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Republicof the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No.L-41001 September30,1976
MANILA LODGE NO.761, BENEVOLENTAND PROTECTIVEORDER OF THE ELKS,INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS,CITYOF MANILA,and TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
No.L-41012 September30,1976
2. TARLACDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLECOURT OFAPPEALS,CITY OFMANILA,LODGE NO.761, BENEVOLENT ANDPROTECTIVE
ORDER OF ELKS, INC.,respondents.
CASTRO, C.J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
STATEMENT OF THE CASEAND STATEMENTOF THE FACTS
These twocasesare petitionsoncertiorari toreview the decisiondatedJune30,1975 of the Court of
AppealsinCA-G.R.No.51590-R entitled"TarlacDevelopmentCorporationvs.Cityof Manila,andManila
Lodge No.761, BenevolentandProtective Orderof Elks,Inc.,"affirmingthe trial court'sfindinginCivil
Case No.83009 that the propertysubjectof the decisionaquois a "publicparkor plaza."
On June 26, 1905 the PhilippineCommissionenactedActNo.l360 whichauthorizedthe Cityof Manilato
reclaima portionof ManilaBay. The reclaimedareawasto form part of the Luneta extension.The Act
providedthatthe reclaimedarea"Shall be the propertyof the Cityof Manila"and that "the Cityof
Manilais herebyauthorizedtosetaside atract of the reclaimedlandformedbythe Lunetaextensionx x
x at the north endnotto exceedfive hundredfeetbysix hundredfeetinsize,forahotel site,andto
lease the same,withthe approval of the GovernorGeneral,toa responsible personorcorporationfora
termnot exceedninety-nine years."
Subsequently,the PhilippineCommissionpassedonMay18, 1907 Act No.1657, amendingActNo.1360,
so as to authorize the Cityof'Manilaeitherto lease or tosell the portionsetaside asa hotel site.
The total area reclaimedwasalittle over25 hectares.The Cityof Manila appliedforthe registrationof
the reclaimedarea,andon January20, 1911, O.C.T. No.1909 wasissuedinthe name of the Cityof
Manila.The title describedthe registeredlandas"unterrenoconocidoconel nombre de Luneta
3. Extension,situatoenel distritode laErmitax x x."The registrationwas"subject,howevertosuchof the
incumbrancesmentionedinArticle 39of saidlaw (Land RegistrationAct) asmaybe subsisting"and
"sujetoalas disposicionesycondicionesimpuestasenlaLeyNo.1360; y sujetotambeinaloscontratos
de venta,celebradosyotorgadosporla Ciudadde Manilaa favordel Armyand NavyCluby laManila
Lodge No.761, BenevolentandProtective Orderof Elks,fechadosrespectivamente,en29 de Diciembre
de 1908 y 16 de Enerode 1909." 1
On July13, 1911 the Cityof Manila,affirmingapriorsale datedJanuary16, 1909 cancelled5,543.07
square meters of the reclaimedareatothe ManilaLodge No.761, BenevolentandProtective Orderof
Elksof the U.S.A.(BPOE,for short) onthe basisof whichTCT No. 2195 2 was issuedtothe latteroverthe
Marcela de terrenoque esparte de la LunetaExtension,Situadaenel Distritole laErmita...." At the
back of this title vasannotateddocument4608/T-1635, whichinpart readsas follows:"que lacitada
Ciusdadde Manilatendraderechoa su opcion,de recompararla expresadapropiedadparafines
publicossolameteincualquiertiempodespuesde cincuentaanosdesde el 13le Juliole 1911, preciode
la mismapropiedad,masel valorque entoncestenganlasmejoras."
For the remainderof the LunetaExtension,thatis,aftersegregatingtherefromthe portionsoldto the
ManilaLodge No.761, PBOE,a newCertificate of Title No.2196 3 wasissuedonJuly17, 1911 to the City
of Manila.
ManilaLodge No.761, BPOE,subsequentlysoldthe said5,543.07 square meterstothe Elks Club,Inc.,to
whichwasissuedTCT No.67488. 4 The registeredowner,"The ElksClub,Inc.,"waslaterchangedby
court oderto "ManilaLodge No.761, BenevolentandProtectiveOrderof Elks,Inc."
In January1963 the BPOE. petitionedthe Courtof FirstInstance of Manila,Branch IV,for the
cancellationof the rightof the Cityof Manilato repurchase the propertyThispetitionwasgrantedon
February15, 1963.
On November19,1963 the BPOE soldforthe sumof P4,700,000 the landtogetherwithall the
improvementsthereontothe Tarlac DevelopmentCorporation(TDC,forshort) whichpaidP1,700.000
as downpaymentandmortgagedto the vendorthe same realtyto secure the paymentof the balance to
be paidin quarterlyinstallments.5Atthe time of the sale,,there wasnoannotationof anysubsisting
lienonthe title tothe property.OnDecember12, 1963 TCT No.73444 wasissuedtoTDC overthe
subjectlandstill describedas"UNA PARCELA DE TERRENO, que esparte de la LunetaExtension,situada
enel Distritode Ermita ...."
4. In June 1964 the City of Manila filedwiththe Courtof FirstInstance of Manilaa petitionforthe
reannotationof itsrightto repurchase;the court,afterhaering,issuedanorder,datedNovember19,
1964, directingthe Registerof Deedsof the Cityof Manilato reannotate intoto the entryregarindthe
rightof the Cityof Manilato repurchase the propertyafterfiftyyears.FromthisorderTDC andBPOE
appealedtothisCourtwhichon July31, 1968 affirmedinG.R.Nos.L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's
orderof reannotation,butreservedtoTDC the rightto bringanotheractionfor the clarificationof its
rights.
As a consequence of suchreservation,TDCfiledonApril 28,1971 againstthe Cityof Manilaand the
ManilaLodge No.761, BPOE,a complaint,docketedasCivil Case No.83009 of the Court of FirstInstance
of Manila,containingthree causesof actionandpraying -
a) On the firstcause of action,that the plaintiff TDCbe declaredtohave purchasedthe parcel of
landnowin questionwiththe buildingsandimprovementsthereonfromthe defendantBPOEforvalue
and ingood faith,andaccordinglyorderingthe cancellationof EntryNo.4608/T-1635 onTransfer
Certificate of Title No.73444 inthe name of the Plaintiff;
b) On the secondcause of action,ordering the defendantCityof Manilatopay the plaintiff TDC
damagesinthe sum of note lessthan one hundredthousandpesos(P100,000.00);
c) On the thirdcause of action,reservingtothe plaintiffTDCthe rightto recoverfromthe
defendantBPOEthe amountsmentionedinpar.XVIof the complaintinaccordance withArt.1555 of
the Civil Code,inthe remote eventthatthe final judgmentinthiscase shouldbe thatthe parcel of land
nowin questionisapublicpark;and
d) For costs,and for suchotherand furtherrelief asthe Courtmay deemjustandequitable.6
ThereindefendantCityof Manila,initsanswerdatedMay 19, 1971, admittedall the factsallegedinthe
firstcause of actionexceptthe allegationthatTDC purchasedsaidproperty"forvalue andingood
faith,"butdeniedforlackof knowledge orinformationthe allegationsinthe secondandthirdcausesof
action.As,special andaffirmative defense,the Cityof ManilaclaimedthatTDC wasnot a purchaserin
goodfaithfor ithad actual notice of the City'sright torepurchase whichwasannotatedat the back of
5. the title priorto itscancellation,andthat,assumingarguendothatTDChad no notice of the right to
repurchase,itwas,nevertheless,underobligationtoinvestigateinasmuchasitstitle recitesthatthe
propertyisa part of the Lunetaextension.7
The Manila Lodge No.761, BPOE,inits answerdatedJune 7,1971, admittedhavingsoldthe land
togetherwiththe improvementsthereonforvalue tothereinplaintiff whichwasingoodfaith, but
deniedforlackof knowledge astotheirveracitythe allegationsunderthe secondcause of action.It
furthermore admittedthatTDC hadpaid the quarterlyinstallmentsuntil Octoberl5,1964 butclaimed
that the latterfailedwithoutjustifiable cause topaythe subsequentinstallments.Italsoassertedthatit
was a sellerforvalue ingoodfaithwithouthavingmisrepresentedorconcealedtactsrelative tothe title
on the property.Ascounterclaim,ManilaLodge No.761 (BPOE) soughttorecoverthe balance of the
purchase price plusinterestandcosts.8
On June 15, 1971 TDC answeredthe aforesaidcounterclaim, allegingthatitsrefusal tomake further
paymentswasfullyjustified.9
Afterdue trial the court a quo renderedonJuly14, 1972 itsdecisionfindingthe subjectlandtobe part
of the "publicparkor plaza"and, therefore,partof the publicdomain.The courtconsequentlydeclared
that the sale of the subjectlandbythe Cityof Manilato ManilaLodge No.761, BPOE,was null andvoid;
that plaintiff TDCwasa purchaserthereof ingfaithand for value fromBPOEand can enforce itsrights
againstthe latter;and that BPOE isentitledtorecoverfromthe Cityof Manilawhateverconsiderationit
had 'paidthe latter.'The dispositive partof the decisionreads:ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the Court herebydeclaresthatthe parcel of landformerlycoveredbyTransferCertificate
of Title Nos2195 and 67488 inthe name of BPOE andnow byTransferCertificate of Title No.73444 in
the name of Tarlac DevelopmentCorporationisapublic'park or plaza,and,consequently,instant
complaintisdimissed,withoutpronouncementastocosts.
In viewof the reservationmade byplaintiffTarlacDevelopmentCorporationtorecoverfromdefendant
BPOE the amounts mentionedinparagraphXVIof the complaintinaccordance withArticle 1555 of the
Civil Code,the Courtmakesnopronouncementonthispoint.10
From saiddecisionthe thereinplaintiff TDCaswell asthe defendantManilaLodge No.761, BPOE,
appealedtothe Courtof Appeals.
6. In itsappeal docketedasCA-G.R.No.51590-R, the Manila Lodge No.761, BPOE, aversthat the trial
court committedthe followingerrors,namely:
1. In holdingthatthe propertysubjectof the actionisnot patrimonial propertyof the Cityof
Manila;and
2. In holdingthatthe Tarlac DevelopmentCorporationmayrecoverandenforce itsrightagainst
the defendantBPOE.11
The Tarlac DevelopmentCorporation,onthe otherhand,assertsthatthe trial court erred:
(1) In findingthat the propertyinquestionisorwasa publicpark andin consequentlynullifyingthe
sale thereof bythe Cityof Manila toBPOE;
(2) In applyingthe casesof Municipalityof Cavite vs.Rojas,30Phil.602, andGovernmentvs.
Cabangis,53 Phil.112, to the case at bar; and
(3) In notholdingthatthe plaintiff-appellantisentitledto,recoverdamagesfromthe defendant
Cityof Manila.12
Furthermore,TDCas appelleeregardingthe secondassignmentof errorraisedbyBPOE,maintainedthat
it can recoverandenforce itsrigthagainstBPOE inthe eventthatthe landinquestionisdeclareda
publicparkor part thereof.13
In itsdecisionpromulgatedonJune 30,1975, the Court of Appealsconcuredinthe findingsand
conclusionsof the lowercourtuponthe groundthat theyare supportedbyhe evidence andare in
accordance withlaw,andaccordinglyaffirmedthe lowercourt'sjudgment.
7. Hence,the presentpetitionsforreviewoncertiorari.
G.R. No.L-41001
The Manila Lodge No.761, BPOE,contends,inits petitionforreview oncertiorari docketedasG.R.No.
L-41001, that the Court of Appealserredin(1) disregardingthe veryenablingactsand/orstatutes
accordingto whichthe subjectpropertywas,andstill is,patrimonial propertyof the Cityof Manila and
couldtherefore be soldand/ordisposedof like anyotherprivate property;and(2) indepartingfromthe
acceptedandusual course of judicial proceedingswhenitsimplymade ageneral affirmance of the court
a quo's findingsandconclusionswithout botheringtodiscussorresolve severalvital pointsstressedby
the BPOE inits assignederrrors.14
G.R. No.L-41012
The Tarlac DevelopmentCorporation,initspetitionforreview oncertiorari docketedasG.R.No.L-
41012, reliesonthe followinggroundsforthe allowance of itspetition:
1. that the Court of AppealsdidnotcorrectlyinterpretActNo.1360, as amendedbyAct No.1657,
of the PhilippineCommission;and
2. that the Court of Appealshasdepartedfromthe acceptedandusual course of judicial
proceedingsinthatitdidnot make itsownfindingsbutsimplyrecitedthose of the lowercourt.15
ISSUES ANDARGUMENTS
FIRST ISSUE
Upon the firstissue,bothpetitionersclaimthatthe propertysubjectof the action,pursuantto the
provisions of ActNo.1360, as amendedbyActNo.1657, was patrimonial propertyof the Cityof Manila
and nota park or plaza.
8. Argumentsof Petitioners
In G.R. No.L-41001, the ManilaLodge No. 761, BPOE,admitsthat "there appearsto be some logicinthe
conclusion"of the Courtof Appealsthat"neitherActNo.1360 nor Act No.1657 couldhave meantto
supplythe Cityof Manilathe authoritytosell the subjectpropertywhichislocatedatthe southendnot
the north — of the reclaimedarea."16 It argues, however,thatwhenActNo.1360, as amended,
authorizedthe Cityof Manilato undertake the constructionof the Lunetaextensionbyreclaimedland
fromthe ManilaBay, anddeclaredthatthe reclaimedlandshall be the "propertyof the Cityof Manila,"
the State expresslygrantedthe ownershipthereoftothe Cityof Manila which.consequently.could
enterintotransactionsinvolvingit;thatuponthe issuance of O.C.T.No.1909, there couldhe nodoubt
that the reclaimedareaownedbythe Citywasits patrimonial property;"thatthe southendof the
reclaimedareacouldnotbe for publicuse for.as arguedby TDC a street,parkor promenade canbe
propertyforpublicuse pursuantto Article 344 of the SpanishCivil Code onlywhenithasalreadybeen
so constructedor laidout,andthe subjectland,atthe time it wassoldto the Elk's Club,wasneither
actuallyconstructedasa street,parkor promenade norlaidoutas a street,parkor promenade;"that
evenassumingthatthe subjectpropertywasatthe beginningpropertyof publicdominion,itwas
subsequentlyconvertedintopatrimonialpropertypursuanttoArt.422 of the Civil Code,inasmuchasit
had neverbeenused,redorutilizedsince itwasreclaimedin1905 for purpose otherthanthisof an
ordinary real estate forsale or lease;thatthe subjectpropertyhadneverbeenintendedforpublicuse,
isfurthershownbythe fact that itwas neitherincludedasapart of the LunetaPark underPlanNo.30
of the National PlanningCommissionnorconsideredapart of the LunetaNational Park(now Rizal Park)
by ProclamationNo.234 datedDecember19, 1955 of PresidentRamonMagsaysayorby Proclamation
OrderNo. 274 datedOctober4, 1967 of PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos;" 19 that,such beingthe case,
there isno reasonwhythe subjectpropertyshould -notbe consideredashavingbeenconvertedinto
patrimonial property,pursuanttothe rulinginMunicipalityvs.Roa7 Phil.20, inasmuchas the Cityof
Manilahas considereditasitspatrimonial propertynotonly bringingitunderthe operationof the Land
RegistrationActbutalsoby disposingof it;20 and that to considernow the subjectpropertyasa public
plazaor park wouldnotonlyimpairthe obligationsof the partiestothe contractof sale (ratedJuly13,
1911, butalso authorize deprivationof propertywithoutdue processof law.21
G.R. No.L-410112
In L-41012, the petitionerTDCstressesthatthe principal issue isthe interpretationof ActNo.1360, as
amendedby.ActNo.1657 of the Philippine Commission,22 andaversthat inasmuchas Section6 of Act
No.1360, as amendedbyAct1657, providedthatthe reclamationof the Lunetaextensionwastobe
paidfor outof the fundsof the Cityof Manila whichwasauthorizedtoborrow P350,000 "to be
9. expendedinthe constructionof LunetaExtension,"the reclaimedareabecame "publicland"belonging
to the Cityof Manilathat spentforthe reclamation,conformablytothe holdinginCabangis,23and
consequently,saidlandwassubjecttosale andotherdisposition;thatthe InsularGovernmentitself
consideredthe reclaimedLunetaextensionaspatrimonial propertysubjecttodispositionasevidenced
by the fact that See.3 of Act 1360 declaredthat"the land herebyreclaimedshall be the propertyof the
Cityof Manila;"that thispropertycannotbe propertyforpublicuse for accordingto Article 344 of the
Civil Code,the characterof propertyforpublicuse can onlyattach to roads andsquaresthat have
alreadybeenconstructedorat leastlaidoutas such,whichconditionsdidnotobtainregardingthe
subjectland,thatSec.5 of Act 1360 authorizedthe Cityof Manilato lease the northernpartof the
reclaimedareaforhotel purposes;thatActNo.1657 furthermore authorizedthe Cityof Manilatosell
the same;24 that the expressstatutoryauthoritytolease orsell the northernpartof the reclaimedarea
cannot be interpretedtomeanthatthe remainingareacouldnotbe soldinasmuchas the purpose of
the statute was notmerelytoconferauthoritytosell the northernportionbutratherto limitthe city's
powerof dispositionthereof,towit:topreventdispositionof the northernportionforanypurpose
otherthan fora hotel site thatthe northernandsouthernendsof the reclaimedareacannotbe
consideredasextensionof the Lunetafortheylie beyondthe sidesof the original Lunetawhen
extendedinthe directionof the sea,andthatis the reasonwhythe law authorizedthe sale of the
northernportionforhotel purposes,and,forthe same reason,itis impliedthatthe southernportion
couldlikewise be disposedof.26
TDC argueslikewisethatthere are several itemsof uncontradictedcircumstantial evidence whichmay
serve asaids inconstruingthe legislativeintentandwhichdemonstrate thatthe subjectpropertyis
patrimonial innature,towit:(1) Exhibits"J"and"J-1", or PlanNo.30 of the National Planning
Commissionshowingthe Lunetaanditsvicinity,donotinclude the subjectpropertyaspartof the
LunetaPark; (2) Exhibit"K",whichisthe planof the subjectpropertycoveredbyTCTNo. 67488 of BPOE,
preparedonNovember11,1963, indicatesthatsaidpropertyisnota publicpark;(3) Exhibit"T",which
isa certifiedcopyof ProclamationNo.234 issuedonDecember15,1955 is PresidentMagsaysay,and
Exhibit"U"whichis ProclamationOrderNo.273 issuedonOctober4, 1967 byPresidentMarcos,do not
include the subjectpropertyinthe LunetaPark-,(4) Exhibit"W",whichisthe locationplanof the Luneta
National ParkunderProclamations Nos.234 and273, furtherconfirmsthatthe subjectpropertyisnota
publicpark;and (5) Exhibit"Y",whichisa copy of O.C.T.No.7333 inthe name of the UnitedStatesof
Americacoveringthe landnowoccupiedbythe Americacoveringthe landnow occupiedbythe
AmericanEmbassy,the boundariesof whichwere delineatedbythe Philippine Legislature,statesthat
the saidland isboundedonthe northwestbypropertiesof the ArmyandNavyClub(BlockNo.321) and
the Elks Club(BlockNo.321), and thiscircumstance showsthateventhe Philippine Legislature
recognizedthe subjectpropertyasprivate propertyof the ElksClub.27
TDC furthermore contendsthatthe Cityof Manilais estoppedfromquestioningthe validityof the sale
of the subjectproperty thatitexecutedonJuly13, 1911 to the ManilaLodge No. 761, BPOE,for several
10. reasons,namely:(1) the City'spetitionforthe reannotationof EntryNo.4608/T-1635 waspredicatedon
the validityof saidsale;(2) whenthe propertywasboughtbythe petitionerTDCitwas nota publicplaza
or park as testifiedtobyboth PedroCojuanco,treasurerof TDC,and the surveyor,Manuel Añoneuvo,
accordingto whomthe subjectpropertywasfromall appearancesprivate propertyasitwas enclosed
by fences;(3) the propertyinquestionwascadastrallysurveyedandregisteredaspropertyof the Elks
Club,accordingto Manuel Anonuevo;(4) the propertywasneverusedasa publicpark,for,since the
issuance of T.C.T.No.2165 onJuly17, 1911 inthe name of the Manila Lodge NO.761, the latterusedit
as private property,andas earlyasJanuary 16, 1909 the Cityof Manila had alreadyexecutedadeedof
sale overthe propertyinfavorof the Manila Lodge No.761; and (5) the Cityof Manilahas not presented
any evidence toshowthatthe subjectpropertyhaseverbeenproclaimedorusedasa publicpark.28
TDC, moreover,contendsthatSec.60 of Com.Act No.141 cannot applytothe subjectland,forCom.
Act No.141 tookeffectonDecember1,1936 and at that time the subjectlandwasno longerpart of the
part of the publicdomain.29
TDC also stressesthatitsrightsas a purchaseringood faithcannotbe disregarded,forthe mere
mentioninthe certificate of title thatthe lotitpurchasedwas"part of the Luneta extension"wasnota
sufficientwarningthattile title tothe Cityof Manilawasinvalid;andthatalthoughthe trial court, inits
decisionaffirmedbythe Courtof Appeals,foundthe TDC -tohas beenaninnocentpurchaserforvalue,
the court disregardedthe petitioner'srightsassuchpurchaserthat reliedonTorrenscertificate of title.
30
The Court, continuesthe petitionerTDCerredinnot holdingthatthe latterisentitledtorecoverfrom
the Cityof Maniladamagesinthe amountof P100,000 causedby the City'spetitionfor- reannotationof
itsright to repurchase.
DISCUSSION ANDRESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUE
It isa cardinal rule of statutoryconstructionthatcourts mustgive effecttothe general legislative intent
that can be discoveredfromoris unraveledbythe fourcornersof the statute,31 and inorderto
discoversaidintent,the wholestatute,andnotonlyaparticularprovisionthereof,shouldbe
considered.32It is,therefore,necessarytoanalyze all the provisionsof ActNo.1360, as amended,in
orderto unravel the legislativeintent.
11. Act No.1360 whichwas enactedbythe Philippine CommissiononJune 26, 1905, as amendedbyActNo.
1657 enactedonMay 18, 1907, authorizedthe "constructionof suchrock and timberbulkheadsorsea
wallsasmay be necessaryforthe makingof an extensiontothe Luneta"(Sec.1 [a]),andthe placingof
the material dredgedfromthe harborof Manila "inside the bulkheadsconstructedtoinclose the Luneta
extensionabove referredto"(Sec.1[a]).It likewise providedthatthe planof ArchitectD. H. Burnhamas
"a general outline forthe extensionandimprovementof the Lunetainthe Cityof Manila"be adopted;
that "the reclamationfromthe Bayof Manilaof the landincludedinsaidprojectedLunetaextension...is
herebyauthorizedandthe landtherebyreclaimedshall be the propertyof the Cityof Manila"(Sec.3);
that "the Cityof Manilaisherebyauthorizedtosetaside atract of the reclaimedlandformedbythe
Lunetaextensionauthorizedbythis Actat the worth endof saidtract, notto exceedfive hundredfeet
by six hundredfeetinsize,forahotel site,andtolease the same withthe approval of the Governor
General,...fora term not exceedingninety-nine years;that"shouldthe Municipal Board...deemit
advisable itisherebyauthorizedtoadvertiseforsale tosell saidtract of land... ;" "that saidtract shall
be usedfor hotel purposesashereinprescribed,andshall notbe devotedtoanyotherpurpose or
objectwhatever;""thatshouldthe grantee x x x fail to maintainonsaidtract a first-classhotel x x x then
the title tosaid tract of landsold,conveyed,andtransferred,andshall notbe devotedtoanyother
purpose or objectwhatever;""thatshouldthe grantee x x x fail tomaintainonsaidtract a first-class
hotel x x x thenthe title tosaidtract of landsold,conveyed,andtransferredtothe grantee shall revert
to the Cityof Manila,and saidCityof Manila shall thereuponbecome entitledtoimmediate possession
of saidtract of land"(Sec.5); thatthe constructionof the rock and timberbulkheadsorseawall "shall
be paidfor out of the fundsof the Cityof Manila,butthe areato be reclaimedbysaidproposedLuneta
extensionshall be filled,withoutcosttothe Cityof Manila,withmaterial dredgedfromManilaBayat
the expense of the InsularGovernment"(Sec.6);andthat "the Cityof Manila isherebyauthorizedto
borrowfrom the InsularGovernment...the sumof three hundredthousandpesos,tobe expendedin
the constructionof Lunetaextensionprovidedforbyparagraph(a) of sectionone hereof"(Sec.7).
The grant made byAct No.1360 of the reclaimedlandtothe Cityof Manilaisa grant of "public"nature,
the same havingbeenmade toa local political subdivision.Suchgrantshave alwaysbeenstrictly
construedagainstthe grantee.33 One compellingreasongivenforthe strictinterpretationof apublic
grant isthat there isin suchgrant a gratuitousdonationof,publicmoneyorresourceswhichresultsin
an unfairadvantage tothe grantee andfor thatreason,the grant shouldbe narrowlyrestrictedinfavor
of the public.34 Thisreasonfor strict interpretationobtainsrelative tothe aforesaidgrant,for,although
the Cityof Manilawas to payfor the constructionof such workand timberbulkheadsorseawallsas
may be necessaryforthe makingof the Lunetaextension,the areatobe reclaimedwouldbe filledat
the expense of the InsularGovernmentandwithoutcosttothe Cityof Manila,withmaterial dredged
fromManila Bay.Hence,the letterof the statute shouldbe narrowedtoexclude materswhichif
includedwoulddefeatthe policyof the legislation.
12. The reclaimedarea,anextensiontothe Luneta,isdeclaredtobe propertyof the Cityof Manila.
Property,however,iseitherof publicownershiporof private ownership.35What kindof propertyof
the Cityis the reclaimedland?Isitof publicownership(dominion) orof private ownership?
We holdthatit isof publicdominion,intendedforpublicuse.
Firstly,if the reclaimedareawasgrantedtothe Cityof Manilaas its patrimonial property,the Citycould,
by virtue of itsownership,disposeof the whole reclaimedareawithoutneedof authorizationtodoso
fromthe lawmakingbody.ThusArticle 348of the Civil Code of Spainprovidesthat"ownershipisthe
rightto enjoyanddispose of a thingwithoutfurtherlimitationsthanthose establishedbylaw."36The
rightto dispose (jusdisponendi)of one'spropertyisanattribute of ownership.ActNo.1360, as
amended,however,providesbynecessaryimplication,thatthe Cityof Manilacouldnotdispose of the
reclaimedareawithoutbeingauthorizedbythe lawmakingbody.Thusthe statute providesthat"the
Cityof Manilaisherebyauthorizedtosetaside atract ...at the northend,for a hotel site,andtolease
the same ... shouldthe municipal board...deemitadvisable,itisherebyauthorized...tosell saidtractof
land... " (Sec.5).If the reclaimedareawere patrimonialpropertyof the City, the lattercoulddisposeof
it withoutneedof the authorizationprovidedbythe statute,andthe authorizationtosetaside ...lease
...or sell ...givenbythe statute wouldindeedbe superfluous.Toso construe the statute sto renderthe
term"authorize,"whichisrepeatedlyusedbythe statute,superfluouswouldviolate the elementary
rule of legal hermeneuticsthateffectmustbe giventoeveryword,clause,andsentence of the statute
and that a statute shouldbe sointerpretedthatnopart thereof becomesinoperativeorsuperfluous.37
To authorize meanstoempower,togive aright toact. 38 Act No.1360 furthermore qualifiesthe verbit
authorize"withthe adverb"hereby,"whichmeans"bymeansof thisstatue orsection,"Hence without
the authorizationexpresslygivenbyActNo.1360, the Cityof Manilacouldnot lease orsell eventhe
northernportion;muchlesscoulditdispose of the whole reclaimedarea.Consequently,the reclaimed
area wasgrantedto the Cityof Manila,not as itspatrimonial property.Atmost,onlythe northern
portionreservedasa hotel site couldbe saidtobe patrimonial propertyfor,byexpressstatutory
provisionitcouldbe disposedof,andthe title theretowouldreverttothe Cityshouldthe grantee fail to
complywiththe termsprovidedbythe statute.
TDC however,contendsthatthe purpose of the authorizationprovidedinActNo.1360 to lease orsell
was reallytolimitthe City'spowerof disposition.Tosustainsuchcontentionistobegthe question.If
the purpose of the law wasto limitthe City'spowerof dispositionthenitisnecessarilyassumedthatthe
Cityhad alreadythe powertodispose,forif suchpowerdidnotexist,how coulditbe limited?Itwas
preciselyAct1360 that gave the Citythe powerto dispose foritwas herebyauthorizedbyleaseof sale.
Hence,the Cityof Manila had nopowerto dispose of the reclaimedlandhadsuchpowernotbeen
grantedby Act No.1360, andthe purpose of the authorizationwastoempowerthe citytosell orlease
the northernpart and not,as TDC claims,to limitonlythe powertodispose.Moreover,itispresumed
13. that whenthe lawmakingbodyenactedthe statute,ithadfull knowledge of priorandexistinglawsand
legislationonthe subjectof the statute andacted in accordance or withrespectthereto.39If by
anotherpreviouslaw,the Cityof Manilacouldalreadydispose of the reclaimedarea,whichitcoulddoif
such areawere giventoit as itspatrimonial property,woulditthennotbe a superfluityforActNo.1360
to authorize the Citytodispose of the reclaimedland?NeitherhaspetitionerTDCpointedtoanyother
lawthat authorizedthe Citytodo so,nor have we come acrossany. What we do know isthat if the
reclaimedlandwere patrimonialproperty,therewouldbe noneedof givingspecial authorizationtothe
Cityto dispose of it.Saidauthorizationwasgivenbecausethe reclaimedlandwasnotintendedtobe
patrimonial propertyof the Cityof Manila,andwithoutthe expressauthorizationtodisposeof the
northernportion,the Citycouldnotdispose of eventhatpart.
Secondly,the reclaimedareaisan"extensiontothe Lunetainthe Cityof Manila."40 If the reclaimed
area isan extensionof the Luneta,thenitisof the same nature or character as the oldLuneta.Anent
thismatter,it hasbeensaidthat a powerto extend(orcontinue anact or business)cannotauthorize a
transactionthat istotallydistinct.41 Itis not disputedthatthe oldLunetaisa publicparkor plazaand it
isso considered bySection859 of the RevisedOrdinancesof the Cityof Manila.42 Hence the "extension
to the Luneta"must be alsoa publicparkor plazaand for publicuse.
TDC, however,contendsthatthe subjectpropertycannotbe consideredanextensionof the oldLuneta
because itisoutside of the limitsof the oldLunetawhenextendedtothe sea.Thisisa strained
interpretationof the term"extension,"foran"extension,"ithasbeenheld,"signifiesenlargementin
any direction — inlength,breadth,orcircumstance."43
Thirdly,the reclaimedareawasformerlyapartof the manilaBay.A bay isnothingmore thanan inletof
the sea.Pursuantto Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays,roadsteads,coastsea,inletsand
shoresare parts of the national domain opentopublicuse.These are alsopropertyof publicownership
devotedtopublicuse,accordingtoArticle 339 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Whenthe shore or part of the bay isreclaimed,itdoesnotlose itscharacterof beingpropertyforpublic
use,accordingto Governmentof the Philippine Islandsvs.Cabangis.44The predecessorof the
claimantsinthiscase was the ownerof a bigtract of landincludingthe lotsinquestion.From1896 said
landbeganto wearaway due to the actionof the watersof ManilaBay. In1901 the lotsinquestion
became completelysubmergedinwaterinordinarytides.Itremainedinsuchastate until 1912 when
the Governmentundertookthe dredgingof the Vitasestuaryanddumpedthe Sandand - siltfrom
estuaryon the lowlandscompletelySubmergedinwatertherebygraduallyformingthe lotsinquestion.
Tomas Cabangistookpossessionthereofassoonas theywere reclaimedhence,the claimants,his
14. successorsininterest,claimedthatthe lotsbelongedtothem.The trial courtfoundforthe claimants
and the Governmentappealed.ThisCourtheldthatwhenthe lotsbecame apart of the shore.Asthey
remainedinthatconditionuntil reclaimedbythe fillingdone bythe Government,theybelongedtothe
publicdomain.forpublicuse .4'Hence,a part of the shore,and forthat purpose a part of the bay,did
not lose itscharacterof beingforpublicuse afteritwas reclaimed.
Fourthly,Act1360, as amended,authorizedthe leaseorsale of the northernportionof the reclaimed
area as a hotel sites.The subjectpropertyisnotthatnorthernportionauthorizedtobe leasedorsold;
the subjectpropertyisthe southernportion.Hence,applyingthe rule of expresiouniusestexlusio
alterius,the Cityof Manilawasnot authorizedtosell the subjectproperty.The applicationof this
principle of statutoryconstructionbecomesthe more imperativeinthe case at bar inasmuchas notonly
mustthe publicgrantof the reclaimedareatothe Cityof Manilabe,as above stated,strictlyconstrued
againstthe Cityof Manila,but alsobecause agrant of powerto a municipal corporation,ashappensin
thiscase where the cityisauthor izedtolease orsell the northernportionof the Lunetaextension,is
strictlylimitedtosuchasare expressly orimpliedlyauthorizedornecessarilyincidentaltothe objectives
of the corporation.
Fifthly,Article344 of the Civil Code of Spainprovidesthattopropertyof publicuse,inprovincesandin
towns,comprisesthe provincialandtownroads,the squaresstreetsfountains,andpublicwatersthe
promenades,andpublicworksof general service paidforbysuchtownsor provinces."A parkor plaza,
such as the extensiontothe Luneta,isundoubtedlycomprisedinsaidarticle.
The petitioners,however,argue that,accordingtosaidArticle 344, inorderthat the character of
propertyforpublicuse maybe soattached to a plaza,the lattermustbe actuallyconstructedorat least
laidoutas such,and since the subjectpropertywasnotyetconstructedas a plazaor at leastlaidoutas
a plaza whenitwassoldby the City,itcouldnot be propertyfor publicuse.Itshouldbe noted,however,
that propertiesof provincesandtownsforpublicuse are governedbythe same principlesasproperties
of the same character belongingtothe publicdomain.46In orderto be propertyof publicdomainan
intentiontodevote ittopublicuse issufficient.47The,petitioners'contentionisrefutedbyManresa
himself whosaid,inhiscomments",onArticle344, that:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Las plazas,callesypaseospublicoscorrespondentsindudaaigunaaldominiopublicomunicipal),porque
se hallanestablecidossobre suelomunicipal yestandestinadasal usode todosLaurentpresenta
tratandode lasplazas,una questionrelativaa si debenconceptuarse comode dominiopublicolos
lugaresvacioslibres,que se encuenttanenlosMunicipiosrurales...LaurentopinacontraPioudhonque
toda vezque estanal serviciode todospesoslugares,debenconsiderablepublicosyde dominion
15. publico.Realmente,paladecidirel punto,bastarasiempre fijarse enel destinoreal yefectivode los
citadoslugares,ysi este destinoentrañaunusocomunde todos,no hayduda que sonde dominio
publicomunicipal si nopatrimoniales.
It isnot necessary,therefore,thataplazabe alreadyconstructedof- laidoutasa plazainorder thatit
be consideredpropertyforpublicuse.Itissufficientthatitbe intendedtobe suchInthe case at bar,it
has beenshownthatthe intentionof the lawmakingbody ingivingtothe Cityof Manilathe extensionto
the Lunetawas not a grant to it of patrimonial propertybutagrant for publicuse asa plaza.
We have demonstratedadsatietatemthatthe Lunetaextensionasintendedtobe propertyof the City
of Manilafor publicuse.But,couldnotsaidproperty-lateronbe converted,asthe petitionerscontend,
to patrimonial property?Itcouldbe.ButthisCourthas alreadysaid,inIgnaciovs.The Directorof Lands,
49 the executive andpossiblythe legislationdepartmentthathasthe authorityandthe powerto make
the declarationthatsaidproperty,isno longerrequiredforpublicuse,anduntil suchdeclarationi made
the propertymustcontinue toform paintof the publicdomain.Inthe case at bar, there hasbeenno
such explicitorunequivocal declarationItshouldbe noted,furthermore,anentthismatter,thatcourts
are undoubtedvnot.primarilycalledupon,andare notina position,todeterminewhetheranypublic
landis still neededforthe purposesspecifiedinArticle 4of the Law of Waters. 50
Havingdisposedof the petitioners'principal argumentsrelative tothe mainissue,we now passtothe
itemsof circumstantial evidencewhichTDCclaimsmayserve as aidsinconstruingthe legislativeintent
inthe enactmentof ActNo.1360, as amended.Itisnoteworthythatall these itemsof alleged
circumstantial evidence are actsfarremovedintime fromthe date of the enactmentof Act No.1360
such that theycannotbe consideredcontemporaneouswithitsenactment.Moreover,itisnot
farfetchedthatthismassof circumstantial evidence mighthave beeninfluencedbythe antecedent
seriesof invalidacts,towit:the City'shavingobtainedoverthe reclaimedareaOCTNo.1909 on January
20,1911; the sale made bythe Cityof the subjectpropertytoManila Lodge No.761; andthe issuance to
the latterof T.C.T.No. 2195. It cannot gainsaidthatif the subsequentactsconstitutingthe
circumstantial evidence have beenbase on,orat leastinfluenced,bythose antecedentinvalidactsand
TorrenstitlesStheycan hardlybe indicativeof the intentof the lawmakingbodyinenactingActNo.
1360 and itsamendatoryact.
TDC claimsthat Exhs."J,""J-l""K,""T," "U," "W" and"Y" show thatthe subjectpropertyisnota park.
16. Exhibits"J"and"J-1," the "Lunetaand vicinityshowingproposeddevelopment"datedMay14, 1949,
were preparedbythe National UrbanPlanningCommissionof the Office of the President.Itcannotbe
reasonablyexpectedthatthisplanfor developmentof the Lunetashouldshow thatthe subjectproperty
occupiedbythe ElksClubisa publicpark,forit was made 38 yearsafterthe sale to the Elks,and after
T.C.T. No.2195 had beenissuedtoElks.Itisto be assumedthat the Office of the Presidentwas
cognizantof the Torrens title of BPOE.That the subjectpropertywasnotincludedasa part of the
Lunetaonlyindicatedthatthe National UrbanPlanningCommissionthatmade the planknew thatthe
subjectpropertywasoccupiedbyElksand thatElks hada Torrenstitle thereto.Butthisinnoway proves
that the subjectpropertywasoriginallyintendedtobe patrimonialpropertyof the Cityof Manilaor that
the sale to Elksor that the Torrens-title of the latterisvalid.
Exhibit"K"isthe "Planof landcoveredbyT.C.T . No ----,aspreparedforTarlac DevelopmentCompany."
It was made onNovember11, 1963 byFelipe F.Cruz,private landsurveyor.Thissurveyorisadmittedlya
surveyorforTDC. 51 Thisplan cannotbe expectedtoshow thatthe subjectpropertyisapart of the
LunetaPark, forhe planwasmade to show the lot that "wasto be soldto petitioner."Thisplanmust
have alsoassumedthe existence of avalidtitle tothe landinfavor of Elks.
Exhibits"T"and "U" are copiesof Presidential ProclamationsNo.234 issuedonNovember15,1955 and
No.273 issuedonOctober4, 1967, respectively.The purpose of the saidProclamationswastoreserve
certainparcelsof landsituatedinthe Districtof Ermita,Cityof Manila,for park site purposes.Assuming
that the subjectpropertyisnotwithinthe boundariesof the reservation,thiscannotbe interpretedto
meanthat the subjectpropertywasnotoriginallyintendedtobe forpublicuse or that ithas ceasedto
be such. Conversely,hadthe subjectpropertybeenincludedinthe reservation,itwouldmean,if it
reallywere private property,thatthe rightsof the ownersthereof wouldbe extinguished,forthe
reservationswas"subjecttoprivate rights,if anythere be."That the subjectpropertywasnotincluded
inthe reservationonlyindicatesthatthe Presidentknew of the existence of the Torrenstitles
mentionedabove.The failureof the Proclamationstoincludethe subjectpropertyinthe reservationfor
park site couldnotchange the character of the subjectpropertyasoriginallyforpublicuse andtoform
part of the LunetaPark.What has beensaidhere appliestoExhibits"V","V-1"to"V-3,"and "W" which
alsoreferto the area and locationof the reservationforthe LunetaPark.
Exhibit"Y"is a copy of O.C.T.No.7333 datedNovember13, 1935, coveringthe lotwhere now stands
the AmericanEmbassy[Chancery].Itstatesthatthe propertyis"bounded...onthe Northwestby
propertiesof ArmyandNavyClub(BlockNo.321) andElks Club(BlockNo.321)." Inasmuchas the said
bounderiesdelineatedbythe PhilippineLegislatureinActNo.4269, the petitionerscontendthatthe
Legislature recognizedandconcededthe existenceof the ElksClubpropertyasa primate property(the
property inquestion) andnotasa publicparkor plaza.Thisargumentis nonsequiturplainandsimple
SaidOriginal Certificate of Title cannotbe consideredasanincontrovertible declarationthatthe Elks
17. Clubwas intruth andin fact the ownerof such boundarylot.Suchmentionasboundaryownerisnot a
meansof acquiringtitle norcan it validate atitle thatisnull andvoid.
TDC finallyclaimsthatthe Cityof Manilais estoppedfromquestioningthe validityof the sale itexecuted
on July13,'1911 conconveyingthe subjectpropertytothe ManilaLodge No.761, BPOE.This contention
cannot be seriouslydefendedinthe lightof the doctrine repeatedlyenunciatedbythisCourtthatthe
Governmentisneverestoppedbymistakesorerrorson the pan of its agents,andestoppel doesnot
applyto a municipal corporationtovalidate acontractthat is prohibitedbylaw oritsagainstRepublic
policy,andthe sale of July13, 1911 executedbythe Cityof Manilato ManilaLodge was certainlya
contract prohibitedbylaw.Moreover,estoppelcannotbe urgedevenif the Cityof Manilaacceptedthe
benefitsof suchcontractof sale andthe Manila Lodge No.761 had performeditspartof the agreement,
for to applythe doctrine of estoppel againstthe Cityof Manilainthis case wouldbe tantamountto
enablingittodo indirectlywhatitcouldnotdodirectly.52
The sale of the subjectpropertyexecutedbythe Cityof Manilato the Manila Lodge No.761, BPOE, was
voidand inexistentforlackof subjectmatter.53 It sufferedfromanincurable defectthatcouldnotbe
ratifiedeitherbylapse of time orby expressratification.The ManilaLodge No.761 therefore acquired
no rightby virtue of the saidsale.Hence toconsidernow the contract inexistentasitalwayshasseen,
cannot be,as claimedbythe ManilaLodge No.761, an impairmentof the obligationsof contracts,for
there wasit,contemplationof law,nocontract at all.
The inexistence of saidsale canbe setup againstanyone whoassertsa rightarisingfromit, notonly
againstthe firstvendee,the ManilaLodge No.761, BPOE, butalso againstall itssuceessors,including
the TDC whichare not protectedthe doctrine of bonafide ii purchaserwithoutnotice,beingclaimedby
the TDC doesnotapplywhere there isa total absence of title inthe vendor,andthe goodfaithof the
purchaserTDC cannot create title where none exists.55
The so-calledsale of the subjectpropertyhavingbeenexecuted,the restorationorrestitutionof what
has beengivenisorder56
SECONDISSUE
The secondgroundallegedinsupportof the instantpetitionsforreview oncertiorari isthatthe Courtof
Appealshasdepartedfromthe acceptedandusual course of judicial proceedingsastocall for an
18. exercise of the powerof supervision.TDCinL-41012, arguesthat the respondentCourtdidnotmake its
ownfindingsbutsimplyrecitedthose of the lowercourtandmade a general affirmance,contrarytothe
requirementsof the Constitution;thatthe respondentCourtmade glaringandpatentmistakesin
recountingeventhe copiedfindings,palpablyshowinglackof deliberateconsiderationof the matters
involved,as,forexample,whensaidcourtsaidthatAct No.1657 authorizedthe Cityof Manilatoset
aside a portionof the reclaimedland"formedbythe LunetaExtensionof- tolease orsell the same for
park purposes;"andthatrespondentCourt.furthermore,didnotresolve ordispose of anyof the
assignederrorscontraryto the mandate of the JudiciaryAct..57
The Manila Lodge No.761, in L-41001, likewise alleges,asone of the reasonswarrantingreview,that
the Court of Appealsdepartedfromthe acceptedandusual course of Judicial proceedingsbysimply
makinga general affirmance of the courta quofindingswithoutbotheringtoresolve several vital points
mentionedbythe BPOEinitsassignederrors.58
COMMENTS ON SECONDISSUE
We have showninour discussionof the firstissue thatthe decisionof the trial courtis fullyin
accordance withlaw.Tofollowsthatwhensuchdecisionwasaffirmedbythe Courtof Appeals,the
affirmance waslikewiseinaccordance withlaw.Hence,nouseful purposewillbe servedinfurther
discussingthe secondissue.
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY,the petitionsinbothG.R.Nos.L-41001 and L-41012 are denied forlackof merit,andthe
decisionof the Courtof Appealsof June 30, 1975, isherebyaffirmed,atpetitioner'scost.
Makasiar, MunozPalmaand Martin, JJ.,concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Teehankee,concursinthe resultwhichiswhollyconsistentwiththe basic rulingsandjugdmentof this
Court initsdecisionof July31, 1968.
22. 37 Sutherland,op.cit.,p.339.
38 4 Words andPhrases,p.830, citingState vs.Board of Com'rs of FranklinCounty,114 p. 247, 248; 24;
Kan.404.
39 Tamiami Trial Tours vs.Lee,194 So.305, 306
40 Sec.1, Act No.1360.
41 See 15-A Words andPhrases,p.602, citingClements'Ex'rsvs.Dickey,5 Fed.Cas.1025, 1027.
42 Bureauof Printing,1908, p. 281.
43 15-A Words and Phrases,p.614, citingMayor, etc.of Monroe vs. OuachitaParish,17 So. 498, 499, 47
La. Ann.1061.
44 53 Phil.112.
45 Syllabus,citingAragonvs.InsularGovernment,19Phil.223; Franciscos Government of the Philippine
Islands,28 Phil.505.
46 Viudade Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo,49Phil,52, 55.
47 Art 420, Civil Code.
48 3 CodigoCivil Español,6aedicion,p.106.
24. EN BANC
G.R. No.L-6225 January10, 1953
ARSENIOH. LACSON,petitioner,
vs.
MARIANOROQUE, as ActingExecutive Secretary,BARTOLOMEGATMAITAN,asVice-Mayorof Manila
and DIONISIOOJEDA,asActingChief of Police of Manila,respondents.
ArsenioH.Lacson, Jose P.Laurel,RamonDioknoandJose W. Dioknoforpetitioner.
CityFiscal EugenioAngelesforrespondentsBartolome GatmaitanandDionisioOjeda.
Office of the SolicitorGeneral JuanR.LiwagandSolicitorFelix V.Makasiarforrespondents.
JesusG. Barrera and Enrique M.Fernandoas amici curiae.
TUASON,J.:
The petitioner,ArsenioH.Lacson,Mayor of the Cityof Manila,has beensuspendedfromthe office by
the Presidentandhasbroughtthisoriginal actionforprohibitioncontestingthe legalityof the
suspension.MarianoRoque,ActingExecutive Secretary,andDionisioOjeda,Chief of Police of Manila,
whoare saidto have threatenedtocarry out the President'sorder,andBartolome Gatmaitan,the Vice-
Mayor who isperformingthe dutiesof mayor,are made defendants.
The salientfactsallegedinthe application,notdeniedbythe respondents,are asfollows:
On October20, 1952, followingthe acquittal of CelestinoC.Juan,DeputyChiefof Police,inacriminal
prosecutionformalversationof publicpropertyinstitutedatthe instance of MayorLacson, the
petitionermade aradiobroadcast inwhichhe criticizedthe court'sdecisionstating,itisalleged:"Ihave
nothingbutcontemptforcertaincourts of justice... . I tell youone thing(answeringaninterrogator),if
25. I have the powerto fire Judge Montesa(the trial judge) Iwill fire himforbeingincompetent,forbeing
an arrogant . . . an ignoramus."
Thereafter,Judge Montesa,ata publicmeetingof the Judgesof the Courtsof First Instance of Manila
submittedtothe considerationof hiscolleaguesthe questionof whetherMayorLacson's remarkswere
contemptof court. A committee of judges,whichwasappointedtostudythe question,reportedthatit
was notfree to state whethercontemptproceedingsif institutedwouldprosper.The Committee
believedthatJudge Montesawasthe one mostcompetenttodecide uponthe actionthatshouldbe
taken.
In the meanwhile,OnOctober23, Judge Montesawrote the Secretaryof Justice requestingthata
special prosecutorbe designatedtohandle the case forcriminal libelwhichhe intendedtofile against
the mayor. He gave as reasonsforhisrequestthat"whateverblundersthe mayorhadcommitted,the
same was due to an advice givenhimbyhislegal adviser,the cityfiscal,"andthatit wouldbe "difficult
to expectthathe wouldbe willingtomove againsthimoract in a mannerthat wouldputhimina bad
lightwiththe mayor."
On October24, inSpecial Administrative OrderNo.235, markedRUSH, the Secretaryof Justice
designatedSolicitorMartinianoP.Vivoof the Solicitor'sOffice "toassistthe CityFiscal of Manilainthe
investigationof the complaintof Judge AgustinP.MontesaagainstMayorArsenioH.Lacson, to file
whatevercriminal actionthe evidencemaywarrantand to prosecute the same incourt."
On the followingday,Judge Montesafiledhisprojected complaintfor"libelandcontempt"withthe City
Fiscal whichwasnumbered27909. Thiscomplaintinthe ordinaryroutine of distributionof casesinthe
CityFiscal'sOffice shouldhave correspondedtoAssistantFiscal Jose B.Jimenez.Consequentlyupon
SolicitorVivo'sdesignation,CityFiscal AngelesdesignatedAssistantFiscalsJimenezandalso
HermogenesConcepcion,Jr.torepresenthimandtocollaborate withthe Solicitorfromthe Bureauof
Justice.
SolicitorVivoconductedapreliminaryinvestigationinthe officeof the SolicitorGeneralwithoutthe
presence of eitherof the AssistantFiscalsassignedtothiscase,andsentout subpoenasinhisname and
uponhissignature.Andhavingcompletedthe preliminaryexamination,onOctober30 he docketedin
the Court of First Instance a complaintforlibel againstMayorLacson,signedandswornto byJudge
Montesaas complainant.Atthe footof the complaintbothAssistantFiscal HermogenesConcepcion,Jr.
26. and SolicitorVivocertifiedthat"we have conductedthe preliminaryinvestigationinthiscase in
accordance withlaw"althoughFiscal Concepcionhadtakennopart inthe proceedings.
On October31, the day followingthe filingof the above complaint,the Presidentwrote the Mayora
letterof the followingtenor:
In viewof the pendencybefore the Courtof FirstInstance of Manilaof criminal case No.20707 against
you,for libel,andpursuanttothe presentpolicyof the administration,requiringthe suspensionof any
local elective official whichisbeingchargedbefore the courtswithanyoffenseinvolvingmoral
turpitude,youare herebysuspendedfromoffice effectiveuponreceipthereof,yoursuspensionto
continue until the final dispositionof the saidcriminal case.
Andnotifiedof the suspension,Vice-MayorBartolome Gatmaitanentereduponthe dutiesof the office
inplace of the suspendedcityexecutive.
Allegationshave beenmade vigorouslyattackingthe formandlegalityof SolicitorVivo'sdesignationand
of the procedure pursuedinthe conductof the preliminaryinvestigation.The objectionsare atbest
inconclusiveof the fundamental issuesandwill be brushedaside inthisdecision.Itwill be assumedfor
the purpose of our decisionsthatthe assaileddesignationandinvestigationwere regularandlegal,and
we will proceedatonce to the considerationof the validityof the disputedsuspension.
By section9 of the RevisedCharterof the Cityof Manila(RepublicActNo.409), "the Mayor shall hold
office forfouryearsunlesssoonerremoved."Butthe Chartterdoesnotcontainany provisionforthis
officer'sremoval orsuspension.Thissilenceisinstrikingcontrasttothe explicitnesswithwhichRepublic
Act No.409 stipulatesforthe removal andsuspensionof boardmembersandothercity officials.Section
14 specifiesthe causesforwhichmembersof the Municipal Boardmaybe suspendedandremoved,to
wit:the same causesfor removal of provincial elective officers,andsection22 expresslyauthorizesthe
removal — forcause — of appointive cityofficialsandemployeesbythe Presidentorthe Mayor
dependingonwhomade the appointments.
Nevertheless,the rights,dutiesandprivilegesof municipal officersdonothave to be embodiedinthe
charter,but may be regulatedbyprovisionsof general applicationspeciallyif these are incorporatedin
the same code of whichthe city organiclaw formsa part.
27. Such isthe case here.If the ManilaCity Charteritself issilentregardingthe suspensionorremoval of the
mayor,section64 (b) of the RevisedAdministrativeCode doesconferuponthe Presidentthe powerto
remove anypersonfromany positionof trustor authorityunderthe Governmentof the Philippinesfor
disloyaltytothe Republicof the Philippines.There isnodenyingthatthe positionof mayorisunderthe
Governmentof the Philippinesandone trustandauthority,andcomeswithinthe purview of the
provisionbeforecited.
The intentof the phrase "unlesssoonerremoved"insection9of the ManilaCharterhas beena topicof
much speculationanddebate inthe course of the oral argumentandin the briefs.Thisphrase isnot
uncommoninstatutesrelatingtopublicoffices,andhasreceivedconstructionfromthe courts.Ithas
beendeclaredthat"Powerinthe appointingauthoritytoremove apublicofficermaybe impliedwhere
to statutoryspecificationof the termof office are addedthe words'unlesssoonerremoved.'"(43Am.
Jur.,30.)
It isobviousfromthe plainlanguage of thisstatementthatthe respondentscanhardlyderive comfort
fromthe phrase inquestionasrepositoryof ahiddenorveiledauthorityof the President.Implying
powerof the appointingagencytoremove,the natural inference isthatthe wordshave exclusive
applicationtocasesaffectingappointiveofficers;sothat,where the officersinvolvedare elective,like
that of mayor of the Cityof Manila,theyhave no othermeaningthanthat the officerisnotimmune to
removal,andthe whole clausesistobe interpretedtoread,"The mayorshall holdhispositionforthe
prescribedtermunlesssooneroustedasprovidedbyotherlaws,"orsomethingtothe effect.The
Congressispresumedtohave beenaware of section64 (b) of the RevisedAdministrative Code andto
have inmindthissectionandotherremoval statutes thatmay be enactedinthe future,inemploying
the phrase "unlesssoonerremoved."Anotherconclusion,we are impelledtosay,isthatunderexisting
legislation,the ManilaCityMayorisremovable onlyfordisloyaltytothe Republic.For,aswill be shown,
the expressmentionof one cause orseveral causesforremoval orsuspensionexcludesothercauses.
Four justiceswhojoininthisdecisiondonotshare the view thatthe onlygroundwhichthe Mayor may
be expelledisdisloyalty.The ChiefJustice,Mr.Justice PadillaandMr. Justice Jugo,three of the Justices
referredto,reasonthat,as the office of provincial executive isatleastasimportantas the office of
mayor of the city of Manila,the latterofficer,byanalogy,oughttobe amenable toremoval and
suspensionforthe same causesasprovincial executives,who,undersection2078 of the Revised
Administrative Code,maybe dischargedfordishonesty,oppression,ormisconductinoffice,besides
disloyalty.Evenso,thesemembersof the Courtopine thatthe allegedoffenseforwhichMayorLacson
has beensuspendedisnotone of the groundsjustenumerated,andare incomplete agreementwith
othersof the majoritythatthe suspensionisunwarrantedandillegal.Mr.Justice Pabloalsobelieves
28. that the suspensionwasillegal butwantstohave itunderstoodthathe baseshisconcurrence mainlyon
the strengthof the rulinginthe case of Cornejovs.Naval (54 Phil.,809),of whichwill speakmore later.
The contentionthatthe Presidenthasinherentpowertoremove orsuspendmunicipal officersis
withoutdoubtnotwell taken.Removal andsuspensionof Publicofficersare alwayscontrolledbythe
particularlawapplicable anditsproperconstructionsubjecttoconstitutional limitations.(2McQuillen's
Municipal Corporations[Revised],section574.) Soit has beendeclaredthatthe governorof a state,
(whoisthe state whatthe Presidentistothe Republicof the Philippines),canonlyremove where the
powerisexpresslygivenorarisesbynecessaryimplicationunderthe Constitutionorstatutes.(43Am.
Jur.,34.)
There isneitherstatutorynorconstitutional provisiongrantingthe Presidentsweepingauthorityto
remove municipal officials.ByArticle VII,Section10,paragraph (1) of the Constitutionthe President
"shall .. . exercise general supervisionoverall local governments,"butsupervisiondoesnot
contemplate control.(People vs.Brophy,120 P.,2nd., 946; Cal.App.,2nd.,15.) Far fromimplying
control or powerto remove,the President'ssupervisoryauthorityovermunicipal affairsdisqualifiedby
the proviso" as may be providedbylaw,"a clear indicationof constitutionalintentionthatthe provision
was notto be self-executingbutrequireslegislative implementation.Andthe limitationdoesnotstop
here.Itis significanttonote thatsection64 (b) of the RevisedAdministrative Code in conferringonthe
Chief Executivepowertoremove specificallyenjoinsthatthe saidpowershouldbe exercised
conformablytolaw,whichwe assume tomeanthat removalsmustbe accomplishedonlyforanyof the
causesand inthe fashionprescribedbylaw andthe procedure.
Thenagain,strict constructionof lawrelatingtosuspensionandremoval,isthe universalrule.The rule
isexpressedindifferentformswhichconveythe same idea:Removal istobe confinedwithinthe limits
prescribedforit;The causes,mannerand conditionsfixedmustbe pursuedwithstrictness;Where the
cause for removal isspecified,the specificationamountstoa prohibitiontoremove foradifferent
cause;etc.,etc. (Mechemonthe Law of OfficesandOfficers,p286; 2 McQuillen'sMunicipal
Corporations[Revised],section575; 43 Am.Jur., 39.) The last statementisaparaphrase of the well
knownmaximExpressiouniusestexclusioalterius.
The reasonfor the stringentrule issaidto be that the remedybyremoval isa drastic one (43 Am.Jur.,
39) and,accordingto some courts, includingours(Cornejovs.Naval,supra),penalinnature.When
dealingwithelectiveposts,the necessityforrestrictedconstructionisgreater.Manifestingjealous
regardfor the integrityof positionsfilledbypopularelection,some courtshave refusedtobringofficers
holdingelective officeswithinconstitutional provisionwhichgivesthe state governorpowertoremove
29. at pleasure.Noteveninthe face of suchprovision,ithasbeenemphasized,mayelective officersbe
dismissedexceptforcause.(62C.J.S.,947.)
It may be true,as suggested,thatthe publicinterestandthe properadministrationof official functions
wouldbe bestservedbyanenlargementof the causesforremoval of the mayor, and vice versa.The
answerto thisobservationisthatthe shortcomingisforthe legislative branchalone tocorrectby
appropriate enactment.Itistrite tosay that we are notto pass uponthe follyorwisdomof the law.As
has beensaidinCornejovs. Naval,supra,anentidentical criticisms,"if the law istoonarrow in scope,it
isfor the Legislature ratherthanthe courts to expandit."Itisonlywhenall othermeansof determining
the legislative intentionfailthata court maylookintothe effectof the law;otherwisethe interpretation
becomesjudicial legislation.(Kansasex rel.Little Atty.,Gen.vs.Mitchell,70L.R.A.,306; Dudlyvs.
Reynolds,1Kan.,285.)
Yet,the abridgmentof the powertoremove orsuspendanelective mayorisnotwithoutitown
justification,andwas,we think,deliberatelyintendedbythe lawmakers.The evilsresultingfroma
restrictedauthoritytosuspendorremove musthave beenweighedagainstthe injusticesandharmsto
the Republicinterestwhichwouldbe likelytoemerge fromanunrestraineddiscretionarypowerto
suspendandremove.
In consonance withthe principlesbefore stated,we are constrainedtoconclude thatthe powerof the
Presidenttoremove orsuspendthe Mayorof the Cityof Manila isconfinedtodisloyaltytothe Republic
or, at the most,followingthe opinionof three of the subscribingJustices,forthe othercausesstipulated
insection2078 of the RevisedAdministrative Code,andthatthe suspensionof the petitionerforlibelis
outside the boundsof expressorunwrittenlaw.Itneedsnoargumenttoshow that the offense of libel
or oral defamationforwhichMayorLacson isbeingprosecutedisnotdisloyalty,dishonesty,or
oppressionwithinthe legal orpopularmeaningof these words.Misconductinoffice isthe nearest
approach to the offense of libel,andmisconductMayorLacson's offense is,inthe opinionof counsel
and of some membersof the court. Admitting,aswe understandthe respondents'position,thatthe
petitionerwasnotguilty of disloyalty,dishonestyoroppression,yetcounseldocontendthatthe
petitioner's"outburst"againstJudge Montesaconstitutedmisconductinoffice.
Misconductin office hasa definite andwell-understoodlegal meaning.Byuniformlegal definition,itisa
misconductsuchas affectshisperformance of hisdutiesasanofficerandnot suchonlyas affectshis
character as a private individual.Insuchcases,ithas beensaidall times,itisnecessarytoseparate the
character of the manfrom the character of the officer.(Mechem, supra,section457.) "It issettledthat
misconduct,misfeasance,ormalfeasance warrantingremoval fromoffice of anofficer,musthave direct
30. relationtoand be connectedwiththe performance of official dutiesamountingeitherto
maladministrationorwillful,intentional neglectandfailure todischarge the dutiesof the office... " (43,
Am.Jur.,39, 40.) To thiseffectisthe principle laiddowninCornejovs.Naval,supra.
In that case,Cornejo,Municipal Presidentof Pasay,Rizal,hadbeenfoundguiltyof the crime of
falsificationof aprivate documentandsentencedtherefore toone year,eightmonths,andtwenty-one
days' imprisonment,etc.Onthe basisof hisconviction,the Municipal Presidenthadbeensuspended
and administrative chargespreferredagainsthimwiththe ProvincialBoard,bythe Governor.
The suspendedofficerassailedthe legalityof the suspensionbefore thiscourt,andthiscourt ina
unanimousdecisionruledthatthe suspensionwasillegalandwithouteffect.The courtprefacedits
opinionwiththe statementthatthe charge againstthe municipal officertobe validcause forsuspension
or removal "mustbe one affectingthe officialintegrityof the officerinquestion."Makingthispremise
the basisof itsinvestigation,the courtconcludedthatthe crime of falsificationof aprivate documentis
not misconductinoffice,pointingoutthatthiscrime "doesnot implythatone takesadvantage of his
official position,inasmuchascorruptionsignifiesinoffice,andinasmuchof the charge mustbe one
affectingthe officialintegrityof the officerinquestion."
Judgedbythe foregoingstandarddefinitionof misconductinoffice,the allegedlibel imputedtothe
suspendedmayorwasnotsuchmisconduct evenif the term"misconductinoffice"be takeninits
broadestsense.The radiobroadcastinwhichthe objectionable utteranceswere made hadnothingor
verylittle todowithpetitioner'sofficial functionsanddutiesasmayor.Itis wasnot done byvirtue or
undercolorof authority.Itwas notany wrongful official act,oromissiontoperforma dutyof public
concern,tacitlyor expresslyannexedtohispositionNeithercanitbe saidthat Mayor Lacson committed
an abuse or tookadvantage of hisoffice.One doesnothave tobe a mayor to make those remarksor to
talkon the radio.The use of the radioisa privilege opentoanyone whowouldpayforthe time
consumed,orwhomthe ownerwouldallow forreasonsof hisown.The mere circumstance thatthe
broadcast wastransmittedfromthe CityHall insteadof the radiostationdidnotalterthe situation.Itis
the character of the remarksand theirimmediaterelationtothe office thatare of paramount
consideration.Itisourconsideredopinionthatthe petitioneractedasa private individualandshouldbe
made to answerinhisprivate capacityif he committedanybreachof proprietyorlaw.
The most liberal view thatcanbe takenof the powerof the Presidenttoremove the Mayorof the City
of Manilais that it mustbe forcause.Eventhose whowouldupholdthe legalityof the Mayor's
suspensiondonotgoso far as to claimpowerinthe Chief Executive toremove orsuspendthe Mayorat
pleasure.Untramelleddiscretionarypowertoremove doesnotapplyto appointedofficerswhoseterm
31. of office isdefinite,muchlesselective officers.hasbeenpointedlystated,"Fixityof tenure destroysthe
powerof removal at pleasure otherwiseincidenttothe appointingpower... The reasonof thisrule is
the evidentrepugnance betweenthe fixedtermandthe powerof arbitraryremoval . . ."
"Aninferentialauthoritytoremove atpleasure cannotbe deduced,since the existence of adefined
term,ipsofacto,negativessuchaninference,andimpliesacontrarypresumption,i.e.,thatthe
incumbentshall holdoffice tothe endof histermsubjectto removal forcause."(State ex rel.Gallaghar
vs.Brown,57 Mo Ap.,203, expresslyadoptedbythe Supreme CourtinState ex rel.vs.Maroney,191,
Mo., 548; 90 S.W.,141; State vs.Crandell,269 Mo., 44; 190 S.W.,889; State vs.Salval,450, 2d, 995; 62
C.J.S.,947.)
Grantingnow,for the sake of argument,thatthe Presidentmayremove the Mayorforcause,was the
Mayor's allegedcrime sufficientlegal justificationforhis suspension?
In a limitedsensethe words"forcause"and"misconductinoffice"are synonymous."Forcause,"like
"misconductinoffice."hasbeenuniversallyacceptedtomeanforreasonswhichthe law and sound
publicpolicyrecognizeassufficientgroundforremoval,thatis,legal cuase,andnotmerelycause which
the appointingpowerinthe exercise of discretionmaydeemsufficient.Itisimpliedthatofficersmay
not be removedatthe mere will of those vestedwiththe powerof removal,orwithoutanycause.
Moreover,the cause mustrelate to andeffectthe administrationof the office andmustbe restrictedto
somethingtoa substantial nature directlyaffectingthe rightsandinterestof the public.(43Am. Jur.,
48.) One court wentto the extentof sayingthat"The eccentricmannerof an officer,hishaving
exaggeratednotionof hisownimportance,indulgence incoarse language,ortalkingloudlyonthe
streets,howeveroffensive,wouldnotwarrantanyinterference withhisincumbency.Rudenessof an
officernotamountingtoillegalityof conductoroppressionisnotsuchmisconductaswill give cause for
removinghimfromoffice."
Much discussion,whichwe considerof title ornoimportance,hasbeendevotedtothe questionof
whetherthe powerto remove carrieswithitthe powertosuspend.The twopowers,ashas been
indicated,are identical andgovernedbythe same principlesintheirimportantaspectsthathave any
bearingonthe case at bar. Whetherdecreedasa punishmentinitself,oras auxiliaryinthe proceedings
for removal soas to tie the defendant'shandpendinghisinvestigation,suspensionoughttobe basedon
the same ground uponwhichremoval maybe effectedorissought.(43 Am.Jur.,65.) Whenexercisedas
a mere incidenttothe powerto remove,the powertosuspendcannotbe broaderthanthe powerto
whichitis anciliary.A streamcannotrise higherthanits source,asthe sayinggoes.
32. In theireffects,the differencebetweenthe powertoremove andthe powertosuspendisonly one of
degree.Suspensionisaqualifiedexpulsion,andwhethertermedsuspensionorexpulsion,itconstitutes
eithertemporaryorpermanentdisfranchisement.Itisanad interimstoppage orarrestof an official
powerandpay. (2 McQuillen'sMunicipal Corporations[Revised],section585).In fact, whenthe
"suspensionistocontinue untilthe final disposition"of acriminal prosecution,like the petitioner's
suspension,itmightbecome avirtual removal,consideringthatinthe eventof convictionbythe trial
court the case mightdrag as longas the remainderof the suspendedofficer'stermof office,orlonger.
We believe alsothatinthe fieldof procedure nolessthaninthatof substantive law the suspension
underreviewisfatallydefective.Noadministrative chargeshave beenpreferredagainstthe petitioner
and none seemtobe contemplated.The sole groundsforthe suspension,asrecitedinthe President's
order,are "the pendencyof criminal case No.20707 forlibel,"and"the presentpolicyof the
administration,requiringthe suspensionof anyelective officialwhoisbeingchargedbefore the courts
of anyoffense involvingmoral turpitude."
It seemsself-evidentthatif,asmust be conceded,temporarysuspensionisallowedmerelysoasto
preventthe accusedfromhamperingthe normal course of the investigationwithhisinfluence and
authorityoverpossible witnesses,the rule presupposesthe existenceof administrativechargesand
investigationbeingconductedortobe conducted.We are certain that no authorityorgood reasoncan
be foundinsupportof a propositionthatthe Chief Executive cansuspendanofficerfacingcriminal
chargesfor the sole purpose of aidingthe courtin the administrationof justice.Independentof the
otherbranches of the Government,the courtscanwell take care of theirownadministrationof the law.
An administrative policyorpractice notpredicatedonconstitutionalorstatutoryauthoritycanhave no
bindingforce andeffectinmattersnotpurelypolitical orgovernmental.Where individual rights,honor
and reputationare injeopardy,itisonlylaw or the Constitutionwhichcangive legalitytoexecutive
actions.It hasbeenshownthatnothinginthe Constitution,law ordecisionwarrantsthe petitioner's
suspension.
If policyisto be a guidingfactor,andwe thinkif shouldbe,suchpolicymustemanate fromthe
legislative branch,which,underourformof government,isthe legitimatepolicy-makingdepartment.
The legislative policy,assuchpolicymaybe gatheredfromsection2188 of the RevisedAdministrative
Code,frownsuponprolongedorindefinite suspensionof local elective officials.Bythissection"the
provincial governorshall receiveandinvestigatecomplaintsagainstmunicipal officersforneglect of
duty,oppression,corruptionorotherformof maladministrationof office.'Itprovidesthatincase
suspensionhasbeeneffected,the hearingshall occurassoonas practicable,innocase laterthan ten
33. daysfrom the date the accusedisfurnishedacopyof the charges,unlessthe suspendedofficial on
sufficientgroundsasksforan extensionof time toprepare hisdefense.The sectionfurtherwarnsthat
"the preventivesuspensionshall notbe formore thanthirtydays,"and ordainsthat at the endof that
periodthe officershouldbe reinstatedinoffice withoutprejudice tothe continuationof the
proceedingsagainsthimuntil theircompletion,unlessthe delayinthe decisionof the case isdue tothe
defendant'sfault,neglectorrequest,andunless incase of convictionthe Secretaryof the Interiorshall
otherwise direct.
Section2188 is of relativelyrecentvintage,andisdesignedtoprotectelective municipal officialsagainst
abusesof the powerof suspension,abusesof whichpastexperience andobservationhadpresented
abundantexamples.The pointwe wishtodrive home isthat,evincinggrave concernsforordinary
municipal officialsincludingmunicipalcouncilors,asa matterof publicpolicy,itisunreasonable to
suppose thatthe Legislature intendedtowithholdthe same safeguardsfromthe postof mayorof the
metropolisandseatof the National Government.Onthe contrary,inconvertingthe office from
appointive toelective,one of the legislative purposes,we venturetosay,wasto affordthe position
greaterstabilityaswell astoclothe it withgreaterdignityandprestige.Whatcouldbe the practical use
of havingthe people choose the cityexecutive tomanage the city'saffairsif bythe simple expedientof a
criminal accusationhe couldbe laidoff forthe longdurationof a criminal prosecution,prosecution
which,at longlastmight,as isnot infrequentlythe case,turnouttobe false,malicious,unsubstantial,or
foundedona mistakennotionof laworevidence?Letitnot be overlookedthatcriminal accusationsare
easyto make and take monthsor yearsto try and finallydecide,andthatthe filingof suchaccusations
and the time withinwhichtheyare tobe finishedare mattersoverwhichthe accusedhasno effective
control.It isnot difficulttosee thatthe tenure of office andthe incumbent'srightscouldeasilybe
overthrownanddefeatedif powerrestedinanyauthoritytosuspendthe officeronthe mere filingor
pendencyof acriminal accusation,the suspensiontocontinue until the final terminationof the trial.The
ideaseemsrepugnanttothe principlesof due process,speedytrial,andsimplejustice — "principlesthat
are fundamental andeternal."
It will alsobe notedfromsection2188 that itdoesnot onlylimitthe periodof preventive suspension,
but requiresthe filingof chargesandpromptinvestigation.Withoutsuchexpressprovision,however,it
isestablishedbythe greatweightof authoritythatthe powerof removal orsuspensionforcause can
not,exceptby clearstatutoryauthority,be exercisedwithoutnoticeandhearing.Mere silence of the
statute withrespecttonotice and hearingwill notjustifythe removal of suchanofficerwithout
knowledge of the chargesandanopportunitytobe heard.(Mechem, p. 287; 43 Am.Jur.,50-52; 93 C.J.,
65; 62 C.J.S.,924; 43 C.J.,666, footnote 83 [e] andcasescited.) Itis onlyinthose casesinwhichthe
office isheldatthe pleasure of the appointingpower,andwhere the powerof removal isexercisable at
itsmere discretion,thatthe officermaybe removedwithoutsuchnotice orhearing.(Id.) Notevenfinal
convictionof a crime involvingmoral turpitude,asdistinguishedfromconvictionpendingappeal,
dispenseswiththe requisitesnotice andhearing.Finalconvictionismentionedinsection2188 of the
34. RevisedAdministrative Code asgroundforproceedingadministrativelyagainstthe convictedofficerbut
doesnotoperate as automaticremoval doingawaywiththe formalitiesof anadministrative hearing.
The policymanifestedbysection2188 of the RevisedAdministrativeCode,whichisaconsecratedpolicy
inotherjurisdictionswhoserepublicaninstitutionsthiscountryhascopied,requiresspeedytermination
of a case in whichsuspensionof the accusedhasbeendecreed,notonlyinthe interestof the immediate
party butof the publicingeneral.The electorate isvitalityinterested,andthe publicgooddemands,
that the man it haselevatedtooffice be,withinthe shortesttime possible,separatedfromthe service if
provenunfitandunfaithful toitstrust,andrestoredif foundinnocent.Special proceedingsalone,
unicumberedbynice technicalitiesof pleading,practice andprocedure,andthe rightof appeal,are best
calculatedtoguarantee quickresult.
The petitionmustbe,andthe same is granted,withoutcosts.
Feria,Pablo,andJugo,JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS,C.J.,concurring:
The Executive powerisvestedinthe President.(Section1,Article VIII,Constitution.) The President
exercises general supervisionoverall local governmentsasmaybe providedbylaw.(Section10,[1],
Article VII,Constitution.) Amongthe particularpowerof the Presidentisthe power"toremove all
officialsfromofficeconformablytolaw."(Section64(b),RevisedAdministrative Code.) Uponthe other
hand,the RevisedCharterof the Cityof Manila,RepublicActNo.409, section9,providesthatthe city
mayor "shall holdoffice forfouryears,unlesssoonerremoved."
Counsel forthe petitioneradmitsthatthe weightof authorityinthe UnitedStatesistothe effectthat
the powerto remove includesthe powertosuspend.We are of the opinionthatthe Presidenthasthe
powerto remove andconsequentlytosuspendthe petitionerconformablytolaw.Itisnoteworthy that
the powerof removal conferredonthe Presidentbysection64(b) of the RevisedAdministrativeCode
35. refersto"all officials";andthere beingnostatutorydistinction,the term, "officials"shouldinclude both
appointive andelectiveofficials.
It ishard and illogical tobelievethat,whilethere are expresslegal provisionsforthe suspensionand
removal of provincial governorsandmunicipal mayors,itcouldhave beenintendedthatthe mayorof
Manilashouldenjoyanoverall immunityorsacrosanctposition,consideringthataprovincial governor
or municipal mayormayfairlybe consideredinparitywiththe citymayorinsofarastheyare all
executiveheadsof political subdivisions.Counselforpetitionercallsattentiontothe factthat the
peculiarlyelevatedstandardof the Cityof Manilaand itspopulace mighthave promptedthe lawmakers
to exemptthe citymayorfromremoval or suspension.Muchcan be saidabout the desirabilityof
makingthe executiveheadof Manilaasstrong and independent aspossible,butthere shouldnotbe any
doubtthat awarenessof the existence of some sortof disciplinarymeasureshasa neutralizingand
deterringinfluence againstanytendencytowardsofficial'smisfeasance,excessesoromission.
It iscontendedforthe petitionerthatthe terms"unlesssoonerremoved"insection9of RepublicAct
No.409 ismerelyapart of the provisionfixingthe tenure of office,andreferstosuchremoval asmay
arise fromcausesenumeratedinsection29of the RevisedElectionCode,Articles13to 32 of the
RevisedPenal Code,andArticle VI,section10,paragraph (3),and Article IXof the Constitution.This
contentionisuntenable,because underpetitioner'stheorythe clause "unlesssoonerremoved"would
be superfluous.
It isalso arguedforthe petitionerthatunderthe constitution,ArticleVII,section10,paragraph (1),the
Presidentisgrantedthe powertoexerciseonlygenerallysupervisionoverlocal governments,incontrast
to the powergrantedto himto have control overthe executive departments,bureausoroffices,
therebyintimatingthatthe words"general supervision"weresointendedastodeprive the Presidentof
any authorityoverlocal governments,includingthatof removal.Thiscontentionislikewise without
merit,since the consitutional provisionconferssuchgeneral supervisionasmaybe providedbylaw,so
that saidsupervisionwillinclude anypowervestedinthe Presidentbylaw.AsAlreadystated,64(b) of
the RevisedAdministrativeCode hasconferredonthe Presidentthe specialpowertoremove all officials
conformablytolaw.Moreover,the removal of provincial officersisexpresslyprovidedforinsection
2078 of the RevisedAdministrative Code,anditisnot pretendedthatsaidprovisionisinconsistentwith
the powerof general supervisionconferredonthe Presidentbysection10,Article VII,paragraph(1) of
the Constitution.
The questionthatarisescallsforthe specificationof the causesorgroundswarrantingthe suspensionor
removal of the citymayor by the President.Asalreadyseen,section64(b) of the RevisedAdministrative
36. Code providesthatthe Presidentmayremove all officialsconformablytolaw.While there are statutory
causesregardinga provincial officer(Section2078, RevisedAdministrative Code) ormunicipal officer
(section2188, id.),there isno legal provisionenumeratingthe causesforthe removal orsuspensionof
the city mayor.In suchcase, removal conformablytolaw,asprovidedforinsection64(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code,necessarilymeansremoval forcause.Thisfollowsfromthe constitutional provision
that no officeroremployeeinthe civil service shall be removedorsuspendedexceptforcause as
providedforbylaw,and fromthe circumstance (Admitted bycounselforpetitioner) thatthe mayorof
Manila,as an elective officialisincludedinthe unclassifiedcivil service (section671,paragraph [c],
RevisedAdministrative Code.) The phrase "forcause"means,"forreasonswhichthe law andsound
publicpolicyrecognizedassufficientwarrantforremoval,thatislegal cause,andnotmerelycauses
whichthe appointingpowerinthe exercise of discretionmaydeemsufficient.Itisimpliedthatofficers
may notbe removedatthe mere will of those vestedwiththe powerof removal,orwithoutanycause.
Moreover,the cause mustrelate to andaffectthe administrationof office,andmustbe restrictedto
somethingof asubstantial nature directlyaffectingthe rightsandinterestsof the public."(43Am.Jur.,
47, 48.) (See alsoDe losSantosvs. Mallare,*48 Off.Ga., 1787.)
We believe thatthe groundsforthe suspensionandremoval of aprovincial governor,namely,disloyalty,
dishonesty,oppression,ormisconductinoffice,maybyanalogybe appliedtothe citymayor.But even
extendingthe similarityfurther,andapplyingthe groundsasto a municipal mayor,namely,neglectof
duty,oppression,corruption,orotherfromof maladministrationof office,andconvictionbyfinal
judgmentof anycrime involving moral turpitude, — certainlythe citymayorisentitledtoatleastthe
same,if not more,protectionenjoyedbyamunicipal officer, — the questioniswhetherthe petitioner's
suspensionmaybe basedonthe mere filingagainsthimof acomplaintforlibel.The offenseof libelis
clearlynotdisloyalty,dishonesty,oppression,misconductinoffice,neglectof duty,oppression,
corruptionor otherformof maladministrationof office.Indeed,petitioner'ssuspensionisnotpremised
on anyof these grounds. The petitionerhasneitherbeenconvictedbyfinal judgmentof the offense of
libel,sothatevenassumingthatsaidoffenseinvolvesmoral turpitude,hissuspensionwasnotyetin
order.
Upon the otherhand,the offense of libel cannotbe looselyconsideredasamisconductinoffice,
because the misconductinoffice "whichshallwarrantaremoval of the officermustbe such as affects
hisperformance of hisdutiesasan officerandnotsuch onlyas affectshischaracteras a private
individual.Insuchcasesitis necessary`toseparate the character of the manfrom the character of the
officer'."(Mechem,Officers,p.290, see alsoCornejovs.Naval,54 Phil.,809.) In thisconnection,the rule
of strictconstructionshouldbe observed.(Cornejovs.Naval,54Phil.,809.)
The law,in requiringfinal conviction,undoubtedlyisintendedtoforestall anyfabricatedcriminal
prosecutionasa political maneuverorrevenge,nottomentionthe constitutional presumptionof
37. innocence.Itcannotbe arguedthat, if final convictionisalwaysnecessary,the powertosuspendis
renderednugatory.Inthe firstplace,suspensionliesonothergrounds.Inthe secondplace,evenwith
respectto a criminal conviction,administrative investigationhastobe conductedwitha view to
determiningwhetherthe crime involvesmoral turpitude,andof course duringthe periodof said
investigationthe officerconcernedmaybe suspended.Atanyrate,if the powerto suspendorremoved
has to be stretched,itisfor the lawmakerstomake the necessarystatutorychanges.
The libel whichthe petitionerisprosecutedcannotinturnbe saidas havingbeencommittedin
connectionwithorduringthe performance bythe petitionerof hisofficialdutiesandfunctionsasmayor
of Manila.He participatedinthe radiobroadcastwhichgave rise to the allegedlylibelousimputations,
not inthe exercise of hisoffice ascitymayorbut as anyother private citizen,since there isnolaw
imposinguponthe petitionerthe dutyof speakingbefore the radioonthe occasioninquestion.
Wherefore,Ivote togrant the petition.
PADILLA,J.,concurring:
The office of mayorof the Cityof Manilatherefore appointivewasmade elective bythe new charterof
the City,RepublicActNo.409. Under the charter the choice of the persontoholdthe office of mayorin
the Cityof Maniladevolvesexclusivelyuponthe qualifiedelectorsof the City.The tenure of office isfor
a fixedtermof fouryears"unlesssoonerremoved"(section9).Thisprovisionof the charter
contemplatesthe possibilityof removal.Asarule the powertoremove encompassesthe powerto
suspend.There isnodoubtinmy mindthat the citymayor may be removedand,therefore,suspended.
But such removal ansuspensionmustbe forcause.Inthe case of the membersof the municipal board
the charter providesthat"theymaybe suspendedorremovedfromofficeunderthe same
circumstances,inthe same manner,andwiththe same effect,aselective provincial officers"(section
14). In the case of the mayorthere isno such provisionexceptthe bare feasibilityof hisremoval.That
powerto remove must,of course,be lodgedsomewhereinthe frameworkof the Government.Itcould
be in a competentcourtif the mayor shouldbe foundguiltyof acrime or misdemeanorforwhichthe
penaltyprovidedandimposeduponhimbe temporaryorperpetual disqualificationorsuspensionfrom
holdingpublicoffice.If he shouldbe foundtohave committedmalfeasance orirregularitiesinthe
exercise of hispowersandperformance of hisdutiesassuchmayor notamountingtoa crime or
misdeameanor,the Presidentcouldremove him.Pursuanttosection64(b) of the RevisedAdministrative
Code the Presidentisempowered"toremove officialsfromoffice conformablytolaw andto declare
vacant the officesheldbysuchremovedofficials."And"Fordisloyalty,.. . the Presidentof the
38. Philippinesmayatany time remove apersonfromany positionof trustor authorityunderthe
Governmentof the Philippines."Doesthatprovisionspecifyingdisloyaltyasthe cause for removal and,
therefore,suspensionexclude othercauseswhichwouldrenderthe CityMayor unfitandunworthyto
act as such?I believethatthe mentionof disloyaltyasacause for removal fromoffice wasnotintended
by Congressasa limitation,forthe clause where disloyaltyismentionedasacause forremovalsfrom
office isprecededbyanothergrantingtothe Presidentthe power"toremove officialsfromoffice
conformablytolaw,"andbecause if construedasa limitation,itwoulddefeatitsveryaimandpurpose
— an honestgovernmentdedicatedtothe promotionof the general well-beingof all the inhabitantsof
the city.Section2078 of the RevisedAdministrative Codeprovidesthatprovincial officersmaybe
suspendedandremovednotonlyfordisloyaltybutalsofordishonesty,oppressionormisconductin
office.Idonot believethe CityMayorof Manilashouldbe placedoverandabove the elective provincial
governorsinrank andimportance;andfor the that reasonthe causesfor removal of electiveprovincial
governorsmayas well be appliedtothe CityMayorof Manila.I am, therefore,of the opinionthatthe
CityMayor of Manila,if foundguiltyafterinvestigationortrial,couldbe removedandalsosuspended
pendinganadministrative orjudicial investigationof chargespreferredagainsthiminvolvingdisloyalty,
dishonesty,oppressionormisconductinoffice.
Thisbringsme to the considerationof whetherthe informationforlibel filedagainstthe petitionerin
the Court of First Instance of Manilawarrants hissuspensionfromoffice bythe Presidentof the
Philippines.Whenaninformationisfiledinthe city courtscharginga personwiththe commissionof a
crime,itis done onlyafteraninvestigationhasbeenmade bythe prosecutingofficerwhofinds
sufficientorprimafacie evidence of hisguilt.Tofindoutwhetherhe shouldsuspendandthenafteran
investigationremoveanofficerchargedwithirregularitiesormalfeasance inoffice,the Presidentinthe
exercise of hissupervisorypowercouldeitherordersuchadministrative investigationtobe conducted
or relyuponthe investigationmade byaprosecutingofficer,andif he believesthatthe factsfoundby
the prosecutingofficerwarrantsuspensionthe President,undoubtedly,couldsuspendhimand
thereafterif the officerchargedwithacrime shouldbe foundbya competentcourtguiltythereof,he
couldremove himformoffice.The Presidentmaychoose betweeninstitutinganadministrative inquiry
or relyuponthe trial and judgmentmade bya competentcourtof justice.Nevertheless,convictionof a
crime by a competentcourtdoesnotnecessarilygrantthe Presidentunderhisauthorityof supervision
the powerto remove unlessforcause providedbylaw,towit:disloyalty,dishonesty,oppressionor
misconductinoffice.Disloyaltymaybe committedindependentlyof the exercise of the powersand
performance of the dutiesbythe CityMayor. Once that isprovedthe Presidentmayandmustremove
him.Dishonestymaybe committednotonlyinconnectionwiththe exercise of the powersand
performance of the functionsanddutiesbythe mayorbutalso independently of the exercise of such
powersandperformance of suchduties.Forinstance,independentlyof the exerciseof hispowersand
the performance of hisdutiesasmayorof the Cityof Manilahe may be charged withandfoundguiltyof
smugglingcontrabandgoods intoaprovince or othercityoutside hiscity'sjurisdictional limitsorhe may
be charged withandfoundguiltyof robbery,burglary,forgeryorseductionunconnectedwiththe
exercise of hispowersandthe performance of hisduties.Suchconvictioninvolvesdishonestyand
39. certainlythe mayorcannotcontinue inoffice butmustbe removed.A manof sucha character should
not be allowedtocontinue inoffice.He shouldforthwithbe removed.Actsof oppressionmustbe
committedinconnectionwiththe exerciseof the powersandthe performance of the dutiesasmayor,
unlesstheyinvolve dishonesty.Notall actsof oppressioninvolve dishonesty.Theyvaryindegree and
some may seemoppressive butdonotinvolve dishonesty.Forthatreasoninorder that the mayormay
be removedfromoffice,if foundguiltyof oppression,itmustbe inconnectionwiththe exerciseof his
powersandperformance of hisdutiesassuchmayor. It isclearthat misconductinoffice mustbe
committedinconnectionwiththe exerciseof hispowersandperformance of hisdutiesassuchmayor.
Againthisbringsme to anotherpoint.Whetheraninformationforlibel whichisneitherdisloyalty,
disloyalty,dishonesty,oroppressionmaybe consideredasmisconductingoffice.Itshouldbe borne in
mindthat the filingof the informationforlibel againstthe petitioneristhe offshootoraftermathof the
stepstakenbyhimto purge the ManilaPolice Department.Asaresultof suchstepshe filedacomplaint
againstthe DeputyChief of Police, Lt.ColonelCelestinoC.Juan.All the stepstakenbyhim, suchas
investigatingthe policeofficersinvolvedinthe irregularitiescommittedinthe ManilaPolice
Department,filingthe complaintinthe cityfiscal'soffice andpresentingorsubmittingevidence against
the deputychief of police,were all inconnectionwiththe performance of hisdutiesasmayor.So that if
for suchacts he couldbe heldliable inanadministrative investigationtheywouldfall undermisconduct
inoffice providedforbylaw.Butthere isno questionthatsuchstepscannotbe deemedtoconstitute
misconductinoffice.Onthe contrary,theyare praiseworthyacts.However,the performance of his
dutiesinconnectionwiththe prosecutionandeventual theyare praise worthyacts. However,the
performance of hisdutiesinconnectionwiththe prosecutionandeventualremoval of the deputychief
of police of Manilastoppedorceasedtobe a functionof hisoffice afterthe presentationof the
complaintandof the complaintandof the evidence insupportthereoftothe cityfiscal'soffice.
Thereafter,anythingdone byhim,anythingutteredbyhim, anythingutteredbyhim, if itshould
constitute acrime wouldnotbe inconnectionwiththe performance of the dutiesof hisoffice and,
therefore,itwouldnotconstituteamisconductinoffice.If itisa crime,hisisthe responsibilityandhe
mustbe made to answerforit before acourt a competentjurisdiction.
Much as itis wishedanddesiredtosee andhave amayor as becominganofficerof suchhighrank
possessedof composure inhisbehavior,prudence inhisactsand self-restraintinhisutterances,yetI
cannot bringmyself tobelieve thatalibel allegedlycommittedbyhimwhichisunrelatedtothe
performance of the dutiesof hisoffice wouldwarranthissuspensionfromoffice.Itisunnecessaryto
pass judgmentonwhetherhe maybe removedafterconviction.Hisutterancesmaybe biting,cutting,
sharp,caustic and sarcastic;and, grantingforthe sake argument,that the utterance uponwhichthe
informationforlibelisgroundedtocontemptuous — apointI do notpass uponpendingdetermination
and judgementonthe meritsof the case forlibel file againstthe petitionerinthe Courtof First Instance
of Manila— still Idonot believethatthe allegedlibelousutterance whichgave rise tothe filingof the
information,unrelatedtothe performance of hisdutiesasmayor,wouldbe sufficientcause forhis
40. suspensionfromoffice.The offendedpartymustresorttocourt for redressof hisgrievance andto have
it rightthe wrong.Andif itbe contemptuousthe courtagainstwhichit wascommittedhasample power
to make himanswerforhis misdeed.
The foregoingreasonsleadme toholdthe opinionandconclude thatthe suspensionof the petitioneris
illegal,invalidandof nolegal effect.The petitionforawritof quowarranto shouldbe granted,asthe
respondentactingmayorisunlawfullyholdinganoffice fromwhichthe petitionerwhoisentitled
theretoisexcluded.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.,dissenting:
The powerof the Presidenttoremove the officialsinthe governmentservicemaybe foundinsection
64(b) of the RevisedAdministrative Code.Thissectionprovides,amongothers,thatthe Presidentcan
"remove officialsfromofficeconformablytolaw."Inaddition,he mayalsoremove fordisloyaltyany
personfromany positionof trustor authorityunderthe government.
The term "officials"includesall officialsof the government,whetherelective of appointive,because
whenthe lawdoesnotdistinguishthere isnojustificationtomake anydistinction.Ubi Lex Non
Distinguit,NecNosDistinguereDebemus.Saidterm, therefore,includesthe Mayorof the Cityof Manila.
But isthere any lawwhichexpresslyauthorizesthe Presidentto remove the Mayorof the Cityof
Manila?The answertothisquestionwouldbringustoa scrutinyof the Charterof the Cityof Manila
(RepublicActNo.409). A careful perusal of thischarterwoulddisclose noexpressprovisionconcerning
the removal of the Mayor otherthanthe followingphrase;"He shall holdoffice forfouryears,unless
soonerremoved",unlikethe membersof the Municipal Boardwhereinitisclearlypostulatedthatthey
can be removedinthe same mannerandon the same groundsas any provincial official.Andbecause of
thisscanty provision,counsel forpetitionernow contendsthatthere isavoidinthe law whichcan only
be remediedbylegislation.The phrase unlesssoonerremoved,counselclaims,doesnotnecessarily
allude tothe Presidentasthe removingpower,butratheritis expressive of actswhichmayrenderthe
Mayor disqualifiedtocontinue inoffice asfoundatrandomin differentpenal provisionsof the land.But
an insightintothe originandhistorical backgroundof the phrase underconsiderationwouldatonce
reveal thatsuch a claimhas no merit.
41. Note that the phrase unlesssoonerremovedisanoldprovisioncontainedinthe RevisedAdministrative
Code (section2434) and whichwasmerelytransplantedtothe Charterof the Cityof Manila(Republic
Act No.409, section9). Saidphrase wasat the same time takenfromstatutesof Americanorigin.This
phrase has a well-definedmeaninginAmericanstatutes.Inthe case of State ex rel.Nagle vs.Sullivan,
(99 A.L.R.,321, 329), the phrase wasdefinedasimplying"powerinthe appointingauthoritytoremove,"
whichrulingfoundsupportintwoothercases.(Townsendvs.Kurtz,83 Md., 350; 34 A.,1123, 1126;
State ex rel.vs.Mitchell,50 Kan.,295; 33 P.,104, 105; 20 L. R. a., 306.) Or, as quotedinthe majority
opinion,"Powerinthe appointingauthoritytoremove apublicofficermaybe impliedwhereto
statutoryspecificationof the termof office are addedthe words"unlesssoonerremoved."(43Am.Jur.,
30.) These authoritiessuffice todispel anydoubtthatwhensaidphrase wascarriedintothe charter of
the Cityof Manilait wasso carriedwiththe implicationthatthe Presidentwouldcontinue wieldinghis
powerof removal as heretofore followedunderthe oldset-up.The isnothinginsaidCharterthatwould
indicate anyintentiontothe contrary.To holdotherwisewouldbe todevoidthe wordremovedof its
substance andmeaning.Thiswordpresupposesthe existence of powersomewhere,andthispowercan
onlybe the Chief Executive.Thisisessentiallyanexecutivefunction.He cannotbe deprivedof this
powerunlessthe lawlodgesitelsewhere.
Thiscase presentsthe questionswhetherunderthe Constitutionthe Presidenthasthe exclusive power
of removingexecutive officersof the UnitedStateswhomhe hasappointedbyandwithadvice and
consentof the Senate . . . .
It isveryclear fromthishistorythat the exactquestionwhichthe House voteduponwaswhetherit
shouldrecognize anddeclare the powerof the President underthe Constitutiontoremove the
Secretaryof foreignAffairswithoutthe advice andconsentof the Senate.Thatwaswhatthe vote was
takenfor.Some efforthasbeenmade to questionwhetherthe decisioncarriesthe resultclaimedforit,
but there isnotthe slightestdoubt,afteranexaminationof the record,thatthe vote was,andwas
intendedtobe,alegislative declarationthatthe powertoremove officersoppointedbythe President
and the Senate vestedinthe Presidentalone,anduntil the Johnsonimpeachmenttrial in1868, its
meaningwasnotdoubtedevenbythose whoquestioneditssoundness....
Afterthe bill asamendedhaspassedthe House,itwassentto the Senate,where itwasdiscussedin
secretsession,withoutreport.The critical vote there wasuponthe strikingoutof the clause recognizing
and affirmingthe unrestrictedpowerof the Presidenttoremove.The Senate dividedbytentoten,
requiringthe decidingvote of the Vice-President,JohnAdams,whovotedagainststrikingout,andin
favorof the passage of the bill asithad leftthe House.Tenof the Senatorshadbeeninthe
Constitutionalconvention,andof themsix votedthatthe powerof removal wasin the Presidentalone.
The bill havingpassedasit came fromthe House wassignedbyPresidentWashingtonandbecame a
law.Ac of July27, 1789, 1 Stat.at L. 28, Chap. 4. . . .
42. Assumingthenthe powerof Congresstoregulate removalsasincidentaltothe exercise of its
constitutional powertovestappointmentsof inferior officersinthe headsof departments,certainlyas
longas Congressdoesnotexercise thatpower,the powerof removal mustremainwhere the
Constitutionplace it,withthe President,aspartof the executivepower,inaccordance withthe
legislative decisionof 1789 whichwe have beenconsidering.(Myersvs.UnitedStates,71law.ed.pp.
160, 162, 165, 184.) (Emphasissupplied.)
Now,the lawsays thatthe Mayor shall holdoffice forfouryearsunlesssoonerremoved.Itdoesnotsay
that he shall holdoffice atthe pleasure of the Presidentunlike similarprovisionsappearinginothercity
charters.The ideaisto give the Mayor a definite tenure of office notdependentuponthe pleasure of
the President.If thiswere the case he couldbe separatedfromthe service regardlessof the cause or
motive.Butwhenhe wasgivena definite tenurethe implicationisthathe can onlybe removedfor
"cause".
An inferentialauthoritytoremove atpleasure cannotbe deduced,since the existence of adefined
term,ipsofacto,negativessuchaninference,andimpliesacontrarypresumption,i.e.,thatthe
incumbentshall holdoffice tothe endof histermsubjectto removal forcause."(State ex rel.Gallaghar
vs.Brown,57 Mo. Ap.,203 expresslyadoptedbythe Supreme CourtinStatesex rel.vs.Maroney,191
Mo., 548; 90 s.w.,141; State vs.Crandell,269 Mo.,44; 190 S.W.,889; State vs. Salval,450, 2d, 995; 62
C.J.S., 947.)
There isa divergence of opinionamongthe membersof the courtas to the cause that mayserve as
basisfor the removal of the Mayor of the Cityof Manilainview of the silence of the law.Some are of
the opinionthatthe cause must be one whichspecificallyrelatesto,andaffectsthe administrationof,
the office of the official tobe removed. Andinthatthe advocacytheyare guidedbythe rulinglaiddown
inthe case of Cornejovs.Naval,(54 Phil.,809).But I am of the opinionthatcause shouldnotbe givena
restrictive meaningindealingwiththe officeof the Mayor of the Cityof Manilaconsideringits
importance andstature.The Cityof Manilais a classby itself.Itisthe show window of the Orientsoto
speak.Peoplesof differentnationalitiesandfromall walksof life have theirabode inthatcityand
because of theirpeculiarsituationare entitledtobe accordedsuchtreatment,courtesyand
considerationwhichare notexpectedinothercities.Indealingwiththesedifferentgroupsof peoplethe
Mayor is confrontednotonlywithdomesticproblemsbutinternational aswell.Hisapproachtothese
problemsbutinternational aswell.Hisapproachtothese problemsshouldbe characterizedwithutmost
tact, abilityandcircumspection.Hisoffice isona par withotherhighofficialsof ournational
governmentandattimeshe is calledupontomeetissuesandsituationsjustasimportantandfar-
reachingas those confrontedbythe Presidenthimself.Suchasituationcouldnothave passedunnoticed
43. to Congresswhenitdeemeditwise toplace withinthe sounddiscretionof the Presidenthis
continuance inoffice.Andsoitismy consideredopinionthatwhenthe Chapterof the Cityof Manila has
impliedlyprovidedthatthe Mayor can onlybe removedforcause it musthave meantone whichthe law
an boundpublicpolicyrecognizeassufficientwarrantforremoval regardlessof whetheritrelatestohis
office orotherwise.There are manyauthoritieswhichfollowthislineof reasoning.
Discharge of a civil service employeefor"goodof the service"or"for cause"impliedsomepersonal
misconduct, orfact, renderingincumbent'sfurthertenure harmfultothe publicinterest(Stateex rel.
Ecklesvs.KansasCity,Mo., 257 s.W.,197, 200).
The phrase "for cause"whenusedinreference toremoval of officersmeansnotthe arbitrarywill of the
appointingpower,butsome cause affectingorconcerningthe abilityof fitnessof the officertoperform
hisduties.(Farishvs.Young,158 P.,845, 847, 18 Ariz.,298)
"Cause"as effectremoval of apublicemployee meanssome substantial shortcomingwhichrenders
continuance inhisoffice oremploymentinsome waydetrimentaltothe discipline andefficiencyof the
service andsomethingwhichthe lawandsoundpublicopinionrecognize asagood cause for hisno
longeroccupyingthe place"(Murphyvs.Houston,259 Ill.,pp.385)
"Cause"forremoval of officerstatedinresolutionof addressif Legislature mustbe legal andrelate to
matersof substantial nature directlyaffectingpublicinterest,andthe qualificationsof officeror
performance of thisduties,showinghe isnotfitpersontoholdoffice (Moultonvs.Scully,89A.,944,
947, 111 me.428.
A "cause"withinstatute providingthatnopersoninthe classifiedcivil service canbe removedexcept
for the cause on writtenchargesmeanssome substantial shortcomingwhichrenderscontinuance inhis
office oremploymentinsome waydetrimental tothe disciplineandefficiencyof the service and
somethingwhichthe lawanda a soundpublicopinionwill recognize asagood cause for hisnolonger
occupyingthe place (Cityof Chicagovs.Gillen,124 Ill.app.,210)
Rejectingourtheorythatthe phrase "shall holdoffice forfouryearsunlesssoonerremoved"comprises
the Mayor of the Cityof Manilaevenif he is an electiveofficial,the majorityopinionholdsthe viewthat
as the law nowstandsthe Mayor isremovable onlyfordisloyaltytothe Republic.The opinionalso
expressesthe viewthe "strictconstructionof law relatingtosuspensionandremoval isthe universal
