). In addition, Morocco is also in
the EMP; a party to Agadir Agreement and an important member of the “Euromed process”
which seeks to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (European Commission, 2010).
European Commission defines the aim of the EU and Morocco as to establish “a close economic
relationship that is more than association, less than accession” (European Commission, 2010).
This integration process consequently led the EU to grant „advanced status‟ under the framework
of ENP to Morocco in October 2008 (Kausch, 2009). The close relationship between the EU and
Morocco reached a new peak with the Granada Summit in March 2010. The joint statement of
the EU and Morocco underlines the importance of the summit:
“This summit between the EU and Morocco constitutes an unprecedented event for both parties. … It bears
witness to the pioneering and distinctive nature of the EU-Morocco partnership. It illustrates the degree of
maturity and confidence attained in the political dialogue and highlights the strategic importance of the EU-
Morocco partnership” (Council of The European Union, 2010, p. 1).
As stated above, the political structure of Morocco plays a crucial role on its relations
with the EU since promotion of democracy and human rights are integral parts of EU‟s foreign
policy (Haddadi, 2003). This nature of the EU-Morocco relations is also significant in the Joint
Statement of Granada Summit: “The EU and Morocco reaffirmed their attachment to respect for
and protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the consolidation
of the rule of law, democracy and good governance, which are one of the fundamental pillars of
the EU-Morocco partnership” (Council of The European Union, 2010, p. 5). After several
reforms influenced from the EU and its member states, Morocco emerged as “a shining
example” among Arab countries, and its level of political liberalism is distinctive in the region
(Kausch, 2009, pp. 165-166) Thus, its peculiar status in the region contributed to the Morocco-
EU relations (Kausch, 2009, p. 169). However, reform process is still controversial, as scholars
underline that Morocco‟s current ambition for democratization has not reached to an absolute
level since achievements indicate relative regional successes rather than “irreversible” steps
towards “genuine democracy” (Haddadi, 2003; Kausch, 2009, p. 166).
One of the most important reformation step was the establishment of Equity and
Reconciliation Commission (IER) to investigate human rights violations between 1956 and 1999

4. (Kausch, 2009). Additional projects to compensate the victims of human rights violations (e.g.
disappearances) conducted such as EU backed MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) (Haddadi,
2002). Even compensation was a starting step, it was not sufficient: “Though compensation was
granted in hundreds of cases, the issue still occupies centre stage as some victims and their
families ask for truth and justice as the only way of achieving settlement and reconciliation”
(Haddadi, 2003, p. 77). Nevertheless, these improvements are still important since it shows an
ambition to promote human rights.
In addition to IER, several other reforms were also important such as a comprehensive
revision of the civil personal code (mudawanna), decentralization steps by the establishment of
“super walis”, “granting official recognition to the Berber language as part of the Moroccan
cultural identity and future integration in the school system” (Haddadi, 2003, p. 76), legislation
about torture, and “the opening of the political space for political parties” (Kausch, 2009, p. 167).
In 2002, Morocco witnessed so-called the first free and fair elections. In 2007, international
observers as well as observers of NGO‟s admitted to monitor the elections for the first time in
Morocco history (Kausch, 2009). The election of 2007 is celebrated by important political actors
of the EU such as the Portuguese EU Presidency, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos and Nicolas Sarkozy (Kausch, 2009). Even though the 2007 elections met
international standards, “only 37% of the voters turned out and 19% cast blank ballots, reflecting
widespread disillusionment with the political process and popular understanding of the
powerlessness of the legislature” (Migdalovitz, 2010, p. 1). Furthermore, the European
Commission underlined that “the low voter turnout might be an indicator that voters do not see
their votes translated into meaningful change” (Kausch, 2009, p. 172).
The political space for the political parties, indeed, is very narrow in Morocco. Although
there were elections in 2007 which met international standards, the real power is still in the
hands of the Monarchy and its surrounding elite, the Makhzen:
“The powers are distinguished in law and discourse, but in practice there is neither separation nor balance
of powers, with the palace-led executive exerting leading influence over the legislature and judiciary.
Government and parliament execute the will of the Makhzen rather than the will of the electorate. The King
presides over the Council of Ministers and appoints the government as well as high officials in strategically
important ministries (interior, foreign affairs, defence, and religion). Royal counsellors, loyal technocrats of
the King’s personal entourage, are the true decision makers in the ministries. At the local level, the regional
governors (Walis), usually close to the palace, take all significant decisions. The King also approves and
adopts legislation, can rule by decree and can veto any parliamentary or governmental decision. Political

5. parties have so far been too weak to provide meaningful political alternatives. The lack of independence of
the highly corrupt judiciary and the gap between legal provisions and their practical use undermine the
practical value of many legal reforms. In short, decision-making power on significant political change does
not lie in the hands of elected individuals and institutions, and a separation of powers, both institutionally
and in terms of political practice, is not even under consideration” (Kausch, 2009, p. 168).
Even the reforms were conducted as royal initiatives and introduced a “new concept
authority” rather than spontaneous steps to a genuine democracy (Haddadi, 2003, p. 76). In this
sense, reforms mostly introduced a fast political liberalization whereas democratization process
was, in fact, very slow (Haddadi, 2003, p. 77). In addition Kausch suggests that “the switch from
open repression to a semi-authoritarianism with formally democratic structures and discourse in
Morocco … suggests that incumbent regimes increasingly see open repression as less sustainable
than making concessions to liberalism as a way to retain power and privileges” (2009, p. 170).
Both Haddadi and Kausch underlines the EU‟s soft response to Morocco‟s dedication to
conserve the very nature of its political structure. In a nutshell, the EU focuses on the
achievements of Morocco while neglecting the authoritarian political structure, and it does not
push for further reforms and steps towards genuine democracy and human rights, but settle with
what Morocco‟s Monarch and political elite presents. Haddadi states that the EU‟s policy is
neither imposing nor demanding but “too cautious, worried about upsetting the government and
persistent in its attitude of „change within continuity'” (2003, p. 87). Furthermore he warns that
“such a slow attitude towards promoting democracy in Morocco might risk discrediting
democratization itself in the eyes of the population” (2003, p. 87). Kausch asserts that “both
discourse and action suggest that European policies towards Morocco do not aspire to back full
political freedom and genuine democracy in Morocco” (2009, p. 175). In addition, Kausch
criticizes the EU‟s response as “applause policy” which “creates a distorted image of what the
EU perceives as the reality of Moroccan political life, thereby indirectly bolstering the ruling
elite and weakening the position of Moroccan democracy activists” (2009, p. 172).
Ivan Martin is skeptical on the advanced status of Morocco (2009). In his self
explanatorily titled article “EU-Morocco Relations: How Advanced is the „Advanced Status‟” he
claims that “the Advanced Status does not introduce any novelty” (2009, p. 241). Furthermore,
he adds that the advanced status does not suggest “a clear legal status” either (2009, p. 243).
Martin underlines the lack of rules and guidelines, and the vagueness of the concepts such as „an
increasingly close and mutually beneficial partnership” (2009, p. 244). Hence the relations have

6. not been building on concrete guidelines and legally binding frameworks but ad hoc
arrangements. Moreover, the status of Morocco may be „advanced‟ in rhetoric, but in reality the
position of Israel and other ENP states under „Eastern Partnership‟ are far more advanced than
Morocco since their relations are conducted by the European Council (Morocco-EU relations are
handled through Association Council) and based on concrete guidelines and legal frameworks
(Martin, 2009, p. 243). In addition, the „Eastern Partnership‟ set „full visa liberation‟ and „labor
mobility‟ goals which are omitted for Morocco (Martin, 2009, p. 243). Although Behr is more
hopeful than Martin, he also underlines the possibility of advanced status turning into “just
another empty bureaucratic shell” (2010).
In conclusion, Morocco‟s current political structure is far from the EU norms even
though its performance is outstanding in regional standards. It is true that relationship between
the EU and Morocco has been gradually escalating, but we can not talk about a genuine
integration so far, and it is not prospected even in the long term. Integration will not go beyond a
FTA, the EU funding to Morocco, collaboration in the foreign policy and some gestures of
positive intent such as current observer status of Morocco in the EU institutions, technical and
financial cooperation, participation of Morocco in EU programmes and the EU-Morocco Joint
Parliamentary Committee foreseen in the Granada Summit (Council of The European Union,
2010, pp. 8-9). Accession of Morocco to the customs union with common external tariff policy
or the common market with free flow of capital and labor is as unlikely as the full membership.
In short, the close relationship between the EU and Morocco refers to a relative case; being
closer than other regional actors rather than an absolute closeness, and advanced status does not
necessarily indicate advancement but a gesture for the reforms of Morocco.

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